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Abstract		The	term	“climate	justice,”	despite	wide	usage,	defies	easy	definition.	I	argue	that	in	order	to	appreciate	it	in	its	full	complexity,	climate	justice	is	best	understood	as	a	moral	framework	with	2	“facets.”	Facet	(1)	allows	us	to	identify	the	various	moral	wrongs	or	concerns	that	are	either	causing,	caused	by,	or	raised	by	climate	change	while	facet	(2)	allows	us	to	understand	how	struggles	to	win	responses	to	climate	change	that	address	those	moral	concerns	are	being	organized.	It	is	this	second	facet	that	I	explore	at	length	in	this	dissertation	by	identifying	different	“fronts”	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice.	A	first	front	I	refer	to	as	(a)	climate	justice	as	climate	
ethics,	in	which	rigorous	moral	philosophical	reasoning	is	deployed	to	shape	the	creation	of	a	just	global	agreement	governing	the	distribution	of	climate	burdens	and	benefits	among	nations.	A	second	front	is	(b)	the	climate	justice	of	the	climate	
movement,	which	uses	several	prominent	social	movement	strategies	to	attempt	to	make	governing	elites	democratically	accountable	to	moral	demands	for	climate	action.	However,	progress	on	both	of	these	fronts	is	constrained	by	the	logics	of	capitalism	and	liberal	representative	democracy	(“liberalism”	or	the	“liberal	order”),	which	together	filter	out	all	but	a	narrow	range	of	climate	responses.	I	therefore	argue	that	it	is	necessary	to	turn	to	a	third	front,	(c)	climate	justice	as	just	society,	which	seeks	to	disrupt	liberalism’s	ideological	hold	in	order	to	justify	alternative	institutional	arrangements	that	can	form	the	basis	of	a	society	that	is	simultaneously	more	just	and	better	able	to	respond	to	the	climate	crisis.	I	identify	political	projects	in	the	Leap	Manifesto	and	in	a	capabilities	approach	to	justice	that	can	potentially	make	progress	on	this	third	front.				 		
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I.	Introduction	 	
1.	Why	Climate	Justice?			Here	is	what	a	climate	response	without	climate	justice	looks	like.		 	It	looks	like	states	refusing	to	enter	into	binding	climate	agreements;	like	governments	of	rich	countries	failing	to	adopt	climate	targets	that	reflect	that	they	hold	the	greatest	historical	responsibility	for	causing	the	crisis.	It	looks	like	a	patchwork	of	mitigation	pledges	too	weak	to	prevent	dangerous	climate	change,	like	rich	states	pledging	a	pittance	to	the	international	bodies	charged	with	aiding	developing	countries	prepare	for	climate	change	and	adopt	renewable	energy.	It	looks	like	the	north	abandoning	communities	throughout	the	south,	the	loss	of	irreplaceable	human	heritage	sites,	the	extinction	of	species,	and	the	inheritance	by	future	generations	of	a	dangerously	destabilized	climate.		A	climate	response	without	climate	justice	looks	like	governments	declaring	the	importance	of	combatting	climate	change	while	at	the	same	time	subsidizing	the	very	fossil	fuel	industry	whose	profit	model	requires	the	wreckage	of	the	climate.	It	looks	like	the	approval	of	more	pipelines,	more	fracking,	and	more	drilling;	like	denying	Indigenous	rights	where	those	rights	get	in	the	way	of	fossil	fuel	extraction;	like	universities	and	other	major	institutions	continuing	to	invest	in	the	companies	profiting	from	the	destruction	of	the	climate.	It	looks	like	dysfunctional	democratic	institutions	ignoring	the	demands	of	a	mass-based	climate	movement;	like	policymakers	saving	ambitious	emissions	targets	for	the	far	future,	long	after	their	time	in	power	will	have	come	to	an	end;	like	governments	securitizing	national	borders	and	whipping	up	xenophobic	nativism	at	a	time	when	climate	change	impels	people	to	migrate	from	or	flee	their	homes.		It	looks	like	market	approaches	that	turn	the	most	important	collective	human	endeavour	there	has	ever	been	over	to	corporations;	like	the	prioritization	of	economic	growth	and	profit	over	the	need	to	preserve	a	habitable	climate;	like	a	
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refusal	to	adopt	policies	that	challenge	a	rapacious,	and	unequal	economic	system	and	attendant	lifestyle	based	in	wasteful,	empty	consumption.						 This	is	no	hypothetical	scenario;	it	is	how	the	climate	response	actually	looks	today.	Governments’	mitigation	pledges	really	are	too	weak	to	prevent	dangerous	climate	change;	current	climate	policy	puts	the	world	on	track	to	warm	by	a	world-devastating	3˚C	or	more	relative	to	pre-industrial	times.1	Politicians	really	are	saving	ambitious	emissions	targets	for	far	in	the	future.	New	pipelines	to	major	sources	of	fossil	fuels	really	are	continuing	to	be	built	in	a	time	when	the	world	has	more	fossil	fuel	reserves	than	it	can	ever	burn.2	And	because	the	response	to	climate	change	looks	like	this,	that	response	is	failing.		Unless	morality	forms	its	motive	force,	the	response	to	climate	change	will	continue	to	fail,	and	with	progressively	more	severe	consequences	for	people	(particularly	in	the	global	south)	and	non-human	life	now	and	in	the	future	as	oceans	rise,	as	soils	and	rivers	dry,	as	forests	wither	and	burn,	as	storms	destroy	homes	and	fields.	It	will	continue	to	fail	because	the	climate	crisis	requires	a	response	that	far	exceeds	in	urgency,	scope,	and	ambition	the	solutions	that	are	compatible	with	logics	that	do	not	have	a	moral	core.	Let	us	call	them	“amoral	logics,”	logics	like	those	that,	above	all	else,	prioritize	high	short-term	economic	growth,	or	require	the	creation	of	ideal	market	conditions	for	capitalist	accumulation	to	continue	under	the	transition	to	renewable	energy,	or	that	eschew	large-scale	democratic	planning	and	investment,	or	that	must	preserve	national	economic	competitiveness.	Given	its	severe	and	far-reaching	consequences	over	distance	and	time,	the	nature	of	the	climate	crisis	is	such	that	the	measure	of	a	full																																									 																					
1	United	Nations	Environment	Program	(UNEP),	The	Emissions	Gap	Report	2016:	A	UNEP	
Synthesis	Report	(UNEP,	2016),	16;	“Climate	Scoreboard	UN	Climate	Pledge	Analysis,”	Climate	
Interactive,	https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/	scoreboard/frequently-asked-questions/	2	For	instance,	in	late	2016,	the	Canadian	government	approved	two	new	tar	sands	pipelines.	John	Paul	Tasker,	“Trudeau	cabinet	approves	Trans	Mountain,	Line	3	pipelines,	rejects	Northern	Gateway,”	CBC	News,	November	29,	2016,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-cabinet-trudeau-pipeline-decisions-1.3872828;	Oil	Change	International,	The	Sky’s	Limit:	Why	the	Paris	
Climate	Goals	Require	a	Managed	Decline	of	Fossil	Fuel	Production	(2016).	
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response	to	it	rests	on	the	degree	to	which	that	response	evinces	a	concern	for,	solidarity	with,	and	recognition	of	others—others	more	exposed	to	the	effects	of	a	changing	climate,	others	with	low	capacity	to	adapt	to	those	changes,	others	who	are	employed	in	high-carbon	sectors	of	the	economy	that	must	be	phased	out,	non-human	others,	others	in	the	future.	(As	one	journalist	covering	the	climate	justice	movement	put	it,	“What	we’re	fighting	for	now	is	each	other.”3)	But	because	they	have	overriding	imperatives,	amoral	logics	cannot	do	this.	Where	their	overriding	imperatives	cannot	be	reconciled	with	moral	demands,	where	the	two	ends	are	incongruent,	amoral	logics	yield	to	their	overriding	imperatives.	If	a	country’s	climate	policy	might	negatively	affect	growth	but	represent	its	fair	contribution	to	preventing	communities	in	a	low-lying	island	states	from	the	devastation	of	sea-level	rise,	logics	that	fetishize	high	short-term	economic	growth	permit	the	deluge.	If	it	is	unprofitable	for	private	energy	corporations	to	provide	renewable	energy	infrastructure	rapidly	enough	to	spare	communities	in	rural	Asia	or	sub-Saharan	Africa	from	worsening	drought,	a	neoliberal	capitalist	response	will	delay	until	conditions	for	profit	improve.		And	yet,	it	is	logics	like	these,	logics	that	permit	and	even	require	the	sacrificing	of	others,	that	have	overwhelmingly	characterized	the	response	to	climate	change	in	the	north.	That	is	why	the	climate	response	looks	the	way	it	does,	why	it	is	failing.		It	is	only	a	response	with	morality	at	its	core—one	whose	prioritization	of	ethical	principles,	fairness,	and	empathy	mean	that	moral	imperatives	are	not	the	ones	overridden	but	instead	the	ones	that	override—that	can	hope	to	address	the	climate	crisis	in	the	fullest	way	possible.	That	moral	response	has	come	to	be	known	as	climate	justice.	And	if	climate	justice	can	somehow	challenge	the	dominance	of	the	amoral	logics	that	have	for	so	long	determined	climate	policy—if	it	can	drive	a	much	fuller	array	of	policies	that	avoid	the	sacrificing	of	others—then	it	is	no																																									 																					
3	Wen	Stephenson,	What	We’re	Fighting	for	Now	is	Each	Other:	Dispatches	from	the	Front	
Lines	of	Climate	Justice	(Boston,	MA:	Beacon	Books,	2015),	208.		
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exaggeration	to	say	that	the	struggles	for	it	are	now	the	most	important	in	the	world.	Climate	justice	therefore	needs	to	be	interrogated.		A	brief	note	on	the	voice	I	use	in	this	is	necessary.	The	views	and	overarching	questions	of	this	dissertation	are	situated:	they	stem	from	a	deep,	personal	moral	concern	(bordering	sometimes	on	despairing	anguish)	and	frustration	about	the	nature	of	the	reigning	response	to	climate	change,	a	response	that	shows	no	sense	of	urgency	and	thus	belies	logics	permitting	the	sacrificing	of	others.	My	initial	entry	point	into	researching	climate	change	was	through	the	field	of	adaptation	(the	term	referring	to	efforts	to	prepare	for	the	expected	and	actual	impacts	of	climate	change4).	In	looking	at	the	emerging	challenges	for	adaptation	practice,	one	quickly	realizes	how	closely	linked	prospects	for	adaptation	are	with	progress	on	
mitigation,	(i.e.,	human	efforts	to	“reduce	the	sources	or	enhance	the	sinks	of	greenhouse	gases	(GHGs).”5)	There	can	be	a	tendency	to	discuss	adaptation	in	isolation	from	mitigation,	but	the	consequences	of	the	latter	for	the	former	mean	that	the	two	realms	are	not	neatly	separated.6	A	painful	personal	realization	was	how	extraordinarily	difficult	it	is	to	conceive	of	successful	and	just	adaptation	responses	should	climate	change	grow	increasingly	catastrophic	and	unmanageable																																									 																					
4	The	latest	IPCC	definition	of	adaptation	is	“The	process	of	adjustment	to	actual	or	expected	climate	and	its	effects.	In	human	systems,	adaptation	seeks	to	moderate	or	avoid	harm	or	exploit	beneficial	opportunities.	In	some	natural	systems,	human	intervention	may	facilitate	adjustment	to	expected	climate	and	its	effects”	IPCC,	“Annex	II:	Glossary”	(Katherine	J.	Mach,	Serge	Planton,	and	Christoph	von	Stechow,	eds.),	in	Climate	Change	2014:	Synthesis	Report.	Contribution	of	Working	
Groups	I,	II	and	III	to	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	edited	by	R.K.	Pachauri	and	L.A.	Meyer	(IPCC,	Geneva,	Switzerland,	2014),	118.		5	This	definition	is	the	IPCC’s.	The	IPCC	notes	mitigation	also	includes	human	interventions	to	reduce	the	sources	of	other	substances	which	may	contribute	directly	or	indirectly	to	limiting	climate	change,	including,	for	example,	the	reduction	of	particulate	matter	emissions	that	can	directly	alter	the	radiation	balance	(e.g.,	black	carbon)	or	measures	that	control	emissions	of	carbon	monoxide,	nitrogen	oxides,	Volatile	Organic	Compounds	and	other	pollutants	that	can	alter	the	concentration	of	tropospheric	ozone	which	has	an	indirect	effect	on	the	climate.”	IPCC,	“Annex	II:	Glossary,”	125.		6	Paavola,	Adger,	and	Huq	recognize	this	fact	by	listing	“avoiding	dangerous	climate	change”	as	the	first	of	four	principles	for	advancing	climate	justice	in	adaptation	(the	other	three	principles	for	advancing	climate	justice	in	adaptation	are	“forward-looking	responsibility”	(requiring	polluters	to	compensate	for	the	future	impacts	of	their	emissions	now	and	to	pay	for	adaptation)	“putting	the	most	vulnerable	first,”	and	“fair	participation	of	all”).	See	Paavola,	Adger,	and	Huq	“Multifaceted	Justice	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change”	in	Fairness	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change,	eds.	Neil	Adger,	Jouni	Paavola,	Saleemul	Huq,	and	M.	J.	Mace,	269-276.	
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on	a	global	scale,	as	current	policy	suggests	it	is	likely	to.7	Important	causes	I	had	hoped	my	work	could	contribute	to—identifying	just	solutions	to	climate	change-impelled	human	displacement8	and	for	community-based	adaptation	in	poor	and	vulnerable	communities9—felt	suddenly	hopeless.	This	realization	led	me	to	shift	my	research	to	inquire	into	the	reasons	that	the	real	and	urgent	moral	imperative	of	limiting	climate	change	to	“safe”	levels	is	not	occurring	and	how	it	could	occur.	In	addition	to	my	own	moral	convictions,	my	views	are	also	informed	by	my	experiences	in	Toronto’s	climate	movement	(more	on	which	in	the	methodology	section	below)	over	the	past	several	years.	I	am	thus	writing	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	socially	engaged	(and	deeply	morally	concerned)	scholar-activist.	All	of	this	has	translated,	in	some	instances	in	this	dissertation,	to	insights	from	personal	experience,	occasional	lapses	into	“I,”	some	more	colloquial	or	polemical	portions,	and,	most	of	all	to	a	strong	normative	voice,	which	I	hope	readers	will	not	mind	bearing	with	and	might	even	come	to	feel	is	justified	as	my	argument	proceeds.	With	that	in	mind,	let	us	turn	to	this	dissertation’s	overarching	questions.																																										 																					
7	W.	Neil	Adger	and	Jon	Barnett	note	that	under	earlier	assumptions	that	global	warming	would	not	exceed	2˚C,	it	was	expected	that	adaptation	efforts	would	by	and	large	be	successful.	But	as	the	interconnectedness	of	climate	impacts	has	been	better	understood,	and	given	the	likelihood	that	global	temperatures	will	rise	beyond	2˚C	(and	approach	4˚C),	it	is	very	possible	“that	the	window	of	opportunity	for	adaptation	is	smaller	than	previously	imagined.”	They	refer	to	this	as	“the	new	realism	about	climate	change,”	and	cite	it	as	a	key	reason	for	concern	about	successful	adaptation	efforts	in	the	future.	(W.	Neil	Adger	&	Jon	Barnett,	“Commentary,”	Environment	and	Planning,	4,	no.	21,	(2009):	2801).	Though	currently	difficult	to	identify,	there	are	real	thresholds	beyond	which	adaptation	projects—even	those	that	are	large-scale	and	well	funded—will	be	unable	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	climate	change,	placing	a	brutal	limit	on	the	potential	of	adaptation	practice	(See,	e.g.,	W.	Neil	Adger,	Irene	Lorenzoni,	and	Karen	L.	O’Brien,	“Adaptation	Now,”	in	Adapting	to	Climate	Change:	
Thresholds,	Values,	Governance,	ed.	W.	Neil	Adger,	Irene	Lorenzoni,	and	Karen	L.	O’Brien	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2009),	6.).	8	See	my	“Climate	Change,	Compelled	Migration,	and	Global	Social	Justice,”	in	Climate	Change	
—	Who’s	Carrying	the	Burden?	The	chilly	climates	of	the	global	environmental	dilemma,	L.	Anders	Sandberg	and	Tor	Sandberg	(eds.)	(The	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives,	2010)	and	“Towards	a	Justice	Framework	for	Understanding	and	Responding	to	Climate	Migration	and	Displacement,”	
Environmental	Justice	(Forthcoming).	9	Which	I	had	an	opportunity	to	do	as	part	of	a	research	project	on	climate	justice	and	watr	governance	in	the	informal	settlements	(“slums”)	of	Nairobi,	Kenya	with	Dr.	Ellie	Perkins.	For	the	findings	from	that	project,	see,	Ellie	Perkins	(ed.),	Water	and	Climate	Change	in	Africa:	Challenges	and	
Community	Initiatives	in	Durban,	Maputo	and	Nairobi.	Routledge	Advances	in	Climate	Change	Research	(Abingdon,	Oxon:	Routledge,	2013).			
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How	does	climate	justice	animate	and	organize	struggles	for	a	climate	response	in	the	global	north,	what	are	their	potentials	and	limitations,	and	how	can	their	prospects	be	bolstered?	What	is	the	nature	of	the	economic,	political,	and	ideological	order	that	explains	the	dominance	of	amoral	logics	in	the	climate	response	and	has	for	so	long	stymied	the	advance	of	climate	justice?	What	must	struggles	for	climate	justice	look	like	to	overcome	it?	These	are	the	overarching	questions	this	dissertation	seeks	to	answer.		
2.	The	Meaning	of	Climate	Justice		 But	before	moving	into	those	overarching	questions,	there	is	one	matter	that	must	be	addressed.	No	straightforward	answer	to	them	presents	itself	because,	given	the	multitude	of	pathways	through	which	climate	change	raises	moral	concerns,	climate	justice	can	mean	different	things,	changing	depending	on	who	is	using	it.	A	recognition	that	climate	justice	can	take	on	different	meanings	is	rare	and	comparisons	of	those	meanings	tend	to	be	cursory	when	carried	out.10	And	yet	there	are	important	differences	in	their	meanings,	modes	of	inquiry,	and	related	struggles,	as	the	following	chapters	will	show.	To	philosophers	of	ethics,	the	nature	of	climate	justice	is	such	that	it	must	be	investigated	carefully	and	rigorously	through	moral	theory	to	determine	a	fair	global	agreement	that	distributes	burdens	and	benefits	in	
																																								 																					
10	Building	Bridges	Collective	(Space	for	Movement?	Reflections	on	Climate	Justice,	Social	
Movements	and	the	State,	27-29)	briefly	notes	some	differences	that	fall	under	the	umbrella	of	climate	justice,	for	instance	in	the	choice	of	tactics	and	in	debates	about	the	role	of	capitalism	in	the	climate	response.	Patrick	Bond	discusses	(again	very	briefly)	a	few	different	notions	of	climate	justice,	but	does	so	primarily	to	point	out	that	they	are	less	likely	to	succeed	than	a	grassroots	climate	justice	movement	(Patrick	Bond,	Politics	of	Climate	Justice,	196-197).	Joan	Martínez-Alier	identifies	two	different	approaches	to	climate	justice	in	a	short	book	review	of	Henry	Shue’s	Climate	
Justice:	Vulnerability	and	Protection	and	Naomi	Klein’s	This	Changes	Everything:	Capitalism	vs.	the	
Climate.	See	“Climate	Justice:	Two	Approaches,”	in	EJOLT	Report	23:	Refocusing	resistance	for	climate	
justice.	COPing	in,	COPing	out	and	beyond	Paris,	eds.	Leah	Temper	and	Tamra	Gilbertson	(Environmental	Justice	Organisations,	Liability	and	Trade,	2015).		For	an	excellent	article-length	look,	see	David	Schlosberg,	“Theorising	Environmental	Justice:	The	Expanding	Sphere	of	a	Discourse,”	Environmental	Politics	22	(2013).	Rather	than	contrast	different	types	of	climate	justice,	Schlosberg’s	piece	is	on	how	the	discourse	around	environmental	justice,	has	grown,	particularly	as	climate	has	become	a	central	concern.		
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the	climate	response.	To	many	climate	activists	and	organizations,	calls	for	climate	justice	accompany	a	very	complex	assortment	of	demands	for	democratic	accountability	made	whenever	they	protest	UNFCCC	proceedings	or	march	en	masse	in	city	streets	or	block	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	or	demand	that	universities	or	public	pension	funds	divest	from	fossil	fuels.	More	radical	thinkers,	scholars,	and	parts	of	the	climate	movement,	meanwhile,	define	climate	justice	with	reference	to	an	anti-systemic	critique	of	neoliberal	capitalism	and	imperialism	in	a	time	of	climate	change.11	It	would	seem	we	all	want	climate	justice,	but	have	different	senses	of	what	it	means.		Rather	than	attempting	to	assert	or	determine	whose	is	the	more	genuine	or	true	climate	justice,	the	work	in	this	dissertation	proceeds	from	the	assumption	that	if	climate	justice	is	to	challenge	the	amoral	logics	dominating	the	actions	that	will	determine	the	nature	of	our	future	world,	and	if	its	prospects	are	to	be	evaluated	and	bolstered,	then	it	ought	to	be	understood	in	all	its	complexity.	This	unavoidably	introduces	another	question	that	must	be	addressed	at	the	outset	of	this	dissertation:	how	can	climate	justice	be	conceived	or	defined	in	such	a	way	as	to	reflect	that	complexity?	In	other	words,	what	does	climate	justice	mean?	Section	2	presently	takes	up	this	question.	Once	a	clearer	sense	of	what	climate	justice	means	is	established,	section	3	will	then	introduce	this	dissertation’s	normative	framework.	Finally,	section	4	will	describe	the	organization	and	methodology	of	this	work.				
																																								 																					
11	See,	e.g.,	International	Climate	Justice	Network,	“Bali	Principles	of	Climate	Justice,”	August	28,	2002,	http://www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=3748;	The	Global	Fight	for	Climate	Justice:	
Anticapitalist	Responses	to	Global	Warming	and	Environmental	Destruction,	Ian	Angus	(ed.)	(Fernwood	Publishing,	2011);	Patrick	Bond,	Politics	of	Climate	Justice:	Paralysis	Above,	Movement	
Below	(Scottsville,	South	Africa:	University	of	KwaZulu-Natal	Press,	2012);	Paul	Chatterton,	David	Featherstone,	and	Paul	Routledge,	“Articulating	Climate	Justice	in	Copenhagen:	Antagonism,	the	Commons,	and	Solidarity,”	Antipode	45	no	3	(2013);	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything:	Capitalism	
vs.	The	Climate	(Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2014);	Brian	Tokar,	“Democracy,	Localism,	and	the	Future	of	the	Climate	Movement,”	World	Futures	71	(2015).	
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2.1	A	Working	Definition	of	Justice			 Before	attempting	to	define	climate	justice	in	a	way	that	can	accommodate	its	diverse	meanings	and	prepare	a	deeper	inquiry	into	them,	it	will	perhaps	be	useful	here	to	elaborate	on	the	sense	of	justice	itself	that	guided	the	research	and	writing	of	this	dissertation	and	that	could	act	as	a	kind	of	“solvent”	capable	of	taking	in	a	broad	range	of	moral	concerns.	A	three-point	working	definition	of	that	sense	of	justice	will	here	be	described	with	each	point	unpacked	and	some	discussion	of	how	the	points	interrelate.			
1)	Justice	is	concerned	with	the	application	of	sound	moral	reasoning	to	
determine	parties’	duties	and	claims	arising	from	a	given	moral	problem	of	
social	or	collective	life.			 The	sense	of	justice	providing	a	foundation	for	this	dissertation	needed	to	be	robust	enough	to	accommodate	a	wide	variety	of	moral	concerns	that	have	emerged	in	the	context	of	climate	change	as	well	as	the	complex	approaches	to	seeing	them	addressed.	The	reference	raised	in	this	first	point	to	sound	moral	reasoning—an	important	part	of	any	sense	of	justice12—is	thus	phrased	broadly.	As	such,	it	would	include	many	of	the	important	standard	concerns	of	justice,	often	described	in	terms	of	the	dichotomy	of	distributive	and	procedural	justice.	For	Paavola,	Adger,	and	Huq,	
distributive	justice	“relates	to	the	incidence	of	benefits	and	costs,	broadly	conceived	so	as	to	encompass	nonpecuniary	advantages	and	burdens”	while	procedural	justice	“relates	to	the	way	in	which	parties	are	positioned	vis-à-vis	processes	of	planning	and	decision	making,	encompassing	issues	such	as	recognition,	participation,	and	
																																								 																					
12	See,	e.g.,	Amartya	Sen,.	The	Idea	of	Justice	(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press,	2009),	chapter	1.	
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distribution	of	power.”13	In	the	context	of	climate	change,	distributive	and	procedural	justice	together	cover	a	very	considerable	deal	of	ground,	highlighting	concerns	like	those	about	who	disproportionately	bears	the	burdens	of	climate	change;	who	is	disproportionately	responsible	for	it	(and	disproportionately	benefited	from	the	processes	that	created	it);	which	principles	countries	should	use	(for	example,	ability-to-pay	or	polluter	pays)	to	fairly	divide	climate	mitigation	and	adaptation	burdens	and	duties	in	the	response	to	climate	change;	how	measures	like	carbon	taxes	can	be	applied	without	unfairly	burdening	the	poor;	how	to	ensure	equitable	representation	at	climate	negotiation	proceedings	and	adaptation	planning	processes;	and	other	matters	discussed	below.	They	are	thus	essential	parts	of	any	inquiry	into	justice.		But	at	the	same	time,	the	working	definition’s	appeal	to	sound	moral	reasoning	about	duties	and	claims	is	intended	to	permit	and	encourage	a	broad	inquiry	into	the	complex	moral	nature	of	a	given	dimension	of	social	life,	an	inquiry	that	may	identify	moral	concerns	that	are	not	contained	(either	neatly	or	at	all)	by	that	often-employed	dichotomy	between	distributive	and	procedural	justice.	This	broadening	of	the	sense	of	justice	is	required	to	accommodate	a	large	variety	of	concerns	about	the	moral	dimensions	of	climate	change	that	have	been	raised	across	different	struggles	for	climate	justice.		The	third	point	of	this	working	definition	of	justice	will	identify	where	expanding	the	inquiry	into	justice	beyond	that	dichotomy	will	be	most	important	in	this	dissertation:	in	the	struggles	for	alternative	economic	and	political	institutional	arrangements	that	I	believe	are	necessary	to	take	on	climate	change.	But	to	take	another	sort	of	example	for	now,	consider	one	of	the	main	concerns	in	recent	years	of	the	climate	justice	movement:	the	fossil	fuel	industry	(see	E1	in	section	2.3	of	this	chapter	and	chapter	3	for	citations	and	more	detail).	The	industry	constitutes	a	fully	legally	sanctioned	sector	of	the	economy	whose	business	model	requires	the																																									 																					
13	Jouni	Paavola,	W.	Neil	Adger,	and	Saleemul	Huq,	“Multifaceted	Justice	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change”	in	Fairness	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change,	eds.	Neil	Adger,	Jouni	Paavola,	Saleemul	Huq,	and	M.	J.	Mace	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2006),	266.		
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destruction	of	the	climate;	it	aggressively	pursues	resource	development	on	or	nearby	indigenous	lands	with	deleterious	effects	on	communities;	and	it	has	had	a	powerful	and	complex	role	in	obstructing	climate	action.	The	moral	concerns	around	these	matters,	ones	that	have	sparked	a	non-violent	resistance	movement,	are	not	easily	captured	by	the	distributive-procedural	justice	dichotomy	but	they	are	based	in	sound	moral	reasoning.	What	is	more,	that	part	of	the	climate	movement	facing	off	against	the	fossil	fuel	industry	does	not	tend	to	put	its	demands	or	analysis	in	distributive	or	procedural	terms,	and	yet	sees	taking	on	the	fossil	fuel	industry	as	a	matter	of	climate	justice.	Point	1	allows	moral	concerns	like	these,	which	are	indeed	based	in	sound	moral	reasoning,	to	enter	into	the	inquiry	into	climate	justice	without	having	to	attempt	to	refigure	them	to	fit	that	dichotomy.			
2)	As	opposed	to	voluntary	moral	action	(at	either	an	individual	or	state	level),	
justice	is	to	be	guaranteed	as	far	as	possible	through	institutional	
arrangements	best	able	to	carry	out	and	comply	with	moral	imperatives.		
	 If	the	first	point	prevents	this	working	definition	from	becoming	too	restrictive,	then	point	2	prevents	it	from	becoming	too	expansive.	Identifying	justice	as	concerned	with	social	or	collective	life	(the	end	of	point	1)	and	as	entailing	something	greater	than	voluntary	moral	action	(point	2)	anticipates	and	precludes	from	the	outset	the	possibility	that	justice	simply	expands	to	become	synonymous	with	all	moral	action.		First,	these	parts	of	the	working	definition	make	the	point	that	it	is	not	sufficient	to	qualify	as	justice	to	take	on	a	moral	action	at	only	an	individual	level.	To	put	this	in	terms	of	climate	change	for	purposes	of	illustration,	say	I	decide	to	stop	driving	or	flying	in	vehicles	powered	by	fossil	fuels	because	I	wish	to	reduce	my	participation	in	the	changing	of	the	climate	through	unnecessary	travel	(and	perhaps	you	decide	to	buy	low-	or	zero-emissions	goods	and	services	for	similar	reasons),	an	immoral	act.	But	opting	out	of	the	fossil	fuel	system	(or	opting	in	to	
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low-carbon/ethical	consumerism)	in	this	way	is	separate	from	climate	justice,	and	might	more	properly	belong	to	something	we	can	call,	provisionally,	a	“personal	climate	ethics.”	Individual	actions	of	this	sort—that	is,	actions	on	a	person-to-person	(rather	than	society-wide)	basis	motivated	by	goodwill—will	never	occur	on	a	wide	enough	scale	to	suffice	to	resolve	the	problem.	If	the	phasing	out	of	fossil	fuels	is	a	matter	for	justice,	then	some	way	must	be	found	of	disincentivizing	(and,	eventually,	prohibiting)	fossil	fuel	use,	and	to	do	so	at	the	level	of	a	society	in	a	fair	manner	rather	than	simply	relying	on	people	to	voluntarily	stop.14		The	association	of	justice	with	institutions	made	by	point	2	is	part	of	the	tradition	of	justice.15	It	is	also	critical	in	another	sense.	The	concerns	of	justice	are	not	luxuries	or	optional	niceties	to	be	addressed	at	leisure;	they	are	urgent	moral	obligations.	Some	form	of	institutional	arrangements	is	required	to,	as	far	as	
possible,	guarantee	that	moral	imperatives	are	met.	Those	institutional	arrangements	can	take	a	variety	of	forms—legal,	democratic,	economic,	multilateral,	etc.—so	long	as	they	are	designed	to	be	able	to	credibly	carry	out	moral	imperatives.	In	the	context	of	climate	change,	this	would	mean	the	difference	between	a	just	response	of,	say,	a	government	passing	legislation	that	some	percentage	of	a	national	carbon	tax	(the	amount	determined	by	some	principle	of	justice)	must	go	towards	climate	adaptation	projects	in	poor	and	vulnerable	communities16	and	an	
unjust	response	of	that	same	government	making	aid	pledges	whose	amount	is	determined	arbitrarily.		
																																								 																					
14	None	of	this	is	to	suggest	that	an	individual	person	cannot	be	part	of	the	struggle	for	climate	justice,	however.	If	my	individual	action	is	one	that	contributes,	for	example,	to	a	movement	of	citizens	concerned	with	ensuring	that	policies	are	put	in	place	so	that	our	country	(1)	makes	fair	commitments	based	on	principles	of	justice	to	take	on	its	fair	share	of	climate	duties	and	(2)	meets	those	commitments,	then	my	action	would,	under	this	working	definition,	be	part	of	justice.	15	John	Rawls	for	instance	notes	how	the	basic	structure	of	a	society—“the	way	in	which	the	major	social	institutions	distribute	fundamental	rights	and	duties	and	determine	the	division	of	advantages	from	social	cooperation”—was	the	“primary	subject	of	justice.”	See	John	Raws,	A	Theory	
of	Justice:	Revised	Edition	(Cambridge,	MA:	The	Belknap	Press,	1999),	6-7.		 		16	This	is	the	proposal,	for	instance,	of	Paavola,	Adger,	and	Huq	in	“Multifaceted	Justice	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change,”	272.	
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Furthermore,	because	it	concerns	urgent	moral	obligations,	justice	ought	to	be	enforced,	and	non-compliance	with	moral	imperatives	ought	to	be	subject	to	some	sort	of	penalty,	which	some	institutional	arrangement	ought	to	be	able	to	impose.	If	a	state	makes	a	pledge	(rather	than	agrees	to	a	binding	commitment)	to	take	action	on	a	collective	issue	and	if	the	nature	and	scope	of	that	action	has	neither	(a)	been	determined	by	sound	moral	reasoning	nor	(b)	been	taken	as	part	of	some	institutional	arrangement	with	the	capacity	to	penalize	non-compliance,	then	that	state	could	only	make	dubious	claims	that	its	pledge	of	action	is	just.	As	discussed	in	the	next	chapter,	the	global	climate	regime	has	moved	away	from	a	legally	binding	structure,	and	states	now	make	voluntary	pledges	of	climate	action.	According	to	this	working	definition,	the	global	climate	regime	is	not	currently	characterized	by	justice.		The	role	of	institutions	in	enforcing	compliance	also	underscores	the	importance	of	point	1	of	the	working	definition;	as	opposed	to	an	edict	or	decree,	which	may	be	made	arbitrarily	and	then	enforced	by	some	system	of	power,	justice	requires	that	parties’	duties	and	claims	have	some	grounding	in	moral	reason,	some	
justification.	Otherwise,	parties	may	make	claims	that	they	are	not	entitled	to	or	might	decide	that	they	have	no	duties	when	in	fact	they	do	and	institutions	may	attempt	to	enforce	unjust	rules.			
3)	Justice	is	political	and	concerns	struggles	over	what	the	meaning	of	a	good	
life	is	and,	ultimately,	what	kinds	of	society	best	promote	that	good	life.			Once	the	matter	of	institutions	is	raised,	as	it	is	in	point	2,	the	question	of	the	kind	of	society	those	institutions	are	to	realize	is	opened.	Point	3	thus	picks	up	on	an	important	matter	left	unfinished	in	point	1:	that	there	are	concerns	of	justice	that	are	not	neatly	contained	by	the	dichotomy	of	distributive	and	procedural	justice,	that	“spill”	over	those	containers.	It	should	not	be	taken	for	granted	that	a	just	response	to	a	crisis	must	work	within	the	economic	and	political	institutional	arrangements	
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that	support	some	status	quo.	Point	3	is	intended	to	recognize	that	inquiries	into	justice	can	and	should	include	considerations	of	alternative	social	arrangements	based	on	concepts	of	the	good	life	other	than	the	ones	that	prevail.			 To	illustrate,	the	second	half	of	this	dissertation	will	present	a	critique	of	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy,	and	the	way	they	have	shaped	a	response	to	climate	change	that	is	primarily	characterized	not	by	an	urgency	to	prevent	the	worst	potential	scenarios,	but	by	a	logic	concerned	with	preserving	capitalist	growth	and	profit,	all	while	shutting	out	alternatives.	That	critique	will	lead	to	(a)	a	critical	inquiry	into	the	ideological	underpinning	of	that	arrangement	of	economic	and	political	institutions	and	(b)	how	that	existing	ideological	order	can	be	challenged	by	alternative	conceptions	of	the	good	life	(and	the	changes	to	institutional	arrangements	they	entail)	that	can	respond	more	fully	to	climate	change.	In	this	way,	the	dissertation	takes	up	a	challenge	presented	by	one	of	the	march	slogans	of	the	climate	justice	movement,	“System	change,	not	climate	change,”	by	interrogating	the	nature	of	such	a	system	change.	Must	capitalist	logic	be	taken	for	granted	in	the	climate	response?	Is	there	an	alternative	form	of	society	that	can	better	respond	to	climate	change?	What	notion	of	a	good	life	would	undergird	it	and	what	institutional	arrangements	are	required	for	it?	Point	3	is	intended	to	stress	that	questions	like	these	ought	to	be	part	of	the	search	for	climate	justice.	None	of	this	is	intended	to	diminish	the	importance	of	distributive	and	procedural	justice,	only	to	stress	that	once	the	inquiry	into	institutions	is	opened	to	look	at	possible	alternative	social	arrangements	and	how	they	entail	a	change	to	the	nature	of	a	society,	the	mode	of	inquiry	shifts	away	from	what	is	easily	captured	in	that	dichotomy	towards	questions	of	what	a	good	life	can	mean	and	into	the	realm	of	political	philosophy.		Point	3	also	recognizes	that	justice	is	inherently	political	and	involves	struggles	and	that	moral	reasoning	alone	will	not	suffice	to	achieve	justice.	This	is	why	a	main	concern	of	this	dissertation	is	to	look	at	the	political	struggles	to	see	climate	justice	advanced	against	competing	amoral	logics.		
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2.2	A	Conceptual	Framework	of	Climate	Justice		The	sense	of	justice	described	in	the	three	points	of	this	working	definition	sets	the	stage	for	a	quite	far-ranging	inquiry	into	the	meanings	that	climate	justice	can	take	on,	a	necessary	step	before	analyzing	struggles	for	climate	justice	and	their	prospects.	Some	means	of	organizing	the	considerable	content	that	results	from	such	a	far-ranging	inquiry	is	necessary.		A	way	forward	is	to	recognize	the	following:	any	meaning	of	climate	justice	will	have	some	set	of	moral	concerns	and	these	will	relate	to	some	kind	of	struggle	to	see	them	addressed.	Once	looked	at	in	this	way,	climate	justice	takes	on	two	key	
facets.	First,	climate	justice	is	a	lens	of	analysis	for	identifying	and	drawing	attention	to	different	moral	concerns	or	problems	that	are	potentially	caused	by	climate	change	and	by	the	processes	and	systemic	logic	driving	it.	Any	of	these	concerns	may	be	selected,	invoked,	or	emphasized—activated—to	declare	climate	change	a	problem	of	justice.		To	provide	a	preview	of	how	this	functions	(a	fuller	development	with	citations	follows	in	section	2.1	below),	climate	change	can	be	declared	a	problem	of	justice	by,	for	example,	recognizing	that	rich	countries,	through	long	use	of	fossil	fuels,	have	contributed	disproportionately	to	causing	the	climate	crisis,	which	creates	moral	duties	for	them	in	the	climate	response	based	on	the	principle	of	historical	responsibility.	Climate	change	can	also	be	declared	a	problem	of	justice	by	recognizing	that	there	are	people	who	are	and	will	continue	to	be	disproportionately	vulnerable	to	the	effects	of	climate	change,	particularly	those	in	the	global	south.		These	two	moral	concerns	can	be	linked	or	combined,	and	indeed	a	combined	activation	of	these	two	injustices	is	the	most	common	and	perhaps	most	important	sense	in	which	climate	change	is	seen	a	matter	of	justice:	rich	countries	are	primarily	responsible	for	creating	a	problem	that	will	disproportionately	impact	the	people	least	responsible	and	least	capable	of	adapting	to	it	in	the	poorest	countries:	
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the	actions	of	the	well-off	north	are	thus	an	imposition	of	burdens	and	threats	on	the	poorer	south.		But	because	there	are	additional	ways	that	climate	change	can	be	declared	a	problem	of	justice	there	are	additional	areas	of	potential	injustices	that	can	be	activated	in	this	first	facet	and	other	ways	they	can	be	combined.	For	instance,	there	is	a	need	for	a	just	transition	for	workers	in	the	fossil	fuel	industry	as	governments	pass	legislation	that	rapidly	(at	least	ideally)	sees	the	sector	phased	out.		This	process	of	activation	is	important	because	problems	of	justice	require	different	and	often	complex	responses	with	substantive	input	from	a	wide	array	of	actors	in	a	way	that	would	not	occur	if	climate	change	is	seen	instead	merely	as	a	technocratic	problem	of,	for	example,	energy	governance,	emissions	policy,	technology	promotion,	cost-benefit	economic	analysis,	etc.	This	first	facet	also	reveals	one	of	the	key	reasons	notions	of	climate	justice	are	difficult	to	pin	down:	there	are	just	so	many	moral	wrongs	associated	with	climate	change,	and	not	all	struggles	seeking	climate	justice	are	centrally	concerned	with	the	same	ones.		The	second	facet	of	climate	justice	is	to	organize	and	drive	responses	to	climate	change	that	can	address	the	patterns	of	moral	wrongs	activated	in	that	first	facet.	That	involves	finding	the	proper	sites	of	contestation	in	which	struggles	for	redressing	climate	injustice	can	be	effective	and	win	out	over	whatever	is	preventing	that	from	happening.	One	way	to	think	of	the	difference	between	the	first	and	second	facets	is	in	terms	of	the	question	each	addresses.	The	first	facet	answers	the	question,	What	are	the	various	moral	issues	raised	by	climate	change?	It	answers	that	question	by	enumerating	several	different	areas	of	potential	moral	concern.	The	second	asks,	What	does	seeking	climate	justice	drive	us	to	do?		The	preceding	discussion	should	suffice	to	put	forward	a	definition	of	climate	
justice.	Climate	justice	is	a	moral	framework	that	(1)	identifies	the	various	moral	concerns	that	are	either	causing,	caused	by,	or	otherwise	raised	by	climate	change	and	(2)	organizes	(and	manifests	in)	responses	to	climate	change	attempting	to	
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address	those	injustices.	Climate	justice	thus	represents	a	range	of	challenges	to	the	amoral	logics	that	have	prevented	a	full	response	to	climate	change.		
2.3	(A	Brief	Survey	of)	The	First	Facet	of	Climate	Justice			 This	dissertation	will	explore	that	second	facet,	and	will	do	so,	in	the	chapters	that	follow,	by	investigating	different	types	of	struggles	for	advancing	climate	justice	and	what	is	blocking	progress	on	them.	Nevertheless	some	space	should	be	dedicated	here	in	this	introductory	chapter	to	acknowledging	the	first	facet.	The	various	moral	issues	of	climate	change	raised	in	this	facet	form	a	background	for	this	dissertation;	they	are	the	reason	to	be	concerned	with	what	a	just	response	will	entail,	and	it	is	thus	important	to	in	some	way	attempt	to	name	them	explicitly	all	in	one	place	(an	attempt	I	am	not	aware	of	having	been	made	in	the	literature).		An	important	caveat	should	be	kept	in	mind:	this	section	will	be	an	overview,	a	brief	survey,	rather	than	an	in-depth	look	at	the	nuances	or	internal	debates	around	each	of	these	injustices	or	moral	concerns	(a	few	of	them	could	have	been	expanded	into	literature	reviews	of	their	own),	again,	in	order	to	acknowledge	them.	Despite	attempts	to	be	exhaustive	below,	there	may	be	climate	wrongs	inadvertently	neglected,	and	their	presentation	in	brief	means	there	are	nuances	to	them	that	could	not	be	developed.	What	follows	(from	here	until	page	41)	is	thus	a	kind	of	first	approximation	of	that	first	facet.	Nevertheless,	in	addition	to	laying	some	background	for	why	we	should	be	so	concerned	with	climate	justice,	the	intention	in	presenting	the	following	points	is	to	show	that	this	first	facet	of	climate	justice	makes	pinning	down	a	definition	comprehensively	accounting	for	all	its	content	difficult.	As	I	enumerate	them,	I	also	attempt	to	show	how	each	injustice	draws	attention	to	what	a	just	response	must	take	into	account.	They	are	as	follows:			
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A)	Who	holds	which	duties?		A1.	Determining	fair	duties:	differential	responsibility	and	capacity	A2.	Accepting	fair	duties		
B)	Who	will	be	impacted	and	why?		B1.	Differential	vulnerability	B2.	Colonial	Legacies,	environmental	injustice/racism	B3.	Workers		
C)	What	is	the	moral	significance	of	climate	impacts?		C1.	Violations	of	human	rights/Violence	C2.	Challenging	development	progress		C3.	Loss	of	ways	of	life,	unfair	burdening	and	disruption		C4.	The	human	good		
D)	Whose	voice	is	heard?		D1.	Participation,	representation,	influence	D2.	Future	Generations	D3.	The	non-human		
E)	What	is	driving	the	crisis	and	preventing	responses?		E1.	The	Fossil	Fuel	Industry	E2.	False	Solutions	E3.	Capitalism’s	Hegemony		E4.	Alternative	Social	Arrangements:	System	Change,	Not	Climate	Change		 	A)	Who	holds	duties?		A	first	“family”	of	climate	injustices	arises	in	the	context	of	global	climate	change	governance	and	the	effort	to	establish	an	equitable	distribution	of	climate	duties	between	countries	of	the	global	north	and	south.	Foremost	among	the	moral	concerns	in	this	family	is	the	search	for	principles	to	fairly	divide	climate	change	responsibilities	in	the	context	of	the	grossly	disproportionate	contributions	to	the	climate	crisis	that	have	been	made	by	industrialized	countries	and	their	greater	capacity	to	provide	resources	to	developing	countries	for	adaptation	and	mitigation.			
A1)	Determining	fair	duties:	differential	responsibility	and	capacity.	Climate	change	can	be	seen	as	a	matter	of	justice	in	the	longstanding	search	for	principles	of	
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distributive	justice	that	can	be	used	in	assigning	(binding)	responsibilities	as	part	of	international	agreements	coordinating	action	on	climate	change.17	It	is	a	matter	fraught	with	difficult	questions	regarding	the	nature	and	burdensomeness	of	climate	mitigation,	adaptation,	and	(more	controversially)	compensation	duties,	which	factors	and	principles	determine	who	is	to	take	them	on,	how	much	of	the	historical	emissions	ought	to	be	accounted,	and	more	(much	of	which	will	be	covered	in	greater	detail	in	chapter	2).18		Nevertheless,	there	is	longstanding	and	broad	agreement	that	developed	countries	ought	to	take	on	the	first	and	deepest	obligations	for	at	least	three	reasons.	First,	their	contributions	to	cumulative	greenhouse	gas	emissions	make	them	primarily	responsible	for	the	climate	change	currently	being	experienced;	by	one	measure,	industrialized	countries	are	responsible	for	60%	of	emissions	to	date	but	have	just	18%	of	the	world’s	population.19	Just	6	developed	countries	account	for	51%	of	cumulative	emissions	from	1751-2015.20	Other	disaggregated	data	on	
																																								 																					
17	For	a	good	review,	see	Sonja	Klinsky	and	Hadi	Dowlatabadi,	“Conceptualizations	of	justice	in	climate	policy,”	Climate	Policy	9	no.	1	(2009).	The	authors	find	five	key	principles	of	justice	emerging	from	the	literature:	causal	responsibility,	preferential	treatment	based	on	need,	equal	entitlements	(to	the	use	of	the	atmosphere	as	a	sink	for	emissions),	equal	burdens,	and	procedural	justice.	Three	sets	of	policy	emerge:	(1)	equitable	division	of	the	burden	of	climate	policy,	which	prioritizes	technical	and	financial	efficiency	in	solving	the	problem	but	imposes	ecological	risks	as	a	result;	(2)	fair	distribution	of	economic	costs	and	climate	change	impacts,	which	includes	the	latter	concerns	about	efficiency	but	adds	a	concern	for	human	development;	and	(3)	compensatory	justice	for	the	costs	of	climate	policy	and	liability	for	climate	impacts,	which	would	entail	considerable	transfers	of	resources	from	north	to	south.					18	For	some	surveys,	see	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	Simon	Caney,	Dale	Jamieson,	and	Henry	Shue,	eds.,	Climate	Ethics:	Essential	Readings	(Oxford	University	Press,	2010);	and	Andreas	Niederberger,	“Climate	Justice	from	the	Perspective	of	Philosophy,”	in	Routledge	Handbook	of	the	Climate	Movement,	(ed.)	Matthias	Dietz	and	Heiko	Garrelts,	84-103	(New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	2014).		19	Oil	Change	International,	The	Sky’s	Limit:	Why	the	Paris	Climate	Goals	Require	a	Managed	
Decline	of	Fossil	Fuel	Production	(2016),	30.		20	The	six	countries,	given	in	figures	from	James	Hansen	and	Makiko	Sato,	are	USA	(26%),	Russia	(7%),	Germany	(6%),	the	UK	(5%),	Japan	(4%),	and	Canada/Australia	(combining	for	3%).	A	category	called	“Rest	of	Europe	and	Eurasia”	is	another	17%.	The	entirety	of	Africa	is	just	3%,	as	is	India,	while	China	accounts	for	12%.	The	World	Resources	Institute,	meanwhile,	finds	that	66%	of	cumulative	emissions	between	1850-2011	come	from	just	32	developed	countries:	USA	(25%),	EU28	(27%),	Russian	Federation	(8%),	Japan	(4%),	Canada	(2%).	See	Hansen	and	Sato,	“Fossil	Fuel	CO2	Emissions”	(2016),	http://www.columbia.edu/	~mhs119/CO2Emissions/Emis_moreFigs/;	and	Mengpin	Ge,	Johannes	Friedrich	and	Thomas	Damassa,	"6	Graphs	Explain	the	World’s	Top	10	
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responsibility	reveals	similar	patters.21	Second,	developed	countries	have	left	others	with	little	“atmospheric	space”	to	use	for	economic	development	powered	by	cheap	and	readily	available	fossil	fuels.	Those	two	reasons	would	suggest	that	industrialized	countries	owe	what	is	frequently	called	a	“climate	debt”	to	developing	countries22	based	on	the	principles	of	historical	responsibility	and	disproportionate	
use	of	a	common	good	(the	ability	of	the	atmosphere	to	accumulate	carbon	without	causing	dangerous	climate	change)	respectively.	The	third	reason	for	why	developed	countries	ought	to	take	on	the	most	burdensome	climate	duties	is	based	on	a	different	principle—capacity	to	take	on	climate	duties—given	that	their	own	industrial	and	economic	development	through	long	use	of	fossil	fuels	has	also	left	them	with	a	greater	capability	to	both	transition	to	clean	energy	and	assist	others	in	responding	to	climate	change.		Several	frameworks	for	setting	policy	based	on	these	principles	have	been	proposed.	The	“contraction	and	convergence”	(C&C)	framework	has	tended	to	seek	to	establish	an	equal	per	capita	amount	of	GHG	emissions	that	all	countries	should	be	allowed	to	emit.	High	emitters	(usually	developed	countries)	hold	a	duty	to	bring	their	emissions	down	to	that	level,	thereby	allowing	developing	countries	some	space	to	increase	theirs	in	pursuit	of	their	economic	development.23	The																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					Emitters,"	World	Resources	Institute,	November	25,	2014,	http://www.wri.org//blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%e2%80%99s-top-10-emitters.	21	Per	capita	cumulative	historical	emissions,	for	instance,	yield	some	striking	results.	The	US,	UK,	and	Germany	lead	the	pack,	each	historically	responsible	for	about	300	tons	of	carbon	per	person	(making	them	10	times	as	responsible	for	historical	per	capita	emissions	as	China).	Canada	ranks	next	at	around	200	tons	per	person.	For	comparison,	the	global	mean	is	about	50	(Hansen	and	Sato,	“Fossil	Fuel	CO2	Emissions”).	Another	study	looked	at	per	capita	contributions	to	current	global	warming	rather	than	to	cumulative	emissions.	At	the	top	are	the	UK	(0.54˚C	warming	per	billion	people)	and	US	(0.51˚C)	with	Canada	coming	in	third	place	(0.41˚C).	China	(0.05˚C)	falls	well	below	the	global	average	(0.11˚C	per	billion	people)	despite	being	the	current	top	emitter	in	the	world.	(See	H.	Damon	Matthews	et	al.,	“National	contributions	to	observed	global	warming,”	Environmental	
Research	Letters	9	(2014).	22	Andrew	Simms,	Ecological	Debt:	Global	Warming	and	the	Wealth	of	Nations	(Second	
Edition)	(New	York,	Pluto	Press,	2009);	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything:	Capitalism	vs.	The	
Climate,	chapter	12.		23	Contraction	and	convergence	(C&C)	was	developed	before	the	popularization	of	the	
carbon	budget	approach	to	understanding	the	climate	crisis,	which	is	why	it	tended	to	be	concerned	with	finding	a	(near-term)	per	capita	greenhouse	gas	emissions	stabilization	level.	But	the	carbon	
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Greenhouse	Development	Rights	(GDR)	offers	an	index	for	assigning	duties	(either	for	mitigation	or	adaptation)	to	a	nation	according	to	a	blend	of	capacity—the	proportion	of	the	population	with	income	above	a	certain	amount	sufficient	for	meeting	basic	needs—and	responsibility—the	amount	of	greenhouse	gas	emitted	since	1990.24	(Oxfam’s	Adaptation	Funding	Index	uses	factors	similar	to	that	of	Baer	et	al.	for	determining	adaptation	duties.25)	C&C	and	GDR	are	among	the	most	well	known	frameworks,	but	there	are	others.26	Recently,	some	have	begun	to	look	towards	the	emissions	not	of	rich	countries,	but	of	richer	individuals,	accounting	for	how	highly	economically	unequal	developing	countries	will	contain	a	coterie	of	individuals	living	extremely	high-carbon	lifestyles.27		
A2)	Accepting	Fair	Duties.	If	determining	fair	duties	is	one	challenge	for	justice,	getting	parties	to	not	only	agree	to	but	also	abide	by	them	is	a	different	one	entirely.	The	UNFCCC	negotiation	process	has	never	succeeded	in	setting	the	world	onto	emissions	reduction	pathways	that	are	both	(1)	equitable	and	(2)	capable	of	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					budget	approach	shows	that	there	is	only	a	limited	amount	of	carbon	that	humans	can	ever	emit,	a	point	that	will	be	reached	very	soon	(see	discussion	in	chapter	3);	after	that,	emissions	must	reach	zero	(rather	than	become	stabilized	at	some	non-zero	amount)	to	prevent	further	climate	change.	Recent	work	by	Gignac	and	Matthews	attempts	to	reconcile	C&C	with	the	need	to	permanently	cap	total	emissions	while	also	taking	into	account	historical	responsibility,	something	that	many	C&C	proposals	fail	to	do.	In	their	framework,	countries	with	actual	per	capita	emissions	above	hypothetical	equal	per	capita	emissions	accumulate	over	time	a	carbon	debt	that	can	be	repaid	in	several	ways.	See	Renaud	Gignac	and	H	Damon	Matthews,	“Allocating	a	2˚C	cumulative	budget	to	countries,”	Environmental	Research	Letters	10	(2015)	and	H.	Damon	Matthews,	“Quantifying	historical	carbon	and	climate	debts	among	nations,”	Nature	Climate	Change	6	(2016).	24	Paul	Baer,	Tom	Athanasiou,	Sivan	Kartha,	and	Eric	Kemp-Benedict,	“Greenhouse	Development	Rights:	A	Framework	for	Climate	Protection	That	Is	More	Fair	Than	Equal	Per	Capita	Emissions	Rights,”	in	Climate	Ethics:	Essential	Readings,	eds.,	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	Simon	Caney,	Dale	Jamieson,	and	Henry	Shue	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010).		25	Oxfam,	Adapting	to	climate	change:	What’s	needed	in	poor	countries,	and	who	should	pay,	Oxfam	Briefing	Paper	104	(2007).		26	For	example,	Raupach	et	al.	present	a	formula	for	calculating	emissions	quotas	based	upon	blending	two	sharing	principles—inertia	(current	emissions)	and	equity	(population)—and	also	consider	including	gross	domestic	product,	historical	emissions,	and	consumption-based	emissions.	Michael	R.	Raupach	et	al.,	“Sharing	a	quota	on	cumulative	carbon	emissions,”	Nature	Climate	Change	4	(2014),	873-879.		27	Lucas	Chancel	and	Thomas	Piketty,	Carbon	and	inequality:	from	Kyoto	to	Paris	(Paris	School	of	Economics:	2015).	
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avoiding	dangerous	climate	change.	The	closest	the	world	came	to	an	equitable	agreement	on	emissions	reductions	was	under	the	1997	Kyoto	Protocol,	which	legally	bound	developed	industrial	countries	to	reducing	emissions	by	an	average	of	5%	relative	to	1990	levels.	But	several	major	developed	countries	failed	to	ever	meet	those	targets,	while	the	US,	historically	the	world’s	biggest	polluter,	failed	to	ratify	the	Protocol	altogether.28	The	new	model	of	international	agreements	based	on	voluntary	emissions-reductions	and	climate	financing	pledges	(discussed	in	detail	in	chapter	2)	has	not	really	addressed	the	matter.	If	not	improved	upon,	current	emission	pledges	made	under	the	2015	Paris	Agreement	would	lead	to	a	world-ending	temperature	rise	of	3.5˚C	by	2100,	as	noted	above.29	By	2020,	developed	countries	are	supposed	to	see	$100bn	per	year	“mobilized”	from	“a	wide	variety	of	sources,	public	and	private,	bilateral	and	multilateral,	including	alternative	sources	of	finance”	towards	climate	initiatives	in	the	south.30	At	the	time	of	writing,	pledges	towards	the	Fund	had	reached	a	mere	$10bn.31	In	framing	as	a	matter	of	climate	justice	the	inability	or	unwillingness	of	rich	countries	to	set	and	abide	by	ambitious	targets,	A2	draws	attention	to	possible	reasons	for	this	inability	or	unwillingness,	which	might	include	the	absence	of	a	strong	and	persistent	enough	democratic	climate	movement;	dysfunctional	democratic	institutions;	fossil	fuel	industry	influence	on	democracy	through	contributions	to	pro-industry	politicians	or	climate	deniers	(see	E1	below);	the	
																																								 																					
28	On	how	well	Kyoto	signatories	met	their	targets,	see	Quirin	Schiermeier,	“The	Kyoto	Protocol:	Hot	air,”	Nature	491	vol.	7426	(2012),	656-658.		29	Joe	Romm,	“Misleading	U.N.	Report	Confuses	Media	On	Paris	Climate	Talks,”	Climate	
Progress,	November	3,	2015,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/11/03/3718146/misleading-un-report-confuses-media-paris-climate-talks/.		Different	potential	temperature	rises	resulting	from	current	INDCs	were	reported	in	the	media,	the	most	widely	quoted	being	2.7˚C.	For	some	discussion,	see	Kelly	Levin	and	Taryn	Fransen,	“INSIDER:	Why	Are	INDC	Studies	Reaching	Different	Temperature	Estimates?”	World	Resources	
Institute,	November	9,	2015,	http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/11/insider-why-are-indc-studies-reaching-different-temperature-estimates	30	UNFCCC,	Copenhagen	Accord,	7.		31	Green	Climate	Fund,	“Status	of	Pledges	and	Contributions	made	to	the	Green	Climate	Fund,”	May	27,	2016,	http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24868/	Status_of_Pledges__2016.1.15_.pdf/278bca2f-9672-4cef-a917-a637dbb46591	
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resistance	of	privileged	populations	or	classes	to	giving	up	fossil	fuels	and	attendant	luxuries	and	hyperconsumption;	or	(neoliberal)	capitalism	and	the	underfunding	of	the	public	sphere	(see	E3	below).		A2	also	demands	consideration	of	the	nature	of	the	global	climate	agreement.	The	2015	UNFCCC	Paris	Agreement	was	controversial	because	it	did	not	legally	bind	countries	to	meeting	their	proposed	emissions	reductions	or	funding	targets.	After	all,	duties	of	justice	are	obligatory,	not	voluntary,	and	so	require	an	institutional	arrangement	capable	of	enforcing	them.			 B)	Who	will	be	impacted	and	why?		That	first	family	of	climate	injustices	drew	attention	to	responsibilities	and	duties.	A	second	family	of	climate	injustices	arises	from	how	climate	change	will	unevenly	affect	people.	The	nature	of	these	uneven	impacts	raises	other	matters	for	justice.			
B1)	Differential	vulnerability.	The	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	defines	vulnerability	as			 [T]he	propensity	or	predisposition	to	be	adversely	affected.	Such	predisposition	constitutes	an	internal	characteristic	of	the	affected	element.	In	the	field	of	disaster	risk,	this	includes	the	characteristics	of	a	person	or	group	and	their	situation	that	influences	their	capacity	to	anticipate,	cope	with,	resist,	and	recover	from	the	adverse	effects	of	physical	events.	Vulnerability	is	a	result	of	diverse	historical,	social,	economic,	political,	cultural,	institutional,	natural	resource,	and	environmental	conditions	and	processes.32		
																																								 																					
32	IPCC,	“Climate	Change:	New	Dimensions	in	Disaster	Risk,	Exposure	Vulnerability,	and	Resilience,”	in	Managing	the	Risks	of	Extreme	Events	and	Disasters	to	Advance	Climate	Change	
Adaptation,	ed.	C.B.	Field,	V.	Barros,	T.F.	Stocker,	D.	Qin,	D.J.	Dokken,	K.L.	Ebi,	M.D.	Mastrandrea,	K.J.	Mach,	G.-K.	Plattner,	S.K.	Allen,	M.	Tignor,	&	P.M.	Midgley.	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012),	25-64:	33.	This	definition	replaces	the	IPCC’s	earlier	one,	which	made	only	implicit	reference	to	social	factors	and	stressed	the	role	of	physical	events.	The	newer	definition	emphasizes	the	social	context	explicitly,	and	vulnerability	can	be	understood	independently	of	physical	events	(see	ibid,	33).	It	is	this	definition	of	vulnerability	that	is	meant	in	this	dissertation.		
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Let	us	here	distinguish	between	two	major	scales	in	which	difference	in	vulnerability	occurs:	(1)	at	a	macro	scale	between	the	Global	North	and	the	rest	on	the	one	hand	and	(2)	on	a	micro	scale	internal	to	societies.		Countries	throughout	the	Global	South	as	well	as	Indigenous	communities	are	projected	to	be	those	with	the	highest	degree	of	vulnerability	to	sea-level	rise,	drought,	extreme	storms,	heavy	precipitation,	etc.	and	all	their	attendant	effects	on	food	and	water	security,	sanitation,	housing,	and	so	forth.33	But	due	to	economic	and	political	marginalization,	these	are	also	communities	with	lower	capacity	to	adapt	to	climate	change.34	As	Hanna	Reid	sums	it	up	in	a	book	surveying	the	impacts	of	climate	change	on	developing	countries,																																									 																					
33	For	a	general	overview,	see	IPCC,	“Determinants	of	risk:	exposure	and	vulnerability,”	in:	
Managing	the	Risks	of	Extreme	Events	and	Disasters	to	Advance	Climate	Change	Adaptation,	ed.	Field,	et	al.	(Cambridge,	MA:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012),	80-89;	on	Indigenous	peoples	and	climate	change,	see	Douglas	Nakashima	et	al.,	Weathering	Uncertainty:	Traditional	Knowledge	for	Climate	
Change	Assessment	and	Adaptation,	(Paris,	UNESCO,	and	Darwin:	United	Nations	University,	2012);	There	are,	additionally,	several	vulnerability	indexes.	Risk	analysis	company	Maplecroft	issues	an	annual	one,	but	behind	a	paywall,	making	it	difficult	to	look	at	its	complete	results	and	methodology.	Its	2015	index	has	Chad,	Bangladesh,	Niger,	Haiti	and	Central	African	Republic—all	developing	countries—as	the	five	“worst	performing”	countries.	Europe	and	North	America	face	the	lowest	average	risk	scores	(Maplecroft,	“Climate	Change	Vulnerability	Index	2016,”	(2015)	available	on	Reliefweb	at	http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/	files/resources/Verisk_Maplecroft_	Climate_	Change_Vulnerability_Index_2016_Infographic.pdf.);	Germanwatch	annually	issues	its	Global	Climate	Risk	Index	report.	Its	2016	report	finds	that	9	of	the	10	countries	most	affected	by	heavy	weather	events	between	1995	and	2014	were	all	developing	countries	in	the	low-	to	middle-income	range.	Only	Thailand	was	in	the	upper	middle-income	strata.	Sönke	Kreft,	David	Eckstein,	Lukas	Dorsch	&	Livia	Fischer,	Global	Climate	Risk	Index	2016:	Who	Suffers	Most	From	Extreme	
Weather	Events?	Weather-related	Loss	Events	in	2014	and	1995	to	2014	(Germanwatch,	2016).	Moody’s	investor	service	recently	issued	a	report	on	climate	vulnerability	(also	behind	a	paywall	for	$750).	For	a	review,	see	Ian	Johnston,	"Map	shows	how	climate	change	will	hit	the	economies	of	the	world's	poorest	countries	hardest,"	Independent,	November	7,	2016,	http://www.independent.co.uk/	environment/climate-change-poor-countries-world-hit-hardest-affected-india-ethiopia-kenya-moodys-a7403076.html	Additionally,	there	have	been	attempts	to	visualize	differences	between	countries	in	emissions	and	vulnerability	to	climate	impacts.	Rather	than	sizing	countries	according	to	their	geographical	area,	the	Carbon	Map	offers	maps	with	countries	sized	according	to	factors	like	population,	wealth,	levels	of	poverty,	greenhouse	gas	emissions,	etc.	The	sizes	of	countries	in	the	map	showing	historical	responsibility	for	emissions	is	almost	the	exact	opposite	of	those	in	the	map	showing	vulnerability	to	climate	change	(http://www.carbonmap.org/).	34	In	the	adaptation	literature,	the	key	term	is	adaptive	capacity,	which	describes	the	ability	to	undertake	adaptation.	Poor	adaptive	capacity	can	contribute	to	vulnerability	(W.	Neil	Adger,	Jouni	Paavola,	and	Saleemul	Huq.	“Toward	Justice	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change”	in	Fairness	in	
Adaptation	to	Climate	Change,	W.	Neil	Adger,	Jouni	Paavola,	Saleemul	Huq,	and	M.	J.	Mace	(eds)	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2006),	5).	The	IPCC	(“Determinants	of	risk:	exposure	and	vulnerability,”	
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	 Developing	countries	are	particularly	vulnerable	to	climate	change,	as	are	the	poor	and	marginalised	within	both	developing	and	developed	countries.	Many	poor	countries	already	have	to	cope	with	issues	like	high	population	density,	few	resources,	poor	governance	and	a	high	incidence	of	disasters.	All	these	factors	limit	economic	growth	and	exacerbate	poverty	[…]	Changing	weather	conditions	threaten	the	livelihoods	of	the	poor,	who	more	often	than	not	depend	on	their	environment	more	than	do	the	wealthy.	Poor	people	suffer	most	when	the	natural	resources	they	need,	such	as	land,	water,	fisheries	and	forests,	become	degraded,	and	they	are	at	greater	risk	of	losing	their	jobs.	Climate	change	threatens	their	food	sources	and	nutrition,	as	well	as	reducing	the	number	of	livelihood	options	available	to	them.	They	often	live	in	fragile	ecosystems	that	are	prone	to	cyclones,	floods	or	droughts.	And	poor	people	are	particularly	at	risk	from	disasters	because	they	are	usually	unprepared	and	lack	adequate	shelter.	They	also	struggle	more	to	recover	from	disasters	when	they	occur.	Whilst	poor	people	have	a	wealth	of	understanding	and	knowledge	regarding	how	to	cope	with	climate	change,	their	ability	to	do	so	is	constrained	by	a	lack	of	resources	and	information	and	weak	institutions.	So	when	disaster	strikes,	many	are	pushed	beyond	their	capacity	to	cope	and	have	no	choice	but	to	migrate,	often	to	overcrowded	slums,	which	are	themselves	incredibly	vulnerable	to	climate	change.35		 Hypothetically,	even	if	climate	change	were	not	anthropocentric	or	not	disproportionately	caused	by	some	actors,	the	stark	difference	between	countries	in	vulnerability	to	climate	impacts	and	capability	to	adapt	to	them	would	alone	create	duties	for	those	with	the	greatest	capacity	to	help	the	vulnerable.	But	in	our	real	world	there	is	a	stark	inequality	in	countries’	historical	responsibility	for	contributions	to	the	climate	crisis,	and	those	countries	and	communities	that	have	done	the	least	to	cause	climate	change	are	the	ones	to	experience	its	most	severe	impacts.	Macro-level	differential	vulnerability	thus	draws	attention	to	A1	above	and	the	search	for	duties	owed	by	countries	with	a	higher	degree	of	(a)	capacity	to	provide	adaptation	resources	to	vulnerable	societies	and	(b)	historical	responsibility	for	emissions.	Probing	deeper,	it	could	also	call	for	duties	from	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					76)	notes	that	capacity	is	determined	by	factors	including	the	following:	“an	integrated	economy;	urbanization;	information	technology;	attention	to	human	rights;	agricultural	capacity;	strong	international	institutions;	access	to	insurance;	class	structure;	life	expectancy,	health,	and	well-being;	degree	of	urbanization;	access	to	public	health	facilities;	community	organizations;	existing	planning	regulations	at	national	and	local	levels;	institutional	and	decisionmaking	frameworks;	existing	warning	and	protection	from	natural	hazards;	and	good	governance.”	For	more	discussion	of	capacity	in	the	context	of	adaptation,	see	IPCC,	“Determinants	of	risk:	exposure	and	vulnerability,”	33,	72-76.		35	Hannah	Reid,	Climate	Change	and	Human	Development	(London:	Zed	Books,	2014),	10-11.	
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countries	whose	imperial	histories	contributed	to	the	impoverishment	and	underdevelopment	in	those	vulnerable	communities	(see	B2).		But	climate	change	will	not	simply	affect	northern	and	southern	nations	differently.	Differential	vulnerabilities	to	the	effects	of	climate	change	arise	because	of	existing	unjust	inequalities.	The	effects	of	climate	change	prey	on	social	inequities	due	to	age,	gender,	race,	Indigeneity,	income/class,	sector	of	work,	education,	mobility,	disability,	health,	immigration	status,	and	more.36	These	factors	combine	in	complex	ways	to	expose	people	to	risk	of	climate	impacts,	limit	their	adaptation	options,	and	constrain	their	ability	to	recover	following	a	disaster.	It	draws	attention	to	the	need	to	address	these	inequalities	now	as	part	of	any	response	to	climate	change.	It	also	puts	a	special	onus	on	adaptation	practitioners	and	policymakers	to	be	inclusive	and	participatory	in	their	planning;	it	would	be	an	example	of	procedural	injustice	to	deny	the	active	participation	of	the	most	vulnerable	in	deciding	on	adaption	policy	(see	D1).		
	
B2)	Colonial	Legacies,	environmental	injustice.	Colonial	pasts	conspire	in	several	ways	to	shape	today’s	world.	Roberts	and	Parks	observe	that	“the	way	a	country	is	‘inserted’	into	the	world	economy	bears	heavily	upon	its	ability	to	cope	with	climate-related	disasters.”37	They	argue	that	the	complex	social,	economic,	and	political	structural	changes	imposed	by	colonial	regimes	to	transform	colonies	into	extractive	economies	based	on	a	narrow	range	of	low-value	raw	and	barely	processed	materials	left	several	legacies	that	increase	vulnerability	to	climate	change	today.	These	legacies	include	high	levels	of	rural	vulnerability	to	disasters;	large	coastal	communities	exposed	to	flooding	and	storms;	high	economic	inequality,	which	leaves	the	poor	more	exposed	to	the	effects	of	disasters	and	less																																									 																					
36	See,	e.g.,	IPCC,	“Determinants	of	risk:	exposure	and	vulnerability.”	For	a	literature	review	of	climate	impacts	on	women,	see	Sam	Sellers,	Gender	and	Climate	Change:	A	Closer	Look	at	Existing	
Evidence	(Global	Gender	and	Climate	Alliance,	2016).	Available	at	http://gender-climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/GGCA-RP-110616.pdf	37	J.	Timmons	Roberts	and	Bradley	C.	Parks,	A	Climate	of	Injustice:	Global	Inequality,	North-
South	Politics,	and	Climate	Policy	(Cambridge,	MA:	The	MIT	Press,	2007),	104.		
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able	to	adapt	and	recover	after	they	hit;	and	weak	private	property	right	regimes	that	prevent	access	to	capital,	insurance,	and	credit,	and	that	drive	people	into	squatter	settlements	in	areas	at	high	risk	of	environmental	disaster.38	If	vulnerabilities	are	recognized	neither	as	natural	nor	random,	but	created,	this	draws	our	attention	to	past	impositions	on	the	South	that	the	North	might	now	need	to	consider	in	taking	on	its	climate	duties.	Climate	justice	would	then	mean	seeking	to	make	reparations	for	those	colonial	wrongs	and	to	ensure	that	the	voices	of	peoples	living	with	those	colonial	legacies	are	given	the	influence	they	deserve.			 Similar	colonial	legacies	have	left	indigenous	communities	and	communities	of	colour	located	on	the	frontlines	of	fossil	fuel	extraction,	refinement,	waste	dumping,	and	burning	for	power	generation.39	The	political	disenfranchisement	stemming	from	those	legacies	has	limited	their	influence	on	government	to	win	stronger	environmental	regulation,	move	the	sites	of	these	activities	elsewhere,	or	shut	them	down	altogether.	The	result	is	that	living	communities	become	sacrifice	
zones,	“places	that	are	exploited	for	the	purpose	of	supplying	cheap	fossil	fuels	and	electricity	to	power	the	worlds’	growing	energy	demands.”40	In	Canada,	fossil	fuel	companies	undermine	Indigenous	nations’	sovereignty	by	aggressively	pushing	a	variety	of	energy	projects	on	unceded	lands,	as	with	tar	sands	and	natural	gas	pipeline	projects	in	Unist’o’ten	in	British	Columbia,	and	by	so	degrading	some	lands	that	traditional	hunting	and	fishing	activities	are	endangered,	as	the	Beaver	Lake																																									 																					
38	Journalist	Christian	Parenti	contextualizes	climate	change	within	the	history	of	the	Cold	War	and	neoliberal	capitalism.	In	the	South,	the	North’s	Cold-War	proxy	battles	left	in	their	wake	armed	groups,	cheap	weapons,	smuggling	networks,	and	state	corruption	while	neoliberalism	led	to	economic	crises	and	inequality	in	developing	countries	and	withered	away	the	governments’	ability	to	pursue	development	goals.	Climate	change	is	now	acting	as	an	“accelerant”	to	the	problems	caused	by	this	fatal	combination,	creating	what	Parenti	calls	the	catastrophic	convergence.	Though	it	is	from	a	less	academically	rigorous	point	of	view,	it	was	a	rare	example	(at	least	from	what	I	have	seen)	of	concerns	about	Cold	War	and	neoliberal	history	and	the	effect	of	their	legacies	on	the	Global	South	in	a	time	of	climate	change	reaching	the	mainstream.	Christian	Parenti,	Tropic	of	Chaos:	Climate	Change	
and	the	New	Geography	of	Violence	(New	York:	Nation	Books,	2011),	8,	11	and	225-226.		39	Sharon	L.	Harlan,	David	N.	Pellow	and	J.	Timmons	Roberts	with	Shannon	Elizabeth	Bell,	William	G.	Holt,	and	Joane	Nagel,	“Climate	Justice	and	Inequality,"	in	Climate	Change	and	Society:	
Sociological	Perspectives,	eds.	Riley	E.	Dunlap	and	Robert	J.	Brulle,	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015),	137-139.			40	Ibid.,	137.			
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Cree	are	experiencing	in	their	territory	due	to	tar	sands	extraction.	Here,	climate	justice	draws	our	attention	to	how	the	same	processes	driving	climate	change	have	been	closely	tied	with	environmental	racism	and	injustice.	These	injustices	even	persist	under	one	major	proposed	response	to	climate	change;	carbon-offsetting	schemes	(discussed	below)	have	the	effect	of	prolonging	the	use	of	fossil	fuels,	prolonging	in	turn	their	extraction	(and	their	refinement	near	poor	communities,	communities	of	colour,	and	Indigenous	communities)	so	do	nothing	to	eliminate	these	wrongs.	
	
B3)	Fossil	Fuel	Workers.	The	necessary	shift	away	from	fossil	fuels	as	the	primary	source	of	the	world’s	energy	mix	will	have	significant	consequences	for	workers	in	the	industry.41	But	this	shift	cannot	be	one	to	leave	workers	without	an	alternative	means	of	receiving	income,	a	challenging	program	given	that	many	of	them	will	have	years	of	experience	and	training	primarily	in	the	fossil	fuels	sector.	There	must	come	what	is	frequently	referred	to	as	a	“just	transition”	where	workers	can	receive	the	training	and	means	to	successfully	shift	out	of	the	fossil	fuel	sector	and	into	another,	the	renewable	energy	industry	the	most	oft-cited	candidate.	A	series	of	publications	on	climate	justice	from	the	Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives	focuses	on	this	just	transition	for	workers.42		 																																										 																					
41	Fossil	fuels	currently	make	up	around	80%	of	the	world’s	total	primary	energy	supply.	Coal	accounts	for	around	29%,	oil	30%,	and	natural	gas	21%.	Renewables	account	for	about	14%	of	the	global	primary	energy	mix	with	hydro	accounting	for	the	bulk	and	around	1%	from	solar,	geothermal,	and	wind.	Amounts	calculated	from	2013	figures	in	IEA,	Key	World	Statistics	2015	(IEA,	2015),	37.	Marginally	different	figures	are	given	in	IEA,	Key	Renewables	Trends:	Excerpt	from	
‘Renewables	Information’	(IEA	2015),	3,	https://www.iea.org/publications/	freepublications/publication/RENTEXT2015_PARTIIExcerpt.pdf	42	See	Karen	Cooling,	Marc	Lee,	Shannon	Daub,	and	Jessie	Singer,	Just	Transition:	Creating	a	
green	social	contract	for	BC’s	resource	workers	(Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives,	2015),	https://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/BC%20Office/2015/01/ccpa-bc_JustTransition_web.pdf	
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	C)	What	is	the	moral	significance	of	climate	impacts?		 At	the	most	basic	level,	identifying	reasons	for	concern	about	climate	change	consists	of	enumerating	its	impacts	on	human	systems.	This	would	include	effects	like	loss	of	life,	property,	or	shelter	from	climate	disasters;	food	and	water	insecurity;	spread	of	disease;	impelled	migration	or	forcible	displacement;	heightened	risk	of	instability,	conflict,	or	war,	etc.43	The	wrongs	largely	speak	for	themselves	and	often	tend	to	be	invoked	without	requiring	further	interpretation	or	elaboration.	But	to	discuss	these	wrongs	as	only	impacts,	severe	as	they	are,	and	let	them	speak	for	themselves	is,	if	not	morally	detached,	morally	superficial.	A	justice	lens	allows	and	even	urges	us	to	take	a	deeper	look,	to	investigate	why	these	impacts	are	morally	severe	and	detestable,	and	the	nuances	that	just	responses	must	adopt.	That	is	what	this	third	family	of	moral	concerns	addresses.			
C1)	Violations	of	human	rights/Violence.	Climate	change	can	be	declared	a	matter	of	moral	concern	because	it	will	affect	human	rights.	The	United	Nations	Environment	Programme	(UNEP)	identifies	three	ways	this	can	occur:	(a)	through	climate	impacts	on	ecosystems,	natural	resources,	physical	infrastructure,	and	human	settlements;	(b)	through	poorly	designed	climate	adaptation	and	mitigation	responses;	and	(c)	through	the	deployment	of	geoengineering	technologies.	Together	they	affect	human	rights	to	food,	water	and	sanitation,	health,	housing,	property,	self-determination,	mobility,	and	an	adequate	standard	of	living.44		Human	rights	seek	to	provide	a	minimum	standard	protecting	the	dignity	and	equality	of	human	beings.	Which	rights	should	be	included	within	the	human	
																																								 																					
43	For	an	overview	of	these	impacts,	see	e.g.	IPCC,	“Summary	for	policymakers”	and	“Human	Security”	(chapter	12),	in	Climate	Change	2014:	Impacts,	Adaptation,	and	Vulnerability.	Contribution	of	
Working	Group	II	to	the	Fifth	Assessment	Report	of	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change,	ed.	Field	et	al.	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).		44	UNEP,	Climate	Change	and	Human	Rights	(UNEP	and	Columbia	Law	School:	2015),	2-10.	
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rights	canon	becomes,	to	be	sure,	contentious	past	a	certain	point.45	Caney	argues	that	taking	even	a	small	bundle	of	uncontroversial	rights—the	right	to	life,	the	right	to	health,	and	the	right	to	subsistence,	even	when	each	is	defined	minimally—suffices	to	recast	the	way	we	understand	climate	duties	in	several	ways.	For	one,	a	human	rights	approach	exposes	the	weakness	of	arguments	claiming	climate	action	should	not	be	taken	because	it	is	too	expensive:	human	rights	take	precedence	over	cost-benefit	analysis.46	Second,	the	approach	also	expands	the	climate	response	beyond	mere	adaptation	and	mitigation,	entitling	people	wronged	by	climate	change	to	compensation.	Finally,	if	these	human	rights	should	not	be	violated	due	to	the	effects	of	climate	change,	it	follows	that	they	should	not	be	violated	as	part	of	any	response	to	climate	change.47		A	related,	if	slightly	different,	way	to	identify	a	moral	wrong	of	climate	change	is	to	see	it	as	a	species	of	violence.	Violence	is	the	supreme	form	of	interference	in	a	person’s	or	community’s	ability	to	pursue	the	human	good.	Rob	Nixon	counts	climate	change	among	the	phenomena	he	names	slow	violence,	“a	violence	that	occurs	gradually	and	out	of	sight,	a	violence	of	delayed	destruction	that	is	dispersed	across	time	and	space,	an	attritional	violence	that	is	typically	not	viewed	as	violence	at	all.”48	Rebecca	Solnit	tells	us	“climate	change	is	itself	violence.	Extreme,	horrific,	longterm,	widespread	violence”	of	an	industrial	and	systemic	
																																								 																					
45	Thanks	to	Dr.	Ellie	Perkins’	comments	raising	the	point	that	collective	or	community	rights	do	not	tend	to	be	counted	within	the	human	rights	canon.	My	intention	in	C1	is	to	make	the	case	that	climate	change	constitutes	a	violation	of	human	rights—even	when	they	are	defined	minimally—without	enumerating	all	of	the	human	rights	climate	change	violates.	If	collective	or	community	rights	are	counted	among	the	canon	(as	I	agree	they	should	be),	climate	change	would	surely	constitute	an	even	greater	violation	of	human	rights.		46	Caney	is	not	alone	in	pointing	to	the	importance	of	rights.	See	also	Sheila	Watt-Cloutier,	
The	Right	to	be	Cold:	One	Woman’s	Story	of	Protecting	her	Culture,	the	Arctic	and	the	Whole	Planet	(Toronto:	Allen	Lane,	2015),	xii-xiii.		47	Simon	Caney,	“Climate	Change,	Human	Rights,	and	Moral	Thresholds,”	in	Climate	Ethics:	
Essential	Readings,	eds.,	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	Simon	Caney,	Dale	Jamieson,	and	Henry	Shue	(New	York,	NY:	Oxford	University	Press,	2010),	163-173.	48	Rob	Nixon,	Slow	Violence	and	the	Environmentalism	of	the	Poor	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2011),	2.		
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nature,	committed	against	the	poor,	intentionally	and	aggressively	in	the	case	of	fossil	fuel	companies	(thus	relating	to	B1	above	and	E1	below).49		To	invoke	the	term	violence	evokes	something	more	egregious	and	visceral	than	a	violation	of	human	rights.	But	they	are	similar	in	that	both	focus	urgent	attention	on	who	experiences	severe	harm	and	how	it	can	be	stopped.	And	both	prioritize	a	rapid,	ambitious,	and	comprehensive	response	to	climate	change	over	other	considerations.	As	Solnit	put	it,	“Once	we	call	[climate	change]	by	name,	we	can	start	having	a	real	conversation	about	our	priorities	and	values.”50			C2)	Challenging	development	progress.	Like	rights,	development	is	another	contested	term.	But	if	it	is	understood	as	the	process	required	for	improving	the	human	condition	and	allowing	the	world’s	poorest	to	pursue	the	human	good,	then	its	interruption	and	reversal	by	climate	change	surely	constitutes	an	injustice.	The	wide-ranging	effects	of	climate	change	threaten	to	not	only	make	development	more	difficult	to	achieve,	but	to	undo	much	of	the	progress	achieved	in	alleviating	poverty,	reducing	malnutrition,	providing	water	and	sanitation,	and	so	on—all	necessary	to	pursue	the	good.51	As	the	United	Nations	Development	Programme’s	2007/2008	
																																								 																					
49	Rebecca	Solnit,	“Call	climate	change	what	it	is:	violence,”	Guardian,	April	7,	2014,	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/07/climate-change-violence-occupy-earth	50	In	the	wake	of	the	November	2015	terrorist	attacks,	the	French	government	controversially	banned	the	marches	planned	for	the	major	United	Nations	climate	negotiations	a	few	weeks	later.	Naomi	Klein	condemned	the	decision	as	one	prioritizing	the	security	of	the	elite	over	the	security	of	people	using	the	march	as	a	rare	opportunity	to	be	heard	in	their	fight	for	survival.	Drawing	on	Solnit,	she	wrote	that	climate	change	“is	a	violence	so	large,	so	global	and	inflicted	against	so	many	temporalities	simultaneously	(ancient	cultures,	present	lives,	future	potential)	that	there	is	not	yet	a	word	capable	of	containing	its	monstrousness.	And	using	acts	of	violence	to	silence	the	voices	of	those	who	are	most	vulnerable	to	climate	violence	is	yet	more	violence.”	Naomi	Klein,	“What’s	really	at	stake	at	the	Paris	climate	conference	now	marches	are	banned,”	Guardian,	November	20,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/	2015/nov/20/paris-climate-talks-protesters-hollande-violence	51	For	an	excellent	survey	compiling	the	Up	in	Smoke	reports	on	climate	change	and	development	published	by	the	International	Institute	for	Environment	and	Development	see	Reid,	
Climate	Change	and	Human	Development.	For	an	earlier	but	influential	look	at	how	climate	change	will	affect	development,	see	chapter	4	of	Nicholas	Stern,	Stern	Review:	The	Economics	of	Climate	
Change	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2007).		
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Human	Development	Report	focused	on	the	effects	of	climate	change	on	development	put	it,			All	development	is	ultimately	about	expanding	human	potential	and	enlarging	human	freedom.	It	is	about	people	developing	the	capabilities	that	empower	them	to	make	choices	and	to	lead	lives	that	they	value.	Climate	change	threatens	to	erode	human	freedoms	and	limit	choice.	It	calls	into	question	the	Enlightenment	principle	that	human	progress	will	make	the	future	look	better	than	the	past.52		Invoking	this	wrong	keeps	focus	on	the	poor	in	the	poorest	nations	and	how	their	prospects	to	realize	the	human	good,	however	defined,	will	be	undermined	by	climate	change.	It	also	draws	our	attention	to	how	climate	change	undoes	tremendous	efforts	over	decades	to	address	the	effects	of	poverty;	the	key	finding	of	a	recent	in-depth	report	from	the	Lancet	and	University	College	London	was	that	“The	threat	to	human	health	from	climate	change	is	so	great	that	it	could	undermine	the	last	fifty	years	of	gains	in	development	and	global	health.”53	The	World	Bank	estimates	that	without	serious	action	on	climate	change	and	in	the	absence	of	“rapid	and	inclusive”	development,	35-122	million	additional	people	could	find	themselves	in	poverty	by	2030.54	A	second	matter	concerning	climate	change	and	development	is	how	what	some	call	the	“right	to	development”	can	be	protected	at	the	same	time	that	the	world	phases	out	fossil	fuels.55	How	are	poor	countries	to	provide	energy	for	their																																									 																					
52	United	Nations	Development	Programme,	Fighting	Climate	Change:	Human	Solidarity	in	a	
Divided	World,	Human	Development	Report	2007/2008,	1.		53	These	health	effects	of	climate	change	will	not	only	be	visited	directly	upon	populations	through	disruptions	to	food	systems,	morbidity,	etc.,	but	also	through	indirect	impacts	of	social	insecurity	and	compelled	migration.	“The	Lancet:	Climate	change	threatens	to	undermine	the	last	half	century	of	health	gains,”	Lancet	Commission	on	Health	and	Climate,	https://climatehealthcommission.	files.wordpress.com/2015/04/press-release-health-and-climate-commission.pdf	54	The	authors	of	the	report	consider	even	this	figure	to	likely	be	an	underestimate.	(See	World	Bank,	Shock	Waves:	Managing	the	Impacts	of	Climate	Change	on	Poverty	(2015),	12-15.)	Even	in	the	US,	a	government	report	found	that	climate	change	will	threaten	the	health	of	every	American.	Suzanne	Goldenberg,	“Climate	change	threat	to	public	health	worse	than	polio,	White	House	warns,”	
Guardian,	April	4,	2016,	http://www.theguardian.com/	environment/2016/apr/04/climate-change-public-health-threat-white-house-report	55	A	prominent	example	of	how	sustainable	development	is	conceived	as	a	right	(and	one	that	requires	special	protection	in	the	response	to	climate	change)	comes	from	Ecoequity’s	Greenhouse	Development	Rights.	(See,	e.g.,	Paul	Baer,	Tom	Athanasiou,	Sivan	Kartha	and	Eric	Kemp-
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economic	development?	How	will	rich	countries	transfer	to	them	the	means	to	increase	the	availability	of	renewable	energy?	This	draws	our	attention	to	the	importance	of	provisions	in	the	current	global	climate	regime	specifying	the	nature	and	amount	of	north-south	financial	transfers	and	whether	or	not	the	duties	described	therein	are	being	met,	thus	relating	to	C1	and	C2	described	below.			
C3)	Burdening	Communities	and	Threatening	Ways	of	Life.	Climate	change	threatens	to	radically	and	rapidly	transform	the	environmental	conditions	on	which	a	variety	of	traditional	and	indigenous	lifestyles	depend.	In	low-lying	developing	island	states,	sea-level	rise	will	drown	the	environments	entirely.			Inuit	environmental	activist	Sheila	Watt-Cloutier	describes	a	“right	to	be	cold.”	The	arctic	climate	is	the	one	under	which	Inuit	culture	has	thrived	for	thousands	of	years,	and	Watt-Cloutier	describes	it	as	an	educational	institution	where	people	learn	a	variety	of	invaluable	life	skills	through	cultural	practices	adapted	to	the	environment.	Hunters,	for	instance,	learn	not	just	to	hunt,	but	also	to	develop	patience,	endurance,	and	the	ability	to	make	decisions	under	pressure.	She	has	described	climate	impacts	in	the	Arctic	in	terms	that	non-Inuit	people	of	the	south	can	comprehend,	asking	audience	members	to	imagine	all	post-secondary	institutions	suddenly	beginning	to	crumble.56		Serious	questions	arise	about	how	and	whether,	in	the	case	of	mass	displacement,	relocation,	or	drastic	environmental	change,	cultural	integrity	can	be	maintained.	What	is	unique	about	this	wrong	is	that	it	cannot	be	redressed—at	least	not	fully—through	compensation;	it	has	to	be	stopped.	That	adds	an	extra	onus	to	take	more	ambitious	action	on	climate	change,	and	also	directs	attention	to	the																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					Benedict,	The	Greenhouse	Development	Rights	Framework:	The	right	to	development	in	a	climate	
constrained	world	(2008);	See	also,	chapter	5	in	Darrell	Moellendorf,	The	Moral	Challenge	of	
Dangerous	Climate	Change:	Values,	Poverty,	and	Policy	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014).		 56	Sheila	Watt-Cloutier,	The	Right	to	be	Cold:	One	Woman’s	Story	of	Protecting	her	Culture,	the	
Arctic	and	the	Whole	Planet,	(Toronto:	Allen	Lane,	2015);	Sheila	Watt-Cloutier,	Planet	IndigenUS:	In	Conversation	with	Sheila	Watt-Cloutier,	Planet	IndigenUS	and	International	Festival	of	Authors	(IFOA)	Weekly,	Harbourfront	Centre,	Toronto,	August	4,	2015.		
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power	differential	at	play	in	international	climate	negotiations:	how	much	say	do	those	cultures	facing	existential	risks	hold	(D1)?		However,	loss	of	a	way	of	life	is	not	in	every	case	inevitable	and	to	suggest	otherwise	can	risk	ignoring	people’s	agency	in	their	ability	to	take	action	or	even	fight	for	mitigation	and	adaptation	action	from	polluting	actors.	The	Pacific	Climate	Warriors,	a	network	of	climate	activists	from	several	impacted	Pacific	islands,	have	taken	a	series	of	direct	actions	including	using	traditional	canoe	flotillas	to	blockade	coal	ships	under	the	banner	“We	are	not	drowning,	we	are	fighting!”	The	wrong	in	this	case	is	not	that	a	culture	now	verges	on	extinction	or	that	a	community	is	beyond	saving,	but	rather	that	its	members	have	had	the	burden	of	preserving	it	
imposed	upon	them	through	no	fault	of	their	own.	People	might	also	be	able	to	preserve	their	modes	of	life	and	wellbeing	through	adaptation	measures,	but	they	would	not	have	to	be	undertaking	adaptation	if	not	for	the	change	in	the	climate	caused	disproportionately	by	other	actors	(A1).	Speaking	of	indigenous	people’s	resilience,	Tom	Goldtooth,	Executive	Director	of	the	Indigenous	Environmental	Network,	states,	“We	have	certain	knowledge	that	we’re	able	to	adapt,	but	we	should	not	be	put	into	a	position	of	forced	adaptation	or	forced	change	[…]	Our	forecast	as	indigenous	people	is	that,	yes,	we	will	survive,	but	we	shouldn’t	have	to	go	through	all	these	difficulties	[…]	We	should	not	be	put	in	that	position.”	Goldtooth	also	notes	the	difficulty	of	migration	as	an	adaptation	measure	in	a	settler-colonial	context	(relating	to	B2	above).57		
C4)	The	human	good.	Justice	has	long	been	concerned	with	seeking	the	human	good,	that	highest	pursuit	or	condition	which	each	person	should	be	guaranteed	the	possibility	to	engage	in	or	achieve.	The	human	good	and	the	conditions	required	for	it	have	been	conceived	in	too	many	ways	to	go	into	detail	about	here,	but	authors	have	discussed	how	climate	change	presents	serious	threats	to	several	of	them,																																									 																					
57	Tom	Goodtooth,	“What	does	climate	change	mean	for	indigenous	communities?”	Youtube	video,	7:03,	uploaded	December	27,	2011	by	“One	World	TV,”	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFRxJFUefw8	
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whether	conceived	of	in	terms	of	capabilities	(or	flourishing),	sufficiency,	economic	growth	and	progress,	or	even	pursuit	of	scientific	knowledge	and	advancement.58	(I	would	also	include	here	concerns	about	how	severe	climate	change	would	destroy	conditions	for	human	civilization,	civilization	standing	in	as	shorthand	for	the	human	good.)			 D)	Whose	voices	are	heard?		A	fourth	category	of	moral	concerns	stems	from	how	those	who	are	and	will	be	most	severely	affected	by	climate	change	are	poorly	represented	in	climate	policy	discussions.			
D1)	Marginalization	in	participation,	representation,	influence.	Those	most	affected	by	climate	change	ought	to	have	a	high	degree	of	say	in	deciding	how	the	world	will	respond	and	through	what	measures.	But	it	is	the	representatives	from	the	richest	states	that	tend	to	have	the	most	influential	role	at	international	climate	negotiations.	Voices	from	grassroots	organizations,	peasant	movements,	vulnerable	communities	in	the	Global	South,	underserved	communities	of	colour	in	the	Global	North,	etc.,	tend	to	find	louder	expression	in	assemblies	and	marches	held	in	parallel	to—but	outside	of—the	official	climate	negotiations	(see	chapter	3	for	some	discussion).	But	it	is	not	simply	that	these	actors’	participation	is	suppressed.	Another	wrong	to	include	here	is	how	proposed	solutions	to	the	climate	crisis	from																																									 																					
58	On	capabilities	and	climate	change,	see	David	Schlosberg,	“Climate	Justice	Beyond	Equity:	The	Flourishing	of	Human	and	Non-Human	Communities,”	talk	presented	the	American	Political	Science	Association	annual	meeting,	Toronto,	Canada.	September	2009.	(See	also	the	2007/2008	Human	Development	Report	cited	in	C2	above.)	On	economic	growth	and	how	climate	change	could	affect	its	prospects,	the	classic	example	is	the	work	of	Nicholas	Stern,	particularly	Stern	Review:	The	
Economics	of	Climate	Change	(Cambridge	University	Press,	2007).	On	sufficiency,	see	Edward	A.	Page,	
Climate	Change,	Justice	and	Future	Generations	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2007).	Scientific-progress-
as-human-good	originates	from	an	unorthodox	source,	a	sub-genre	of	fiction	dealing	with	climate	change	called	“cli-fi,”	specifically	Kim	Stanley	Robinson’s	Science	in	the	Capital	trilogy	(i.e.,	40	Days	of	
Rain,	50	Degrees	Below,	and	60	Days	and	Counting)	in	which	one	of	the	main	protagonists	is	driven	to	“[save]	the	world	so	that	science	can	proceed.”		
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grassroots	organizations	are	left	out.	Groups	like	La	Via	Campesina	argue,	for	example,	that,	instead	of	being	rooted	in	the	same	profit-seeking	market-based	approaches	that	have	driven	the	climate	crisis,	climate	solutions	should	be	modelled	on	already	existing	life-modes	of	low-carbon	local	communities.59	Appeals	to	climate	justice	under	D1	highlight	a	wrong	committed	against	communities	with	fewer	resources	to	access	and	influence	centres	of	decision-making,	leaving	a	severe	disjuncture	between	degree	of	affectedness	and	ability	to	affect.			 It	is	a	clear	instance	of	procedural	injustice.	This	is	why,	in	the	realm	of	climate	change	adaptation,	Paavola,	Adger,	and	Huq	note	that	decisions	will	need	to	be	taken	in	processes	characterized	by	procedural	justice,	the	core	concerns	of	which	are	captured	in	the	following	questions:		“1.	Which	parties	and	whose	interests	are	recognized,	and	how,	in	planning	decision	making,	and	governance	of	adaptation?	2.	Which	parties	can	participate	in	planning,	decision	making,	and	governance	of	adaptation,	and	how?	3.	What	is	the	effective	distribution	of	power	in	planning,	decision	making,	and	governance	of	adaptation?”60			 D1	would	also	include	the	failure	of	ostensibly	democratic	institutions	to	be	accountable	to	the	demands	of	mass-based	movements	demanding	serious,	ambitious,	and	just	policies	responding	to	climate	change.	This	will	be	taken	up	further	in	chapters	3	and	4.			
D2)	Future	Generations.	Due	to	inertia	in	the	climate	system,	the	most	catastrophic	potential	effects	of	continued	dependence	on	fossil	fuels	will	be	in	the	future.	This	means	that	depending	on	decisions	taken	now,	members	of	coming	generations	face																																									 																					
59	In	anticipation	of	the	Paris	climate	meeting,	La	Via	Campesina	wrote,	“Food	Sovereignty—based	on	peasant	agroecology,	traditional	knowledge,	selecting,	saving	and	sharing	local	adoptive	seeds,	and	control	over	our	lands,	biodiversity,	waters,	and	territories—is	a	true,	viable,	and	just	solution	to	a	global	climate	crisis	caused	largely	by	TNCs.”	See,	La	Via	Campesina,	“Peasant	agriculture	is	a	true	solution	to	the	climate	crisis,”	September	3,	2015,	http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/actions-and-events-mainmenu-26/-climate-change-and-agrofuels-mainmenu-75/1853-peasant-agriculture-is-a-true-solution-to-the-climate-crisis	(Original:	http://www.nfu.ca/blog/ViaCampesina-COP21)	60	Paavola,	Adger,	and	Huq,	“Multifaceted	Justice	in	Adaptation	to	Climate	Change,”	268.	
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possibilities	of	living	in	drastically	different	worlds.	Climate	justice	here	directs	our	attention	to	the	responsibilities	current	generations	might	hold	towards	ensuring	a	habitable	and	flourishing	world	for	them	and	how	we	may	represent	their	interests	in	political	and	economic	systems	in	which	the	unborn	have	no	influence.61			
D3)	The	non-human.	The	non-human	world	can	also	be	deserving	of	climate	justice.	Schlosberg,	for	instance,	argues	this	to	be	the	case	following	from	the	capabilities	approach	to	justice.	Both	human	and	non-human	life	have	claims	to	justice	following	from	their	capability	to	exist	with	integrity.62	Susan	George	recently	coined	the	term	
geocide:	“the	collective	action	of	a	single	species	among	millions	of	other	species	which	is	changing	planet	Earth	to	the	point	that	it	can	become	unrecognisable	and	unfit	for	life.		This	species	is	committing	geocide	against	all	components	of	nature,	whether	microscopic	organisms,	plants,	animals	or	against	itself,	homo	sapiens,	humankind.”63	In	This	Changes	Everything,	Naomi	Klein	dedicates	probably	her	most	philosophical	chapter	to	the	question	of	how	our	economic	system	interrupts	life’s	ability	to	reproduce	and	writes	of	a	“right	to	regenerate.”64	The	2014	documentary	
Cowspiracy	linked	the	issues	in	a	different	way,	bringing	the	matter	of	the	livestock	industry’s	sizeable	greenhouse	gas	emissions	into	the	mainstream,	merging	ethical	concern	for	animal	life	and	welfare	with	concerns	about	climate	change.65		
																																								 																					
61	For	a	book-length	treatment,	see	Page,	Climate	Change,	Justice	and	Future	Generations,	2007.		 62	Schlosberg,	“Climate	Justice	Beyond	Equity:	The	Flourishing	of	Human	and	Non-Human	Communities.”	63	Susan	George,	"Committing	Geocide:	Climate	Change	And	Corporate	Capture"	(talk	presented	at	the	Seminar	of	the	International	Centre	for	the	Promotion	of	Human	Rights	[CIPDH]	and	UNESCO,	Buenos	Aires,	1-2	September,	2016).	Available	at	http://www.defenddemocracy.	press/committing-geocide-climate-change-corporate-capture-susan-george/	64	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything,	Chapter	13.		65	Unfortunately,	the	documentary	prominently	cites	a	flawed,	non-peer	reviewed	study	arguing	emissions	from	animal	agriculture	compose	about	half	of	all	human-caused	emissions,	a	staggering	overestimate.	See	Dana	Nuccitelli,	“How	much	does	animal	agriculture	and	eating	meat	contribute	to	global	warming?,”	Skeptical	Science,	November	30,	2015,	http://www.skepticalscience.com/how-much-meat-contribute-to-gw.html;	and	Cam	Fenton,	“#NotAllVegans,”	Medium,	December	1,	2015,	https://medium.com/@CamFenton/notallvegans-af89826d821f#.3yq8s17eu	
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The	2010	World	Peoples	Conference	on	Climate	Change	and	the	Rights	of	Mother	Earth	in	Cochabamaba	Bolivia	included	significant	input	from	indigenous	groups.	Participants	here	foregrounded	the	sacredness	of	the	natural	world	(which	they	recognized	by	referring	to	it	as	pachamama,	Mother	Earth)	and	saw	it	as	deserving	of	basic	rights.	It	suggests	an	approach	to	climate	justice	that	would	create	duties	to	protect	the	earth	in	recognition	of	its	sacred	status	in	a	number	of	worldviews.			 	E)	What	is	driving	the	crisis	and	preventing	responses?		A	final	family	recognizes	moral	concerns	built	into	the	logic	of	the	reigning	energy	and	economic	systems.			
E1)	The	Fossil	Fuel	Industry.	One	of	the	most	significant	developments	in	recent	years	is	how	a	large	part	of	the	climate	movement	has	directed	its	attention	towards	the	fossil	fuel	industry,	coming	to	understand	it	as	the	primary	enemy	in	the	fight	for	the	climate.	To	invoke	climate	justice	with	reference	to	the	fossil	fuel	industry	is	to	perceive	the	need	to	direct	moral	action	against	an	entire	sector	of	the	economy.	There	are	several	reasons	for	this.	First,	and	most	prominently,	the	logic	of	the	fossil	fuel	industry	business	model	absolutely	requires	the	destruction	of	the	climate:	fossil	fuel	companies’	value	is	based	on	the	reserves	that	they	hold	and	can	sell	in	the	market.	However,	they	currently	hold	more	in	their	reserves	than	can	ever	be	used	if	humanity	seeks	to	maintain	a	decent	chance	of	survival,	and	their	profit	model	demands	that	all	of	it	is	burned	and	that	new	stock	is	found	to	replace	it.66		
																																								 																					
66	See	the	section	on	divestment	in	chapter	3	for	more.	The	landmark	essay	that	brought	popular	attention	to	how	the	carbon	content	in	fossil	fuel	industry	reserves	greatly	exceeds	the	amount	of	carbon	that	can	still	be	“safely”	burned	was	Bill	McKibben,	“Global	Warming's	Terrifying	New	Math,”	Rolling	Stone,	July	19,	2012	http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719?page=3.	For	an	update	on	the	figures	therein,	see	Bill	Mckibben,	“Recalculating	the	Climate	Math,”	New	Republic,	September	22,	2016,	https://newrepublic.com/article/136987/recalculating-climate-math	
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	 Second,	and	related,	fossil	fuel	companies	have	been	aggressively	pushing	development	of	fossil	fuel	deposits	that	are	more	difficult	to	access	and	whose	production	carries	greater	risk	of	harms,	and	of	infrastructure	that	exposes	communities	to	risk	of	pipeline	spills	or	exploding	“bomb	trains”	as	oil	is	carried	by	rail.	All	of	this	has	involved	putting	pressure	on	governments	to	reduce	environmental	regulation	to	permit	oil	exploration,	production,	and	transportation	in	high-risk	areas.	As	noted	above,	it	fits	a	long	pattern	of	creating	“sacrifice	zones.”		Third,	governments	continue	to	give	the	industry	wrecking	the	climate	massive	subsidies.	There	are	several	major	estimates	for	the	size	of	contemporary	fossil	fuel	subsidies	ranging	from,	on	the	low	end,	billions	of	dollars	per	year	up	to	trillions	if	negative	externalities	are	included.67	These	subsidies	go	towards	the	industry	driving	the	crisis	and	benefiting	from	environmental	injustice	(recall	B3	above)	at	the	same	time	that	funds	are	desperately	needed	for	investing	in	post-carbon	energy	systems	and	social	infrastructure	or	for	paying	back	a	climate	or	ecological	debt.	Finally,	the	industry	has	poured	significant	funding	into	obstructing	climate	policy	by	sponsoring	climate	change	denier	organizations,	by	lobbying	policymakers	to	adopt	industry-friendly	policy,	and	supporting	pro-fossil	fuel	politicians.68		
																																								 																					
67	A	2012	study	from	the	OECD	found	that	between	2005-2011	its	member	states	gave	between	US$55-90	billion	per	year	in	fossil	fuel	subsidies	in	the	form	of	support	to	producers	and	tax	concessions	to	producers	and	consumers.	A	2015	International	Monetary	Fund	(IMF)	study,	meanwhile,	produces	much	higher	figures,	estimating	that	global	energy	subsidies	reached	$4.9	trillion	(6.5%	of	global	GDP)	in	2013,	and	by	2015	were	projected	to	reach	$5.3	trillion.	Notably,	the	latter	study	includes	negative	externalities—social	and	environmental	costs	not	reflected	in	the	market	price—as	subsidies.	See,	OECD,	Inventory	of	Estimated	Budgetary	Support	and	Tax	
Expenditures	for	Fossil	Fuels	2013	(2012);	and	David	Coady,	Ian	Parry,	Louis	Sears,	and	Baoping	Shang,	How	Large	Are	Global	Energy	Subsidies?	IMF	Working	Paper	(IMF	2015).	For	a	comparison	of	fossil	fuel	subsidy	estimates	and	their	different	methodologies,	see	Ambrus	Bárány	and	Dalia	Grigonytė,	Measuring	Fossil	Fuel	Subsidies	(European	Commission's	Directorate	General	for	Economic	and	Financial	Affairs	Economic	Brief	Issue	40,	2015).		68	“Dirty	Energy	Money,”	Oil	Change	International,	http://dirtyenergymoney.org/;	Mike	Gaworecki,	“How	Much	Are	Fossil	Fuel	Interests	Spending	to	Sway	Your	Vote	for	Congress?”	Desmog,	October	31,	2016,	http://www.desmogblog.com/2016/10/31/how-much-money-fossil-fuels-interests-have-spent-sway-your-vote-congress	
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E2)	“False	solutions.”	Climate	justice	can	also	apply	to	the	solutions	to	climate	change	that	are	being	proposed	under	that	capitalist	hegemony.	Rather	than	adopt	ambitious	policies	to	reduce	emissions,	developed	countries	have	turned	to	the	highly	controversial	emissions	reductions	schemes	of	emissions	trading	(“cap	and	trade”)—often	made	more	controversial	through	carbon	offsetting69—and	Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	(REDD+).70	These	kinds	of	solutions—and	often	included	alongside	them	are	carbon	capture	and	storage,	biofuels,	and	a	new	REDD-like	program	for	mangroves	and	sea	grasses	called	Blue	Carbon71—are	critiqued	for	trying	to	make	climate	solutions	accord	with	the	existing	economic	system	(“to	make	the	square	peg	of	the	climate	crisis	fit	into	the	round	hole	of	deregulated	capitalism, forever	touting	ways	for	the	problem	to	be	solved	by	the	market	itself,”	as	Naomi	Klein	puts	it72)	rather	than	adapting	our	economic	system	to	the	problem.	Drawing	attention	to	false	solutions	also	takes	note	of	the	persistent	role	of	ideological	and	systemic	factors	in	constraining	ambitious	responses	to	the	climate	crisis.	False	solutions	instead	prioritize	economic	growth	and	the	interests	of	the	economic	elite	while	doing	little	to	bring	down	emissions.			
E3)	Capitalism’s	Hegemony.	Climate	justice	has	also	been	used	as	a	way	of	critiquing	capitalism	in	the	context	of	the	climate	crisis.	Capitalism’s	grow-to-survive	logic	has	
																																								 																					
69	See,	e.g.,	Annie	Leonard,	“The	Story	of	Cap	&	Trade,”	Free	Range	Studios	(2009),	http://storyofstuff.org/movies/story-of-cap-and-trade/;	Tamra	Gilbertson	and	Oscar	Reyes,	Carbon	
Trading:	How	it	Works	and	Why	it	Fails	(Uppsala:	Dag	Hammarskjöld	Foundation,	2009);	and	Durban	Group	for	Climate	Justice,	“The	Durban	Declaration	on	Carbon	Trading,”	in	The	Global	Fight	for	
Climate	Justice:	Anticapitalist	Responses	to	Global	Warming	and	Environmental	Destruction,	ed.	Ian	Angus	(Nova	Scotia:	Fernwood	Publishing,	2011),	124-126.		70	See,	e.g.,	Tom	B.K.	Goldtooth,	“Why	REDD/REDD+	is	NOT	a	Solution,”	in	No	REDD:	A	
Reader,	eds.	Joanna	Cabello	and	Tamra	Gilbertson	(Indigenous	Environmental	Network	and	Carbon	Trade	Watch,	2010),	11-23,	http://noredd.makenoise.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/REDDreaderEN.pdf	71	Salena	Tramel,	“Land	and	Ocean	Grabs	Not	the	Solution	to	Climate	Change,”	The	World	
Post,	February	18,	2016,	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/salena-tramel/land-and-ocean-grabs-not-_b_9261814.html	72	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything,	20.		
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sharply	constrained	the	kinds	of	policies	governments	and	corporations	have	been	willing	to	adopt.	Neoliberal	capitalism	in	particular,	which	sharply	constrains	taxation	on	corporations	or	the	economic	elite	and	rejects	state	economic	planning,	has	significantly	defunded	the	public	sector	at	a	time	when	massive	investments	in	renewable	energy,	public	transit,	and	adaptation	projects	are	crucial.	Its	rejection	of	economic	planning	has	had	a	chilling	effect	on	the	plans	governments	have	been	willing	to	adopt	and	their	stringency.73		At	a	historical	moment	when	capitalism’s	neoliberal	form	has	entailed	economic	crises,	sharp	economic	inequality,	austerity	in	public	spending,	and	increasing	precarity	in	working	life,	its	failure	to	address	climate	change	acts	as	a	double-condemnation	of	the	system.	Not	only	might	alternative	economic	arrangements	better	address	climate	change,	but	they	can	also	create	fairer	and	more	meaningful	modes	of	life.	According	to	this	argument,	an	insistence	on	resolving	climate	change	through	capitalism	is	thus	irrational	and	immoral.	Of	course,	drawing	attention	to	this	aspect	of	climate	justice	raises	questions	over	how	much	of	capitalism	can	be	challenged	in	time	to	address	the	crisis.74	Rooting	the	problem	of	climate	change	in	capitalism	has	also	allowed	the	climate	movement	to	merge	with	parts	of	the	global	justice	movement,	which	adopts	a	similar	lens.		
	
E4)	Alternative	Social	Arrangements:	System	Change,	Not	Climate	Change.	Under	the	liberal	ideological	order	dominant	in	today’s	world,	the	good	life	is	to	be	pursued	through	the	possibilities	provided	in	the	life	space	created	by	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy,	but	the	institutional	arrangements	that	realize	this	social	form	place	serious	constraints	on	the	climate	responses	being	seriously	considered	by	governments.	Are	there	competing	visions	of	how	the	good	life	can	be	pursued	that	
																																								 																					
73	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything.			74	Naomi	Klein,	“No,	We	Don’t	Need	to	Ditch/Slay/Kill	Capitalism	Before	We	Can	Fight	Climate	Change.	But	We	Sure	As	Hell	Need	To	Challenge	It,”	The	Leap	Blog,	September	27,	2014,	http://theleapblog.org/no-we-dont-need-to-ditchslaykill-capitalism-before-we-can-fight-climate-change-but-we-sure-as-hell-need-to-challenge-it/	
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simultaneously	make	fairer	and	fuller	climate	responses	more	likely?	What	would	an	alternative	vision	of	a	just	society	look	like?	I	turn	in	chapters	4	and	5	to	these	and	related	questions.			 *	 *	 *		 The	first	facet	of	climate	justice	answers	the	question,	What	are	the	moral	
concerns	that	make	climate	change	a	matter	of	justice?	An	important	point	raised	in	the	next	section	(2.4)	is	that	different	struggles	for	climate	justice	will	activate	different	sets	of	central	moral	concerns.	For	this	reason,	the	first	facet	of	climate	justice	accounts	for	the	different	ways	this	question	can	be	answered	without	privileging	any	one	particular	answer,	which	allows	for	varying	degrees	of	complexity	and	focus	depending	on	context	and	struggle.	For	example:		
• A	progressive	union	might	declare	that	climate	change	is	a	matter	for	justice	by	activating	D2	to	assert	that	rapidly	phasing	out	the	fossil	industry	will	leave	some	workers	in	need	of	new	opportunities	to	earn	income.		
• Philosophers	or	activists	concerned	with	convincing	rich	governments	to	contribute	their	fair	share	to	the	climate	response	might	declare	that	climate	change	is	a	matter	of	justice	because	richer	industrialized	nations	are	disproportionately	responsible	for	causing	climate	change	(C1),	the	effects	of	which	are	disproportionately	affecting	the	poorest	and	most	vulnerable	(B1).		
• A	diverse	climate	march,	meanwhile,	might	declare	that	climate	change	is	a	matter	of	justice	because	richer	industrialized	nations	are	disproportionately	responsible	for	causing	it	(C1),	and	its	effects	disproportionately	affect	the	poorest	and	most	vulnerable	(B1),	violating	their	human	rights	(A2)	as	well	undermining	development	prospects	(A3).	At	the	same	time,	those	rich	nations	are	refusing	to	accept	and	undertake	their	moral	duties	(C2)	because	capitalism’s	growth	and	profit	imperative	constrains	the	kinds	of	responses	they	have	been	willing	to	adopt	(D3)	and	the	fossil	fuel	industry	has	been	
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funding	climate	change	denier	organizations	to	corrupt	the	political	discourse	on	the	matter	(D1).			 Other	combinations	are	of	course	possible—and	that	is	the	point.	This	first	facet	captures	the	various	and	complex	ways	that	climate	change	can	be	declared	a	matter	of	climate	justice	depending	on	context.			 	
2.4	(An	Introduction	to)	The	Second	Facet	of	Climate	Justice			 If	attempts	to	define	climate	justice	are	restricted	to	that	first	facet,	the	term	can	take	on	many	meanings	because	there	are	so	many	potential	ways	climate	change	is	a	matter	of	justice.	It	is	thus	more	useful	to	think	of	this	first	facet	not	as	definitional	on	its	own,	but	as	a	body	of	potential	content	that	can	be	activated	in	complex	ways	in	relation	with	a	second	facet	of	climate	justice,	one	which	organizes	and	drives	responses	seeking	justice.	It	is	this	second	facet	that	this	dissertation	is	concerned	with.	In	the	following	chapters,	I	distinguish	between	three	different	meanings	that	can	be	given	to	climate	
justice	once	we	appreciate	the	second	facet,	and	I	evaluate	the	possibilities	they	hold	for	finding	just	solutions	to	climate	change	in	the	global	north.	Because	they	all	work	simultaneously,	I	refer	to	them	as	“fronts”	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice,	each	with	a	different	“site	of	contestation”	in	which	some	form	of	engagement	takes	place	to	see	justice	advanced:	(1)	climate	justice	as	ethics,	concerned	with	the	design	of	an	ideally	just	global	agreement	governing	the	distribution	of	burdens	and	benefits	among	nations;	(2)	the	climate	justice	of	the	climate	movement,	which	directs	its	efforts	to	making	governing	elites	democratically	accountable	for	its	moral	demands	through	a	variety	of	mass	actions;	and	(3)	climate	justice	as	just	society,	focused	on	the	ideological	or	political	philosophical	grounds	justifying	a	society’s	political	and	economic	institutions.	Each	is	concerned	with	different	combinations	of	injustices	of	that	first	facet	and	each	finds	a	different	site	(with	different	means)	of	engagement.	In	activating	different	patterns	of	injustice	and	selecting	a	site	of	contestation	that	
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can	take	them	on,	climate	justice	thus	comes	to	mean	something	different	in	each	of	these	fronts.			 And	that	creates	a	highly	complex	theatre	of	climate	justice.	In	table	1	below,	I	offer	a	preliminary	attempt	to	map	out	the	relationship	between	the	two	facets.	The	point	for	now	is	to	note	the	central	concerns	of	the	different	fronts.	So,	it	would	be	inaccurate	to	say	people	involved	in,	for	example,	the	divestment	movement	do	not	care	about	the	right	to	development	(C2),	but	the	tactic	they	are	engaged	in	does	not	relate	centrally	to	that	injustice.	Similarly,	front	(3)	climate	justice	as	good	or	just	
society	focuses	on	questions	of	the	good	life	and	of	capitalism	as	the	most	immediate	matters	to	be	resolved	in	order	to	progress	on	the	other	matters	in	the	first	facet.	
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Table	1:	The	Complex	Theatre	of	Climate	Justice	
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3.	Normative	Framework	and	Contributions	to	Knowledge		In	describing	the	distinction	between	the	three	fronts	of	climate	justice,	the	work	that	follows	is	not	intended	to	be	a	detached,	analytically	distant	survey	of	different	interpretations	of	climate	justice.	Any	parts	that	might	read	as	removed	or	descriptive	are	meant	to	contribute	to	a	critique	founded	on	understanding	both	the	contributions	and	limitations	of	the	concepts	of	climate	justice.	But	I	am	most	definitely	writing	with	a	normative	political	framework	in	mind.	To	give	a	sense	of	that	framework,	we	can	distinguish	broadly	between	two	ways	of	seeing	and	responding	to	injustice.	Let	us	call	them	a	contextually	situated	justice	and	a	far-reaching	justice.	Contextually	situated	justice	seeks	immediate	or	expedient	solutions	given	the	relevant	political	and	economic	institutions	governing	the	system	in	which	the	injustice	arises.	Allowing	the	injustice,	whatever	it	is,	to	persist	or	worsen	would	be	unjust.	In	responding	to	it,	there	is	a	claim	to	justice:	those	who	require	a	solution	are	receiving	it;	it	is	being	distributed	to	them,	but	it	is	being	done	without	disrupting	the	context	in	which	the	ill	arose.	It	thus	seeks	to	achieve	justice	as	best	as	possible	within	that	given	context.	In	addition	to	concerns	with	pragmatism,	those	holding	to	a	contextually	situated	justice	may	believe	(or	take	for	granted)	that	the	institutional	context	has	strong	claims	to	having	created	a	just	society,	so	that	deviating	from	it	would	be	harmful.		Contrast	that	with	a	more	far-reaching	justice.	Here,	injustices	reveal	systemic	problems,	as	they	arise	from	or	are	sustained	by	some	deep	function	of	the	political	and	socioeconomic	institutions	that	govern	our	lives.	Addressing	injustice	requires	a	search	for	a	political	project	able	to	shape	a	new	society	animated	by	different	principles	than	those	that	gave	rise	to	and	preserve	the	system	of	injustice.	This	second	form	of	justice	thus	seeks	radical	systemic	change.	Under	this	perspective,	contextually	situated	justice	would	be	problematic	for	two	reasons.	First,	a	superficial	understanding	of	injustices	reveals	little	about	the	system	that	created	them	or	has	prevented	them	from	being	addressed,	and	so	those	injustices	
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do	not	become	cause	to	fundamentally	alter	that	system.	The	injustice	must	be	framed	in	a	way	that	the	system	is	capable	of	remedying;	it	becomes	reduced	to	an	exercise	in	problem	solving.	As	the	system	takes	on	the	injustices,	the	larger	problems	that	the	ills	(should	have)	revealed	are	re-obscured.	Second,	contextually	situated	justice	might	be	falsely	pragmatic,	displaying	a	bias	for	the	status	quo	when	that	status	quo	could	be	changed	quite	feasibly	and	for	the	better.	Such	pragmatism	would	thus	be	a	compromise	on	seeking	a	deeper	good.	However,	a	far-reaching	
justice	is	disadvantaged	by	definition.	It	is	counter-systemic	and	thus	lies	in	opposition	to	powerful	interests	among	elites	as	well	as	to	intuitive	acceptance	among	much	of	the	demos.	The	radical	changes	it	proposes	may	not	have	been	demonstrated	to	present	viable	alternative	social	arrangements.		This	clearly	creates	a	tension	in	the	context	of	climate	change.	On	the	one	hand,	is	it	just	to	pursue	radical	change	if	that	change	is	highly	unlikely	given	current	conditions	and	time	remaining	to	act	on	climate—that	is,	if	it	is	not	pragmatic?	On	the	other	hand,	how	just	is	it	to	try	to	work	within	a	system	sharply	constraining	the	possibilities	for	just	solutions?		I	situate	my	own	views	under	the	far-reaching	sense	of	climate	justice,	and	use	it	in	this	dissertation	as	a	vantage	point	to	level	a	systemic	critique	concerned	with	(1)	how	struggles	for	climate	justice	are	constrained	by	the	reigning	political	and	economic	order	whose	institutions	are	hostile	to	the	kind	of	ambitious	action	required	to	address	climate	change	and	deal	with	its	consequences	and	(2)	the	limitations	of	a	world	ushered	in	if	only	a	contextually	situated	climate	justice	is	pursued.		Adopting	far-reaching	justice	also	leads	to	an	inquiry	into	the	full	scope	of	the	systemic	change	that	can	occur	within	the	unique	and	fateful	political	moment	that	climate	change	has	created.	In	one	important	respect,	climate	change	is	very	different	from	that	other	anthropogenic	existential	threat—nuclear	war.	The	technologies	destabilizing	the	climate—coal	plants,	internal	combustion	engines,	gas	turbines,	and	the	rest—were	not	created	for	the	purpose	of	mass	destruction.	
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Rather,	climate	change	is	an	accident,	the	unintended	consequence	of	the	normal	functioning	of	multiple	interlocking	systems	that	make	up	the	modern	world.	It	thus	signals	that	one	or	several	of	those	systems	can	no	longer	function	in	the	same	way	and	must	be	changed	or	replaced	if	we	are	to	preserve	a	livable	climate.	But	where	within	the	complex	of	our	system—of	our	globalized,	capitalist,	liberal	democratic,	
industrial	civilization—does	the	primary	source	of	the	problem	lie?	Which	part	of	it	is	preventing	us	from	turning	away	from	fossil	fuels	and	bringing	greenhouse	gas	emissions	down?	Does	that	part	perform	a	function	necessary	to	creating	a	good	or	just	society?	If	not	(and	especially	if	it	is	in	fact	inimical	to	the	creation	of	such	a	society),	why	should	our	efforts	to	take	on	the	climate	crisis	be	hampered	by	efforts	to	preserve	it?		This	introduces	a	kind	of	condition—call	it	a	proviso	of	far-reaching	climate	justice.	Like	nothing	else	before	it,	the	threat	of	climate	change	makes	the	continued	commitment	to	our	dominant	political	and	economic	institutions	open	to	challenge	and	transcendence	(1)	if	they	can	make	only	weak	claims	to	having	created	a	just	society	and	(2)	if	they	constrain	just	responses	to	the	climate	crisis.	As	I	will	argue,	both	conditions	hold.	The	climate	crisis	thus	offers	an	extremely	rare	moment	of	emancipatory	potential	that	ought	to	be	seized	by	progressive	democratic	movements	to	not	simply	limit	climate	destabilization,	but	to	usher	in	a	more	just	society	in	the	process.	It	is	a	moment	that	many	left-progressive	thinkers	and	activists	have	described,	most	prominently	Naomi	Klein.	As	she	suggests	in	the	title	of	her	book,	This	Changes	Everything,	climate	change	presents	a	stark	choice:	if	we	do	nothing,	as	she	puts	it,	“climate	change	will	change	everything	about	our	world”;	if	we	seek	to	do	the	things	to	prevent	that,	“the	catch	is	that	these	also	involve	changing	everything”	but	in	a	way	that	is	“distinctly	un-catastrophic.”75	Under																																									 																					
75	She	writes,	“through	conversations	with	others	in	the	growing	climate	justice	movement,	I	began	to	see	all	kinds	of	ways	that	climate	change	could	become	a	catalyzing	force	for	positive	change	[…]	the	best	argument	progressives	have	ever	had	to	demand	the	rebuilding	and	reviving	of	local	economies;	to	reclaim	our	democracies	from	corrosive	corporate	influence;	to	block	harmful	new	free	trade	deals	and	rewrite	old	ones;	to	invest	in	starving	public	infrastructure	like	mass	transit	and	affordable	housing;	to	take	back	ownership	of	essential	services	like	energy	and	water;	to	
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contextually	situated	justice,	this	moment	of	emancipatory	potential	is	lost,	either	because	it	goes	undetected	or	the	potential	for	change	it	offers	gets	dismissed.	But	under	far-reaching	climate	justice,	it	is	a	moment	in	which	we	may	begin	to	think	about	the	nature	of	a	society	that	is	simultaneously	more	just	and	better	able	to	respond	to	the	climate	crisis	and	all	its	attendant	injustices.	 			 *	 *	 *	This	dissertation	is	intended	to	contribute	to	the	literature	on	climate	justice	and	climate	change	politics	in	several	ways.	First,	it	posits	a	conceptual	framework	of	
climate	justice	that	accommodates	a	broad	array	of	content.	In	so	doing,	it	accounts	for	the	complexity	of	the	term	and	the	flexibility	with	which	it	has	been	(and	can	be)	used	without	privileging	any	particular	meaning	of	climate	justice	as	being	somehow	more	authentic	than	another.	Second,	that	conceptual	framework	launches	an	in-depth	comparison	between	different	senses	of	climate	justice	and	an	analysis	of	the	contestations	they	entail,	something,	as	noted	above,	that	has	been	missing	from	the	literature.		Third,	the	normative	framework	for	this	dissertation	contributes	to	deepening	discussions	about	fundamental	economic	and	political	system	changes	that	I	believe	are	vital	to	lessening	the	impact	of	developed	nations	on	the	climate.	Political	transformation	of	this	order	can	be	carried	out	democratically	in	Canada	and	internationally,	and	that	will	require	public	deliberation	and	education	about	(a)	why	such	a	transformation	is	required	and	(b)	what	it	would	look	like.	It	is	appeals	to	morality,	empathy,	and	desire	for	justice	that	can	provide	a	motive	force	for	that	transformation	(the	why):	looking	at	the	climate	crisis	through	this	normative	framework	leads	this	dissertation	to	assert	that	system	change	is	an	integral	part	of	carrying	out	moral	duties	in	the	context	of	climate	change.	The																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					remake	our	sick	agricultural	system	into	something	much	healthier;	to	open	borders	to	migrants	whose	displacement	is	linked	to	climate	impacts;	to	finally	respect	Indigenous	land	rights—all	of	which	would	help	to	end	grotesque	levels	of	inequality	within	our	nations	and	between	them.”	This	
Changes	Everything,	7.		
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normative	framework	also	brings	the	inquiry	into	climate	justice	into	the	realm	of	political	philosophy	and	critical	political	theory	and	it	leads	this	dissertation	to	conclude	on	an	attempt	to	explore	and	further	develop	a	positive	alternative	vision	of	a	more	just	society	better	able	to	take	on	its	climate	duties	(the	what).	With	that	in	mind,	let	us	turn	to	the	chapter	layout	and	methodology	of	this	dissertation.			
4.	Chapter	Layout	and	Methodology			 The	next	chapter,	“Climate	Justice	as	Ethics,”	focuses	on	philosophers	specializing	in	normative	ethics	who	apply	moral	theory	to	determine	how	the	world	ought	to	respond	to	climate	change.	Here,	I	conduct	a	literature	survey	drawing	primarily	on	a	particular	community	of	philosophers	looking	at	climate	change.	Members	of	this	community	tend	to	publish	prominent	book-length	works	(as	opposed	to	only	article-length),	which	are	handled	by	major	academic	publishing	houses	(e.g.,	Cambridge	University	Press,	Oxford	University	Press);	they	regularly	reference	one	another’s	works	(in	the	case	of	an	important	survey	called	
Climate	Ethics:	Essential	Readings	several	of	them	even	collaborated	together	as	editors	of	the	volume);	and	they	tend	to	understand	the	problem	of	climate	change	as	a	global	collective	action	problem	requiring	a	binding	agreement	to	prevent	non-compliance.		What	emerges	is	a	sense	of	climate	justice	that	is	primarily	concerned	with	defining	a	just	global	institutional	architecture,	one	capable	of	fairly	distributing	international	duties	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	emissions	in	accordance	with	what	climate	science	asserts	is	required	to	prevent	dangerous	climate	change.	A	first	priority	of	climate	justice	as	ethics	is	thus	to	provide	some	guidance	for—or	standards	for	evaluating	progress	on—achieving	the	ultimate	aim	of	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC),	which	is	to	“protect	the	climate	system	for	the	benefit	of	present	and	future	generations	of	humankind,	on	the	basis	of	equity	and	in	accordance	with	their	common	but	differentiated	
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responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities.”	In	addition	to	these	mitigation	duties,	there	has	also	been	some	attention	given	to	describing	the	duties	associated	with	adaptation	aid	and,	especially	in	recent	years,	payment	for	loss	and	damages	resulting	from	climate	change.	Using	an	organizational	scheme	I	adapt	from	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,76	this	chapter	surveys	ethicists’	search	for	principles	that	can	form	the	basis	of	prescriptions	for	achieving	climate	justice.	The	chapter	concludes	by	noting	the	large	discrepancy	between	those	prescriptions	and	what	has	actually	occurred	in	climate	negotiations	up	to	the	2015	Paris	Agreement.	Since	climate	talks	began	in	1992,	they	have	so	far	failed	to	produce	an	agreement	capable	of	leading	to	the	rapid	greenhouse	gas	emissions	cuts	required	to	avoid	dangerous	climate	change.	(As	frustrated	youth	delegates	to	the	UNFCCC	negotiations	have	told	negotiators,	“You	have	been	negotiating	all	my	life!”77)	Something	more	is	needed	to	make	the	UNFCCC	parties	act	than	guidelines	for	a	just	architecture.		This	is	where	the	climate	movement	enters	the	picture	as	I	show	in	Chapter	3	“Climate	Justice	and	the	Climate	Movement.”	For	this	chapter,	I	“read”	the	sense	of	climate	justice	that	emerges	from	the	movement’s	most	prominent	actions:	its	diverse	forms	of	agitation	at	the	UNFCCC;	the	organization	of	mass	marches	and	demonstrations;	the	attempts	to	blockade	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	development	projects;	and	the	rapidly	growing	fossil	fuel	divestment	movement.	There	is	meaning	not	only	in	the	demands	that	accompany	movement	actions,	but	also	in	the	forms	those	actions	take,	their	messaging,	their	timing,	and	their	locations.	In	the	movement’s	version	of	climate	justice,	states	are	committing	serious	injustices	by	refusing	to	adopt	ambitious	climate	policy,	and	are	going	to	continue	to	do	so	if	left	to	their	own	devices.	The	movement’s	engagement	with	the	problems	of	climate																																									 																					
76	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	A	Perfect	Moral	Storm:	The	Ethical	Tragedy	of	Climate	Change	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011)	77	See	Christina	Ora,	“As	climate	talks	drag	on,	low-lying	atolls	are	already	being	flooded”	The	
Sydney	Morning	Herald,	December	11,	2009,	http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-opinion/as-climate-talks-drag-on-lowlying-atolls-are-already-being-flooded-20091210-km57.html;	and	Anjali	Appadurai	(2014)	in	“Anjali	Appadurai	on	Climate	Justice:	“	‘You	have	been	negotiating	all	my	life.	Get	it	done!’	”	Ceasefire	Magazine,	January	20,	2014,	https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/anjali-appadurai-climate-justice-you-negotiating-life-done/	
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justice,	then,	is	to	attempt	to	insert	itself	into	climate	policymaking	by	exerting	popular	pressure	on	economic	and	political	institutions	using	a	variety	of	tactics	and	moral	and	economic	arguments	to	make	them	accountable	to	a	mass-based	democratic	movement.	Particularly	in	recent	years,	the	movement	has	also	come	to	link	up	with	other	important	related	social	justice	struggles	not	typically	observed	by	climate	ethicists,	most	notably	matters	of	environmental	justice,	for	example	the	siting	of	destructive	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	projects	on	or	near	to	indigenous	lands.		The	literature	surveyed	and	arguments	presented	in	that	chapter	are	deeply	informed	by	experiences	and	observations	that	stem	from	my	involvement	in	Toronto’s	climate	justice	movement	over	the	last	several	years,	which	included	taking	part	in	hours	upon	hours	of	planning	meetings	and	discussions;	hearing	about	or	even	witnessing	serious	intra-	and	inter-group	disagreements	concerning	foundational	principles	and	effective	strategies;	attending	various	climate	talks,	film	screenings,	and	workshops,	and	their	accompanying	Q&As;	looking	at	hundreds	of	email	blasts	and	articles	concerning	climate	politics	shared	over	social	media	by	contacts	in	the	movement;	and	taking	part	in	some	of	the	prominent	actions	and	strategies	covered	in	the	chapter	(including	as	one	of	the	leads	of	York	University’s	fossil	fuel	divestment	group).		These	experiences	have	been	informative	and	revealing,	and	left	no	doubt	that	a	strong	and	diverse	climate	justice	movement	will	be	essential	if	dangerous	climate	change	is	to	somehow	be	prevented	or	minimized.	At	the	same	time,	alongside	these	experiences	came	some	nagging	personal	doubts	about	the	possibilities	of	these	actions	leading	to	our	demands	being	met	within	the	current	political	and	economic	context.	Following	a	large	climate	march	through	downtown	Ottawa	in	2015,	I	recall	one	of	my	more	radical	contacts	from	Toronto’s	climate	movement	writing	something	on	his	Facebook	wall	like,	“Surely	we	can	do	better	than	yell	at	some	empty	offices	on	a	Sunday	afternoon.”	To	what	degree	are	those	of	us	in	the	climate	movement	through	our	most	prominent	actions	making	political	and	economic	
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elites	accountable	to	our	demands,	especially	our	most	ambitious	and	radical	ones?	Are	we	taking	actions	with	the	assumption	that	the	existing	system	of	political	and	economic	power	is	more	“pliable”	to	those	demands	than	it	really	is?	Do	these	actions	amount	to	significantly	more	than	yelling	at	empty	buildings	on	the	weekend?				 So,	in	addition	to	reading	the	sense	of	climate	justice	that	emerges	from	movement	actions,	I	also	felt	that	Chapter	3	would	not	be	complete	without	looking	at	two	important	tensions	within	the	movement.	The	first	tension	arises	from	the	movement’s	diversity;	it	is	composed	of	two	broad	currents,	one	moderate,	the	other	radical.	While	both	participate	in	the	same	prominent	actions,	they	make	different	demands	for	climate	justice.	The	second	tension	is	between,	on	the	one	hand,	the	movement’s	demands	and,	on	the	other,	the	nature	of	the	reigning	economic	and	political	order,	which	has	shown	itself	unwilling	to	take	on	the	movement’s	more	ambitious	demands	(and	is	particularly	true	of	the	radical	current’s	demands).		This	is	where	my	normative	framework	begins	to	show.	I	argue	that	the	two	previous	types	of	climate	justice	are	constrained	in	what	they	can	achieve	and	are	unable	to	see	their	prescriptions	enacted	so	as	to	reach	very	just	solutions.	The	climate	justice	of	moral	philosophy	seeks	ideal	moral	arrangements,	yet	amoral	states	are	under	no	imperative	to	accept	them.	Meanwhile,	the	justice	of	the	climate	movement	is	limited	in	its	possibilities	to	the	extent	that	it	appeals	to	governments	that	prioritize	the	continuation	of	political	and	economic	systems	only	capable	of	accepting	a	very	limited	range	of	climate	policies	and	of	implementing	them	gradually	and	weakly.	Lying	behind	this	impasse	are	the	workings	of	a	political-economic	order	whose	logics	make	it	hostile	to	the	prescriptions	of	these	kinds	of	climate	justice.		A	third	type	of	climate	justice	is	required	of	a	more	far-reaching	variety,	one	that	identifies	the	source	of	the	constraints	on	climate	policy	in	the	political	and	economic	order	inhering	in	modern	liberalism,	“the	liberal	order,”	as	I	will	refer	to	
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it.	In	Chapter	4,	“The	End	of	History	and	the	End	of	the	World”	I	turn	to	political	philosophy	to	give	a	sense	of	why	a	committed	liberal	would	believe	that	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy—the	institutions	that	realize	the	liberal	order—form	the	foundation	of	a	just	society,	and	so	cannot	be	altered	even	in	the	face	of	climate	change.	I	then	use	a	conceptual	model	to	show	how	these	same	institutions	act	to	filter	out	a	series	of	climate	policies	and	to	constrain	democratic	support	behind	them.		 Climate	justice,	I	will	argue,	thus	needs	to	entail	a	search	for	a	different	mode	of	life.	Without	that,	there	are	two	possibilities.	The	most	likely	is	that	the	liberal	order,	in	attempting	to	reconcile	the	need	for	capitalist	growth	with	the	need	to	reduce	emissions	all	while	constraining	the	depth	and	intensity	of	democratic	participation,	will	push	the	climate	crisis	into	extremely	dangerous	territory.	Another	possibility,	though	less	likely,	is	that	the	liberal	order	will	manage	to	address	the	climate	crisis	but	will	preserve	a	mode	of	life	that	fails	to	address	a	host	of	concerns	about	human	freedom	and	wellbeing	or	flourishing.	As	I	discuss	at	the	beginning	of	Chapter	5,	this	would	carry	over	into	the	world	on	the	other	side	of	the	climate	crisis	a	search	for	the	good	life	through	commodity	consumption	based	on	endless	and	ever	more	extreme	resource	development;	the	legitimacy	of	corporate	control	over	production	and	distribution	of	goods;	work	lives	without	meaning;	continued	encroachment	on	natural	limits;	and	the	belief	that	technology	will	save	us	from	it	all.	As	I	note	there,	there	is	a	brutal	irony	in	refusing	to	act	decisively	on	climate	change	because	it	will	change	our	system	when	that	system	is	one	that	probably	should	be	changed.		The	third	type	of	climate	justice	must	be	one	that	begins	to	shake	free	from	the	constraints	of	the	current	liberal	political	and	economic	order	and	its	institutions,	and	that	can,	in	this	freedom,	create	a	more	just	society	capable	of	truly	attending	to	the	climate	crisis	in	its	various	dimensions.	To	address	this	matter	I	turn,	in	Chapter	5,	to	several	alternative	frameworks	for	understanding	climate	change	that	step	outside	of	the	liberal	order	based	in	the	climate	politics	literature.	I	describe	how	
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they	offer	possibilities	for	a	more	far-reaching	climate	justice	by	providing	principles	around	which	a	more	just	society	can	be	built,	one	relieved	of	the	constraints	on	climate	action	imposed	by	the	liberal	order.	I	then	consider	the	prospects	of	the	recent	political	project	in	Canada	centered	on	the	Leap	Manifesto.	I	draw	on	critical	political	theory	to	end	with	a	discussion	on	the	possibilities	of	reviving	a	political	project	that	I	believe	may	be	capable	of	transcending	liberalism’s	growth	imperative,	but	preserve	its	concern	for	people’s	plans	of	life,	one	built	around	the	notion	of	capabilities.			
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II.	Climate	Justice	as	Climate	Ethics			 This	chapter	examines	the	first	understanding	of	climate	justice	and	how	it	can	be	used	to	direct	action	on	climate	change:	climate	justice	as	climate	ethics.	Climate	justice	as	climate	ethics	is	best	conceived	as	an	approach	to	the	problem	of	climate	change	using	moral	theory	in	order	to	describe	some	ideally	fair	global	approach	to	climate	change	that	fully	takes	into	account	the	stark	inequalities	between	parties	in	responsibility	for	causing,	capacity	to	respond	to,	and	vulnerability	to	climate	change.	Its	work	is	primarily	directed	towards	the	site	of	global	climate	negotiations:	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC).	That	ideal	approach	may	be	compared	against	the	real-world	UNFCCC	developments	to	serve	as	a	basis	of	judgment	or	as	a	model	to	strive	for,	or	may	serve	as	a	way	of	bearing	witness	to	wrongs	even	where	there	is	little	hope	that	that	ideal	approach	is	taken	up	by	existing	institutions.78		The	body	of	literature	on	climate	ethics	is	vast,	and	covers	a	range	of	theoretical	perspectives	on	justice.	The	approach	used	in	this	chapter	to	survey	that	literature	departs	from	some	existing	efforts	to	categorize	those	perspectives.79	
																																								 																					
78	For	example,	Paul	Baer	et	al.	proposed	their	Greenhouse	Development	Rights	framework	(discussed	below)	as	“a	‘reference	framework’	by	which	the	adequacy	and	fairness	of	any	proposal	can	be	judged.”	Paul	Baer,	Tom	Athanasiou,	Sivan	Kartha,	and	Eric	Kemp-Benedict,	“Greenhouse	Development	Rights:	A	Framework	for	Climate	Protection	That	Is	More	Fair	Than	Equal	Per	Capita	Emissions	Rights,”	in	Climate	Ethics:	Essential	Readings,	eds.,	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	Simon	Caney,	Dale	Jamieson,	and	Henry	Shue,	226.	Stephen	A.	Gardiner	raises	the	point	of	bearing	witness	in	A	Perfect	
Moral	Storm:	The	Ethical	Tragedy	of	Climate	Change	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	437.	79	Sonja	Klinsky	and	Hadi	Dowlatabadi	(“Conceptualizations	of	justice	in	climate	policy,”	
Climate	Policy	9	no.	1	(2009))	identify	five	principles	of	justice	in	their	literature	review:	causal	responsibility,	preferential	treatment	based	on	need,	equal	entitlements	(to	the	use	of	the	atmosphere	as	an	emissions	sink),	equal	burdens,	and	procedural	justice.		Darrell	Moellendorf	(“Climate	change	and	global	justice,”	WIREs	Climate	Change	3	(2012))	conducts	a	broad	literature	survey	intended	to	review	the	most	important	matters	of	climate	change	and	global	justice.	It	includes	a	discussion	of	different	approaches	to	justice	in	assigning	mitigation	responsibilities:	responsibility	for	historic	emissions,	ability	to	pay,	grandfathering	(i.e.,	reducing	emissions	relative	to	some	historical	baseline),	equal	emissions	entitlements,	and	the	right	to	sustainable	development.	He	concludes	with	a	look	at	applying	justice	frameworks	to	adaptation	duties.		
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First,	in	order	to	consult	this	large	literature	in	a	way	that	is	manageable,	but	representative	of	the	kinds	of	matters	climate	justice	as	climate	ethics	is	concerned	with,	the	material	surveyed	here	is	primarily	taken	from	a	prominent	community	of	philosophers	specializing	in	normative	ethics	(whom	I	will	refer	to	as	“climate	ethicists”	as	a	shorthand	in	what	follows)	as	described	in	the	previous	chapter.	Second,	in	order	to	introduce	into	this	survey	a	means	of	highlighting	how	climate	change	poses	a	series	of	difficult	ethical	challenges	on	multiple	dimensions,	I	turn	to	an	organizational	scheme	developed	by	Philosopher	Stephen	M.	Gardiner.		Gardiner	describes	the	fundamental	problem	of	climate	change	through	the	metaphor	of	“a	perfect	moral	storm,”	a	convergence	of	three	smaller	“storms”—the	global,	the	intergeneration,	and	the	theoretical—each	composed	of	difficult	moral	issues,	and	each	interacting	and	reinforcing	one	another	to	together	yield	an	incentive	structure	that	discourages	actors	from	taking	action	on	climate	change:			 The	peculiar	features	of	the	climate	change	problem	pose	substantial	obstacles	to	our	ability	to	make	the	hard	choices	necessary	to	address	it.	Climate	change	is	a	perfect	moral	storm.	One	consequence	of	this	is	that,	even	if	the	difficult	ethical	questions	could	be	answered,	we	might	still	find	it	difficult	to	act.	For	the	storm	makes	us	extremely	vulnerable	to	moral	corruption.80		In	the	perfect	moral	storm…the	current	rich	“kick”	the	current	poor,	and	both	“kick”	future	generations.	But	the	“kicking”	is	unlikely	to	stop	there.	Chances	are	that	many	of	the	costs	of	our	problematic	ways	of	life	will	be	passed	on	to	other	species.81			I	use	each	of	Gardiner’s	storms	as	an	occasion	to	describe	ways	in	which	climate	ethicists	have	attempted	to	wrestle	with	various	moral	challenges,	and	close	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					Another	survey	is	given	in	Andreas	Niederberger,	“Climate	Justice	from	the	Perspective	of	Philosophy,”	in	Routledge	Handbook	of	the	Climate	Movement,	(ed.)	Matthias	Dietz	and	Heiko	Garrelts,	84-103	(New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	2014).	Niederberger	identifies	the	following	debates	in	the	literature:	climate	justice	vs.	social	justice;	climate	justice	as	an	individual	virtue	or	responsibility;	polluter	pays	principle	vs.	beneficiary	pays	principle;	individual	claims	vs.	collective	claims;	the	development	of	sufficientarianism	into	prioritarianism	;	and	intergenerational	justice.		80	Gardiner,	A	Perfect	Moral	Storm,	22.	81	Ibid.,		44.		
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the	discussion	on	each	storm	with	considerations	of	how	it	discourages	action	on	climate	change	even	if	its	difficult	questions	are	answered.		The	intent	in	surveying	climate	ethics	in	this	way	in	part	1	of	this	chapter,	is	to	give	a	sense	of	the	kinds	of	matters	climate	justice	as	climate	ethics	deals	with	(bearing	in	mind	of	course	that	there	is	a	variety	of	approaches	to	climate	justice	as	climate	ethics)	as	well	as	the	thoroughness	and	carefulness	with	which	it	does	so.	But	I	also	seek	to	give	a	sense	of	its	boundaries,	which	may	not	extend	far	enough	to	deal	with	an	important	shift	in	climate	negotiations	since	COP15	in	2009	that	has	disrupted	the	applicability	of	the	kinds	of	climate	responses	that	emerge	from	moral	philosophy,	a	matter	taken	up	in	part	2	of	this	chapter.	The	real-world	UNFCCC	negotiations	have	undergone	a	kind	of	“mutation,”	shedding	or	recasting	some	of	the	principles	and	features	climate	ethicists	have,	since	the	early	years	of	thinking	about	climate	ethics,	insisted	upon.	It	is	not	altogether	clear	yet	what	impact	this	will	have	on	the	future	of	climate	ethicists’	engagement	with	climate	justice.		
	
1.	“A	Perfect	Moral	Storm”		1)	The	Global	Storm		 Gardiner’s	Global	Storm	describes	the	spatial	features	of	the	climate	crisis	that	prevent	the	action	climate	justice	demands.	Unlike	other	environmental	problems,	carbon	pollution	responsible	for	climate	change	(1)	is	caused	by	countless	emissions	sources	worldwide	rather	than	a	small	number	of	major	polluters;	and	(2)	has	impacts	that	occur	far	from	their	points	of	origin	rather	than	in	local	environments.	National	governments	must	address	this	situation	by	enacting	policies	to	curb	emissions	originating	within	their	borders	as	part	of	an	international	agreement	recognizing	the	far-reaching	consequences	of	climate	change.	Any	such	effort	would,	however,	be	complicated	by	several	important	moral	issues	originating	in	the	world’s	economic	divisions.			
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1.1	Egalitarian	Assumptions	and	Conceptualizing	an	Atmospheric	Commons		 We	all	share,	as	the	title	of	ethicist	Peter	Singer’s	influential	work	reminds	us,	“One	Atmosphere.”	This	one	and	only	atmosphere	possesses	a	unique	property:	to	maintain	a	stable	climate	while	absorbing	the	greenhouse	gas	waste	product	of	activities	that	have	proven	necessary	for	improving	human	wellbeing	(activities	which	run	the	gamut	from	subsistence	agriculture	to	electricity	and	heat	generation	to	industrial	production	and	transportation.	Due	to	its	role	in	the	maintenance	and	promotion	of	wellbeing,	this	atmospheric	property	can	thus	be	conceived	as	a	good	or	resource.82	It	can	also	be	conceived	of	as	one	held	in	common	for	several	reasons.	First,	no	one	may	take	ownership	of	it	in	a	way	that	somehow	prevents	another’s	emissions	from	entering	the	atmosphere	or	excludes	others’	enjoyment	of	a	stable	climate.83	Second,	emissions	do	not	remain	fixed	in	their	area	of	origin	but	become	well	mixed	throughout	that	one	global	atmosphere.	And	finally,	alterations	to	that	one	atmosphere	have	consequences	shared	worldwide	(though	not	equally)	due	to	another	important	property:	the	atmosphere’s	ability	to	absorb	GHGs	safely—that	is,	without	dangerous	climate	change—is	limited.	To	summarize,	as	Singer	puts	it,	“The	atmosphere’s	ability	to	absorb	our	gases	has	become	a	finite	resource	on	which	various	parties	have	competing	claims.	The	problem	is	to	allocate	those	claims	justly.”84			 	How	those	claims	are	to	be	allocated	in	a	just	manner—the	main	problem	that	arises	in	and	is	confounded	by	the	global	storm—depends	on	the	approach	to	justice	taken.	One	such	approach	conceives	of	climate	justice	within	an	egalitarian	framework	informed	by	cosmopolitan	theories	of	global	justice,	one	in	which																																									 																					
82	Vanderheiden	for	instance	notes	that	the	atmosphere	“may	appropriately	be	considered	as	a	global	primary	good.	The	critical	importance	of	its	capacity	to	produce	a	stable	climate	cannot	be	underestimated	because	it	is	absolutely	vital	for	the	continuance	of	life	on	this	planet	and	instrumental	to	human	flourishing.”	Atmospheric	Justice,	79.		83	Vanderheiden	notes	“Although	persons	or	nations	may	make	claims	on	the	as	theirs	to	use	when	they	emit	GHGs,	these	claims	cannot	draw	on	existing	theories	of	entitlement	to	property,	since	the	resource	transcends	political	borders	and	is	not	the	sort	of	good	that	can	be	appropriated	from	the	commons	by	being	improved,	as	through	a	Lockean	labor	theory	of	value.”	Atmospheric	Justice,	103-104.			84	Peter	Singer,	“One	Atmosphere,”	in	Climate	Ethics:	Essential	Readings,	188.		
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climate	justice	is	built	up	from	a	first	principle	that	all	persons	are	moral	equals.85	I	describe	in	this	section	on	the	global	storm	how	that	approach	has	been	used	to	identify	elements	of	justice	that	ought	to	be	part	of	an	international	treaty.			 If	all	people	are	morally	equally,	all	individuals	ought	to	have	equal	entitlements	to	the	goods	that	are	required	for	their	wellbeing,	the	good	in	question	in	the	context	of	climate	change	being	the	atmospheric	ability	to	absorb	GHGs.	“Egalitarian	principles,”	writes	Steve	Vanderheiden	“are	individualistic:	They	maintain	that	no	person	is	entitled	to	a	larger	share	of	a	finite	good	than	any	other,	for	this	would	be	to	ascribe	greater	value	to	the	lives	of	those	allowed	to	emit	more	
GHGs	than	those	required	to	emit	fewer.”86	He	adds,	“No	persons,	merely	by	virtue	of	their	national	identity,	geographic	residence,	prior	use	patterns,	or	command	of	wealth	or	power,	deserve	to	be	awarded	a	much	larger	share	of	the	planet’s	atmosphere	than	do	any	others.”87		It	would	be	difficult	to	overstate	the	importance	of	this	conceptualization	of	the	atmosphere	as	(1)	a	resource	whose	use	is	necessary	in	sustaining	and	improving	human	wellbeing,	but	(2)	is	limited,	and	(3)	is	held	in	common	and	must	be	allocated	justly.	This	conceptualization,	if	accepted,	performs	the	important	function	of	establishing	climate	change	as	a	problem	of	equity	on	a	global	scale.	In	some	form,	it	thereby	frames	any	proposed	response	designed	to	yield	an	arrangement	allocating	to	parties	only	their	respective	fair	amounts	of	GHG	emissions	with	respect	to	atmospheric	limits.	In	attempting	to	discover	that	fair	amount,	this	conceptualization	quickly	highlights	a	major	injustice	in	the	world	system:	some	parties	are	using	more	than	their	fair	share	of	that	resource.			
																																								 																					
85	This	approach	was	prominent	in	the	community	of	climate	ethicists	I	surveyed.	One	finds	it	in	Peter	Singer	and	Henry	Shue	(see	below),	for	instance.	Vanderheiden’s	Atmospheric	Justice	(particularly	chapters	2	and	3)	is	probably	the	best	example	of	this	approach	in	the	works	I	consulted	for	this	chapter,	and	it	informs	this	section	considerably.		86	Steve	Vanderheiden,	Atmospheric	Justice:	A	Political	Theory	of	Climate	Change	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2008),	225	[emphasis	mine].		87	Ibid.,	108.		
  60 
1.2	The	Right	to	Development		The	world’s	emissions	profile	has	not	changed	much	since	1993	when	Henry	Shue	wrote,	“current	emissions	of	CO2	are	very	nearly	as	unequal	as	they	could	possibly	be:	a	few	rich	countries	with	small	populations	are	generating	the	vast	bulk	of	the	emissions,	while	the	majority	of	humanity,	living	in	poor	countries	with	large	populations,	produces	less	altogether	than	the	rich	minority.”88	The	problem	is	not	simply	that	developed	countries	are	violating	egalitarian	principles	by	proceeding	as	though	they,	as	Vanderheiden	noted,	“ascribe	greater	value	to	the	lives”	of	their	populations	by	using	more	than	their	fair	share.	It	is	that	in	doing	so,	they	are	failing	to	observe	another	basic,	universal	principle	of	equity:	Do	no	harm.89		Where	there	is	a	common	but	limited	good	necessary	for	human	wellbeing,	any	party	taking	more	than	its	fair	share	of	that	good	denies	the	right	of	others	to	its	use	by	depleting	its	availability.	Because	it	is	a	good	necessary	for	wellbeing,	depleting	its	availability	does	harm.	To	illustrate,	in	the	context	of	climate	change,	that	limited	necessary	good	is	the	ability	of	the	atmosphere	to	safely	absorb	carbon.	If	poor	countries	seek	to	pursue	development	in	order	to	address	endemic	poverty	and	seek	to	do	so	through	the	use	of	readily	available	fossil	fuel	technologies,	they	will	need	to	use	a	larger	portion	of	that	good.	Yet	to	the	extent	that	rich	countries	disproportionately	deplete	that	good	with	their	emissions,	they	would	harm	developing	countries	by	denying	them	an	avenue	to	reduce	poverty	and	its	associated	ills.		Any	overly	simple	global	climate	agreement	in	which	all	countries	reduce	emissions	by	the	same	proportion	and	thereby	preserves	the	unequal	contemporary	emissions	profile	would	therefore	deny	a	vital	right	to	the	poor:	the	right	to	
development.	Rendering	development	into	a	right	performs	the	function	of	introducing	some	constraints	on	the	morally	permissible	allocation	arrangements	of																																									 																					
88	Henry	Shue,	“Subsistence	Emissions	and	Luxury	Emissions,”	in	Climate	Ethics:	Essential	
Readings,	207.		89	See,	e.g.,	Henry	Shue,	Climate	Justice:	Vulnerability	and	Protection	(New	York,	NY:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	112.		
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the	atmospheric	resource;	responses	to	climate	change	should	not	deny	the	freedom	of	developing	nations	to	take	those	actions	required	to	improve	human	wellbeing.	As	Shue	put	it,	“[T]hose	living	in	desperate	poverty	ought	not	to	be	required	to	restrain	their	emissions,	thereby	remaining	in	poverty,	in	order	that	those	living	in	luxury	should	not	have	to	restrain	theirs.”90	The	right	to	development	therefore	created	a	moral	duty	for	rich	nations	to	take	the	lead	in	reducing	their	emissions.			
1.3	Moral	Incommensurability	of	Emissions		If	asserting	a	right	to	development	protected	the	freedom	of	poor	nations	to	increase	GHG	emissions,	it	would	also	be	important	to	somehow	guard	against	competing	alternative	approaches	to	the	problem	of	climate	change,	ones	that	would	threaten	equity-based	approaches	and	would	dismiss	concerns	about	unequal	atmospheric	use	entirely.		Startled	by	signs	of	increasing	concern	in	the	north	about	curbing	the	rising	emissions	of	the	south,	Agarwal	and	Narain	coined	an	influential	distinction	between	survival	and	luxury	emissions	in	1991.91	Though	they	did	not	define	the	terms,	their	examples	make	their	meaning	clear	enough:	survival	emissions	are	caused	through	activities	of	the	poor	required	for	subsistence,	like	methane	release	from	livestock	or	rice	paddies;	luxury	emissions,	meanwhile,	are	those	resulting	from	the	excesses	of	fossil	fuelled	wealth,	like	gas-guzzling	automobiles.	The	distinction	sounded	a	warning	about	the	view	some	northern	writers	were	taking,	a	view	concerned	with	the	physical	impacts	of	GHGs	regardless	of	origin	or	purpose.	Any	such	view	was	missing	something	important;	while	a	set	of	survival	emissions	and	a	set	of	luxury	emissions	might	be	physically	identical	in	terms	of	their	impact	on	the	climate	they	are	not	morally	commensurable.		Agarwal	and	Narain’s	concept	would	enter	into	climate	ethics	most	influentially	through	Henry	Shue	who	adapted	it	to	address	a	different,	but	equally																																									 																					
90	Shue,	“Subsistence	Emissions	and	Luxury	Emissions,”	202.		91	Anil	Agarwal	and	Sunita	Narain.	Global	Warming	in	an	Unequal	World:	A	Case	of	
Environmental	Colonialism	(New	Delhi:	Centre	for	Science	and	Environment,	1991).	
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unjust	approach	to	climate	change,	one	prioritizing	the	most	cost-effective	solutions.	“What	if,”	he	writes,	“the	economic	costs	of	abandoning	rice	paddies	are	less	than	the	economic	costs	of	increasing	miles-per-gallon	in	luxury	cars?	Does	it	make	no	difference	that	some	people	need	those	rice	paddies	in	order	to	feed	their	children,	but	no	one	needs	a	luxury	car?”92	A	survival-affecting	response	might	be	more	
economically	efficient	than	a	luxury-affecting	one,	but	not	more	just.	From	this	analysis,	Shue	would	come	to	conclude	that	all	people	ought	to	hold	an	inalienable	right	to	survival	emissions.	In	the	event	that	a	per	capital	emissions	trading	scheme	would	be	established	in	the	future,	Shue	anticipated	that	this	inalienable	right	could	protect	poor	nations	from	falling	under	pressure	to	sell	rights	to	survival	emissions	to	the	point	where	they	would	not	have	enough	for	their	populations.93	Agarwal	and	Narain’s	and	Shue’s	survival	emissions	constraints	perform	several	functions.	Alongside	the	right	to	development,	they	defend	the	case	for	a	justice-based	approach	to	climate	change	against	alternative	frameworks,	and	further	argue	the	case	that	it	has	to	be	countries	of	the	developed	north	whose	emissions	must	come	down	first.	Survival	emissions	can	also	be	used	to	determine	the	threshold	after	which	climate	duties	can	be	assigned:	there	is	a	morally	relevant	distinction	between	emitters,	whose	emissions	do	in	fact	contribute	to	climate	change,	but	are	within	allowances	for	subsistence	rights	and	so	do	not	trigger	moral	duties,	and	polluters,	who	emit	more	than	their	fair	share	and	so	must	take	on	duties.94	Lastly,	they	place	an	extra	onus	on	developed	countries	to	lower	their	emissions.			
1.4	Contraction	and	Convergence.	One	of	the	more	prominent	proposed	formulations	for	organizing	duties	in	mitigating	climate	change	in	a	just	manner	is	called	
																																								 																					
92	Shue,	“Subsistence	Emissions	and	Luxury	Emissions,”	211.		93	Ibid.,	213.		94	Göran	Duus-Otterström	and	Sverker	C.	Jagers,	“Identifying	burdens	of	coping	with	climate	change:	A	typology	of	the	duties	of	climate	justice,”	Global	Environmental	Change,	22	(2012):	748-749,	752;	Vanderheiden,	Atmospheric	Justice,	71,	243.		
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“contraction	and	convergence”	(C&C)	and	it	addresses	many	of	the	points	raised	in	the	preceding	discussion.	C&C	recognizes	egalitarian	principles,	allows	the	fullest	use	of	the	atmospheric	commons,	and	protects	the	right	to	develop.		The	ultimate	aim	of	C&C	is	to	give	each	individual	the	same	per	capita	emission	right,	the	same	right	to	use	the	atmospheric	commons,	until	cleaner	technologies	became	available.	Contraction	refers	to	the	requirement	for	those	countries	emitting	more	than	their	fair	per	capita	share	to	reduce	emissions	over	some	transition	period.	This	would	allow	poorer	countries	enough	atmospheric	space	to	emit	more	as	part	of	their	development.	As	the	emissions	of	the	rich	fell	and	those	of	the	poor	rose,	they	would	eventually	converge	on	equal	per	capita	emissions.	C&C	even	lends	itself	to	a	clear	policy:	emissions	trading.	Countries	can	be	assigned	emissions	credits	according	to	population	size	at	a	baseline	year.	Developed	countries	with	high	emissions	would	buy	excess	credits	from	developing	countries	that	could	then	use	the	income	to	finance	their	development.	C&C	thus	offers	one	model	of	what	a	just	real-world	climate	agreement	could	look	like.95		
	
1.5	The	Wrath	of	the	Global	Storm	Concerns	for	equitable	use	of	the	global	atmospheric	commons,	the	need	to	observe	the	right	to	development,	and	the	importance	of	subsistence	emissions	make	it	clear	that	rich	nations	must	take	the	first	steps	in	the	collective	agreement	to	bring	down	
																																								 																					
95	It	is	worth	repeating	a	point	from	a	footnote	from	the	introduction	here	in	case	it	was	missed.	The	development	of	C&C	occurred	before	the	carbon	budget	approach	to	understanding	the	climate	crisis	became	popularized.	For	this	reason,	its	concern	was	with	determining	a	level	at	which	near-term	per	capita	greenhouse	gas	emissions	would	be	stabilized.	But,	as	discussed	in	chapter	3,	the	carbon	budget	approach	shows	that	human	emissions	must	not	exceed	a	certain	limit,	one	that	will	be	reached	very	soon.	Beyond	that	limit,	if	emissions	do	not	reach	zero	(rather	than	become	stabilized	at	some	non-zero	amount)	it	is	not	possible	to	prevent	further	climate	change.	Gignac	and	Matthews	attempt	to	reconcile	C&C	with	the	need	to	cap	total	emissions	while	at	the	same	time	taking	historical	responsibility	into	consideration,	which	many	previous	C&C	proposals	fail	to	do.	Should	countries’	actual	per	capita	emissions	exceed	a	hypothetical	equal	per	capita	emissions	level,	they	accumulate	a	carbon	debt	that	can	be	repaid	in	several	ways.	See	Renaud	Gignac	and	H	Damon	Matthews,	“Allocating	a	2˚C	cumulative	budget	to	countries,”	Environmental	Research	Letters	10	(2015)	and	H.	Damon	Matthews,	“Quantifying	historical	carbon	and	climate	debts	among	nations,”	
Nature	Climate	Change	6	(2016).	
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emissions	that	all	rational	actors	would	seek	because	they	want	to	address	climate	change.	And	though	it	is	possible	to	point	to	a	model	for	a	global	climate	agreement	that	can	address	these	matters,	the	problem	is	that	while	it	is	collectively	rational	for	nations	to	together	curb	fossil	fuel	use,	it	is	individually	rational	for	a	single	nation	to	increase	its	emissions	to	improve	economic	competition	and	growth—and	entrenched	economic	and	political	interests	favour	the	latter.	The	standard	solution	to	such	prisoner’s	dilemma-type	situations	is	to	provide	institutional	arrangements	that	incentivize	actors	to	accept	collectively	rational	options	over	individually	rational	ones.	There	is	nothing	in	the	anarchic	international	system	to	change	the	incentive	structure,	however,	by,	for	example,	enforcing	trade	sanctions	on	individual	nations	that	refuse	to	lower	emissions.	Given	power	relations	in	the	global	system,	the	upshot	is	that	problems	are	externalized	onto	poorer	actors	who	are	not	only	least	responsible	and	most	vulnerable,	but	also	hold	the	least	power	to	bring	the	most	responsible	actors	into	a	global	agreement.			2)	The	Intergenerational	Storm		
The	Intergenerational	Storm	describes	the	temporal	features	of	the	crisis.	It	originates	in	the	dispersion	of	emissions	and	their	impacts	through	time	due	to	the	lag	in	the	planet’s	physical	response	to	GHGs.	Climate	change	is	seriously	“backloaded,”	as	Gardiner	puts	it:	the	current	impacts	of	climate	change	were	caused	by	previous	generations,	and	our	actions	today	will	have	consequences	for	generations	still	to	come,	all	of	which	creates	some	epistemological	concerns	around	what	duties	can	be	held.	Gardiner’s	intergenerational	storm	draws	thus	our	attention	to	both	the	past	and	the	future	and	the	problems	arising	as	we	attempt	to	factor	in	each.			
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2.1	Future	Generations		Edward	A.	Page	describes	an	“Intergenerational	Responsibility	Argument.”	The	argument	consists	of	the	following	two	premises	and	conclusion:			 P1:	The	changes	in	the	climate	system	that	are	being	brought	about	by	human	action	threaten	the	well-being	of	members	of	future	generations.		P2:	Human	action	that	threatens	the	well-being	of	members	of	future	generations	is	unjust.		C:	The	changes	in	the	climate	system	that	are	being	brought	about	by	human	action	are	unjust.96		 The	argument,	or	one	very	much	like	it,	likely	stands	behind	the	convictions	many	people	hold	(myself	included)	that	current	generations	need	to	act	on	climate	change	to	prevent	the	severe	harms	it	will	cause	to	people	in	future	generations;	appeals	to	the	responsibilities	we	hold	for	“our	grandchildren”	are	a	kind	of	shorthand	for	the	argument.		Page	observes	that	while	the	argument	appears	valid—the	conclusion	follows	logically	from	the	premises—it	might	not	actually	be	true.	P1	is	defended	easily	enough;	only	the	discredited	arguments	of	climate	change	deniers	doubt	its	truth.	The	threat	is	rather	to	P2	in	the	form	of	something	called	the	non-identity	problem,	and	it	is	a	particularly	tough	philosophical	problem.97		 Developed	independently	by	several	philosophers	in	the	late	twentieth	century,	non-identity	might	obliterate	all	at	once	a	whole	line	of	assumptions	about	what	climate	justice	ought	to	mean.	In	at	least	one	possible	interpretation,	the	consequences	of	the	non-identity	problem	are	far-reaching,	and	fully	ugly.	According	to	that	interpretation,	descendants	of	slaves	still	experiencing	poverty	and	disenfranchisement—the	continuing	legacies	of	a	long	history	beginning	with	
																																								 																					
96	Edward	A.	Page,	Climate	Change,	Justice	and	Future	Generations	(Edward	Elgar	Publishing,	2007),	161.		97	For	reasons	of	space,	I	do	not	go	into	how	Page	addresses	doubts	about	whether	duties	of	justice	can	obtain	between	actors	with	a	non-reciprocal	relationship,	another	threat	he	sees	to	P2.			
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slavery—would	not	be	eligible	to	receive	reparations.	Neither	would	those	living	with	the	legacies	of	colonialism,	to	take	another	example.98			 Despite	that	possibility,	I	did	not	come	across	philosophers	engaging	with	climate	change	who	felt	that	non-identity	invalidated	concerns	for	future	generations.	Taking	a	cue	from	Henry	Shue,	who	is	actually	dismissive	of	the	problem,99	I	do	not	believe	it	has	posed	as	much	of	a	problem	as	its	inclusion	in	Gardiner’s	storm	might	suggest.	Apart	from	it	being	raised	by	philosophers	(who	do	not	have	much	problem	with	non-identity	in	any	case),	I	have	not	come	across	a	single	mention	of	this	problem	in	the	climate	movement.	More	problematic	for	some	potential	principles	of	climate	justice	is	the	matter	of	past	emissions,	which	I	turn	to	now.																																											 																					
98	The	reasoning,	with	some	simplification	for	concision,	goes	like	this:	people	have	been	wronged	if	some	event	or	set	of	events	leaves	them	worse	off	than	they	might	otherwise	have	been.	That	creates	a	problem	because	the	people	allegedly	owed	reparations	in	the	present	for	the	historical	events	of	the	past	exist	because	of	these	historical	events.	Had	slavery	never	occurred,	for	example,	descendants	of	slaves	in	the	Americas	today	would	never	have	existed	because	there	would	never	have	been	slaves	in	the	Americas	to	be	descended	from.	Therefore,	there	was	no	other	world	that	these	descendants	could	have	lived	in.	And	if	this	is	the	only	world	they	could	have	lived	in,	they	have	not	been	wronged	because	of	slavery	in	the	past.	For	some	discussion,	see	Page,	Climate	Change,	
Justice	and	Future	Generations,	137,	157-8.	In	the	same	way,	we	may	not	have	obligations	of	justice	to	future	generations	who	suffer	the	consequences	of	the	climate	change	we	create.	If	we	take	the	kind	of	drastic,	rapid,	and	system-wide	action	needed	to	tackle	climate	change,	it	will	have	the	kind	of	cumulative,	chaotic,	“butterfly-effect”	changes	that	alter	which	people	are	born	because	it	will	affect	when	and	by	whom	future	people	are	conceived.	As	long	as	they	consider	their	lives	worth	living,	we	would	not	be	harming	anyone	in	the	future	by	hesitating	to	act	on	climate	change.	As	we	will	see	below,	the	non-identity	problem	might	even	affect	duties	the	north	holds	for	past	emissions.	99	As	he	writes	(and	only	in	a	footnote)	in	a	recent	piece,	“Many	philosophers	have	been	much	taken	with	what	is	known	as	the	non-identity	problem…As	far	as	I	can	see,	our	current	lack	of	knowledge	of	particular	identities	in	later	centuries	has	no	implications	at	all	for	what	we	ought	to	do	now	about	future	climate	change.	At	most	it	has	some	implications	for	how	we	explain	our	more	basic	moral	judgements.”Shue,	Climate	Justice:	Vulnerability	and	Protection,	298.	Both	Shue	and	Vanderheiden	see	duties	extending	to	future	generations	through	the	need	to	preserve	rights	to	an	environment	capable	of	promoting	human	wellbeing.	Shue,	ibid.;	Vanderheiden,	125-142.		Even	Derek	Parfit,	the	philosopher	who	gave	the	problem	its	name,	is	not	himself	convinced	that	non-identity	means	abandoning	duties	to	future	generations,	but	that	it	requires	some	care	in	searching	for	a	theory	assigning	them.	He	wrote	that	those	of	us	who	feel	intuitively	that	our	social	policies	have	bearing	on	the	wellbeing	of	future	people	(writing	in	the	early	1980s,	his	concern	was	around	nuclear	technology,	not	climate	change)	should	be	careful	to	“conceal”	non-identity	until	it	was	resolved;	otherwise,	those	in	power	considering	adopting	policies	that	would	increase	the	possibility	for	catastrophes	in	the	future	might	be	more	likely	to	implement	them.	See	Parfit,	Reasons	
and	Persons,	451-452.		
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2.2	Historical	Responsibility	It	was	countries	of	the	global	north	that	emitted	the	GHGs	the	effects	of	which	are	currently	being	felt	by	vulnerable	communities	in	the	south.	Intuitively,	it	follows	that	developed	countries	ought	to,	in	some	way,	be	held	responsible.	This	is	a	special	form	of	what	is	commonly	called	the	“polluter	pays	principle”	(PPP).	In	one	form,	the	PPP	applies	only	to	contemporary	polluters	(a	carbon	tax	would	be	an	example).	But	if	applied	diachronically,	it	requires	that	those	who	polluted	in	the	past	hold	a	duty	today	to	either	prevent	the	avoidable	impacts	of	their	historical	pollution	by	financing	adaptation	projects	and/or	to	provide	compensation	for	unavoidable	impacts.	It	is	a	form	of	backwards-looking	or	corrective	justice.		There	is	a	second	way	that	past	emissions	can	be	morally	relevant.	One	can	read	the	history	of	unequal	economic	development	into	the	north’s	overuse	of	the	common	atmospheric	resource.	Another	potential	guiding	principle	for	a	just	global	climate	agreement	thus	emerges:	the	“beneficiary	pays	principle”	(BPP).	People	in	the	north	have	benefited	from	the	economic	activities	that	produced	the	emissions	that	led	to	the	climate	crisis	today.	They	owe	an	“ecological”	or	“climate	debt”	for	having	used	up	so	much	of	the	atmospheric	commons	in	unjustly	generating	their	wealth	that	there	is	no	longer	enough	left	for	the	rest.		But	can	developed	nations	really	be	held	responsible	for	all	past	(luxury)	emissions?	At	the	2009	climate	negotiations	in	Copenhagen,	US	negotiator	Todd	Stern	denied	that	the	US,	historically	the	world’s	largest	emitter	of	greenhouse	gases,	holds	any	responsibility	to	pay	reparations.			 I	actually	completely	reject	the	notion	of	a	debt	or	reparations	or	anything	of	the	like.	Let’s	just	be	mindful	of	the	fact	that	for	most	of	the	200	years	since	the	industrial	revolution	people	were	blissfully	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	emissions	cause	the	greenhouse	effect.	It’s	a	relatively	recent	phenomena.	It's	the	wrong	way	to	look	at	this.	We	absolutely	recognize	our	historic	role	in	putting	the	emissions	in	the	atmosphere	up	
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there	that	are	there	now,	but	the	sense	of	guilt	or	culpability	or	reparations—I	categorically	reject	that.100		One	might	be	tempted	to	brush	aside	Stern’s	views	as	those	of	a	delegate	cynically	protecting	the	interests	of	the	world’s	largest	historical	emitter,	but	the	argument	that	emissions	of	the	distant	past	should	not	count	finds	support	among	some	climate	ethicists	for	several	reasons.		The	first	is	that,	just	as	Stern	says,	it	might	be	unfair	to	hold	people	morally	responsible	for	actions	they	were	unaware	had	negative	consequences.	Though	he	does	not	elaborate	on	it,	Stern	is	drawing	a	distinction	between	“historic	role”	and	“guilt”	or	“culpability”	that	he	suggests	holds	moral	importance.	In	this	argument,	having	a	historic	role	is	merely	a	factual	claim,	datum	that	can	at	most	be	proven	true	or	false,	carrying	no	moral	content.	Obligation	to	others	does	not	follow	from	the	simple	fact	of	past	emissions.	Something	more	must	be	established,	in	this	case	what	one	might	call	“willful	emissions,”	emissions	made	with	knowledge	beyond	reasonable	doubt	that	they	negatively	affect	the	climate.	The	distinction	resembles	the	one	made	earlier	between	“emitters”	and	“polluters,”	but,	instead	of	holding	between	contemporaries,	and	instead	of	making	survival-luxury	the	morally	relevant	dichotomy,	it	adds	a	diachronic	element	and	makes	ignorance-knowledge	what	counts.101		
																																								 																					
100		Darren	Samuelsohn,	"No	'Pass'	for	Developing	Countries	in	Next	Climate	Treaty,	Says	U.S.	Envoy,”	New	York	Times,	December	9,	2009,	http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/12/09/	09greenwire-no-pass-for-developing-countries-in-next-clima-98557.html?pagewanted=all.		Stern	held	firm	to	this	position	in	2013	at	the	climate	talks	in	Warsaw	as	well,	dismissing	
Democracy	Now	journalist	Amy	Goodman’s	question	on	whether	the	US	owes	any	sort	of	reparation:	“this	is	a	question	that	I’ve	answered—I	answered	in	Copenhagen,	I	think.	We	don’t	regard	climate	action	as	a	matter	of	compensation	or	reparations	or	anything	of	the	kind.	But	thanks	for	the	question.”	See,	“As	Environmentalists	Walk	Out	of	UN	Talks,	Top	US	Envoy	Says	No	to	Reparations	for	Climate	Damage,”	Democracy	Now,	November	22,	2013,	http://www.democracynow.org/	2013/11/22/as_environmentalists_walk_out_of_un	101	Willfulness	does	certainly	seem	to	make	emissions	more	egregious.	In	2015	it	was	revealed	that	ExxonMobil’s	top	scientists	had	been	aware	of	the	reality	and	potential	dangers	of	climate	change	for	decades.	The	proof	that	Exxon	was	aware	of	the	consequence	of	their	activities	but	proceeded	to	then	fund	climate	change	denier	organizations	to	distort	public	knowledge	about	the	crisis	outraged	the	climate	movement	(the	social	media	hashtag	it	rallied	around	was	#ExxonKnew).	As	Bill	McKibben	put	it	(emphasis	mine)	“knowingly,	they	helped	organise	the	most	consequential	lie	
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Secondly,	there	is	the	problem	of	the	nature	of	the	historical	agent	who	is	to	be	found	morally	at	fault	under	the	polluter	pays	principle.	If	the	morally	responsible	agents	are	individuals	of	previous	generations,	then	the	problem	is	that	many	of	them	are	now	dead;	the	polluters	cannot	pay.	If	the	morally	responsible	agent	is	a	collectivity	like	a	country,	which	does	have	a	historical	continuity	between	the	distant	past	and	present	in	a	way	that	an	individual	cannot,	then	present	day	citizens	of	that	country	are	being	held	responsible	for	decisions	made	by	others	in	the	past,	decisions	that	present	day	citizens	had	no	role	in	making	(and	no	possibility	to	prevent),	which	seems	unfair.102		Perhaps	one	can	turn	to	the	beneficiary	pays	principle	to	help	out	with	these	matters.	But	then	new	complications	arise.	First,	as	Caney	points	out,	turning	to	the	beneficiary	pays	principle	actually	means	abandoning	polluter	pays	entirely.103	Second,	have	people	in	the	north	really	benefited	from	past	emissions?	If	we	understand	“benefited”	to	mean	“become	better	off	than	might	otherwise	be,”	then	the	non-identity	problem	rears	its	head,	suggesting	that	the	individuals	in	the	north	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					in	human	history,	and	kept	that	lie	going	past	the	point	where	we	can	protect	the	poles,	prevent	the	acidification	of	the	oceans,	or	slow	sea	level	rise	enough	to	save	the	most	vulnerable	regions	and	cultures…No	corporation	has	ever	done	anything	this	big	and	this	bad…this	company	had	the	singular	capacity	to	change	the	course	of	world	history	for	the	better	and	instead	it	changed	that	course	for	the	infinitely	worse.”	(Bill	McKibben,	“Exxon's	climate	lie:	'No	corporation	has	ever	done	anything	this	big	or	bad',”	Guardian,	October	14,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/	2015/oct/14/exxons-climate-lie-change-global-warming)	To	be	sure,	this	example	does	not	show	that	emissions	without	knowledge	of	their	consequence	ought	to	be	excused,	but	it	does	show	that	willful	emissions	really	do	seem	to	carry	moral	weight	in	a	way	that	the	former	do	not.		Exxon	is,	at	the	time	of	writing,	attempting	to	block	a	legal	case	against	it	founded	on	its	role	in	knowingly	misleading	the	public	on	climate	change.	See	David	Hasemyer,	"	Exxon	Now	Seeks	to	Block	New	York	Attorney	General's	Climate	Probe,"	Inside	Climate	News,	October	18,	2016,	https://insideclimatenews.org/news/17102016/exxonmobil-climate-change-research-seeks-block-new-york-attorney-general-investigation-subpeona-eric-schneiderman;	and	David	Hasemyer,	“Exxon	Widens	Climate	Battle,	May	Depose	17	State	AGs	Over	Investigations,"	Inside	Climate	News,	November	10,	2016,	https://insideclimatenews.org/news/09112016/exxon-climate-change-investigation-research-scandal-state-attorneys-general.			102	Simon	Caney,	“Cosmopolitan	Justice,	Responsibility,	and	Global	Climate	Change,”	Climate	
Ethics:	Essential	Readings,	130.		103	Ibid.,	128.		
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today	did	not	in	fact	benefit	because	the	world	in	which	fossil	fuels	powered	the	growth	in	the	north	is	the	only	world	they	could	have	existed	in.104		Even	if	populations	in	the	developed	north	can	be	said	to	have	benefited,	Posner	argues	that	they	were	not	alone:			 The	technology	of	industrialization	has	spread	far	and	wide,	benefiting	people	all	around	the	world.	If	we	are	responsible	for	the	effects	of	our	ancestors’	behavior	on	future	populations,	we	need	to	subtract	the	benefits	from	the	costs.	Very	likely,	unless	climate	change	turns	catastrophic,	the	benefits	of	steam	engines,	computers	and	vaccines	will	exceed	the	climate-related	costs,	meaning	that	rich	countries	will	owe	poor	countries	nothing	at	all.105		 Something	else	has	occurred	to	make	it	difficult	to	hope	rich	countries	will	be	the	ones	to	pay:	countries	that	are	not	economically	well-off	are	becoming	major	sources	of	emissions;	China	has	become	the	number	one	contributor	to	cumulative	emissions	since	1990.106	That	creates	a	serious	problem:	a	country	with	a	large	amount	of	its	population	still	living	in	poverty	would	owe	more	according	to	a	polluter	pays	principle	from	1990	than	developed	countries.			Posner	and	Weisbach	sum	up	the	problems	of	attempting	to	apply	corrective	justice	to	climate	change	like	this,			 It	is	tempting	to	think	that	rich	countries	should	bear	the	principal	economic	burden	of	any	climate	change	agreement,	because	they	have	been	the	major	contributors	in	the	past.	But	this	claim	encounters	serious	objections.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	developing	nations	will	be	close	to	the	developed	world,	in	cumulative	emissions,	in	the	relatively	near	future—perhaps	as	early	as	2030.	As	a	matter	of	principle,	the	corrective	justice	model	is	a	poor	fit	with	the	climate	change	problem.	Many	of	the	past	contributors	are	dead.	Many	of	them	lacked	the	requisite	state	of	mind.	In	addition,	those	who	have																																									 																					
104	Ibid.,	128.		105	Eric	Posner,	“When	it	comes	to	climate	change,	payback	isn’t	enough,”	Washington	Post,	January	8,	2016,	https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/in-theory/wp/2016/01/08/when-it-comes-to-climate-change-payback-isnt-enough/	106	Natasha	Geiling,	“The	U.S.	Will	Soon	No	Longer	Be	The	Leading	Cause	Of	Modern	Global	Warming,”	Think	Progress,	April	13,	2015,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/04/13/3646202/china-climate-change-largest-contributor/	
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inflicted	risks	of	harm	have	also	conferred	significant	benefits	on	other	nations,	and	the	benefits	should	be	included	in	any	accounting.107			Are	there	counter-arguments	to	these	objections?	If	not,	the	objections	risk	sinking	some	strong	motivators	for	climate	action.	Part	of	what	pushed	me	to	study	climate	change	from	the	perspective	of	justice	and	to	join	the	climate	justice	movement	was	having	been	struck	by	the	discomforting	intuition	that	I	belong	to	a	country	(Canada)	that	is	neglecting	moral	duties	arising	from	the	harms	of	our	actions	to	the	wellbeing	of	future	generations	due	to	our	historical	emissions.	The	preceding	arguments	stemming	from	the	epistemological	problems	of	the	intergenerational	storm	would	suggest	that	my	intuition—and	the	intuition	of	a	lot	of	people	in	the	climate	movement—is	flawed.	Even	aside	from	undermining	motivating	claims,	the	matter	is	especially	important	to	figure	out.	The	polluter-	and	beneficiary-pays	principles	potentially	offered	to	do	some	“heavy	lifting,”	obligating	the	richest	and	most	powerful	nations	to	direct	their	wealth	towards	addressing	climate	change	as	duties	of	justice	tied	to	the	harms	rich	countries’	actions	have	caused.		It	does	seem	difficult	to	salvage	the	initial	intuitive	attempt	to	assign	duties	for	them	under	polluter-	or	beneficiary	pays	principles.	Gardiner	offers	a	defense,	but	not	a	particularly	rigorous	one.	He	insists	that	we	should	not	excuse	individuals	who	are	part	of	nations	with	high	emissions	in	the	past	from	holding	historical	responsibility	for	them,	asking	simply	“if	we	are	not	responsible	for	at	least	some	of	the	debts	incurred	by	our	ancestors,	why	are	we	entitled	to	inherit	all	of	the	benefits	of	their	activities?”	For	him,	“the	burden	of	proof	remains	on	those	who	would	reject	all	historical	accountability.”108	This	of	course	would	not	satisfy	those	who	would	insist	that	we	do	not	really	benefit	from	past	activities	that	created	the	conditions	for	our	existence.		Some	have	settled	for	applying	the	PPP	only	on	emissions	from	the	year	1990,	when	the	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	issued	its	first	assessment																																									 																					
107	Eric	A.	Posner	and	David	Weisbach,	Climate	Change	Justice	(New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	2010),	190-191.		108	Gardiner,	A	Perfect	Moral	Storm,	402	&	418.		
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report	showing	that	human	activity	was	having	an	impact	on	the	climate,	as	the	point	from	which	countries	could	no	longer	claim	ignorance	and	so	could	be	held	liable	for	their	excess	emissions.109	Others	have	turned	to	a	different	principle	to	impose	duties	on	the	wealthy:	the	ability	to	pay.	Those	who	are	well	off	and	can	help	without	endangering	their	own	wellbeing	have	a	duty.110	For	the	most	part,	though,	
ability	to	pay	has	meant	leaving	behind	a	search	for	principles	that	assign	duties	derived	from	responsibility	for	injustices	of	a	more	distant	past.111		
	
2.3	Greenhouse	Development	Rights		The	intergenerational	storm	calls	for	a	schema	for	assigning	duties	that	can,	in	addition	to	problems	raised	in	the	global	storm,	address	temporal	matters	of	justice	like	historical	emissions.	Baer	et	al.’s	Greenhouse	Development	Rights	(GDR)	framework	offers	an	example	of	one	such	schema.	It	assigns	duties	for	emissions	reductions	and	for	adaptation	aid	based	on	two	key	principles:	capacity	and	
responsibility.	Capacity	refers	to	“the	ability	to	pay	for	climate	policies	without																																									 																					
109	Vanderheiden,	for	example,	writes,	“The	most	defensible	starting	point	for	assessing	moral	responsibility	for	historical	emissions	is	the	year	1990,	with	the	publication	of	the	IPCC’s	first	assessment	report.	By	then,	most	national	governments	were	fully	aware	of	the	likely	effects	of	various	kinds	of	human	activity	on	global	climate	and	could	have	initiated	emission	abatement	programs…Continued	luxury	emissions	after	1990,	allowed	under	full	knowledge	of	their	consequences	for	global	climate	and	despite	pledges	to	reduce	them,	ought	to	affect	the	assignment	of	compensatory	burdens.”	Vanderheiden,	Atmospheric	Justice,	191.		110	Caney’s	attempt	is	perhaps	the	most	ambitious.	He	designs	his	ability-to-pay	principle	to	take	into	account	historical	emissions	without	turning	to	the	more	controversial	diachronic	PPP.110	Burdens	fall	on	the	wealthy	in	proportion	to	their	wealth	because	“(a)	they	can	bear	the	burden	most	easily	and	also	(b)	the	wealth	that	they	hold	came	about	in	climate-endangering	or	other	unjust	ways.”	As	such,	its	design	also	avoids	triggering	the	non-identity	problem;	the	wealthy	do	not	benefit	from	climate-endangering	actions	of	the	past,	but	their	“current	holdings	[…]	are	almost	certainly	built	on	a	history	that	includes	very	high	emissions.”	Simon	Caney,	“Human	Rights,	Responsibilities,	and	Climate	Change”	in	Global	Basic	Rights	(New	York,	NY:	Oxford	University	Press,	2009),	244.		111	For	example,	Moellendorf	turns	to	ability-to-pay,	but	does	not	attempt	to	incorporate	historical	emissions	into	it	as	Caney	does	(see	previous	footnote).	To	Moellendorf,	the	overriding	purpose	of	the	international	framework	is	to	regulate	energy	use	to	promote	mitigation	while	also	permitting	human	development,	and	the	most	effective	approach	to	do	so	is	to	set	principles	of	justice	around	that	purpose.	The	central	problem	the	international	regime	attempts	to	solve	is	not,	in	other	words,	to	penalize	people	for	having	accumulated	wealth	in	an	unjust	manner;	therefore	polluter-	or	beneficiary-pays	principles	are	inappropriate,	and	can	safely	be	left	behind.	The	ability-to-pay	principle,	he	believes,	suffices.	Darrel	Moellendorf,	The	Moral	Challenge	of	Dangerous	Climate	
Change:	Values,	Poverty,	and	Policy	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014),	178.		
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sacrificing	consumption	of	greater	moral	priority.”112	Baer	et	al.	establish	a	per	capita	“development	threshold”	($7,500	purchasing	power	parity	adjusted),	and	countries’	duties	are	weighted	according	to	size	of	population	with	wealth	above	that	threshold.	Responsibility,	meanwhile,	weights	duties	according	to	a	country’s	emissions	(in	keeping	with	the	preceding	discussion,	Baer	et	al.	make	1990	the	date	after	which	countries	are	responsible	for	their	emissions)	but	excludes	a	proportion	of	emissions	based	on	population	below	the	development	threshold.113		Baer	et	al.	believe	that	the	resulting	“responsibility	and	capability	index”	offers	two	means	of	establishing	duties.	One	is	to	establish	countries’	respective	financial	contributions	to	“a	single	grand	international	fund	to	support	both	mitigation	and	adaptation.”	The	second	is	to	define	emissions	mitigation	obligations.114	Like	C&C,	GDR	is	careful	to	respect	development	rights,	while	also	being	much	more	sensitive	to	historical	emissions.			
2.4	The	Wrath	of	the	Intergenerational	Storm	Gardiner	tells	us	that	the	great	danger	of	the	intergenerational	storm	is	in	how	present	generations	benefit	from	their	emissions,	but	are	spared	their	consequences.	The	destructive	effects	of	climate	change	are	externalized	onto	future	generations	who	have	no	ability	to	influence	events	in	the	past,	creating	a	“tyranny	of	the	present.”	Even	if	duties	to	future	generations	are	recognized,	the	fact	that	the	worst	climate	impacts	will	occur	in	the	future	reduces	incentives	for	existing	institutions	and	decision	makers	to	take	concerted	action	today.	I	would	add	to	Gardiner’s	arguments	that	the	inability	to	turn	to	the	polluter	pays	principle	to	historical	emissions	to	do	some	heavy	lifting	might	even	make	it	more	difficult	to																																									 																					
112	Baer	et	al.,	“Greenhouse	Development	Rights,”	222	113	As	they	put	it,	“As	many	have	argued,	the	fact	that	knowledge	of	the	risks	from	GHG	pollution	was	not	widespread	before	around	1990,	the	year	of	the	first	report	of	the	IPCC,	means	that	the	conditions	for	moral	responsibility	do	not	easily	apply	before	then.”	Baer	et	al.,	“Greenhouse	Development	Rights,”	224.		Not	pertinent,	but	of	some	interest,	Caney	protects	the	right	to	development	with	his	
contribution	principle,	but	Baer	et	al.	protect	it	with	their	capacity	principle.		114	Baer	et	al.,	“Greenhouse	Development	Rights,”	224.		
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secure	the	levels	of	financing	from	rich	countries	that	need	to	be	directed	towards	serious	climate	action	right	now.			3)	The	Theoretical	Storm	This	final	storm	results	from	how	existing	moral	theories	are	“inept”	or	“unsuited”	to	sufficiently	guide	our	actions	in	the	realms	of	intergenerational	ethics	(including	non-identity),	international	justice,	scientific	uncertainty,	and	non-human	life.	The	latter	appears	to	have	been	particularly	difficult	to	wrestle	with;	in	the	works	consulted	for	this	chapter,	few	philosophers	engaged	at	length	with	an	attempt	to	theorize	non-instrumental	climate	responsibilities	relating	to	non-human	life.				 Climate	ethicists	have	been	deeply	concerned	with	one	manifestation	of	the	theoretical	storm	in	particular:	cost-benefit	analysis	(CBA)	approaches	to	climate	change.	Put	simply,	CBA	insists	that	actions	should	only	be	pursued	where	the	costs	of	implementation	are	less	costly	than	the	benefits	they	bring.	It	becomes	complicated,	however,	when	it	is	applied	over	longer	spans	of	time	and	incorporates	what	is	called	discounting.	Discounting	attempts	to	account	for	economic	growth	over	time	and	raises	the	possibility	that	current	generations	should	not	make	sacrifice	economic	growth	to	deal	with	climate	change	because	that	would	make	future	generations	less	economically	well	off	than	they	might	otherwise	have	been.		Despite	the	attention	to	the	problem	given	by	climate	ethicists,	the	seriousness	of	the	problem	CBA	posed	may	now	have	been	undercut.115	CBA	rests	on	an	assumption	that	climate	change	will	not	be	severe	if	the	world	continues																																									 																					
115	To	give	a	sense	of	how	much	climate	ethicists	have	been	concerned	with	this	issue,	note	(some	of)	the	full	chapters	devoted	to	this	issue	in	the	following	ethicists’	books:	Eric	A.	Posner	and	David	Weisbach,	“Future	Generations”	in	Climate	Change	Justice	(New	Jersey:	Princeton	University	Press,	2010),	144-168;	Stephen	M.	Gardiner	“Cost-Benefit	Paralysis”	in	A	Perfect	Moral	Storm:	The	
Ethical	Tragedy	of	Climate	Change	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	247-298;	Donald	A.	Brown,	“Ethical	Problems	with	Cost	Arguments”	in	Climate	Change	Ethics:	Navigating	the	Perfect	
Moral	Storm	(Earthscan.	2013),	57-90;	Dale	Jamieson,	“The	Limits	of	Economics”	in	Reason	in	a	Dark	
Time:	Why	the	Struggle	Against	Climate	Change	Failed—and	What	it	Means	for	our	Future	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	105-143;	Darrel	Moellendorf,	“Discounting	the	Future	and	the	Morality	in	Climate	Change	Economics”	in	The	Moral	Challenge	of	Dangerous	Climate	Change:	Values,	
Poverty,	and	Policy	(New	York:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014),	90-121.		
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emissions	on	business-as-usual	trajectories	or	that	it	will	be	easy	to	adapt	to,	but	neither	claim	finds	much	support	in	the	latest	scientific	literature.116		CBA	is	important	in	a	different	respect:	it	serves	as	a	reminder	that	ethical	theories	have	not	been	the	ones	most	readily	turned	to	when	looking	at	climate	duties.	That	might	be	due	to	climate	change	being	very	unlike	other	ethical	problems.	Jamieson	observes	that,	if	we	compare	the	average	American’s	CO2	emissions	with	estimates	of	what	emissions	should	be	allowed,			then	virtually	all	Americans	are	human	rights	violators,	as	are	most	of	those	in	the	rest	of	the	world	who	live	middle-class	(and	beyond)	lifestyles.	Yet	not	only	do	most	of	these	people	not	feel	like	human	rights	violators,	many	of	them	do	not	think	that	they	have	choices	that	would	allow	them	to	emit	less	[…]	This	does	not	sound	like	a	view	that	is	embedded	in	commonsense	morality.117		What	this	suggests	is	that	in	our	individual	contributions	to	climate	change	we	never	quite	feel	like	we	are	committing	an	injustice.	Driving	a	car	or	using	electricity	from	coal-powered	plants,	at	least	in	the	way	the	ethics	of	it	is	processed	mentally,	is	different	from	directly	assaulting	or	stealing	from	someone	for	instance.	Gardiner	is	rightly	concerned	about	a	lack	of	suitable	ethical	theories,	but	the	problem	that	Jamieson	raises	suggests	that	even	if	those	theories	were	at	hand,	the	way	many	people	think	about	climate	change	has	been	such	that	they	may	not	experience	the	required	sense	of	moral	culpability	to	be	sufficiently	moved	by	it	to	seek	out	those	theories.			
The	Wrath	of	the	Theoretical	Storm	The	theoretical	storm	thus	risks	further	contributing	to	the	externalization	of	consequences	onto	future	people,	already	victimized	under	the	second	storm,	but	it																																									 																					
116	The	work	of	CBA’s	most	high-profile	proponent	Bjørn	Lomborg	has	been	thoroughly	discredited	for	downplaying	the	current	and	future	costs	of	climate	change	and	exaggerating	the	costs	of	taking	action.	What	we	might	think	of	as	a	sub-sub-genre	of	climate	literature	is	dedicated	to	exposing	Lomborg,	but	one	may	begin	with	the	website	exhaustively	detailing	his	errors	(Kåre	Fog,	“Lomborg	Errors,”	http://www.lomborg-errors.dk/)	or	to	Howard	Friel’s	The	Lomborg	Deception:	
Setting	the	Record	Straight	About	Global	Warming	(Yale	University	Press,	2011).		117	Jamieson,	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time,	156.		
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also	means	that	some	problems	are	externalized	onto	other	species	as	well.	To	this	storm	we	can	add	what	we	might	call	the	problem	of	moral	perception,	a	difficulty	in	perceiving	a	need	for	ethical	theories.				
2.	The	UNFCCC	and	“The	Wreckage	of	the	Old	Story”		The	discussion	in	part	1	of	this	chapter	highlighted	the	many	challenges	that	any	real-world	attempt	to	realize	climate	ethics	would	need	to	address.	Important	elements	of	what	a	global	climate	agreement	must	contain	according	to	a	vision	of	climate	justice	as	climate	ethics	can	be	identified.			
• The	imposition	of	mitigation,	adaptation,	and	possibly	disaster	response	(whether	in	the	form	of	recovery	aid	or	reparations)	duties	must	be	justified	through	appeals	to	well-founded	principles.	
• Application	of	these	principles	must	not	endanger	either	subsistence	rights	or	the	right	to	development.		
• The	most	well-founded	principles	are	(a)	contribution	to	cumulative	emissions	from	about	1990	and	(b)	ability-to-pay.	(Though	possessing	some	intuitive	appeal,	a	diachronic	polluter-pays	principle	and	a	beneficiary-pays	principle	are	highly	controversial.)		
• The	selection	of	these	principles	and	the	caveats	on	their	application	imply	that	richest	nations	ought	to	take	on	the	largest	part	of	climate	duties.		
• Any	global	arrangement	must	have	the	capacity	to	actually	address	climate	change.	If	it	does	not,	it	would	fail	to	protect	the	wellbeing	of	people	now	and	in	the	future.		
• Because	thoroughly	vetted	ethical	principles	guide	the	assignment	of	duties	and	because	those	duties	must	address	climate	change,	it	is	legitimate	to	enforce	them	(i.e.,	make	them	legally	binding).118			 To	what	degree	are	matters	like	these	reflected	in	the	real-world	global	response	to	climate	change?	To	answer	that,	it	is	necessary	to	look	at	the	United	Nations	
																																								 																					
118	Vanderheiden,	Atmospheric	Justice,	60.		
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Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC).	Framework	conventions	like	the	UNFCCC	are	broad	treaties;	parties	agree	to	general	goals	and	guiding	principles,	but	use	subsequent	agreements	to	fine-tune	the	policies	that	will	achieve	their	objectives.	The	influence	structure	is	top-down:	decisions	made	at	global-level	climate	talks	are	intended	to	coordinate	national-level	policies.		The	wording	in	the	founding	UNFCCC	document	does	indeed	give	space	for	considerations	of	justice.	Consider	Article	3.1,	the	UNFCCC’s	oft-quoted	first	principle:			 The	Parties	should	protect	the	climate	system	for	the	benefit	of	present	and	future	generations	of	humankind,	on	the	basis	of	equity	and	in	accordance	with	their	common	but	differentiated	responsibilities	and	respective	capabilities.	Accordingly,	the	developed	country	Parties	should	take	the	lead	in	combating	climate	change	and	the	adverse	effects	thereof.			 The	challenge	has	been	in	defining	the	policies	that	realize	those	considerations	of	justice.	The	Kyoto	Protocol—signed	in	1997	and	ratified	in	2005—was	the	first	major	attempt.	The	expectation	was	that	rich	industrialized	countries	would	be	the	first	to	adopt	a	legally	binding	agreement	on	emissions	reductions.	The	reasoning	behind	it	was	straightforward:	developed	countries	had	a	long	and	exclusive	history	of	economic	growth	powered	by	fossil	fuels	and	were	thus	most	responsible	for,	and	most	capable	of	responding	to,	climate	change.		Kyoto’s	first	commitment	period	(2008-2012)	was	to	serve	as	a	kind	of	practice	round,	a	field-test	of	principles,	requiring	developed	countries	and	industrial	ex-Soviet	countries—together	known	as	Annex	I	countries—to	reduce	emissions	by	an	average	of	5%	relative	to	1990	levels.	And	while	a	5%	reduction	was	never	enough	to	solve	the	climate	crisis,	achieving	it	would	have	entailed	rich	countries	experimenting	with	policy	design	and	renewable	technologies,	and	being	in	a	position	to	pass	the	best	of	those	to	developing	countries.	They	might	even	have	formed	the	basis	of	a	more	ambitious	post-Kyoto	agreement.		Kyoto	contained	at	least	some	elements	that	would	belong	to	an	equitable	agreement.	Centrally,	duties	fell	on	those	countries	with	the	greatest	ability	to	act.	
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Also,	emissions	reductions	among	the	rich	nations	were	not	optional,	but	legally	binding.		But	Kyoto	failed.	Though	legally	binding,	it	had	few	real	enforcement	mechanisms	and	contained	design	flaws.	For	one,	the	Kyoto	commitments	of	the	ex-Communist	countries	could	be	met	simply	by	the	transition	to	capitalism,	which	would	entail	a	move	away	from	energy-inefficient	industrial	production.	Developed	countries,	particularly	those	with	governments	captured	by	fossil	fuel	industries	as	in	the	US	under	George	W.	Bush	and	Canada	under	Stephen	Harper’s	Conservatives,	used	those	flaws	to	claim	Kyoto	would	unfairly	burden	their	economies.119	Even	before	the	end	of	Kyoto’s	first	commitment	period	(2008-2012),	it	was	apparent	that	the	unwillingness	of	major	developed	country	parties	to	take	serious	action	on	climate	change	was	straining	the	possibility	for	Kyoto-type	models	in	the	future.		Jamieson	argues	that	between	1992	when	the	UNFCCC	was	founded	at	the	Rio	Earth	Summit	and	COP15	in	2009,	the	dominant	narrative	could	be	called	the	“Rio	dream,”	one	where	“states,	motivated	at	least	in	part	by	a	sense	of	justice,	would	make	binding	commitments	to	limit	emissions	and	transfer	resources	in	an	effort	to	protect	the	global	environment	and	bring	the	benefits	of	modernity	to	less	developed	countries.”120	That	dream,	he	tells	us,	ended	in	2009	at	COP15	in	Copenhagen.	We	currently	live	in	the	“wreckage	of	the	old	story.”121	And	that	wreckage	is	severe.		Rather	than	fix	the	flaws	of	Kyoto	but	retain	its	essential	form,	climate	negotiations	underwent	a	mutation	starting	at	COP15.	Under	the	new	approach,	the	Kyoto	model	was	steadily	abandoned.	Out	went	legally	binding	emissions	targets	on	countries	most	responsible	for	and	most	able	to	respond	to	climate	change;	in	came	a	system	where	all	countries,	developing	countries	included,	were	invited	to	
																																								 																					
119	For	some	good	reviews	by	climate	ethicists,	see	Vanderheiden,	Atmospheric	Justice,	chapter	1;	and	Jamieson,	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time,	chapter	2.	See	also,	Quirin	Schiermeier,	“The	Kyoto	Protocol:	Hot	air,”	Nature	491	vol.	7426	(2012).		120	Jamieson,	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time,	227.		121	Ibid.,	237.		
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voluntarily	submit	emissions	reductions	pledges,	or	Intended	Nationally	Determined	
Contributions	(INDCs).	A	similar	voluntary	approach	characterizes	the	provision	of	climate	financing	for	developing	countries	for	mitigation	and	adaptation,	where,	by	2020,	$100bn	per	year	is	to	be	“mobilized”	by	developed	countries	from	“a	wide	variety	of	sources,	public	and	private,	bilateral	and	multilateral,	including	alternative	sources	of	finance.”122		The	6-year	mutation	culminated	at	COP21	in	the	2015	Paris	Agreement.	As	part	of	the	lead-up	process,	countries	submitted	their	voluntary	INDCs.	If	not	improved	upon,	these	pledges	led	to	a	terrifying	temperature	rise	of	3.5˚C	by	2100.123	The	agreement’s	inability	to	coordinate	emissions	reductions	in	line	with	what	climate	science	shows	will	be	necessary	to	prevent	dangerous	climate	change	earned	it	some	bitter	criticism	from	James	Hansen,	one	of	the	world’s	leading	climatologists,	who	called	it	“a	precatory	agreement,	wishful	thinking	that	mainly	reaffirms,	23	years	later,	the	1992	Rio	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change.”124	“There’s	a	misconception	that	we’ve	begun	to	address	the	climate	problem,”	he	noted	in	an	October	2016	press	call.	“The	misapprehension	is	based	on	the	Paris	climate	summit	where	all	the	government	leaders	clapped	each	other	on	
																																								 																					
122	UNFCCC,	“Copenhagen	Accord,”	7.		123	Joseph	Romm,	“Misleading	U.N.	Report	Confuses	Media	On	Paris	Climate	Talks,”	Think	
Progress,	November	3,	2015,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/	11/03/3718146/misleading-un-report-confuses-media-paris-climate-talks/.		Different	potential	temperature	rises	were	reported	in	the	media,	the	most	widely	quoted	being	2.7˚C.	For	some	accessible	discussion	on	the	disparity	between	the	2.7˚C	and	3.5˚C	figures,	see	Kelly	Levin	and	Taryn	Fransen,	“INSIDER:	Why	Are	INDC	Studies	Reaching	Different	Temperature	Estimates?”	World	Resources	Institute,	November	9,	2015,	http://www.wri.org/blog/2015/11/insider-why-are-indc-studies-reaching-different-temperature-estimates;	and	“Comparison	between	Climate	Action	Tracker	and	Climate	Interactive	assessments,”	
Climate	Action	Tracker,	October	19,	2015,	http://climateactiontracker.org/global/227/Comparison-between-Climate-Action-Tracker-and-Climate-Interactive-assessments.html	124	James	Hansen,	"Young	People's	Burden,"	Earth	Institute,	Columbia	University,	October	4,	2016,	http://csas.ei.columbia.edu/2016/10/04/young-peoples-burden/	
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the	back	as	if	some	great	progress	has	been	made,	but	you	look	at	the	science	and	it	doesn’t	compute.	We	are	not	doing	what	is	needed.”125	And	the	shortcomings	of	the	mutated	climate	regime	extend	beyond	emissions	reductions	targets.	A	large	part	of	the	climate	financing	developed	countries	have	claimed	counts	towards	the	$100bn	mobilization	of	climate	financing	is	not	directly	related	to	climate	change	and	comes	through	market-rate	loans.126	According	to	the	Copenhagen	Accord,	a	“significant	portion”	of	that	$100bn	was	to	flow	through	the	Green	Climate	Fund.	Pledges	towards	the	Fund	had	reached	a	mere	$10bn	in	2016.127		Even	though	any	of	them	would	always	be	contentious,	there	were	forms	that	global	arrangements	ought	to	have	taken	on	if	they	were	going	to	address	climate	change	in	a	just	fashion,	C&C	and	GDR	providing	two	potential	examples.	But	this	new	global	mitigation	regime	looks	nothing	like	what	they	described.	Voluntary	
pledges	of	emission	targets	and	contributions	to	climate	funding	for	developing	countries	fall	far	short	of	duties	imposed	and	enforced	following	careful	selection	of	principles.	Perhaps,	a	supporter	of	the	new	regime	might	suggest,	the	pledges	reflect	an	ability-to-pay	principle.	But	the	INDCs	are	more	representative	of	governments’	projections	of	emissions	reductions	that	can	be	made	without	harming	economic	
growth	than	without	harming	wellbeing.	And	rich-country	contributions	towards	climate	financing,	particularly	through	the	Green	Climate	Fund,	are	much	lower	than	what	they	are	able	to	pay.128	Given	its	inability	to	produce	a	climate	agreement																																									 																					
125	Natasha	Geilling,	"Climate	scientist	James	Hansen:	We	aren’t	doing	nearly	enough	to	slow	climate	change,"	Think	Progress,	October	4,	2016,	https://thinkprogress.org/hansen-paper-warming-courts-7c0bf59de6f7#.w613433tx	126	John	Upton,	“The	$100	Billion	Climate	Question,”	Climate	Central,	November	23,	2015,	http://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-100-billion-climate-question-19726	127	Green	Climate	Fund,	“Status	of	Pledges	and	Contributions	made	to	the	Green	Climate	Fund,”	May	27,	2016,	http://www.greenclimate.fund/documents/20182/24868/	Status_of_Pledges__2016.1.15_.pdf/278bca2f-9672-4cef-a917-a637dbb46591	128	In	2015,	Canada’s	then-incoming	Liberal	government	pledged	to	contribute	$2.65	billion	over	2016-2020.	(Rosemary	Barton,	“Government	announces	$2.65B	to	help	developing	countries	fight	climate	change,”	CBC	News,	November	27,	2015,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/funding-for-climate-change-chogm-1.3339907)	The	Canadian	government’s	contribution	will	be	just	$800	million	in	2020,	when	the	$100	billion	per	year	is	supposed	to	be	mobilized.	To	put	that	in	
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capable	of	keeping	temperature	rise	below	safe	levels,	the	climate	regime	also	fails	to	protect	future	generations	in	any	clear	way;	the	further	globally	averaged	temperature	rises	above	1.5˚C,	the	more	dangerous	the	world	grows	for	people	in	the	future	as	they	will	face	a	confluence	of	rising	sea	levels,	extreme	storms,	persistent	droughts	and	other	effects	of	climate	change.		Jamieson	described	the	regime	as	“a	portfolio	of	policies	without	a	single	effective	portfolio	manager.”129	He	writes,	For	the	foreseeable	future,	climate	policy	will	largely	reflect	the	motley	collection	of	policies	and	practices	adopted	by	particular	countries,	rather	than	reflecting	the	outcome	of	a	global	deal	based	in	a	shared	conception	of	justice.	There	will	be	climate-relevant	policy	virtually	everywhere,	but	it	will	be	different	in	different	countries	and	it	will	be	pursued	under	different	descriptions	and	with	different	objectives.	Some	countries	will	adopt	emissions	trading,	others	carbon	taxes,	and	others	technology-forcing	policies.	Some	countries	will	alter	their	energy	mix,	others	their	transportation	systems,	and	others	will	focus	on	buildings.	Some	countries	will	do	a	lot	and	others	will	do	a	little…These	policies…will	reflect	a	mix	of	self-interest	and	ethical	ideals	constructed	in	different	ways	in	different	countries.130			Which	world	we	live	in	will	largely	be	a	function	of	the	policies	and	practices	adopted	by	particular	countries.	What	countries	do	(and	fail	to	do)	will	reflect	their	internal	politics,	values,	fears,	ambitions,	hopes,	and	national	priorities.	What	happens	may	actually	be	quite	volatile.131			There	are	unsettling	indications	that	the	UNFCCC’s	primary	and	immediate	concern	going	into	COP21	was	not	even	preventing	severe	climate	warming,	let	alone	doing	so	in	a	just	way.	In	advance	of	COP21,	UNFCCC	Executive	Secretary	Christiana	Figueres,	EU	climate	chief	Miguel	Arias	Canete,	and	US	lead	climate	negotiator	Todd	Stern	alongside	other	high-level	commentators	all	downplayed	the	summit’s	potential	to	achieve	an	agreement	that	would	by	itself	keep	climate	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					perspective,	Canada	gave	$4.2	billion—a	mere	0.24%	of	gross	national	income—in	development	aid	in	2014.	(See,	OECD,	“Development	aid	stable	in	2014	but	flows	to	poorest	countries	still	falling,”	
OECD,	2015,	http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-flows-to-poorest-countries-still-falling.htm)	It	is	therefore	difficult	to	see	how	the	promised	$800	million	(it	remains	to	be	seen	if	it	will	even	be	delivered)	reflects	Canada’s	ability	to	pay.	129	Jamieson,	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time,	228.		130	Ibid.,	9.		131	Ibid.,	227.		
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warming	below	2˚C.	All	the	while,	they	were	careful	to	point	out	that	such	a	result	would	not	constitute	a	failure.132	Aligning	with	them,	Joseph	Romm	of	the	important	climate	blog	Climate	Progress	(since	folded	into	the	Think	Progress	site)	summarizes	the	logic	well:			 You	can’t	judge…any	country’s	commitment	on	whether	it	is	sufficient	to	keep	the	world	below	2°C	—	because	none	of	them	are…that’s	because	2°C	will	require	deeper	and	deeper	commitments	for	2040	and	2050	and	beyond	until	total	global	emissions	hit	zero	and	then	beyond	that	until	they	go	negative.	No	major	country	is	prepared	to	take	on	such	long-term	obligations,	especially	given	the	last	quarter-century	of	relative	inaction	by	so	many	major	countries	[…]		 Again,	Paris	is	focused	on	stanching	the	bleeding	with	a	tourniquet.	The	goal	has	always	been	to	get	firm	global	commitments	from	the	big	emitters	to	meet	serious	targets	in	the	2025-2030	timeframe	so	we	can	get	off	our	current	emissions	pathway	—	a	pathway	that	would	blow	past	4°C	(7°F)	warming,	ruin	a	livable	climate	for	centuries	and	make	feeding	9	billion	people	post-2050	an	unimaginably	difficult	task.133		 The	UNFCCC’s	standard	for	success	at	COP21	seemed	to	have	changed,	then,	to	one	of	preserving	its	credibility	by	having	parties	remain	part	of	any	ongoing	process	of	negotiations	that	holds	some	promise	of	getting	away	from	the	current	emissions	trajectory.134	By	that	standard,	the	UNFCCC	would	succeed	in	Paris	as	long	as	talks	ended	in	even	a	weak	agreement,	and	with	little	concern	for	justice.	An	optimistic	Environmental	Defense	Fund	climate	strategist	offered	a	perceptive	explanation	for																																									 																					
132	For	Canete’s	views,	see	Suzann	Goldenberg,	“Paris	climate	summit:	missing	global	warming	target	'would	not	be	failure',”	Guardian,	February	4,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/feb/04/paris-climate-summit-missing-global-warming-target-would-not-be-failure;	Stern’s	statements	can	be	found	in	Fiona	Harvey,	“World	should	not	rush	to	judge	Paris	climate	deal,	says	top	US	negotiator”	Guardian,	February	27,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/feb/27/world-should-not-rush-to-judge-paris-climate-deal-says-top-us-negotiator;	see	also	Joseph	Romm,	“Of	Course	Paris	Climate	Talks	Won’t	Keep	Warming	Below	The	Dangerous	2°C	Limit,”	Climate	Progress,	February	5,	2015,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/02/05/3619717/paris-climate-talks-2c/	133	Joseph	Romm,	“How	Obama’s	New	Clean	Power	Plan	Might	Be	Just	Enough	To	Stave	Off	A	Climate	Catastrophe,”	Climate	Progress,	August	3,	2015,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/08/03/3686977/moral-urgency-epa-clean-power-plan/	134	This	was	the	view	of	the	outgoing	EU	climate	chief,	for	example.	See,	Fiona	Harvey,	“Connie	Hedegaard:	credibility	of	UN	climate	process	hangs	on	Paris	talks,”	Guardian,	December	28,	2014,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/dec/28/connie-hedegaard-credibility-un-climate-process-2015-paris-talks	
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the	shift	in	parameters	of	success	[emphasis	mine]:	“The	idea	is	that	the	Paris	agreement	will	put	us	not	on	an	emissions	trajectory	for	2	degrees,	but	on	an	
institutional	trajectory	that	allows	us	to	try	to	meet	that	goal.”135	A	writer	for	The	
Atlantic	observed	the	Paris	Agreement	“is	meant	to	work	more	as	an	economic	signal	than	as	a	binding	statute”	and	quoted	then-US	Secretary	of	State	John	Kerry	as	saying	it	sends	“a	critical	message	to	the	global	marketplace”	to	invest	in	a	green	economy.136		What	will	ostensibly	correct	the	course	of	the	new	climate	regime	is	something	referred	to	unofficially	as	a	“ratchet	mechanism.”137	Every	five	years,	countries	are	to	submit	a	new	INDC	with	a	more	ambitious	target	than	the	previous	submission,	a	process	sometimes	called	“pledge	and	review.”	The	aforementioned	climate	strategist	tells	us	that	instead	of	binding	agreements,	the	Paris	Agreement	“will	rely	instead	on	peer	pressure,	national	accountability,	and	global	cooperation	to	voluntarily	try	to	slow	the	climate-changing	impacts	of	all	nations,	be	they	developed,	dirt	poor	or	somewhere	in	between.”138	Speaking	in	2013,	Todd	Stern	characterized	the	emerging	climate	regime	as	one	where	“norms	are	the	crucial	motivator	–	norms	built	up	among	countries,	international	organizations	and	financial	institutions,	civil	society,	the	press.”	Countries	will	seek	to	meet	norms	and	expectations	in	order	“to	enhance	their	global	standing	and	reputation.”139		
																																								 																					
135	John	Upton,	“Paris	Talks	Won’t	Achieve	2°C	Goal:	Does	That	Matter?,”	Climate	Central,	February	10,	2015,	http://www.climatecentral.org/news/paris-talks-wont-achieve-2-degree-goal-does-that-matter-18648;	see	also	Joseph	Romm,	“How	Obama’s	New	Clean	Power	Plan	Might	Be	Just	Enough	To	Stave	Off	A	Climate	Catastrophe.”	136	Robinson	Meyer,	“A	Reader's	Guide	to	the	Paris	Agreement,”	Atlantic,	December	16,	2015,	http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/a-readers-guide-to-the-paris-agreement/420345/	137	Sophie	Yeo,	“Explainer:	the	‘ratchet	mechanism’	within	the	Paris	climate	deal,”	Carbon	
Brief,	December	3,	2015,	http://www.carbonbrief.org/explainer-the-ratchet-mechanism-within-the-paris-climate-deal	138	John	Upton,	“Paris	Talks	Won’t	Achieve	2°C	Goal:	Does	That	Matter?,”	Climate	Central,	February	10,	2015,	http://www.climatecentral.org/news/paris-talks-wont-achieve-2-degree-goal-does-that-matter-18648	139	Todd	Stern,	“The	Shape	of	a	New	International	Climate	Agreement,”	Oct	22,	2013	http://www.state.gov/e/oes/rls/remarks/2013/215720.htm.	Other	appeals	in	this	vein	strain	credulity	even	further.	As	two	Canadian	climate	scientists	put	it,	“Countries	of	the	world	have	officially	
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	 But	to	the	degree	that,	this	late	in	the	game,	the	UNFCCC’s	current	concern	is	still	with	its	“institutional	trajectory”	to	be	corrected	through	“peer	pressure,	national	accountability,	and	global	cooperation”	relying	on	countries	seeking	“to	enhance	their	global	standing	and	reputation”	(the	same	non-binding	approach	incapable	of	preventing	the	2003	US	invasion	and	occupation	of	Iraq	and	larger	“War	on	Terror,”	of	raising	development	aid	from	rich	countries	to	0.7%	of	their	GDP,	of	meeting	the	Millennium	Development	Goals—and	one	could	continue),	the	process	lags	frighteningly	behind	the	times.		Dale	Jamieson’s	book	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time:	Why	the	Struggle	Against	
Climate	Change	Failed—and	What	It	Means	for	Our	Future	is	a	kind	of	post-mortem	searching	for	the	cause	of	the	inability	to	realize	that	Rio	dream.	It	joins	Gardiner’s	work,	with	its	warnings	about	the	difficulty	of	finding	ethical	solutions	to	climate	change	due	to	the	perfect	moral	storm,	in	signifying	a	pessimism	among	at	least	some	philosophers	about	the	degree	to	which	ethics	can	shape	the	global	agreements	guiding	the	world’s	climate	response.		To	be	sure,	climate	change	is	without	doubt	a	problem	of	ethics.	But	many	of	the	ethical	prescriptions	could	only	ever	function	with	states	that	(1)	actually	prioritize	ending	the	crisis	and	(2)	are	concerned	with	fairly	distributing	and	abiding	by	their	duties.	As	I	discuss	over	the	next	several	chapters,	the	entities	that	have	come	to	occupy	the	negotiation	space	the	UNFCCC	carved	out	do	not	have	these	characteristics.	The	current	state	of	the	global	mitigation	regime	more	closely	resembles	what	one	should	expect	from	states	seeking	above	all	to	preserve	economic	growth	than	it	does	states	waiting	for	a	fair	agreement	in	order	to	institute	strong	climate	policy.		
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
embarked	in	a	global	race	to	implement	ambitious	climate	policies	that	contribute	to	reducing	green-house	gas	emissions	at	the	planetary-scale.	This	process	is	not	unlike	the	Olympics	games	where	
countries	get	together	to	compare	their	strengths	and	performance”	[emphases	mine].	James	Byrne	and	Catherine	Potvin,	"Scientists	rate	Canadian	climate	policies,”	Guardian,	November	28,	2016,	https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-per-cent/2016/nov/28/scientists-rate-canadian-climate-policies	
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Let	us	note	that	none	of	this	should	suggest	that	the	fights	for	justice	on	this	first	front	are	over.	While	the	COP15-COP21	mutation	means	the	struggle	to	establish	a	fair,	global,	and	legally	binding	emissions	reduction	agreement	is	(at	least	for	now)	lost,	there	is	still	much	of	importance	to	be	decided	at	the	global	level	that	ethics	can	contribute	to.	The	failure	of	the	UNFCCC	to	secure	an	agreement	capable	of	preventing	dangerous	climate	change	means	that	adaptation	and	“loss	and	damage”	(i.e.,	fund	transfers	for	communities	following	disastrous	climate	events)	will	only	grow	in	importance.	There	are	therefore	arrangements	for	addressing	them	that	will	need	to	be	put	forward	in	a	way	that	is	simultaneously	just	and	can	enter	into	a	difficult	international	negotiation	context	where	compensatory	forms	of	justice	that	assign	blame	will	be	resisted.	The	turn	to	risk-sharing	arrangements	modeled	on	worker	compensation	arrangements	provides	a	promising	alternative.140		But	to	return	to	the	earlier	point,	philosophy	has	no	inherent	means	of	realization.	Whatever	the	soundness	of	a	set	of	arguments,	those	arguments	will	have	to	be	realized	in	the	real	institutions	of	some	living	society	by	some	active	agents.	So	there	are	some	questions	unanswered	by	climate-justice-as-climate-ethics	when	there	is	a	mismatch	between	the	UNFCCC	design	on	the	one	hand	and	the	states	that	actually	participate	in	it	on	the	other.	What	happens	when	states	neither	prioritize	ending	the	crisis	nor	concern	themselves	with	distributing	burdens	fairly?	Who	could	ever	turn	these	states—particularly	those	in	the	north—into	ones	that	would	match	the	UNFCCC	design?	What	do	we	do	if	our	existing	political	and	economic	systems	are	structurally	unlikely	to	or	even	incapable	of	ever	addressing	the	issue	(a	real	possibility	as	discussed	in	later	
																																								 																					
140	My	thanks	to	Dr.	Idil	Boran	for	directing	me	to	her	piece	showing	how	risk-sharing	approaches	can	be	applied	to	loss	and	damage.	See	Idil	Boran,	“Risk-Sharing:	A	Normative	Framework	for	International	Climate	Negotiations,”	Philosophy	and	Public	Policy	Quarterly	32	No.	2	(2014).	Peter	Penz	has	shown	how	risk-sharing	can	also	be	applied	to	climate-related	displacement.	See	Peter	Penz,	“International	Ethical	Responsibilities	to	‘Climate	Change	Refugees’,”	in	Climate	
Change	and	Displacement:	Multidisciplinary	Perspectives,	ed.	Jane	McAdam	(Hart	Publishing,	2010).	
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chapters)?	What	kind	of	socioeconomic	system	would	ever	realize	the	kinds	of	principles	that	emerge	from	this	kind	of	inquiry?	To	be	sure,	matters	of	this	sort	have	not	escaped	climate	ethicists.	Shue	noted	very	early	on	that	the	rich	would	have	to	consume	less	to	meet	their	climate	goals	as	long	as	economies	are	based	on	fossil	fuels,	but	that	the	reduction	in	consumption	might	not	affect	wellbeing	(anticipating	the	problem	of	economic	growth	taken	up	in	my	final	chapter):				 Much	of	what	sustains	a	consumerist	economy	not	only	clogs	our	landfills	but	dulls	our	senses,	clutters	our	minds,	erodes	our	health,	and	fritters	away	our	time	and	natural	resources.	We	could	clearly	live	much	richer	lives	if	we	could	be	free	from	many	of	the	gadgets,	widgets,	and	other	expensive	junk	that	we	sell	to	each	other	and	then	quickly	discard.	All	that	can	be	said	for	much	of	the	stuff	that	expands	the	gross	national	product	(GNP)	is	that	making	it,	advertising	it,	distributing	it,	and	discarding	it	all	create	jobs…the	rich	need	to	create	different	kinds	of	jobs	that,	besides	providing	people	with	income,	add	to	the	quality	of	life.141		Looking	at	the	possibility	that	existing	institutions	will	not	take	on	climate	change,	Gardiner	comes	to	what	he	believes	might	be	a	“startling”	conclusion	that	points	in	the	direction	of	the	next	chapter	on	the	climate	movement:			 Suppose	it	is	true	that	humanity	currently	lacks	the	appropriate	institutions	to	deal	with	global	environmental	change.	What	follows?	If	political	institutions	normally	operate	under	delegated	authority	from	the	citizens,	the	answer	seems	clear.	This	is	a	case	where	the	delegation	has	either	not	happened,	or	else	has	failed	to	be	successful…If	the	attempt	to	delegate	effectively	has	failed,	then	the	responsibility	falls	back	on	citizens	again—either	to	solve	the	problems	themselves,	or	else,	if	this	is	not	possible,	to	create	new	institutions	to	do	the	job.142		Jamieson,	meanwhile,	suggests	that,	following	the	“wreckage	of	the	old	dream,”	a	“narrative	may	come	along	in	the	future	that	will	move	people	and	organize	our	thoughts	and	feelings	about	climate	change	in	a	way	that	will	be	
																																								 																					
141	Henry	Shue,	Climate	Justice:	Vulnerability	and	Protection,	72.	This	citation	is	from	his	piece	“After	you:	may	action	by	the	rich	be	contingent	upon	action	by	the	poor?”	written	in	1994.		142	Gardiner,	A	Perfect	Moral	Storm,	433	
  87 
effective.”143	He	sees	hope	in	non-linear	change	in	social	systems	(citing	the	unexpected	collapse	of	Soviet	Communism)	that	come	from	a	variety	of	actions	(he	gives	fossil	fuel	divestment	as	an	example).144		Climate	ethicists	have	thus	noted	important	matters	that	extend	beyond	the	boundaries	of	climate-justice-as-climate	ethics,	but	do	not	take	them	up.	For	that	reason,	I	move	in	the	next	chapter	onto	the	next	front	of	climate	justice—the	justice	of	the	climate	movement—to	see	its	contributions.								
																																								 																					
143	Jamieson,	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time,	237.		144	“Dale	Jamieson	&	Peter	Singer	in	Conversation:	Reason	in	a	Dark	Time,”	Vimeo	video,	uploaded	by	Princeton	Community	Television	on	March	18,	2015,	https://vimeo.com/122572018	
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III.	Climate	Justice	and	the	Climate	Movement		 	
1.	The	Two	Streams	of	the	Movement		“What	do	we	want?	Climate	Justice!	When	do	we	want	it?	Now!”		I’ve	joined	in	that	particular	call-and-response	in	several	climate	marches	now:	through	downtown	New	York	in	September	2014	as	part	of	the	People’s	Climate	March,	through	the	University	of	Toronto	campus	three	months	later	(and	again	one	year	after	that)	in	support	of	the	student	fossil	fuel	divestment	movement,	and	again	through	downtown	Toronto	in	July	2015	as	part	of	the	March	for	Jobs,	Justice	and	the	Climate.			 On	those	occasions,	I’ve	wondered	just	what	it	was	we	all	had	in	mind	when	we	called	for	“climate	justice.”	At	no	point	did	we	decide	how	we	were	using	the	term.	In	fact,	I	even	recall	taking	part	in	an	activity	with	a	large	group	of	climate	activists	during	a	workshop—many	of	whom	I	had	marched	with	several	months	prior—where	we	tried	to	define	the	climate	justice	we	had	already	demanded	in	at	least	2	marches.	What	is	clear,	however,	is	that	we	were	perceiving	these	marches	as	having	an	element	of	justice.	Most	in	the	climate	movement	will	not	have	had	training	in	ethics.	They	are	likely	unaware	of	the	non-identity	problem	(see	last	chapter)	when	they	make	appeals	for	concern	for	the	wellbeing	of	future	generations	or	when	they	call	for	reparations	for	historical	emissions,	as	we	often	do.	I	doubt	that	many	are	familiar	with	the	works	of	climate	ethicists	like	Simon	Caney,	Dale	Jamieson,	Stephen	M.	Gardiner,	or	Henry	Shue.	They	may	not	have	consulted	the	Contraction	and	Convergence	schema	or	Greenhouse	Development	Rights	framework	and	understood	the	principles	they	are	based	upon.	One	could,	for	these	reasons,	be	tempted	to	accuse	climate	justice	activists	of	not	having	fully	or	properly	interrogated	the	meaning	of	climate	justice,	of	not	knowing	what	justice	really	
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means.	But	that	would	be	unfair,	because	justice	here	carries	a	meaning	quite	different	than	the	one	climate	ethicists	hold.	In	this	chapter	I	explore	that	sense	of	justice.		In	the	previous	chapter,	I	was	ultimately	interested	in	how	the	sense	of	climate	justice	held	by	climate	ethicists	determined	both	the	site	of	contestation	they	identified	as	most	important	to	engage	with—in	that	case,	the	UNFCCC—and	how	they	interacted	with	it.	I	argued	that	climate-justice-as-climate-ethics	required	UNFCCC	parties	to	be	idealized	entities,	ones	prioritizing	a	response	to	climate	change	but	hesitant	to	enter	into	any	agreement	that	was	unfair.	Ethics	could	engage	with	the	matter	by	establishing	principles	and	frameworks	to	guide	the	creation	of	a	just	global	agreement	that	would	encourage	hesitant	states	to	enter	into	it.	I	argued,	however,	that	it	fell	outside	of	climate	ethicists’	prescriptive	bounds	once	it	became	clear	that	the	real-world	UNFCCC	parties	do	not	conform	to	those	ideal	entities.		What	this	means	is	that	some	new	set	of	agents	must	somehow	contend	with	the	UNFCCC	parties	and	their	representatives,	must	somehow	influence	them	to	act	on	climate	change	when	ethical	prescription	alone	is	insufficient.	As	the	set	of	agents	changes	and	as	the	site	of	contestation	shifts	from	the	realm	of	an	idealized	UNFCCC,	how	does	the	sense	of	justice	that	guides	these	new	agents	change?		The	climate	crisis	is	not	at	its	root	only	about	ethics;	it	is	also	deeply	political,	involving	a	power	struggle	between	the	demos	and	existing	concentrations	of	political	and	economic	power	that	block	UNFCCC	parties	from	adopting	the	kind	of	just	climate	policy	climate	ethicists	have	done	so	much	to	describe.	This	struggle	is	an	important	missing	element	that	the	climate	movement	adds	to	the	ethical	approach	to	climate	justice.			Some	clarification	is	needed	before	proceeding.	What	is	sometimes	called	the	
climate	justice	movement	is	a	growing	current	within	the	larger	climate	change	
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movement.145	Its	framework	would	be	associated	with	the	analyses	adopted	by	the	World	People’s	Conference	on	Climate	Change	of	2010,	the	Indigenous	Environment	Network,	Rising	Tide,	and	the	Climate	Justice	Now!	network	(active	at	COP15	in	2009),	as	well	as	the	writings	of	Naomi	Klein,	Ian	Angus,	and	Patrick	Bond.	It	bears	a	distinctly	radical	analysis	rooting	the	climate	crisis	in	colonialism,	racism,	environmental	injustice,	free-market	ideology,	and	capitalist	growth.	Concomitantly,	climate	change	cannot	be	addressed	without	some	kind	of	confrontation	with	colonialism	and	capitalism.	Its	actions	are	taken	at	multiple	scales,	increasingly	local	ones,	and	it	draws	links	of	allyship	and	solidarity	with	other	justice	movements;	it	is	sometimes	described	as	the	newest	phase	in	the	global	justice	movement.146		This	radical	current	may	be	distinguished	from	a	more	moderate	current	within	the	movement	that	largely	advocates	for	solutions	within	the	dominant	economic	paradigm,	like	carbon	pricing—even	in	its	most	controversial	form	of	emissions	trading	and	offsets,	what	the	radical	current	often	calls	“false	solutions.”	While	it	shares	with	the	radical	current	a	concern	with	inequities	between	the	Global	North	and	South,	the	moderate	current	would	not	apply	a	critique	rooted	in	colonialism.	It	is	associated	with	NGOs	like	the	Climate	Action	Network	or	the	Citizens	Climate	Lobby.			 The	reason	for	raising	this	distinction	here,	and	only	in	a	broad	sketch,	is	to	avoid	a	potential	danger	arising	from	the	radical	stream	having	been	given	the	name	“climate	justice	movement.”	This	linguistic	sleight	risks	leading	to	a	conflation	of	the	radical	stream’s	sense	of	justice	with	that	of	the	broader	climate	movement.	There	would	be	two	major	problems	with	proceeding	to	write	this	chapter	based	on	that	conflation.		
																																								 																					
145	A	distinction	like	this	is	made,	for	example,	in	Donatella	della	Porta	and	Louisa	Parks,	“Framing	Processes	in	the	Climate	Movement:	From	Climate	Change	to	Climate	Justice,”	in	Routledge	
Handbook	of	the	Climate	Movement,	Matthias	Dietz	and	Heiko	Garrelts	(eds.).	(New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	2014),	23.		146	E.g.,	Naomi	Klein,	“Copenhagen:	Seattle	Grows	Up,”	Nation,	November	11,	2009,	http://www.thenation.com/article/copenhagen-seattle-grows/	
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First,	the	distinction	between	the	moderate	(climate	change)	movement	and	the	radical	(climate	justice)	movement	is	not	a	straightforward	one	to	make	when	taking	movement	actions	into	consideration.	In	my	time	volunteering	with	climate	activist	organizations	(if	I	may	be	permitted	to	draw	on	a	bit	of	light	anecdotal	evidence),	many	of	us	adopt	a	radical	critique	of	capitalism	and	colonialism	in	our	analyses	of	the	climate	crisis,	and	yet	the	actions	of	our	members—divestment	campaigns;	protest	aimed	at	the	regulatory	body	governing	pipelines;	occupations	of	politicians’	offices;	pipeline	blockades;	marches;	solidarity	campaigns	with	Indigenous	sovereignty	and	anti-racist	movements;	campaigning	against	the	Harper	Conservatives	in	the	2015	Canadian	election—are	not	of	the	sort	that	present	clear	challenges	to	capitalism.	At	the	same	time,	not	all	group	members	embraced	an	anti-capitalist	critique;	some	were	indeed	moderate	in	their	politics.	And	yet	we	all	stood	behind	the	actions.	All	the	while,	we	would	very	much	consider	ourselves	to	be	part	of	the	climate	justice	movement	(likely	because	of	all	the	different	applications	the	term	“climate	justice”	has,	as	described	in	the	introductory	chapter).	Tactics	like	the	ones	just	mentioned	can	be	justified	under	both	moderate	and	radical	views.			 A	second	problem	is	that	the	climate	justice	stream	has	not	been	shown	to	compose	the	majority	portion	of	the	climate	movement,	and	so	focusing	here	on	just	the	system-critical	part	would	overlook	a	lot.	This	is	evident	in,	for	example,	climate	marches,	which	aggregate	people	supporting	a	variety	of	potential	solutions	to	the	climate	crisis.	A	study	looking	at	three	marches—two	of	them	timed	just	before	COP15	(in	Brussels	and	London	on	December	5,	2009)	and	one	in	Copenhagen	during	COP15	(December	12,	2009)—identified	several	different	prescriptive	framings	among	participants.	In	total,	only	about	24%	of	participants	adopted	what	the	study’s	authors	call	a	“system-critical	global	justice”147	perspective,	(which	they	
																																								 																					
147	The	system	critical	global	justice	perspective	is	a	combination	of	a	“system	change”	framework,	demanding	a	new	economic	model	(which	could	range	from	classic	socialist	abandonment	of	capitalist,	to	degrowth,	to	the	more	vague	“more	sustainable	model)	and	a	“global	justice”	framework,	concerned	with	global	disparities	between	rich	an	poor	that	implies	system	change.	Mattias	Wahlström,	Magnus	Wennerhag,	and	Christopher	Rootes,	“Framing	‘The	Climate	
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equate	with	the	“climate	justice	movement”).	The	climate	justice	framework	is	often	said	to	have	emerged	onto	the	global	stage	most	vociferously	at	Copenhagen.148	Yet	even	there,	it	accounted	for	at	most	41%	of	march	participants	(for	comparison,	43%	of	Copenhagen	marchers	called	for	changes	in	legislation	and	policy,	a	more	moderate	demand),	and	this	was	largely	due	to	COP15	being	a	high-stakes	meeting,	making	the	results	atypical	of	climate	marches.	Instead	of	climate	justice	becoming	a	“master	frame”	bridging	the	differences	between	diverse	movement	actors	as	they	expected,	the	study’s	authors	conclude,	“In	short,	announcements	of	the	birth	in	2009	of	a	transnational	climate	justice	movement	appear	premature.	At	best,	if	it	is	a	movement,	it	is	one	better	embedded	among	organizations	and	movement	intellectuals	than	among	rank-and-file	activists.”149		 	To	summarize	this	digression,	both	radical	and	moderate	currents	exist	within	the	movement.	And	what	is	interesting	is	that,	at	this	moment,	both	streams	are	engaging	in	many	of	the	same	sets	of	prominent	actions	motivated	by	moral	imperatives.	This	chapter,	like	the	previous	one,	is	concerned	with	the	relationship	between	a	sense	of	climate	justice,	the	key	site	or	sites	of	contestation	it	identifies,	and	the	kind	of	engagement	it	directs	there;	instead	of	using	the	sense	of	justice	associated	with	the	“climate	justice”	stream	of	the	climate	movement	as	a	stand-in	for	the	broader	movement’s	sense	of	it,	I	read	what	claims	to	justice	the	movement	makes	through	its	most	prominent	actions.	What	sense	of	climate	justice	can	we	infer	from	what	the	movement	does?	What	do	we	learn	if	we	let	the	actions	speak	for	a	sense	of	justice?	What	contribution	to	climate	justice	comes	across	through	them?		
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					Issue’:	Patterns	of	Participation	and	Prognostic	Frames	among	Climate	Summit	Protesters,”	Global	
Environmental	Politics	13,	no.4	(2013):	108.	148	See,	e.g.,	Dana	R.	Fisher,	“COP-15	in	Copenhagen:	How	the	Merging	of	Movements	Left	Civil	Society	Out	in	the	Cold”	Global	Environmental	Politics	10,	no.	2	(2010):	15;	Jennifer	Hadden,	“Explaining	Variations	in	Transnational	Climate	Change	Activism:	The	Role	of	Inter-Movement	Spillover,”	Global	Environmental	Politics	14,	no.	2	(2014):	17.		149	Wahlström,	Wennerhag,	and	Rootes,	“Framing	‘The	Climate	Issue’”:	120.	
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In	this	chapter,	I	focus	on	the	following	prominent	movement	actions:	(1)	presence	at	UNFCCC	COPs;	(2)	climate	marches	and	mobilizations;	and	(3)	fossil	fuel	divestment	campaigns	and	direct-action	blockades	of	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	(“blockadia”).	These	are	actions	that	can	be	justified	through	the	analyses	of	both	the	radical	and	moderate	streams	of	the	climate	movement.	Take	for	example	action	(3).	On	the	one	hand,	divestment	campaigns	and	direct-action	blockades	could	very	well	be	moderate	actions	because	they	do	not	undermine	the	functioning	of	capitalism	(part	of	the	divestment	argument	actually	appeals	to	capitalism’s	profit	logic)	and	are	a	necessary	step	in	even	the	creation	of	even	a	post-carbon	liberal	order.150	On	the	other	hand,	it	could	just	as	well	stem	from	a	critique	of	capitalism	expressing	itself	here	through	a	challenge	to	the	ability	of	a	sector	within	capitalism—here,	the	fossil	fuel	industry—to	function	in	the	market	with	few	regulations.	So	should	we	understand	divestment	groups	to	be	part	of	the	climate	
justice	movement?	 I	argue	that	in	reading	these	actions,	we	can	infer	that	the	climate	movement’s	sense	of	justice	is	one	best	characterized	by	efforts	to	make	political	and	economic	systems	democratically	accountable	to	its	moral	demands	for	climate	action,	to	prevent	them	from	making	policy	decisions	independently	of	democratic	movements.	To	be	sure,	demands	associated	with	these	actions	may	vary	in	terms	of	their	degrees	of	detail,	ambition	(e.g.,	very	deep	and	rapid	emissions	cuts)	and	radicalness	(e.g.,	systemic	change),	but	the	actions	themselves	are	nevertheless	best	read	as	seeking	accountability	from	elites	to	adopt	them.		However,	in	the	existing	institutional	order,	not	all	of	those	demands	are	equally	likely	to	be	adopted.	I	look	more	deeply	into	the	nature	of	that	order	in	the	next	chapter,	but	for	now	I	believe	it	will	be	enough	to	point	out	that	it	is	one	characterized,	economically,	by	large	sectors	of	the	economy	under	private	(largely	corporate)	control	and	concerned	with	preserving	high	capitalist	growth	and	profit,																																									 																					
150	The	politically	liberal	climate	website	Climate	Progress	frequently	features	approving	news	about	divestment	campaigns.		
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and,	politically,	by	a	low-intensity	form	of	democracy	in	which	elected	elites	govern	without	significant	participation	from	the	demos	other	than	elections.	Some	way	is	needed	of	theorizing	the	interaction	between	this	order	and	climate	movement	actions	to	assess	the	likelihood	of	seeing	demands	for	accountability	being	met.	For	that,	I	turn	to	the	concept	of	“friction.”	The	sense	of	friction	I	am	drawing	on	comes	from	Anna	Tsing’s	work	on	globalization.	She	writes,	“A	wheel	turns	because	of	its	encounter	with	the	surface	of	the	road;	spinning	in	the	air	it	goes	nowhere.	Rubbing	two	sticks	together	produces	heat	and	light;	one	stick	alone	is	just	a	stick.”151	“Friction”	as	I	am	using	it	here	refers	to	antagonistic	political	interactions	in	which	a	movement’s	demands	are	capable	(1)	of	registering	in	the	logic	of	the	dominant	liberal	economic	and	political	order,	and	(2)	of	being	resolved	by	it	through	policies	or	reforms	that	political	elites	are	likely	to	adopt.	Like	Tsing’s	metaphor	of	the	wheel	and	the	road,	friction	is	required	to	move	forward,	to	get	anywhere.	The	climate	movement	that	does	not	present	its	demands	to	anyone	or	makes	demands	it	knows	governments	could	never	accept	is	like	that	wheel	spinning	in	the	air,	going	nowhere.			The	climate	movement	creates	the	friction	for	its	demands	through	its	various	actions.	As	we	will	see	when	we	look	at	divestment	actions,	for	example,	the	movement	makes	its	demands	for	a	variety	of	moral	reasons,	but	seeks	to	gain	friction	for	them	by	showing	that	continued	financial	investments	in	fossil	fuel	companies	will	eventually	lead	to	loss	of	returns	on	investment.	This	interaction	is	
																																								 																					
151	Tsing	used	friction	to	describe	encounters	between	different	cultures	in	a	time	of	globalization:	“As	a	metaphorical	image,	friction	reminds	us	that	heterogeneous	and	unequal	encounters	can	lead	to	new	arrangements	of	culture	and	power.”	I	originally	encountered	the	concept	close	to	a	decade	ago	and	had	some	difficulty	tracking	it	down	at	the	same	time	that	the	faded	memory	of	it	was	working	its	way	through	my	mind	and	shaping	to	become	applicable	to	this	chapter.	In	case	the	alteration	of	Tsing’s	concept	is	problematic,	I	considered	other	metaphors—“finding	purchase	with	the	system,”	“latching	onto	the	system,”	“resonating	with	the	system,”	or	“being	metabolizable	by	the	system—but	kept	Tsing’s	friction	in	order	to	give	her	the	credit	for	sparking	the	thought	(however	altered	it	might	have	eventually	become	in	my	hands).	This	is	why	I	say	I	am	only	drawing	on,	but	not	applying,	the	original	concept.	Anna	Lowenhaupt	Tsing,	Friction:	An	
Ethnography	of	Global	Connection	Princeton,	N.J.:	Princeton	University	Press,	2005.	eBook	Collection	
(EBSCOhost),	EBSCOhost	(last	accessed	November	15,	2016).	
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an	antagonistic	one	because	many	institutions	have	been	resistant	to	demands	to	divest	and	require	pressure	from	below.		Not	all	demands	are	capable	of	picking	up	the	same	degree	of	friction	when	coming	into	confrontation	with	the	existing	system;	we	should	logically	predict	that	radical	demands	for	“system	change”	will	be	rejected	outright,	as	will	demands	for	
extremely	ambitious	(i.e.,	immediate	and	drastic	emissions	reductions)	climate	action	incompatible	with	capitalist	growth.	This	introduces	a	dilemma.	The	more	the	demands	require	or	articulate	a	vision	of	society	contrary	to	the	logic	of	the	dominant	liberal	order,	the	more	likely	it	will	be	that	they	slip	off	its	surface;	the	more	friction	for	their	demands	the	movement	seeks	to	gain,	the	more	it	must	appeal	to	the	reigning	systemic	logic,	and	cannot	press	its	most	ambitious	or	radical	elements.		In	sum,	this	chapter	seeks	to	answer	the	questions,	(1)	What	sense	of	climate	justice	can	we	infer	from—because	it	is	most	consistent	with—prominent	climate	movement	actions,	and	(2)	What	potential	do	these	actions	hold	for	spurring	an	effective	and	just	response	to	the	climate	crisis?				 			
2.	Climate	Movement	Presence	at	the	UNFCCC		 Peter	Newell	offers	a	typology	(expanded	upon	by	Caniglia,	Brulle,	and	Szasz)	to	distinguish	groups	and	strategies	within	the	climate	movement	according	to	the	degree	of	access	to	centres	of	decision-making	associated	with	them.152	Insider-
insiders	(e.g.,	World	Wildlife	Fund,	Environmental	Defense	Fund)	have	considerable	access	to	negotiations	and	rely	on	typical	lobbying	tactics.	They	approve	of	market	mechanisms	like	emissions	trading,	will	collaborate	with	the	private	sector,	and																																									 																					
152	Peter	Newell,	“Climate	for	Change?	Civil	Society	and	the	Politics	of	Global	Warming,”	in	
Global	Civil	Society	2005/2006,	M.	Glasius,	M.	Kaldor,	and	H	Anheier,	eds.	(Thousand	Oaks,	CA:	Sage,	2006);	Beth	Schaefer	Caniglia,	Robert	J.	Brulle,	and	Andrew	Szazs.	“Civil	Society,	Social	Movements,	and	Climate	Change,”	in	Climate	Change	and	Society:	Sociological	Perspectives.	Riley	E.	Dunlap	and	Robert	J.	Brulle,	eds.	(New	York,	NY:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015).		
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believe	international	institutions	can	deal	with	the	climate	crisis	effectively.	Insider-
outsiders	(e.g.,	Friends	of	the	Earth,	Greenpeace)	take	a	peripheral,	confrontational	position	despite	having	some	access	to	negotiations.	They	are	critical	of	market	mechanisms	and	believe	that	governments	require	the	adoption	of	legal	regulations	to	respond	to	climate	change	and	so	work	through	the	formal	negotiating	process.	
Outsider-outsiders	(e.g.,	the	more	radical	stream	of	the	climate	movement)	have	no	access	to	formal	negotiations.	They	reject	market	mechanisms	and	believe	that	systemic	change	is	required	to	address	climate	change.	The	organization	of	this	section	echoes	that	progression	from	inside	to	outside,	but	with	the	degree	of	
friction	in	mind	rather	than	group	access	to	negotiations.				The	UNFCCC	is	seen	as	one	of	the	more	inclusive	and	accessible	venues	for	civil	society	among	global	governance	institutions.153	But	though	accessible,	it	is	not	participatory	in	that	civil	society	does	not	hold	decision-making	power.	Rather,	the	UNFCCC	accredits	civil	society	members	to	take	part	in	COPs	in	a	number	of	other	roles	through	which	they	try	to	exert	influence	on	negotiators.	Accredited	civil	society	members	hold	side	events	and	exhibits	inside	the	building	of	official	negotiations.154	Privy	to	the	climate	negotiations,	they	can	also	perform	a	“watchdog”	role	by	reporting	negotiation	developments	to	the	wider	world.	Non-government	organizations	may	additionally	lobby	state	negotiators	directly	in	one-on-one	sessions.155		
																																								 																					
153	Fisher	(2010):	11.		154	The	UNFCCC	keeps	a	record	of	side	events	and	exhibits	for	each	COP.	To	get	a	sense	of	how	diverse	and	numerous	they	are,	see	https://seors.unfccc.int/seors/reports/	archive.html#exhibits.	For	some	analysis	of	the	different	framings	used	in	these	events	from	COP3	to	COP17,	see	Mattias	Hjerpe	and	Katarina	Buhr,	“Frames	of	Climate	Change	in	Side	Events	from	Kyoto	to	Durban,”	Global	Environmental	Politics	14,	no.	2.		155	For	an	example	of	how	one	prominent	NGO	saw	its	influence	on	Canadian	negotiators,	see	CAN-RAC,	“Climate	Action	Network	nudged	Canada's	best	at	COP21”	http://www.nationalobserver.com/2015/12/13/climate-action-network-helped-bring-out-canadas-best-cop21.	The	article	is	not	impartial.	It	is	sponsored	by	the	Canadian	contingent	(CAN-RAC)	of	the	Climate	Action	Network	and	describes	its	lobbying	activities	at	COP21.	
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Civil	society	may	also	address	negotiations	as	“interveners”	at	either	the	opening	or	closing	of	plenary	sessions.	(In	rarer	cases,	civil	society	organizations	may	be	included	within	the	delegations	of	country	negotiators,	though	this	tends	to	be	in	cases	of	negotiator	fatigue.156)			The	movement	has	used	accredited	insiders	in	other	innovative	ways	to	push	for	accountability	for	its	demands.	The	Climate	Action	Network	(CAN),	perhaps	the	most	prominent	civil	society	network	at	the	COPs,	has	innovatively	combined	its	observer	status	and	side	event	host	role	in	its	tongue-in-cheek	“Fossil	of	the	Day”	Awards,	awarded	to	nations	CAN	members	judge	to	be	most	obstructing	climate	action.	Eagerly	covered	by	media	(Slate	called	it	“the	Best	Part	of	the	Paris	Climate	Summit”),	the	awards	work	to	shame	national	leaders	on	a	global	stage	into	agreeing	to	the	kind	of	ambitious	agreement	civil	society	is	demanding.		Some	accredited	observers	are	more	direct.	Anjali	Appadurai,	a	student	speaking	on	behalf	of	youth	delegates,	famously	stood	before	UNFCCC	negotiators	in	2011	as	an	intervener	and	harshly	castigated	them	for	long-standing	lack	of	ambition	and	failure	to	recognize	equity	issues	concerning	the	Global	South.	As	she	put	it,	“You	have	been	negotiating	all	my	life…Get	it	done.”157	Others	have	used	their	position	to	interrupt	representatives	of	particularly	recalcitrant	countries	in	the	official	talks.158	In	Warsaw	in	2013,	around	800	accredited	civil	society	participants	
																																								 																					
156	Newell,	“Climate	for	Change?	Civil	Society	and	the	Politics	of	Global	Warming,”	102.	This	fatigue	is	more	prevalent	among	developing	country	delegations	where	because	of	lack	of	resources	only	a	small	number	of	delegates	can	be	sent	to	negotiations.			157	"	‘Get	It	Done’:	Urging	Climate	Justice,	Youth	Delegate	Anjali	Appadurai	Mic	Checks	U.N.	Summit,”	Democracy	Now!,	December	9,	2011,	http://www.democracynow.org/2011/12/9/	get_it_done_urging_climate_justice;	Appadurai	ended	her	speech	with	a	“mic	check,”	a	tactic	borrowed	from	the	Occupy	movement.	As	she	put	it,	“The	‘mic	check’	was	a	way	for	us	to	tell	the	world	leaders:	we	don’t	need	your	fancy	mic	in	your	fancy	conference	hall.	We	have	our	collective	voices	and	they’re	more	powerful	than	you	think.	It	was	a	pretty	radical	move,	but	much-needed	in	that	setting	and	at	that	time.”	See	Renu	Singh-Joseph,	“Spotlight:	Anjali	Appadurai,”	Darpan,	14	Feb,	2014,	http://www.darpanmagazine.com/people/newsmakers/anjali-appadurai/;	and	Anjali	Appadurai,	“Anjali	Appadurai	interview	about	her	courageous	speech	at	2011	UN	conference	on	climate	change,”	Youtube	video,	8:04,	uploaded	July	4,	2012	by	“TakingOnTheGiant.com,”	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xov8XL3fhIg		158	At	COP17,	6	delegates	from	the	Canadian	Youth	Coalition	stood	up	during	the	remarks	of	then-Canadian	Environment	Minister	Peter	Kent	and	turned	their	backs	on	him.	Another	student	
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(even	among	more	conservative	NGOs	like	the	World	Wildlife	Fund)	staged	an	unprecedented	walkout	from	the	talks,	protesting	parties’	failure	to	commit	to	emissions	reductions	and	North-South	financing,	the	host	government’s	commitment	to	fracking,	the	sponsorship	of	the	talks	by	polluting	corporations,	and	a	pro-coal	summit	taking	place	in	conjunction	with	the	COP.159		Other	movement	actions	take	place	outside	the	UNFCCC	negotiations,	but	are	still	aimed	at	them.	The	primary	outside	action	is	the	march	(I	deal	with	how	marches	communicate	a	sense	of	climate	justice	in	greater	detail	in	the	next	section).	COP15	witnessed	a	massive	march	of	about	100,000	people,	making	a	variety	of	demands	for	leaders	to	meet.	(As	mentioned	in	the	introduction,	the	largest	contingents	of	marchers	there	were	split	almost	evenly	between	those	calling	for	global	justice	or	system	change	(41%)	and	for	more	moderate	changes	to	policy	and	legislation	(43%).)	The	following	year,	COP16	saw	a	march	of	around	10,000	organized	by	La	Via	Campesina	to	oppose	the	United	Nations	Reducing	Emissions	from	Deforestation	and	Forest	Degradation	(REDD+)	Program	and	emissions	trading	systems,	condemned	as	“false	solutions”	to	climate	change	for	transferring	the	atmosphere	and	Indigenous	lands	over	to	private	market	actors	(as	discussed	in	the	introduction).160		Some	have	proposed	the	1999	Seattle	protests	which	shut	down	World	Trade	Organization	negotiations—remembered	on	the	political	left	as	a	popular	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					interrupted	US	negotiator	Todd	Stern’s	speech	at	COP17	telling	him	“I	am	scared	for	my	future.	2020	is	too	late	to	wait.	We	need	an	urgent	path	to	a	fair,	ambitious,	and	legally	binding	treaty.	You	must	take	responsibility	to	act	now.”	See	“Canadian	Youth	Delegation	Ejected	from	COP17,”	December	10,	2011,	https://canadianyouthdelegation.wordpress.com/2011/12/07/press-release-youth-turn-their-backs-on-canadian-government-during-opening-speech/;	and	“	‘I'm	Scared	for	My	Future’:	Student	Disrupts	Speech	by	U.S.	Climate	Envoy	Todd	Stern	in	Durban,”	Democracy	Now!,	December	8,	2011,	http://www.democracynow.org/2011/12/8/im_scared_for_my_future_student	159	“NGOs,	Social	Movements	Walk	Out	Of	Warsaw	Talks,”	World	Wildlife	Fund,	November	21,	2013,	http://wwf.panda.org/wwf_news/?212532/NGOs-Social-Movements-Walk-Out-Of-Warsaw-Talks	 160	“Strong	rejection	of	REDD	by	La	Vía	Campesina	Mobilisation,”	La	Vìa	Campesina,	December	10,	2010,	http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php/actions-and-events-mainmenu-26/-climate-change-and-agrofuels-mainmenu-75/985-strong-rejection-of-redd-by-la-via-campesina-mobilisation	
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democratic	block	on	the	imposition	of	neoliberal	trade	policy—as	a	model	for	climate	movement	mobilization	at	the	COPs.	Through	mass	direct-action	protests,	the	movement	might	steer	the	negotiations	away	from	unambitious	goals	or	retain	a	kind	of	veto	over	agreements	made.161	The	closest	the	movement	has	so	far	come	to	“Seattling”	the	UNFCCC	was	in	planning	a	tactic	under	the	name	“Reclaim	Power!”	for	COP15.	Climate	justice	movement	activists	would	storm	the	Bella	Center—the	official	site	of	UNFCCC	negotiations—and	occupy	it	for	one	day	to	hold	a	People’s	Summit	or	People’s	Assembly,	where	it	aimed	to	align	the	UNFCCC	agenda	with	climate	justice	movement	goals.	As	Climate	Justice	Now!	(CJN),	the	organizing	network,	put	it:			 [O]ur	Reclaim	Power!	march	will	push	into	the	conference	area	and	enter	the	building,	disrupt	the	sessions	and	use	the	space	to	talk	about	our	agenda,	an	agenda	from	below,	an	agenda	of	climate	justice,	of	real	solutions	against	their	false	ones	[…]	Our	goal	is	not	to	shut	down	the	entire	summit.	But	this	day	will	be	ours,	it	will	be	the	day	we	speak	for	ourselves	and	set	the	agenda:	climate	justice	now!	We	cannot	trust	the	market	with	our	future,	nor	put	our	faith	in	unsafe,	unproven	and	unsustainable	technologies.	We	know	that	on	a	finite	planet,	it	is	impossible	to	have	infinite	growth	–	'green'	or	otherwise.	Instead	of	trying	to	fix	a	destructive	system,	we	are	advancing	alternatives	that	provide	real	and	just	solutions	to	the	climate	crisis:	leaving	fossil	fuels	in	the	ground;	reasserting	peoples'	and	community	control	over	resources;	relocalising	food	production;	reducing	overconsumption,	particularly	in	the	North;	recognising	the	ecological	and	climate	debt	owed	to	the	peoples	of	the	South	and	making	reparations;	and	respecting	indigenous	and	forest	peoples'	rights.162		 The	most	extreme	application	of	the	“Seattling”	model	would	be	to	use	it	to	indefinitely	terminate	the	UNFCCC	process	should	it	continually	fail	to	meet																																									 																					
161	Naomi	Klein,	“Copenhagen:	Seattle	Grows	Up,”	The	Nation,	November	11,	2009,	http://www.thenation.com/article/copenhagen-seattle-grows/;	Maxime	Combes	“Towards	Paris	2015:	challenges	and	perspectives	Blockadia	and	Alternatiba,	the	two	pillars	of	climate	justice,”	
France-ATTAC,	(2014)	https://france.attac.org/IMG/pdf/Towards_Paris2015-climate%20justice.pdf.	Combes	also	invokes	the	Cochabamba	“Water	War”	of	2000	that	reversed	the	privatization	of	water	services;	Brent	Patterson,	“Will	the	climate	justice	movement	"Seattle"	the	Paris	talks?,”	Council	of	
Canadians,	June	7,	2015,	http://canadians.org/blog/will-climate-justice-movement-seattle-paris-talks		 162	The	original	Climate	Justice	Now!	site,	from	which	this	quote	originated,	no	longer	exists.	This	excerpt	is	taken	from	“Reclaim	Power:	Pushing	for	Climate	Justice!	Copenhagen,	16	December,”	
The	Laboratory	of	Insurrectionary	Imagination,	August	19,	2009:	http://www.labofii.net/news/2009/08/reclaim-power-pushing-for-climate.html	
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demands	for	justice.163	Movement	actions	have	tended	to	avoid	going	this	far,	however.	Bedall	and	Görg	note	that	unlike	the	anti-globalization	movements	that	
resist	governance	institutions	(in	their	case,	the	World	Trade	Organization,	World	Bank,	and	International	Monetary	Fund),	even	the	more	radical	networks	of	the	climate	movement	have	sought	to	engage	with	their	relevant	governing	body	to	
transform	it	rather	than	reject	it.164	(If	this	is	the	case,	the	comparison	with	Seattle	might	not	be	the	most	accurate.)	Even	the	Reclaim	Power	action	can	be	seen	in	this	light,	an	action	intended	to	assert	alternative	solutions	to	the	climate	crisis	for	the	global	climate	governance	system	to	adopt.165			Altogether,	this	combination	of	inside	and	outside	actions	suggests	an	assessment	that	understands	COPs	as	important	sites	of	contestation	and	engagement	where	movement	pressure	can	achieve	friction.	The	movement’s	presence	at	official	UNFCCC	meetings	attempts	to	check	negotiation	outcomes	from	diverging	from	its	sense	of	climate	justice.	In	some	cases—the	Fossil	of	the	Day	awards,	interruptions	of	negotiations,	the	COP17	NGO	walkout—a	sense	of	climate	justice	led	to	actions	aimed	to	pressure	or	shame	negotiators	into	adopting	more	ambitious	climate	commitments,	or	to	observe	the	common-but-differentiated-responsibilities	principle	between	north	and	south.	In	other	cases	we	see	a	sense	of	climate	justice	leading	to	more	detailed	demands	for	accountability;	the	march	protesting	REDD+,	for	its	part,	challenged	the	legitimacy	of	market-based	climate	policies,	and	the	plan	to	occupy	and	set	the	agenda	for	the	COP	meetings	proposed	alternative	solutions	outside	the	logic	of	capitalism	and	economic	growth.		Here	we	encounter	the	problem	of	friction.	The	more	movement	demands	for	climate	justice	grow	more	detailed,	ambitious,	and	opposed	to	the	logic	of	economic																																									 																					
163	See	Patrick	Bond,	“Maintaining	momentum	after	Copenhagen's	collapse:	Seal	the	deal	or	“Seattle”	the	deal?”	Capitalism,	Nature,	Socialism	21	no.	1	(2010).			164	Philip	Bedall	and	Christoph	Görg,	“Antagonistic	Standpoints:	The	Climate	Justice	Coalition	Viewed	in	Light	of	a	Theory	of	Societal	Relationships	with	Nature,”	in	Routledge	Handbook	of	the	
Climate	Movement,	Matthias	Dietz	and	Heiko	Garrelts	(eds.)	(New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	2014),	56.		165	Hadden,	“Explaining	Variations	in	Transnational	Climate	Change	Activism”:	18.		
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growth	powered	by	capitalism,	the	degree	of	friction	they	can	achieve	falls	off.	The	Paris	Agreement,	the	most	recent	climate	agreement,	is	a	mixed	bag	compared	against	the	demands	the	movement	has	pushed	for.	It	recognizes	a	climate	target	of	keeping	global	average	temperature	rise	“well	below”	2˚C	and	an	aspirational	target	of	1.5˚C.	But	the	movement	was	not	able	to	gain	friction	for	demands	for	legally	binding	commitments	on	emissions	reductions	or	climate	financing.	And	nothing	about	the	Paris	Agreement	really	commits	countries	to	a	sharp	turn	away	from	market	mechanisms	or	capitalist	orthodoxy.	Even	if	an	action	like	CJN’s	Reclaim	Power	at	the	2009	COP	had	occurred	(in	the	end	the	state	took	the	standard	measures—kettling	and	mass	arrests—to	suppress	it166),	it	is	difficult	to	see	the	action	achieving	enough	friction	to	fulfill	the	goal	to	“set	the	agenda”	at	negotiations,	particularly	given	its	list	of	demands.	Following	some	of	the	more	confrontational	inside	actions,	civil	society	members	have	even	seen	accreditation	stripped	away.	Remarking	on	the	actions	of	the	climate	justice	movement	at	COP15,	Fisher	concludes,	“Although	outsider	tactics	are	an	effective	means	of	gaining	media	attention,	they	have	the	unintended	consequence	of	increasing	the	disenfranchisement	of	civil	society	in	international	regimes.”167	Parks	and	Roberts,	likewise,	note,		if	NGO	coalitions	and	insider-outsider	networks	continue	to	press	the	issues	of	‘climate	justice’	and	‘ecological	debt’,	they	could	face	fierce	resistance	to	proposals	that	are	viewed	as	overly	redistributive	or	inconsistent	with	neoliberal	economic	principles.	Therefore,	if	they	hope	to	effectuate	significant	policy	changes,	climate	justice	norm	entrepreneurs	will	likely	need	to	blend	arguments	about	the	moral	imperative	of	climate	change	with	the	pragmatic	economic	logic	of	addressing	a	problem	before	it	becomes	too	costly.	In	all	likelihood,	they	will	also	need	to	consider	burden-sharing	proposals	that	represent	moral	compromise.168		
																																								 																					
166	Bibi	van	der	Zee,	“Protests	in	Copenhagen:	Rights	groups	press	for	inquiry	into	police	tactics,”	Guardian,	December	13,	2009,	https://www.theguardian.com/environment/	2009/dec/13/copenhagen-protests-police-tactics	167	Dana	R.	Fisher,	“COP-15	in	Copenhagen”:	16	168	Bradley	C.	Parks	and	J.	Timmons	Roberts,	“Climate	Change,	Social	Theory	and	Justice,”	
Theory,	Culture	&	Society	27,	no.	2-3	(2010):	151.	Emphasis	mine.		
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The	movement	appears	to	have	understood	these	constraints;	not	all	of	its	outside	activity	during	COPs	is	directed	at	the	UNFCCC.	Indeed,	one	of	the	most	important	results	of	the	climate	justice	movement’s	presence	at	COPs	since	2009	was	to	shift	attention	away	from	the	UNFCCC,	which	it	increasingly	deems	sclerotic	and	beholden	to	corporate	interests.	Instead,	some	outside	activities	are	aimed	at	taking	advantage	of	the	assembling	of	climate	activists	in	order	to	build	a	mass	movement	that	can	undertake	actions	back	home	to	bring	national	and	subnational	elites	to	accept	its	climate	demands.169	Alternative	climate	forums	like	the	Klimaforum	during	COP15	provide	occasions	for	reframing	the	analysis	on	climate	change.	The	UNFCCC	thus	becomes	one	site	of	engagement	amongst	others.			
3.	Climate	Marches		 Mass	climate	mobilizations	outside	of	the	official	climate	negotiation	system	present	another	site	of	struggle	and	another	version	of	climate	justice.	An	important	indication	of	the	sense	of	justice	they	carry	is	the	timing	of	the	largest	rallies	and	protests,	which	have	frequently	been	organized	to	immediately	precede	or	coincide	with	high-level	climate	talks	outside	the	official	UNFCCC	system.	Consider	just	the	following:				
• New	York,	September	21,	2014,	The	People’s	Climate	March	(400,000	people)	timed	for	special	United	Nations	talks	(called	simply	the	Climate	Summit	2014)	attempting	to	achieve	some	progress	on	climate	negotiations	before	the	2015	Paris	summit,	though	it	was	not	officially	part	of	the	UNFCCC;	
• Quebec,	April	11,	2015,	Act	on	Climate	March	(25,000	people)	timed	for	the	First	Ministers	climate	summit	planned	by	Canadian	provincial	premiers;		
• Toronto,	July	5,	2015,	March	for	Jobs,	Justice	and	the	Climate	(10,000	people)	planned	to	precede	the	Pan-American	Climate	Summit	and	Economic	Summit;	
																																								 																					
169	Consider	the	wording	of	The	People’s	Test	on	Climate	2015	written	by	several	major	NGOs:	“We	see	Paris	as	a	beginning	rather	than	an	end	–	an	opportunity	to	start	connecting	people‘s	demands	for	justice,	equality,	food,	jobs,	and	rights,	and	strengthen	the	movement	in	a	way	that	will	
force	governments	to	listen	and	act	in	the	interests	of	their	people	and	not	in	the	vested	interests	of	elites	[emphasis	mine].”	http://peoplestestonclimate.org/	
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• Ottawa,	November	29,	2015,	100%	Possible	March	for	Climate	Solutions	and	Justice	(25,000	people).	Held	the	day	before	COP21	began,	it	was	organized	prior	to	the	federal	election	and	aimed	to	pressure	whichever	political	party	came	into	power	to	take	action	on	climate	change.			 It	is	not	only	the	timing	of	the	marches	that	suggests	their	intent	to	put	pressure	on	governing	elites	for	action.	In	a	Rolling	Stone	piece	where	Bill	McKibben	issued	a	“call-to-arms”	for	the	New	York	march,	the	appeal	to	political	leadership	to	be	accountable	to	marchers’	demands	is	clear:			 [T]he	"world's	leaders"	haven't	been	leaders	on	climate	change	–	at	least	not	leaders	enough.	Like	many	of	us,	they've	attended	to	the	easy	stuff,	but	they	haven't	set	the	world	on	a	fundamentally	new	course	[…] 	In	a	rational	world,	no	one	would	need	to	march.	In	a	rational	world,	policymakers	would	have	heeded	scientists	when	they	first	sounded	the	alarm	25	years	ago.	But	in	this	world,	reason,	having	won	the	argument,	has	so	far	lost	the	fight.	The	fossil-fuel	industry,	by	virtue	of	being	perhaps	the	richest	enterprise	in	human	history,	has	been	able	to	delay	effective	action,	almost	to	the	point	where	it's	too	late.	So	in	this	case	taking	to	the	streets	is	very	much	necessary.170	 	Following	that	march,	May	Boeve,	executive	director	of	350.org	said	of	the	People’s	Climate	March,	“Today,	civil	society	acted	at	a	scale	that	outdid	even	our	own	wildest	expectations.	Tomorrow,	we	expect	our	political	leaders	to	do	the	same.”	A	press	release	issued	by	organizers	immediately	following	the	march	featured	a	series	of	statements	from	prominent	actors	involved.	Doing	a	quick	survey	of	the	37	statements	collected	there,	by	far	the	most	frequently	asserted	view	(54%)	was	that	the	march	was	an	appeal	to	leadership	to	adopt	some	form	of	serious	climate	policy,	frequently	referred	to	simply	as	“action.”171																																									 																					
170	Bill	McKibben,	“A	Call	to	Arms:	An	Invitation	to	Demand	Action	on	Climate	Change,”	
Rolling	Stone,	May	21,	2014,	http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/a-call-to-arms-an-invitation-to-demand-action-on-climate-change-20140521	171	“Largest	Global	Call	for	Climate	Action	in	History,”	People’s	Climate	March,	September	21,	2014,	http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/press-release/largest-global-call-for-climate-action-in-history/.	It	is	not	clear	what	criteria	was	used	in	collecting	the	statements,	or	whether	the	statements	were	edited	from	longer	ones	or	submitted	in	short	form.	In	looking	at	the	statements,	I	identified	six	different	discourses:	the	need	for	governments	to	take	some	kind	of	strong	action	(54%),	assertions	that	climate	change	leads	to	differential	impacts	on	frontline	communities	(22%),	condemnations	of	
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Climate	marches	are	timed	to	make	political	elites	accountable	to	mass	demands	for	climate	action.	As	noted	above,	marches	assemble	diverse	voices,	but,	where	timed	to	coincide	with	major	climate	talks,	their	primary	thrust	is	to	highlight	the	failures	of	democratic	political	leadership	and	the	influence	on	them	from	the	fossil	fuel	industry:	the	vision	of	change	being	advanced	is	presumably	that	democratic	states	have	so	far	failed	to	take	the	necessary	actions	to	lower	emissions,	and	some	democratic	force	is	therefore	needed	to	pressure	those	states	to	adopt	policies	that	end	the	injustice	of	continued	failure	to	act	on	climate	change.	As	calls	for	climate	“action,”	they	do	not	necessarily	call	for	system	change	and	can	attempt	to	work	within	the	existing	system.		Another	feature	of	recent	climate	marches	is	their	diversity.	The	New	York	march,	for	instance,	was	organized	by	a	coalition	of	organizations,	and	by	the	end,	1500	partner	organizations	were	involved.172	I	have	little	doubt	that	participant	prognoses	for	the	climate	crisis	were	at	least	as	diverse	as	the	ones	studied	in	2009	described	above.173	The	march	embraced	this	diversity,	but	also	recognized	that	if	mobilized	without	structure,	this	diversity	could	result	in	a	confused	babel	of	messaging.	Organizers	took	an	innovative	step	to	arrange	the	march	to	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					the	fossil	fuel	industry	and	its	influence	on	economic	and	climate	policy	(19%),	assertions	that	everyone	will	be	affected	by	climate	change/reminders	that	a	particular	group	(a	union,	coal	workers,	“God’s	creation”)	will	also	be	affected	by	climate	change	(13.5%),	demands	for	good	jobs	and	a	better	economy	(13.5%),	and	celebrations	or	assertions	of	the	power	of	the	people	in	mass	movements	(11%).	Some	statements	contained	discourse	that	fell	into	more	than	one	of	these	categories.		172	For	a	full	list,	see	“Partners,”	People’s	Climate	March,	http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/partners/	173	I	was	on	the	bus	trip	from	Toronto	to	the	New	York	that	Toronto350.org	organized	for	the	march.	There,	I	heard	Master’s	students	in	York	University’s	Environmental	Studies	program	situating	the	problem	of	climate	change	in	capitalism.	The	group	I	marched	with,	the	Toronto	chapter	of	350.org,	held	signs	demanding	clean	energy:	“Canadians	for	a	Fossil	Free	World”	or	“Canadians	for	Green	Energy	Investment.”	Our	mobilizing	chants	called	for	an	end	to	the	Stephen	Harper	government	and	to	the	tar	sands.	Behind	me	at	the	march,	I	heard	two	men	calmly	discussing	philosopher	Derrick	Jensen’s	strategy	of	armed	resistance	against	not	just	the	fossil	fuel	industry,	but	civilization	itself.	
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communicate	what	they	saw	as	a	narrative,	dividing	it	into	6	sections	in	the	following	order:174			
• Frontlines	of	Crisis,	Forefront	of	Change,	which	featured	people	experiencing	the	early	impacts	of	climate	change	and	who	were	leading	the	fight	against	climate	change—indigenous	groups,	migrant-justice	and	housing-justice	groups,	and	survivors	of	Hurricane	Sandy	(which	had	recently	torn	through	New	York	and	primarily	affected	communities	of	colour);		
• We	Can	Build	the	Future,	which	was	composed	of	labour	groups,	students,	families,	youth,	women,	and	elders	and	intended	to	remind	people	that	“every	generation’s	future	is	at	stake	and	we	can	build	a	better	one”;	
• We	Have	Solutions	brought	together	several	environmental	groups	to	show	the	variety	of	responses	possible	to	the	climate	crisis;			
• We	Know	Who	is	Responsible	assembled	protest	groups	standing	against	extreme	fossil	fuel	projects	like	tar	sands	and	fracking,	as	well	as	against	war	and	corporate	capitalism;		
• The	Debate	is	Over	featured	scientists	and	interfaith	groups;	and	
• To	Change	Everything,	We	Need	Everyone	demonstrated	the	diversity	of	the	group	beyond	the	climate	movement,	bringing	in	LGBTQ	groups,	and	neighbourhood,	city,	and	national	groups.175			 That	narrative	approach	spread	quickly.	In	July	2015,	a	few	months	after	the	march	in	New	York,	Toronto	held	The	March	for	Jobs,	Justice	and	the	Climate.	It	too	was	organized	by	a	variety	of	Indigenous	(e.g.,	Idle	No	More),	environmental	(e.g.,	Toronto350.org),	labour	(e.g.,	Unifor),	and	social	justice	(e.g.,	No	One	Is	Illegal)	groups,	and	was	divided	into	sections	similar	to	those	in	New	York,	with	frontline	communities	leading	the	march.176		The	organization	of	these	recent	mass	climate	mobilizations	communicates	their	sense	of	justice	in	several	ways.	First,	and	of	special	importance,	is	the																																									 																					
174	As	organizers	put	it	in	an	FAQ,	“In	marches	as	big	as	this	one	will	be,	the	many	messages	we	need	to	communicate	to	the	world	often	get	lost.	This	time,	we	want	to	make	sure	the	People's	Climate	March	clearly	expresses	the	story	of	today's	climate	movement	-	so	we're	trying	something	new,	and	arranging	the	contingents	of	the	march	in	a	way	that	helps	us	thread	our	many	messages	together.	Together,	let’s	tell	the	world	a	clear,	powerful	story!”	(“FAQ,”	People’s	Climate	March,	https://docs.google.com/document/	d/1PXv54n8r6kkO0A2ijynwGAQcAVoNvsGIxzdNjubr_0o/edit)		175	“The	People’s	Climate	March	Lineup:	Telling	the	Story	of	Today's	Climate	Movement,”	
People’s	Climate	March,	accessed	March	13,	2016,	http://2014.peoplesclimate.org/lineup/	176	“Partners,”	March	for	Jobs,	Justice	and	the	Climate,	accessed	March	13,	2016,	http://jobsjusticeclimate.ca/partners/;	http://jobsjusticeclimate.ca/about-2/;	And	it	too	was	populated	by	diverse	messages.	Before	the	march	began,	a	member	of	migrant	justice	group	No	One	is	Illegal	gave	a	rousing	speech	(notably	with	little	overt	mention	of	climate).		
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positioning	of	frontline	communities	in	the	lead	of	recent	marches.	This	positioning	deliberately	places	an	intersectional	analysis	of	the	climate	crisis	quite	literally	front	and	centre,	drawing	attention	to	how	race,	Indigeneity,	and	class	interact	in	complex	ways	with	climate	change	and	the	extractive	processes	driving	it,	leading	to	disproportionate	impacts	on	Indigenous	communities	and	communities	of	colour.	This	arrangement	contrasts	sharply	with	the	UNFCCC	process	where	frontline	communities	have	no	official	negotiating	role	despite	being	most	endangered	by	the	failure	to	secure	an	effective	global	climate	agreement;	unrepresented	in	global	climate	negotiations,	they	here	hold	the	most	prominent	voice,	and	ought	to	have	their	demands	prioritized.	All	of	this	asserts	a	view	of	the	climate	crisis	as	a	form	of	environmental	injustice	that	cannot	be	resolved	without	difficult	confrontations	with	colonialism	and	racism,	and	how	they	enable	extractive	capitalism.	The	prominence	of	this	system-critical	messaging	is	not	always	welcomed	in	the	movement,	however.	Paris	was	set	to	see	a	massive	march	just	before	COP21,	but	French	officials	cancelled	it	following	the	terrorist	attack	by	members	of	the	Islamic	State	in	Iraq	and	Syria	(ISIS)	on	November	13.	The	main	site	of	mobilization	shifted	to	London	instead,	where	Wretched	of	the	Earth,	a	bloc	representing	communities	of	colour	on	the	frontlines	of	climate	change,	had	been	promised	the	lead	spot	in	the	march.	Their	messaging,	centering	on	the	role	of	colonialism	and	corporate	capitalism	in	engendering	the	climate	crisis	and	creating	differential	impacts	on	communities	of	colour,	was	allegedly	deemed	too	controversial	and	divisive	for	march	organizers	who	proceeded	to	jockey	activists	in	animal	costumes	to	the	front	to	present	a	friendlier	face.177	Wretched	of	the	Earth	reasserted	their	right	to	lead	the	march	(their	slogan:	“First	to	die,	first	to	fight,	first	to	march”),	sitting	down	in	the	street	and	obstructing	the	continuation	of	the	march.178																																										 																					
177	For	a	short	but	powerful	video	giving	a	sense	of	Wretched	of	the	Earth’s	sense	of	climate	justice,	see	Wretched	of	the	Earth,	“#NoCo2onialism,”	YouTube	video,	4:40,	uploaded	November	25,	2015	by	“Black	Dissidents,”	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sxOqJ18WAZg	178	Tisha	Brown,	“DeC02lonalism	101:	We	need	to	talk	about	oppression,”	New	
Internationalist,	December	2,	2015,	http://newint.org/blog/guests/2015/12/02/we-need-to-talk-about-oppression/#comments;	Joshua	Virasami	and	Alexandra	Wanjiku	Kelbert,	“Darkening	the	
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	 In	their	inclusivity,	recent	climate	marches	also	present	opportunities	for	disparate	groups	to	assert	concerns	about	the	issue	from	their	respective	standpoints.	The	presence	of	diverse	groups	from	outside	of	the	environmental	movement	showcases	and	celebrates	the	results	of	recent	organizing	efforts,	which	had	intensified	following	COP15,	to	link	together	a	“movement	of	movements”	modeled	on	the	diverse	global	justice	movement	in	what	is	sometimes	called	“frame-bridging”	or	“social	movement	spillover.”179	Migrant	justice	groups	understand	that	climate	change	will	compel	migration	and	displacement	in	a	time	of	border	securitization.	Food	justice	groups	see	that	climate	change	will	endanger	access	to	food.	Healthcare	workers	see	firsthand	the	effects	of	fossil	fuel	pollution	as	well	as	the	effects	of	climate	impacts	following	extreme	events.	Climate	action	thus	becomes	not	simply	a	demand	from	an	undifferentiated	mass	focused	on	an	environmental	issue,	but	one	from	diverse	sections	of	society	concerned	with	multiple	matters	of	justice,	a	broad-based	democratic	demand	stretching	far	beyond	environmentalist	circles.	Organizers	of	the	Toronto	march	branded	it	“a	new	kind	of	climate	movement”	to	distinguish	it	from	the	siloed,	NGO-driven,	primarily	environmental	movement	of	the	past.180	At	the	same	time,	finally,	the	diversity	of	the	marches	can	also	express	potentialities	for	a	different	and	more	just	society.	The	diversity	of	actors	drawn	to	the	issue	of	climate	change	invites	a	search	for	a	shared	vision	of	a	more	just	society	that	can	address	it.	An	especially	important	addition	to	the	climate	movement	has	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					White	Heart	of	the	Climate	Movement”	New	Internationalist,	December	3,	2015,	http://newint.org/blog/guests/2015/12/01/darkening-the-white-heart-of-the-climate-movement/;	“‘Indigenous	people	were	silenced	and	erased’,”	New	Internationalist,	December	17,	2015,	http://newint.org/blog/2015/12/17/wretched-of-the-earth-open-letter/	179	Naomi	Klein,	"The	People’s	Climate	March:	Meet	the	Next	Movement	of	Movements,"	The	
Leap,	September	14,	2014,	https://theleapblog.org/the-peoples-climate-march-meet-the-next-movement-of-movements/;	della	Porta	and	Parks,	“Framing	Processes	in	the	Climate	Movement:	From	Climate	Change	to	Climate	Justice,”	19-29;	Hadden,	“Explaining	Variations	in	Transnational	Climate	Change	Activism.”		180	Naomi	Klein,	“Canada’s	New	Climate	Movement,”	Nation,	June	5,	2015,	https://www.thenation.com/article/canadas-new-climate-movement/		
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been	labour	unions.181	Their	presence	is	reflected	in	how	a	large	part	of	the	New	York,	Toronto,	and	Ottawa	march	narratives	was	that	a	serious	climate	response	would	require	replacing	an	unjust	neoliberal	economic	model	prone	to	crises,	austerity,	inequality,	and	environmental	destruction	with	a	new	economy	characterized	by	massive	reinvestment	in	the	public	and	renewable	energy	sector	to	rapidly	develop	clean	energy	infrastructure	providing	millions	of	jobs	across	the	world.	Among	other	demands	were	that	these	jobs	would	have	to	pay	a	living	wage,	that	they	would	be	available	to	all	fairly,	and	that	the	various	sectors	of	the	new	economy	would	respect	Indigenous	land	rights.		The	climate	crisis	and	the	economic	crisis	are	thus,	these	climate	marches	assert,	resolvable	by	the	same	approach,	and	thereby	link	together	a	variety	of	groups	under	a	vision	of	a	new	and	more	just	society	characterized	by	better	employment.	Describing	the	Toronto	climate	march	as	being	about	a	“justice-based	transition”	away	from	a	fossil	fuelled	society,	Klein	notes	“it's	really	important	for	social	movements	to	have	a	coherent	vision,	to	push	the	government	on	what	we	want.	We	want	to	tackle	poverty	and	inequality	and	climate	change	at	the	same	time,	we	don't	want	those	issues	pitted	against	each	other.”182	These	demands,																																									 																					
181	Unifor,	Canada’s	largest	private	sector	union,	which	also	represents	workers	in	the	fossil	fuel	industry,	joined	prominently	in	the	Toronto	climate	march.	See	John	Cartwright,	"We	don't	have	to	choose	between	jobs	and	climate	action,"	Rabble,	June	24,	2015,	http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/john-cartwright/2015/06/we-dont-have-to-choose-between-jobs-and-climate-action;	and	Joseph	Brean,	"Climate	rally	brings	together	‘uneasy	coalition’	of	Naomi	Klein	and	union	boss	Jerry	Dias,"	National	Post,	May	21,	2015,	http://news.nationalpost.com/toronto/climate-rally-brings-together-uneasy-coalition-of-naomi-klein-and-union-boss-jerry-dias	182	Rachel	Browne,	“We	Talked	to	Naomi	Klein	About	Canada’s	Climate	Record	and	Her	Vatican	Alliance”	Vice,	July	5,	2015,	http://www.vice.com/en_ca/read/we-talked-to-naomi-klein-about-canadas-climate-record-and-her-alliance-with-the-vatican.	Klein	notes	further,	“The	overall	message	is	that	our	politicians	are	not	treating	climate	change	like	the	emergency	that	it	is.	They	are	also	not	treating	action	on	climate	change	like	the	opportunity	that	it	is.	Because	if	we	take	this	crisis	seriously,	if	we	stop	denying	it,	then	we	would	be	making	huge	investments	in	our	energy	economy,	our	transportation	economy,	that	would	create	massive	numbers	of	jobs.	We	could	make	sure	they	were	well-paying	jobs	and	we	could	make	sure	that	the	people	who	got	those	investments	were	the	ones	who	needed	it	most.	And	that's	why	the	framing	of	this	march	is	jobs,	justice,	and	climate	action.	Because	we've	been	told	we	need	to	choose	between	these	things,	between	jobs	and	the	environment.	And	that's	just	not	true.	We	can	create	jobs	by	responding	to	climate	change	in	a	way	that	our	current	economy	is	failing	to	do.”	
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originating	from	below	and	from	a	broad-based	constituency,	are	seen	as	being	more	authentically	democratic	than	top-down	climate	policy.183	(This	sense	of	authenticity	is	attested	to	by	the	marching	chant	used	since	at	least	the	Seattle	WTO	protests:	“Show	me	what	democracy	looks	like!	This	is	what	democracy	looks	like!”)	Political	elites	must	be	accountable	to	more	than	just	demands	for	“action,”	but	to	a	more	specific	vision	of	a	just	society	from	the	demos.				 In	sum,	we	can	read	the	justice	of	climate	marches	as	one	of	directing	democratic	pressure	for	ambitious	climate	policy	towards	national	and	subnational	political	leadership	that	has	so	far	been	unresponsive	in	taking	on	climate	change:	marches	pressure	political	elites	to	do	what	is	just.	That	sense	of	justice	can	be	amplified	and	articulated	by	organizing	the	diverse	constituency	making	the	demands	to	emphasize	the	environmental	injustice	of	climate	change;	the	voices	of	those	most	heavily	affected;	the	broad	and	multi-sectoral	democratic	base	of	demands;	and	the	vision	of	society	being	demanded.			 The	movement,	however,	must	somehow	address	the	fact	that	not	all	of	these	components	easily	gain	friction.	(And	some	thinkers	have	even	been	dismissive	of	the	ability	of	marches	like	these	to	do	much	of	anything	at	all.184)	To	be	sure,																																									 																					
183	See,	e.g.,	Naomi	Klein’s	remarks	at	the	media	conference	launch	of	the	March	for	Jobs,	Justice	&	the	Climate	Launch	(Naomi	Klein,	"Naomi	Klein	-	March	for	Jobs,	Justice	&	the	Climate	Launch,"	7:00,	uploaded	May	27,	2015	by	“350.org,”	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=esCgfUD-_Ew)		 184	Consider	the	reflections	of	journalist	and	author	Roy	Scranton	on	the	People’s	Climate	March,	worth	quoting	at	length:	“[T]he	message	the	march	was	supposed	to	embody	was	never	clear.	If	the	intent	was	to	raise	awareness,	we’d	be	right	to	ask	what	a	march	is	supposed	to	do	that	a	preponderance	of	scientific	data,	decades	of	research,	almost	daily	articles	in	major	media	outlets	worldwide,	and	19	United	Nations	conferences	on	the	issue	since	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	first	met	in	Berlin	in	1995	could	not.	If	the	plan	was	to	convince	conservative	and	mainstream	Americans	to	pay	attention	to	climate	change,	it’s	hard	to	see	how	a	bunch	of	environmentalists	marching	through	a	city	most	Americans	consider	a	bastion	of	rich	liberals	might	be	expected	to	accomplish	that.	If	the	intent	was	to	demonstrate	the	political	power	that	the	umbrella	organizations	could	motivate	in	terms	of	voters,	we	should	ask	which	voters,	where	they’re	from,	how	they	usually	vote,	and	how	many	there	were.	None	of	that	information	was	collected.		“So	one’s	left	to	wonder	exactly	what	kind	of	pressure	this	march	was	supposed	to	put	on	the	American	political	process,	or	for	that	matter	any	political	process.	The	march	was	tightly	constrained	by	police	barriers,	directed	through	low-traffic	streets	far	from	the	United	Nations—far	
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marches	have	a	variety	of	functions—to	strengthen	networks,	to	showcase	and	celebrate	the	strength	of	movements,	to	(re)assert	agency—though	their	primary	one	is	to	make	demands	of	a	political	elite	for	accountability.	But,	recent	attempts	to	organize	them	into	a	narrative	notwithstanding,	marches	are	eminently	interpretable,	even	co-optable,	by	that	political	elite.	The	systemic	challenge	coming	from	the	climate	movement’s	more	radical	stream,	in	particular,	is	weakened	to	the	degree	that	elites	are	free	to	interpret	march	demands.185	After	all,	marches	are	not	like	referenda,	which	bind	politicians	to	specific	demands;	political	elites	have	little	obligation	to	register	a	given	march	as	anything	other	than	what	we	might	call	mass	
reserves	of	raw	volition	supporting	climate	“action”	to	be	fashioned	into	the	policies	elites	see	fit.	As	Pablo	Solon	the	former	UNFCCC	climate	negotiator	for	Bolivia	and	prominent	voice	in	the	climate	justice	movement	noted,	leaders	at	the	2014	UN	Climate	Summit	were	not	significantly	influenced	by	the	People’s	Climate	March,	failing	to	make	strong	emissions	reductions	or	financing	commitments.	Instead,	they	strengthened	the	role	of	carbon	markets.	As	he	put	it,	“A	march	that	calls	for	‘climate	action’	without	clearly	saying	what	that	action	should	be	can	be	manipulated	or	used	to	promote	wrong	actions.”186	(As	an	example	of	clearer	communication	of																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					from	the	meeting	it	was	supposed	to	influence—and	dumped	out	on	empty	blocks	along	the	Hudson	River	west	of	mid-town.	With	no	closing	rally	to	unify	the	protestors,	the	march	ended	with	an	incoherent	whimper,	as	thousands	of	atomized	individuals	scattered	back	to	their	subways,	cars,	and	digitally	wired	but	politically	disconnected	lives.	In	truth,	the	People’s	Climate	March	was	little	more	than	an	orgy	of	democratic	emotion,	an	activist-themed	street	fair,	a	real-world	analogue	to	Twitter	hashtag	campaigns,	something	that	gives	you	a	nice	feeling,	says	you	belong	to	a	certain	group,	and	is	completely	divorced	from	actual	legislation	and	governance.	Given	the	march’s	tremendous	built-in	weaknesses,	the	best	we	might	have	hoped	for	is	that	it	accomplished	nothing.	What’s	more	likely	though	is	that	it	siphoned	off	organizing	energy	that	could	have	been	more	useful	elsewhere,	made	a	public	display	of	climate	activism’s	political	impotence,	and	soothed	hundreds	of	thousands	of	people	into	a	false	sense	of	hope.”	Roy	Scranton,	“Roy	Scranton:	Learning	to	Die	in	the	Anthropocene-	Reflections	on	the	End	of	Civilization,”	YouTube	video,	1:19:14,	posted	on	November	2015	by	“Ed	Mays,”	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N0yUX12ZoTA.	185	One	can	see	the	danger	of	all	of	this	in	the	100%	Possible	March,	which	centered	foremost	on	a	demand	for	a	rapid	switch	to	renewable	energy,	which	policymakers	can	takes	steps	to	address	without	ushering	in	system	change	(see	chapter	5).	186	Pablo	Solon,	“How	Did	Leaders	Respond	to	the	People’s	Climate	March?,”	September	26,	2014,	Focus	on	the	Global	South,	http://focusweb.org/content/how-did-leaders-respond-people-s-climate-march.	He	writes	further	of	climate	marches,	“Our	main	goal	in	strengthening	marches	like	the	one	on	September	21st	is	not	to	target	the	UN	climate	negotiations,	but	to	build	a	movement	that	
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goals,	Solon	points	instead	to	a	list	of	10	demands	endorsed	by	a	group	of	more	than	330	organizations.187)	Klein	observes	this	danger	as	well,	and	reasserts	her	own	sense	of	what	that	march	was	about:		 Right	now,	after	the	People’s	Climate	March	in	New	York,	there	is	nothing	to	prevent	a	slick	green	NGO	from	attempting	to	harness	all	that	power	in	the	streets,	meeting	behind	closed	doors	with	politicians,	and	saying,	“Well,	what	this	movement	wants	is	“fee	and	dividend”	[another	term	for	a	revenue-neutral	carbon	tax].	Is	it?	Did	anyone	ask?	The	march	was	about	more	than	just	climate	action—it	was	about	climate	justice.	One	of	the	most	noteworthy	aspects	of	the	march	was	its	racial	and	economic	diversity.	And	a	lot	of	what	was	driving	that	was	the	hope	of	climate	action	representing	a	real	investment	in	some	deeply	neglected	communities	and	the	possibility	of	jobs	and	infrastructure.	If	you	give	all	the	money	back	from	a	carbon	tax,	you	no	longer	have	any	left	to	invest	in	these	neglected	frontline	communities.188		The	ongoing	problem	is	that	friction	will	remain	highest	for	unspecified	demands	for	action	and	fall	off	as	the	demands	become	more	specific	and	begin	to	fall	outside	of	the	logic	of	the	current	(neo)liberal	order.	The	friction	that	Klein’s	hypothetical	“slick	green	NGO”	could	gain	for	a	revenue	neutral	carbon	tax	is	much	higher	than	that	for	the	kinds	of	progressive	changes	and	economic	planning	that	the	more	radical	parts	of	the	movement	have	been	calling	for.		While	their	ability	to	affect	political	decision-making	in	the	immediate	term	is	perhaps	then	limited,	climate	marches	might	have	a	longer-term	and	different	impact	on	climate	justice.	They	can	express	and	celebrate	ambitious	and	just—even	emancipatory—alternatives	long	incubating	among	progressive	civil	society	groups,	and	not	only	spread	and	normalize	these	alternatives	within	the	broader	climate	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					is	strong	enough	to	challenge	and	change	the	capitalist	system.	The	main	lesson	from	this	week	is	that	we	need	to	make	even	stronger	and	more	permanent	mobilizations	with	much	more	clear	messages	targeting	the	main	polluters,	which	are	the	big	corporations.”	This	would	seem	to	indicate	that	climate	marches	are	then	not,	for	Solon,	the	means	to	demand	climate	justice	from	governing,	but	only	of	building	a	movement	“that	is	strong	enough	to	challenge	and	change	the	capitalist	system,”	an	appeal	that	as	a	way	forward	will	need	further	elaboration.			187	“Mobilize	and	organize	to	Stop	and	Prevent	Planet	Fever!,”	Climate	Space,	September	16,	2014,	https://climatespace2013.wordpress.com/2014/09/16/mobilize-and-organize-to-stop-and-prevent-planet-fever/	188	Naomi	Klein,	“Climate:	The	Crisis	and	the	Movement,”	Great	Transition,	December	2014,	http://www.greattransition.org/publication/climate-the-crisis-and-the-movement.		
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movement,	but	also	gradually	introduce	them	into	the	public	sphere	so	that	ideas	that	were	once	marginal	might	someday,	somehow,	be	made	mainstream.189	This	is	an	idea	I	will	leave	for	now,	but	return	to	in	chapter	6,	where	I	discuss	a	third	front	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice	that	entails	the	search	for	a	more	just	society	where	these	ideas	can	take	root.			
4.	Blockadia	and	Divestment:	Confronting	the	Fossil	Fuel	Enemy		A	look	across	the	immediate	post-Copenhagen	petro-political	landscape	was	enough	to	fill	anyone	concerned	about	climate	change	with	dread.	At	the	precise	moment	that	the	world	needed	to	rapidly	turn	away	from	fossil	fuels,	it	had	committed	to	the	worst,	most	extreme	sources	of	them,	and	in	the	absence	of	a	strong	and	binding	climate	agreement.	The	consequences	would	not	take	long	to	show.	Most	spectacular	was	the	blowout	of	the	BP	Deepwater	Horizon	well	in	2010.	Coal-burning	covered	China’s	major	cities	in	toxic	haze.	Fracking	projects	left	behind	poisoned	wastewater	and	caused	severe	methane	leaks	that	undid	the	emissions	reductions	gains	that	might	otherwise	have	come	from	switching	from	coal	to	natural	gas.190	The	tar	sands	carved	out	and	ripped	away	Alberta’s	boreal	forests	and	left	open	mining	pits	and	tailings	ponds	whose	contents	leaked	and	seeped	and	spilled	into	waterways.	Nearby	Indigenous	communities	saw	traditional	hunting	grounds	made	inaccessible	or	polluted.	In	Fort	Chipewyan,	an	Indigenous	community	downstream	from	the	tar	sands	projects,	rare	forms	of	cancer	
																																								 																					
189	Thanks	to	Dr.	Ellie	Perkins	for	pointing	out	in	her	comments	on	my	chapter	that,	by	changing	what	is	understood	to	be	possible,	big	ideas	like	the	kind	marches	put	forth	can	influence	the	kind	of	long-term	social	changes	that	happen.	Naomi	Klein	described	something	perhaps	similar	when	she	noted	“there	would	be	no	Bernie	moment	without	the	Fight	for	15,	Keystone	XL,	the	movement	against	fracking,	Black	Lives	Matter,	the	immigrant	rights	movement—all	of	it,	right?”	(She	also	includes	the	Occupy	movement	later	in	the	speech.)	The	above	is	from	Naomi	Klein’s	remarks	at	the	People’s	Summit	in	Chicago	available	at	“Naomi	Klein:	There	Would	Be	No	Bernie	Movement	Without	#FightFor15,	Keystone	XL	&	#BlackLivesMatter,”	Democracy	Now,	June	20,	2016,	http://www.democracynow.org/2016/6/20/naomi_klein_there_would_be_no	190	The	documentary	Gasland	by	director	Josh	Fox	helped	draw	popular	attention	to	the	impacts	of	fracking.		
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appeared.191	These	processes	would	impact	so	many	of	the	frontline	communities	who	would	eventually	lead	the	climate	marches.	All	the	while,	the	carbon	content	of	the	atmosphere	rose.	Strategies	were	therefore	needed	to,	as	the	movement	puts	it,	“Keep	fossil	fuels	in	the	ground.”		
  
Blockadia.	A	movement	grew	rapidly	all	over	the	world	to	take	on	extractive	projects	using	a	variety	of	direct	action	techniques.	The	phenomena	became	widespread	enough	to	warrant	a	name,	Blockadia,	which	Klein	describes	in	the	following	way:  Blockadia	is	not	a	specific	location	on	a	map,	but	rather	a	roving	transnational	conflict	zone	that	is	cropping	up	with	increasing	frequency	and	intensity	wherever	extractive	projects	are	attempting	to	dig	and	drill,	whether	for	open-pit	mines,	or	gas	fracking,	or	tar	sands	oil	pipelines.	What	is	clear	is	that	fighting	a	giant	extractive	industry	on	your	own	can	seem	impossible,	especially	in	a	remote,	sparsely	populated	location.	But	being	part	of	a	continent-wide,	even	global,	movement	that	has	the	industry	surrounded	is	a	very	different	story.	Blockadia	is	turning	the	tables,	insisting	that	it	is	up	to	industry	to	prove	that	its	methods	are	safe	–	and	in	the	era	of	extreme	energy	that	is	something	that	simply	cannot	be	done.192		As	she	put	it,	“The	rise	of	Blockadia	is,	in	many	ways,	simply	the	flip	side	of	the	carbon	boom.”		In	Canada,	blockadia	is	fervent.193	Indigenous	land	defenders	stood	on	the	frontlines	of	the	most	important	struggles	against	fossil	fuel	projects.	In	2010,	61																																									 																					
191	For	more,	see	the	3-part	story	on	the	DeSmog	blog	starting	with	Carol	Linnitt,	"The	Oilsands	Cancer	Story	Part	1:	John	O’Connor	and	the	Dawn	of	a	New	Oilsands	Era,"	Desmog	Canada,	July	26,	2014,	http://www.desmog.ca/2014/07/26/oilsands-cancer-story-1-john-oconnor-dawn-new-oilsands-era				192	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything:	Capitalism	vs.	The	Climate	(Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2014),	294-295.		193	Just	as	it	is	in	the	US.	In	late	summer	2016,	the	Standing	Rock	Sioux	Tribe’s	resistance	against	the	Dakota	Access	pipeline	reached	a	fevered	pitch	as	the	pipeline	company	bulldozed	ancestral	graves	and	attacked	protestors	with	dogs	(see	“FULL	Exclusive	Report:	Dakota	Access	Pipeline	Co.	Attacks	Native	Americans	with	Dogs	&	Pepper	Spray,”	Democracy	Now,	September	6,	2016,	http://www.democracynow.org/2016/9/6/full_exclusive_report_dakota_access_pipeline).	Corporate	media	largely	ignored	the	incidents	(see	Jim	Naureckas,	"Dakota	Access	Blackout	Continues	on	ABC,	NBC	News,"	FAIR,	September	22,	2016,	http://fair.org/home/dakota-access-blackout-continues-on-abc-nbc-news/);	#IndianWinter,	“Standing	Rock:	the	story	of	a	heroic	resistance,”	Roar,	November	19,	2016,	https://roarmag.org/essays/standing-rock-no-dapl-
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First	Nations	in	B.C.	turned	to	ancestral	law	and	made	the	Save	the	Fraser	Declaration	to	block	tar	sands	pipelines.	That	same	year,	the	Unist’ot’en	resistance	camp	started	building	on	unceded	territory	in	northern	B.C.	directly	in	the	path	of	Enbridge’s	Northern	Gateway	tar	sands	pipeline	and	Chevron’s	Pacific	Trail	pipeline	for	fracked	natural	gas.	In	Alberta,	the	Beaver	Lake	Cree	Nation	engaged	in	a	legal	fight	against	both	the	Canadian	and	Albertan	governments	to	stop	tar	sands	expansion.194	In	New	Brunswick,	members	of	the	Elsipogtog	Mi’kmaq	First	Nation	withstood	RCMP	attacks	on	their	peaceful	blockade	of	fracking	projects	on	unceded	territory.			 Blockadia	has	vigorously	contested	every	one	of	the	pipelines	seeking	to	bring	Alberta	tar	sands	to	the	global	market.	In	central	and	eastern	Canada,	that	has	involved	opposition	to	TransCanada’s	Energy	East	and	Enbridge’s	Line	9.	In	British	Columbia,	it	was	resistance	to	Kinder	Morgan’s	Trans	Mountain	pipeline	and	(as	mentioned	above)	Enbridge’s	Northern	Gateway.	Though	there	is	a	constant	stream	of	new	developments,195	its	highest	profile	political	victory	to	date	is	probably	in	pressing	President	Obama	to	veto	TransCanada’s	Keystone	XL	pipeline,	which	would	have	brought	tar	sands	fuel	from	Alberta	down	to	the	Gulf	of	Mexico.	The	victory	came	after	several	years	of	widespread	campaigns	that	galvanized	the	climate	movement	like	nothing	else	before	it.	As	a	Vox	article	noted	in	the	wake	of	Obama’s	veto	decision,	“The	kind	of	movement	that	rose	up	around	Keystone	is	not	something	you	can	plan	or	schedule.	It's	as	much	art,	or,	hell,	magic,	as	science.”196																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					protests/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+roarmag+%28ROAR+Magazine%29.	Alleen	Brown,	“As	Construction	Near	Standing	Rock	Restarts,	Pipeline	Fights	Flare	Across	the	U.S.,”	The	Intercept,	Feburary	19,	2017,	https://theintercept.com/2017/02/19/as-construction-near-standing-rock-restarts-pipeline-fights-flare-across-the-u-s/	194	“Tar	Sands	Trial:	Beaver	Lake	Cree	vs	Alberta	and	Canada,”	RAVEN,	accessed	March	13,	2016,	http://raventrust.com/tar-sands-trial/	195	In	fall	2016,	for	instance,	climate	activists	undertook	a	coordinated	action	using	manual	shut-off	valves	to	stop	tar	sands	from	flowing	through	pipelines	in	4	US	states.	“Climate	Direct	Action:	Activists	Halt	Flow	of	Tar	Sands	Oil	by	Shutting	Off	Valves	of	Five	Pipelines,”	Democracy	Now,	October	12,	2016,	http://www.democracynow.org/2016/	10/12/climate_direct_action_activists_halt_flow.		196	David	Roberts,	“What	critics	of	the	Keystone	campaign	misunderstand	about	climate	activism,”	Vox,	November	8,	2015,	http://www.vox.com/2015/11/8/9690654/keystone-climate-activism	
 115 
(That	victory,	however,	was	setback	by	President	Donald	Trump’s	decision	to	approve	Keystone	XL	in	January	2016.)		Blockadia’s	actions	reveal	a	sense	of	climate	justice	in	several	ways.	First,	in	asserting	moral	reasons	for	actions	that	challenge	the	ability	of	the	fossil	fuel	industry	to	freely	follow	its	institutional	logic	and	expand	its	frontiers,	blockadia	identifies	and	condemns	a	realm	of	economic	activity	as	immoral.	A	large	part	of	the	fight	against	Keystone	in	particular	rested	on	characterizing	Alberta	tar	sands	projects	as	threats	to	long-term	human	survival	(Bill	McKibben	evocatively	called	the	pipeline	the	“fuse	to	the	biggest	carbon	bomb	on	the	continent”;	prominent	climatologist	James	Hansen	insisted	that	adding	tar	sands	to	the	global	energy	mix	would	mean	“game	over”	for	the	climate197).	For	TransCanada’s	shareholders	to	profit,	the	world	would	have	to	be	made	unlivable.	Blockadia	thus	presents	a	grassroots	democratic	challenge	to	what	should	be	allowed	to	occur	in	the	market,	prioritizing	moral	imperatives	over	market	imperatives	of	growth	and	profit	or	state	imperatives	of	“energy	independence.”		Second,	through	Blockadia’s	various	land-based	struggles,	climate	change	could	no	longer	be	seen	as	an	abstract	problem	of	atmospheric	pollutants.	Its	struggles	became	grounded	in	the	realities	of	place	and	extraction,	in	the	unjust	legacies	of	colonial	history.	It	ties	actions	together	with	a	deep	recognition	of	the	importance	of	local	environments	for	human	wellbeing,	and	a	democratic	impulse	to	have	control	over	their	preservation.	Klein	notes	that	Blockadia’s	battles	have	been	motivated	most	immediately	not	by	climate	but	by	concerns	about	water,	and	describes	its	defining	feature	as	a	“ferocious	love,”	which	occurs	“[w]hen	what	is	being	fought	for	is	an	identity,	a	culture,	a	beloved	place	that	people	are	determined	
																																								 																					
197	Bill	McKibben,	"The	Keystone	Pipeline	Revolt:	Why	Mass	Arrests	are	Just	the	Beginning,"	
Rolling	Stone,	September	28,	2011,	http://www.rollingstone.	com/politics/news/the-keystone-pipeline-revolt-why-mass-arrests-are-just-the-beginning-20110928;	James	Hansen,	Silence	is	Deadly,	June	3,	2011,		http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/mailings/2011/20110603_	SilenceIsDeadly.pdf;	James	Hansen,	“Game	Over	for	the	Climate,”	New	York	Times,	May	9,	2012,	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/opinion/game-over-for-the-climate.html	
 116 
to	pass	on	to	their	grandchildren,	and	that	their	ancestors	may	have	paid	for	with	great	sacrifice.”198			 Blockadia	also	binds	climate	action	to	struggles	for	Indigenous	rights.	In	finding	common	cause	with	frontline	Indigenous	communities	seeking	to	prevent	the	environmental	degradation	associated	with	extraction	that	turns	their	homelands	into	“sacrifice	zones,”	promoting	climate	justice	comes	to	require	a	deep	and	real	allyship	with	Indigenous	struggles	for	sovereignty.	In	many	cases,	for	example	Enbridge’s	Northern	Gateway	pipeline,	successful	termination	of	the	pipeline	project	can	be	won	through	government	recognition	of	Indigenous	land	rights.			 Similarly,	blockadia	recently	saw	climate	action	linking	up	with	demands	for	environmental	justice.	In	summer	2016,	the	Black	Lives	Matter	movement	temporarily	shut	down	London	City	airport	in	protest	of	how	communities	of	colour	in	London	experience	the	worst	forms	of	air	pollution	and	how	people	of	colour	throughout	the	global	south	experience	the	worst	effects	of	climate	change.199		 These	are	very	much	appeals	for	accountability—to	treaty	obligations,	to	human	rights,	to	international	commitments	(like	the	United	Nations	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples	or	the	UNFCCC),	to	democratic	demands.	Blockadia	cannot	on	its	own	every	single	one	of	the	countless	fossil	fuel	projects	in	the	world—there	are	simply	too	many	of	them	across	the	world	to	blockade	over	long	periods200—but	it	can	draw	attention	to	the	most	extreme	of	them,	and	in	doing	so	condemn	the	rest;	governments	must	now	follow	blockadia’s	lead.	Blockadia	has																																									 																					
198	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything,	342.		199	See,	Alexandra	Wanjiku	Kelbert		“Climate	change	is	a	racist	crisis:	that’s	why	Black	Lives	Matter	closed	an	airport,”	Guardian,	September	6,	2016,	https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/sep/06/climate-change-racist-crisis-london-city-airport-black-lives-matter	200	As	one	prominent	climate	activist	put	it,	“In	2012,	while	playing	a	small	part	supporting	the	Quebec	movement	against	fracking,	I	learned	an	important	lesson	about	fracking:	It’s	next	to	impossible	to	fight	fracking	campaigns	one	company	or	project	at	a	time.	By	the	time	you’ve	stopped	one	fracking	well,	a	hundred	more	have	gone	up.	Knowing	this,	the	only	way	to	stop	fracking	is	often	to	force	a	government	to	give	up	or	at	least	back	off	on	a	plan	to	frack	an	entire	gas	deposit.”	See	Cam	Fenton,	“Why	the	climate	movement	needs	a	reboot,”	Waging	Nonviolence,	January	28,	2016,	http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/why-the-climate-movement-needs-a-reboot/	
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needed	to	gain	friction	with	the	existing	system	for	its	appeals	to	accountability.	It	attempts	to	do	so	in	a	number	of	ways.	With	the	US	legislative	branch	of	government	in	the	hands	of	Republicans	during	the	Obama	presidency,	the	movement	pressured	the	US	executive	branch	to	use	its	powers	to	veto	the	Keystone	XL	pipeline.	Anti-Keystone	XL	protests	and	civil	disobedience	actions	at	the	White	House	(the	first	in	September	2011	when	10,000	protestors	surrounded	the	building,	another	in	March	2014)	sought	to	challenge	the	integrity	of	President	Obama,	who	had	campaigned	on	climate	issues.	In	Canada,	blockadia	activists	have	appealed	to	the	regulatory	functions	of	the	National	Energy	Board.201	In	fall	of	2016,	99	young	activists	were	arrested	as	part	of	a	demonstration	on	Parliament	Hill	(“Climate	101”)	pressuring	the	Trudeau	government	to	reject	Kinder	Morgan’s	TransMountain	tar	sands	pipeline	to	the	west	coast.202	(The	Trudeau	government	ignored	them	and	approved	that	pipeline	as	well	as	an	additional	one	in	late	November	2016.203)		One	of	the	most	innovative	tactics	to	gain	friction	has	come	through	legal	defenses	for	blockadia	activists	facing	criminal	charges.	In	having	turned	the	fight	against	expanded	fossil	fuel	extraction	into	a	fight	about	survival,	blockadia	activists	have	begun	marshaling	a	powerful	legal	defense:	necessity.204	The	necessity	defense	has	appeared	in	a	number	of	instances	and	variations205	(and	not	all	for	just	
																																								 																					
201	In	late	summer	2016,	activists	counted	a	victory	in	the	NEB’s	decision	to	shut	down	hearings	on	the	Energy	East	pipeline	following	major	protest	amid	the	exposure	of	a	conflict	of	interest	among	its	commissioners.	Ethan	Cox,	“NEB	indefinitely	suspends	Energy	East	hearings	in	Montreal,”	Ricochet,	August	29,	2016,	https://ricochet.media/en/1356/montreal-neb-hearings-postponed-after-all-hell-breaks-loose	202	Ethan	Cox,	“99	arrests	in	Ottawa	as	students	confront	Trudeau	over	pipelines,"	Ricochet,	October	24,	2016,	https://ricochet.media/en/1485/99-arrests-in-ottawa-as-students-confront-trudeau-over-pipelines	203	John	Paul	Tasker,	“Trudeau	cabinet	approves	Trans	Mountain,	Line	3	pipelines,	rejects	Northern	Gateway,”	CBC	News,	November	29,	2016,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/federal-cabinet-trudeau-pipeline-decisions-1.3872828	204	“The	Climate	Necessity	Defense:	A	Legal	Tool	for	Climate	Activists,”	Climate	Disobedience	
Center,	http://www.climatedisobedience.org/necessitydefense	205	In	May	2016,	a	coordinated	set	of	mass	civil	disobedience	actions	called	Break	Free	From	Fossil	Fuels	took	place	across	the	world	to	attempt	to	close	down	major	sites	of	fossil	fuel	extraction.	Activists	framed	their	actions	as	motivated	by	necessity	and	the	need	for	some	agents	to	fulfill	the	government’s	public	trust	responsibilities.	(See,	Jeremy	Brecher,	“A	new	wave	of	climate	insurgents	
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Blockadia	actions206),	but	at	its	core	it	insists	that	climate	activists	disrupting	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	are	motivated	by	a	failure	of	governments	to	take	steps	to	protect	the	wellbeing	of	the	population.	If	this	line	of	defense	holds	and	sets	legal	precedents,	it	could	give	blockadia	activists	much	freer	license	to	directly	disrupt	fossil	fuel	projects,	pressuring	governments	to	take	up	policies	to	encourage	alternative,	cleaner	energy	sources.			
Divestment.	In	a	landmark	2012	Rolling	Stone	essay,	Bill	McKibben	observed	that	the	mainstream	environmental	movement	had	largely	failed	to	generate	responses	to	climate	change	at	a	scale	anything	like	what	was	needed	due	to	an	analysis	that	was	extremely	nebulous	in	its	identification	of	the	source	of	the	problem,	one	that	led	to	addressing	climate	change	through	individual	lifestyle	solutions	centered	around	green	purchasing	or	lobbying	governments	for	carbon	pricing.207	That	was	never	going	to	be	enough,	particularly	given	the	role	fossil	fuels	play	in	sustaining	current	western	lifestyles;	all	of	us	are	implicated.	Here,	McKibben’s	assessment																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					defines	itself	as	law-enforcers,”	Waging	Nonviolence,	February	29,	2016,	http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/break-free-from-fossil-fuels-public-trust-domain/.)		The	necessity	defense	was	also	used	in	the	legal	trial	of	an	activist	facing	a	30-year	sentence	for	shutting	off	a	tar	sands	pipeline	valve	as	part	of	a	coordinated	action	in	solidarity	with	the	Standing	Rock	Sioux-led	struggles	against	the	Dakota	Access	Pipeline	with	some	apparent	success.	(See,	Lauren	McCauley,	"Facing	Decades	in	Prison,	Climate	Activist	Says	We	Have	'No	Choice	But	Direct	Action',"	Common	Dreams,	January	30,	2017,	http://www.commondreams.org/	news/2017/01/30/facing-decades-prison-climate-activist-says-we-have-no-choice-direct-action;	Lauren	McCauley,	“Just	in	Time	for	Trump,	Jury	Says	Defense	of	Planet	Is	No	Crime,”	Common	Dreams,	February	2,	2017,	http://www.commondreams.org/news/2017/02/02/just-time-trump-jury-says-defense-planet-no-crime)	206	It	has	also	been	used	by	Flood	Wall	Street	activists	who	attempted	to	reignite	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	occupations	following	the	New	York	People’	Climate	March.	See,	Shawn	Carrie,	“How	The	Flood	Wall	Street	Trial	Changed	The	Game	Of	Policing”	Mintpress	News,	March	27,	2015,	http://www.mintpressnews.com/how-the-flood-wall-street-trial-changed-the-game-of-policing/203768/;	Lindsay	Abrams,	“Flood	Wall	Street’s	bold	legal	defense:	Climate	change	left	us	with	no	other	choice,”	Salon,	October	31,	2014,		http://www.salon.com/2014/10/31/	flood_wall_streets_bold_legal_defense_climate_change_left_us_with_no_other_choice/	207	Bill	McKibben,	“Global	Warming's	Terrifying	New	Math,”	Rolling	Stone,	July	19,	2012	http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/global-warmings-terrifying-new-math-20120719?page=3.	To	be	sure,	divestment	was	already	in	the	air.	McKibben’s	article	features	a	set	of	figures	from	a	UK	financial	team	using	the	carbon	budget	approach	to	show	that	fossil	fuel	companies	were	a	part	of	an	investment	bubble	waiting	to	burst.	I	focus	on	McKibben’s	piece	because	of	its	influence	and	because	of	the	strength	and	completeness	of	the	case	it	laid	out.		
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dovetails	with	another	critique	of	that	older	nebulous	analysis:	it	failed	to	draw	a	link	between	climate	change	and	fossil	fuels,	and	linked	instead—too	abstractly—to	
greenhouse	gases.	Conceptually,	the	difference	between	these	links	is	subtle,	but	important:	we	are	all	responsible	for	emitting	greenhouse	gases	(albeit	some	more	than	others),	but	we	are	not	all	responsible	for	supplying—and	seeking	to	keep	us	hooked	on—fossil	fuels.		That	shift	in	focus	was	key.	As	McKibben	put	it,	“movements	require	enemies”	if	they	are	to	grow.	Fossil	fuel	companies	had	for	too	long	been	spared	from	public	censure	by	both	that	reigning	analysis	and	by	the	seeming	impossibility	of	a	direct	fight	against	such	politically	powerful	opponents.208	And	yet,	McKibben	argued,	they	are	very	much	the	enemy:	their	entire	business	model	relies	on	the	wholesale	destruction	of	the	climate.	McKibben’s	piece	was	one	of	the	first	mainstream	media	articles	to	popularize	the	carbon	budget	approach	to	understanding	the	climate	crisis.209	The	approach	showed	that	if	the	world	hoped	for	an	80%	chance	of	holding	temperature	rise	below	2˚C	(slightly	worse	odds	than	Russian	roulette,	he	points	out),	humanity	could	emit	only	565	gigatons	of	carbon	dioxide	(GtCO2).	Fossil	fuel	companies	meanwhile	held	2,795	GtCO2	in	their	reserves,	five	times	more	than	the	amount	that	can	ever	be	used,	and,	in	accordance	with	the	imperatives	of	an	economic	model	valuing	them	for	the	sellable	assets	they	hold,	have	every	intention	of	seeing	it	burned—and	seeking	more.	McKibben	hoped	that	the	figures	revealed	by	the	carbon	budget	would	direct	moral	outrage	towards	the	fossil	fuel	industry—which	should	now	be	seen	as	“a	rogue	industry,	reckless																																									 																					
208	As	he	put	it,	“Environmentalists,	understandably,	have	been	loath	to	make	the	fossil-fuel	industry	their	enemy,	respecting	its	political	power	and	hoping	instead	to	convince	these	giants	that	they	should	turn	away	from	coal,	oil	and	gas	and	transform	themselves	more	broadly	into	‘energy	companies’."		209	George	Monbiot	published	another	mainstream	media	piece	featuring	the	carbon	budget	in	May	2009	(“How	much	fossil	fuel	can	we	burn?”	Guardian.	May	6,	2009,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/georgemonbiot/2009/may/06/carbon-emissions).	It	followed	on	the	heels	of	two	seminal	Nature	papers	calculating	the	remaining	carbon	budget	for	a	2˚C	constraint	on	global	temperature	rise.	(Meinshausen	et	al.,	“Greenhouse	gas	emission	targets	for	limiting	global	warming	to	2˚C,”	Nature	458	(2009);	and	Allen	et	al.,	“Warming	caused	by	cumulative	carbon	emissions	towards	the	trillionth	tonne,”	Nature	458	(2009)).	
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like	no	other	force	on	Earth”—and	looked	to	the	history	of	struggle	against	South	African	apartheid	for	a	model	of	action	to	wield	that	anger:	divestment.		Fossil	fuel	divestment	aims	to	pressure	major	institutions—universities,	faith	organizations,	healthcare	associations,	government	bodies,	etc.—to	remove	financial	investments	in	fossil	fuel	companies	by	simultaneously	rallying	two	sets	of	motivations.	The	first	is	moral,	and	it	is	here	where	divestment	contributes	to	the	movement’s	sense	of	climate	justice.	It	asserts	that	there	is	something	deeply	wrong	about	benefiting	from	investments	in	corporations	whose	business	models	require	destructive	changes	to	the	climate	and	impacts	on	frontline	communities.	(As	the	movement	sums	it	up	in	its	slogan,	“If	it’s	wrong	to	wreck	the	planet,	then	it’s	wrong	to	profit	from	that	wreckage.”)	By	investing	in	the	fossil	fuel	industry,	individuals	and	institutions	give	tacit	approval	to	its	activities	and	preserve	its	“social	license,”	the	consent	society	grants	the	industry	to	continue	business	as	usual.		The	immorality	of	continued	investments	in	the	industry	extends	beyond	the	figures	revealed	by	the	carbon	budget.	Divestment	created	a	badly	needed	opportunity	to	discuss	the	nature	of	the	industry.	As	with	the	blockadia	movement	to	block	pipelines,	divestment	activists	also	quickly	found	common	cause	with	Indigenous	groups	fighting	the	development	of	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	on	their	traditional	territories,	opening	a	second	set	of	moral	motivations;	investments	in	fossil	fuel	companies	were	doubly	wrong:	the	same	industries	wrecking	the	climate	were	harming	Indigenous	communities	to	do	it.		Similar	to	blockadia,	one	of	divestment’s	contributions	to	climate	justice	is	to	demarcate	morally	legitimate	from	morally	illegitimate	economic	activity	in	a	time	of	climate	change.	Each	divestment	commitment	simultaneously	identifies	the	fossil	fuel	industry	as	an	enemy	to	continued	survival	on	earth	and	leverages	moral	motivations	to	initiate	a	rupture	with	it.	The	logic	behind	it	is	straightforward:	as	commitments	accumulate,	divestment	progressively	strips	away	the	social	license	of	an	entire	sector	of	the	global	economy	and	presents	it	in	the	realm	of	public	opinion	as	the	rogue	industry	the	math	of	the	carbon	budget	reveals	it	to	be.	In	the	same	way	
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that	a	panicked	sell-off	of	stock	signals	economically	toxic	assets	to	the	investment	community,	a	cascading	sell-off	of	fossil	fuel	investments	for	reasons	of	justice	signals	morally	toxic	assets	to	the	larger	society.	With	its	social	license	in	tatters,	the	industry	becomes	stigmatized.	It	can	thereby	be	subjected	to	harsher	political	penalties,	perhaps	becoming	isolated	from	the	halls	of	power	as	the	politicians	whose	electoral	campaigns	it	sponsors	become	delegitimized,	or	finding	itself	subject	to	steeper	carbon	pricing,	or	having	its	profits	seized	as	odious.210	In	these	ways,	fossil	fuel	divestment	is	a	moral	incursion	into	free-market	capitalism.		The	other	set	of	motivations	is	economic,	appealing	to	self-interest	in	the	market,	and	it	is	in	this	way	that	divestment	achieves	friction.	If	the	world	takes	action	to	preserve	a	habitable	climate,	fossil	fuels	become	“stranded	assets,”	excess	stock	that	must	remain	underground.	For	just	a	better-than-even	chance	of	avoiding	2˚C	of	warming,	the	world	must	keep	33%	of	oil	reserves,	49%	of	natural	gas	reserves,	and	82%	of	coal	reserves	in	the	ground.211	It	raises	the	impending	possibility	of	an	economic	“carbon	bubble.”	Since	fossil	fuel	companies	base	their	value	on	the	quantity	of	sellable	reserves	they	hold,	they	are	dramatically	overvalued,	and	become	poor	investments	to	the	degree	the	world	seeks	to	decarbonize.	Fund	managers	could	one	day	soon	be	required	by	law	to	divest	in	order	to	abide	by	legal	fiduciary	duties	(and	there	are	some	recent	signs	that	the	divestment	movement	is	gaining	enough	friction	to	make	this	a	near-term	reality212).																																									 																					
210	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything,	355.		211	Christophe	McGlade	and	Paul	Ekins	(2015),	“The	Geographical	Distribution	of	Fossil	Fuels	Unused	when	Limiting	Global	Warming	to	2˚C,”	Nature	517	(2015):	189-190.	For	an	accessible	summary,	see	Damian	Carrington,	“Leave	fossil	fuels	buried	to	prevent	climate	change,	study	urges,”	
Guardian,	January	7,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jan/07/much-worlds-fossil-fuel-reserve-must-stay-buried-prevent-climate-change-study-says.		212	Several	divestment	talks	and	workshops	I	have	attended	made	the	point	that	investment	institutions	have	yet	to	be	made,	legally	speaking,	to	take	into	consideration	“systemic	risks”	like	climate	change.	But	there	have	been	some	developments	that	could	change	this	(when,	exactly,	is	anyone’s	guess).	Warnings	about	the	financial	risk	of	carbon-intensive	assets	have	come	from	Mark	Carney,	governor	of	the	Bank	of	England	(Pilita	Clark,	"Mark	Carney	warns	investors	face	‘huge’	climate	change	losses,"	Financial	Times,	September	29,	2015,	https://www.ft.com/content/	622de3da-66e6-11e5-97d0-1456a776a4f5).	In	2016,	the	European	Systemic	Risk	Board	(a	body	
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Though	a	few	campaigns	had	already	begun,	the	movement	really	began	to	pick	up	steam	in	fall	of	2012.	As	Rhys	Naylor,	a	fellow	member	of	York	University’s	divestment	group	Fossil	Free	York,	put	it	to	me	in	a	conversation,	divestment	is	“elegant”:	even	those	institutions	whose	logics	do	not	respond	to	moral	reasons	for	climate	action	must	respond	to	economic	reasons	or	else	remain	exposed	to	the	economic	consequences	of	continued	investment	in	the	fossil	fuel	industry.	That	elegance	is	responsible	for	some	impressive	victories.	By	November	2016,	over	600	institutions,	together	commanding	$3.4	trillion,	were	divesting	partially	or	fully	from	fossil	fuels.	This	is	a	massive	growth	on	the	181	institutions	representing	$50	billion	in	assets	who	had	divested	by	September	2014.213	Among	institutions	that	have	divested	are	the	Canadian	Medical	Association,	the	Guardian	newspaper,	and	the	Norwegian	Sovereign	Wealth	Fund.	So	far,	post-secondary	institutions	have	shown	themselves	to	be	extremely	reluctant	to	divest,	making	up	only	13%	of	institutions	that	have	committed	to	divest.	In	Canada,	Concordia	and	the	University	of	Ottawa	have	divested—and	only	partially.	In	the	UK,	matters	have	been	made	even	worse	by	Conservative	government	policy	threatening	penalties	to	local	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					advising	the	European	Central	Bank)	issued	a	report	warning	about	the	systemic	risk	fossil	fuel	stock	now	creates	to	the	financial	system	(European	Systemic	Risk	Board,	Too	Late,	Too	Sudden:	Transition	
to	a	Low-Carbon	Economy	and	Systemic	Risk,	Reports	of	the	Advisory	Scientific	Committee	(2016),	available	at	https://www.esrb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/asc/Reports_	ASC_6_1602.pdf).		Perhaps	most	notably,	in	November	2016,	a	class-action	lawsuit	was	filed	on	behalf	of	Exxon’s	shareholders	due	to	the	company’s	failure	to	disclose	how	climate	change	could	negatively	affect	stock	value	making	it	“the	world’s	first	shareholder-led	lawsuit	over	alleged	inadequate	disclosures	of	climate	risk”	(“Exxon	faces	climate	disclosure	lawsuit	–	from	its	own	investors,"	
ClientEarth,	November	10,	2016,	http://www.clientearth.org/exxon-faces-climate-disclosure-lawsuit-investors/;	David	Hasemyer,	“Class-Action	Lawsuit	Adds	to	ExxonMobil's	Climate	Change	Woes,”	Inside	Climate	News,	November	21,	2016,	https://insideclimatenews.org/news/18112016/exxon-climate-change-research-oil-reserves-stranded-assets-lawsuit).		In	January	2017,	shareholders	introduced	additional	resolutions.	See,	David	Hasemyer,	“Another	Climate	Change	Push	Comes	From	Exxon	Shareholders,”	Inside	Climate	News,	January	11,	2017,	https://insideclimatenews.org/news/11012017/exxon-shareholders-climate-change-rex-tillerson	213	Arabella	Advisors,	Measuring	the	Global	Fossil	Fuel	Divestment	Movement,	(2014),	1;	Arabella	Advisors,	Measuring	the	Growth	of	the	Global	Fossil	Fuel	Divestment	and	Clean	Energy	
Investment	Movement,	(2015);	the	latest	on	divestment	commitments	can	be	found	at	Go	Fossil	Free,	“Divestment	Commitments,”	http://gofossilfree.org/commitments/	
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authorities	that	pursue	fossil	fuel	divestment.214	As	successful	as	divestment	has	been,	more	friction	will	be	required.		
5.	Conclusion:	Not	Bound	to	Even	Hear		 Recall	Anjali	Appadurai	speaking	on	behalf	of	the	world’s	youth	standing	before	the	UNFCCC	country	negotiators,	castigating	them	and	demanding	they	come	to	an	ambitious	climate	agreement.	In	first	reading	about	her	speech,	I	envisioned	a	lone	youth	confronting	an	ocean	of	mostly	unreceptive	political	elites.	But	watching	the	video	of	the	event,	one	notices	that	much	of	the	room	was	empty;	representatives	were	not	only	not	bound	to	act	on	demands	from	the	grassroots—they	were	not	bound	to	even	be	in	the	room	to	hear	them.	The	way	governing	elites	are	responding	to	climate	change	suggests	something	striking	about	the	institutional	logic	of	the	political	and	economic	system	the	climate	movement	is	making	demands	of,	a	matter	we	turn	to	the	next	chapter	to	understand	more	fully.	For	now,	let	us	observe	how,	for	all	the	complex	moral	demands	made	by	the	climate	movement,	climate	policy	throughout	the	developed	world	has	mostly	flattened	to	choosing	from	among	a	set	of	carbon-pricing	mechanisms.	As	we	discuss	in	that	next	chapter,	carbon	pricing—carbon	taxes,	emissions	trading,	and	regulations—aims	to	raise	the	price	of	fossil	fuels	and	shift	demand	for	them	to	renewables,	and	is	the	central	policy	instrument	that	the	liberal	order	deploys	to	take	action	on	climate	change.			 Movement	action	gains	the	most	friction	for	demands	where	they	are	most	easily	absorbed	into	the	existing	status	quo	of	the	liberal	order,	and	they	are	most	easily	absorbed	where	they	complement	its	logic.	Climate	marches	and	demonstrations	assemble	large	numbers,	complex	demands	for	justice,	and	visions																																									 																					
214	Arthur	Neslen,	“UK	councils	warned	of	'severe	penalties'	of	fossil	fuel	divestment,”	
Guardian,	February	18,	2016,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/feb/18/uk-councils-warned-of-severe-penalties-of-fossil-fuel-divestment.	As	noted	in	a	previous	footnote,	“systemic	risk”	like	climate	change	is	not	yet	taken	into	account	in	legal	fiduciary	duties.		
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of	a	more	just	society,	but	gain	friction	by	registering	as	reserves	of	raw	volition	to	be	shaped	by	political	elites	into	“action,”	a	vague	enough	concept	to	be	easily	met	through	measures	like	moderate	carbon	pricing.	Divestment	and	blockadia	aim	to	disrupt	the	market	freedoms	of	a	destructive	fossil	fuel	sector.	And	though	they	might	be	a	democratic	intervention	in	the	economy,	they	act	as	a	negation	of	a	kind	of	economic	activity,	not	an	assertion	of	a	different	kind	of	economic	system.	Divestment	and	blockadia	clear	openings	for	renewable	energy	systems,	but	do	they	do	much	to	determine	whether	that	energy	will	be	used	by	a	capitalist	system	bent	on	growth,	or	some	alternative?	There	is	another	action	being	taken	as	well,	not	reviewed	here	in	detail	for	reasons	of	space,	in	the	form	of	legal	challenges	to	governments	for	failing	to	address	climate	change.215	But	will	the	rulings	coming	out	of	them	change	the	system’s	logic,	or	insist,	once	again,	that	the	system	simply	takes	“actions,”	policies	to	be	determined	by	political	and	economic	elites?			 The	movement	may	be	stuck	in	the	same	way	as	climate-justice-as-climate-
ethics.	Recall	that	the	latter	required	the	UNFCCC	system	to	be	inhabited	by	entities	(1)	prioritizing	climate	change	and	(2)	responsive	to	ethical	reasoning.	Similarly,	the	climate	movement’s	appeal	to	accountability	rests	on	assumptions	about	the	
pliability	of	economic	elites	and	political	representatives,	assumptions	that	there	will	be	significant	institutional	give,	in	the	face	of	mass-based	democratic	demands.		
																																								 																					
215	A	Netherlands	court	ordered	the	Dutch	government	to	cut	emissions	by	25%	by	the	end	of	2020.	(See,	e.g.	Arthur	Neslen,	“Dutch	government	ordered	to	cut	carbon	emissions	in	landmark	ruling,”	Guardian,	June	24,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/jun/24/dutch-government-ordered-cut-carbon-emissions-landmark-ruling).	The	Dutch	government	is	now	appealing	the	ruling.	In	the	US,	Our	Children’s	Trust,	a	group	representing	youth,	is	suing	the	government	to	take	action	on	climate	change.	Interveners	from	the	fossil	fuel	industry	challenged	the	suit.	A	magistrate	judge	allowed	the	case	to	proceed	to	trial,	but	noted	he	was	“troubled”	by	the	rate	of	emissions	reductions	demanded	by	the	suit	(6%	per	year).	The	emissions	reduction	rate	is	anticipated	to	be	the	central	issue	at	the	trial	(see	Our	Children’s	Trust,	“21	Kids	Take	on	the	Feds	and	Big	Oil	in	Historic	Climate	Lawsuit,”	EcoWatch,	March	10,	2016,	https://ecowatch.com/2016/03/10/climate-lawsuit-21-kids/;	Samantha	Page,	“Sorry,	Feds:	Kids	Can	Sue	Over	Climate	Negligence,	Judge	Says,”	Climate	Progress,	April	10,	2016,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/04/10/3768092/climate-trust-suit-moves-forward/;	James	Hansen	et	al.,	“Young	People’s	Burden:	Requirement	of	Negative	CO2	Emissions,”	Earth	System	
Dynamics	(Discussion	paper)	(2016)	doi:10.5194/esd-2016-42).		
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All	of	this	leaves	the	climate	movement	in	an	interesting	moment.	For	now,	a	series	of	shared	causes,	early	steps	essential	to	any	effective	popular	response,	stitches	together	moderate	liberal-progressive	and	radical	elements	of	the	northern	climate	movement:	blocking	the	extraction	of	and	the	construction	or	repurposing	of	new	infrastructure;	divestment	from	fossil	fuel	companies;	demands	for	renewable	energy.	But	there	could	be	seams	that	could	begin	to	come	apart	before	long	(something	that	may	be	occurring	already	as	seen	in	the	2016	Washington	State	vote	over	a	carbon	tax216)	as	governments	commit	to	modest	climate	policies	and	instruments	that	might	mesh	with	the	demands	of	the	more	moderate	stream	of	the	climate	movement,	but	ignore	the	demands	of	that	part	of	the	movement	seeking	systemic	change.			In	2004,	one	scholar	wrote,	“Climate	justice	needs	to	evolve	from	a	parallel	noise	maker	into	a	genuine	pincer	that	cannot	be	ignored	and	into	a	strategic	force	that	can	have	a	direct	impact.”217	Has	the	climate	justice	movement	done	this?	Have																																									 																					
216	In	November	2016,	Washington	State	held	a	ballot	initiative	(I-732)	on	a	carbon	tax	proposed	by	grassroots	climate	group	Carbon	Washington,	which	would	have	been	the	first	carbon	tax	in	the	US	and	the	biggest	in	North	America.	But	voters	turned	down	the	initiative,	and	one	of	the	reasons	was	that	the	more	radical	stream	of	the	climate	movement	rejected	it	(Naomi	Klein	actually	spoke	out	against	it).	The	reason	was	that	the	carbon	tax	was	revenue	neutral,	meaning	it	would	have	failed	to	generate	revenue	to	devote	to	the	kinds	of	projects	the	more	radical	stream	of	the	climate	movement	has	been	demanding,	like	public	investment	in	initiatives	that	prioritize	poor	communities,	communities	of	colour,	non-profits,	schools	districts,	etc.		See	Naomi	Klein,	“The	Carbon	Tax	on	the	Ballot	in	Washington	State	Is	Not	the	Right	Way	to	Deal	With	Global	Warming,”	Nation,	November	4,	2016,	https://www.thenation.com/article/the-carbon-tax-on-the-ballot-in-washington-state-is-not-the-right-way-to-deal-with-global-warming/;	David	Roberts,	"The	left	vs.	a	carbon	tax,"	Vox,	November	8,	2016,	http://www.vox.com/2016/10/18/13012394/i-732-carbon-tax-washington;	"Climate	Policy	Action,"	Alliance	for	Jobs	and	Clean	Energy,	(2016)	http://jobscleanenergywa.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Alliance-Policy-Four-Pager_final.pdf;	Rebecca	Leber,	"The	most	dramatic	climate	fight	of	the	election	is	in	Washington	state,"	Grist,	October	31,	2016,	https://grist.org/election-2016/washington-carbon-tax-732/;	Lisa	Hymas,	"Climate	hawk	vs.	climate	hawk:	State	carbon	tax	divides	national	environmental	leaders,"	Grist,	October	31,	2016,	https://grist.org/election-2016/james-hansen-vs-naomi-klein-state-carbon-tax-splits-national-climate-hawks/;	Lisa	Hymas,	"Washington	state	voters	rejected	a	carbon-tax	ballot	initiative,"	Grist,	November	9,	2016,	http://grist.org/briefly/washington-state-voters-have-rejected-a-carbon-tax-ballot-initiative/	217	Jethro	Pettit,	“Climate	Justice:	A	New	Social	Movement	for	Atmospheric	Rights,”	IDS	
Bulletin	(Climate	Change	and	Development	special	issue),	35	no.	3	(2004),	102–06:	104.	
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those	of	us	in	the	climate	justice	movement	done	more	than	reframe	the	problem?	To	what	degree	are	we	like	Anjali	Appadurai,	making	demands	in	sites	of	contestation	ruled	by	a	political	and	economic	institutional	logic	that	barely	flinches	in	response	to	them?	In	the	next	chapter,	we	take	a	closer	look	at	this	institutional	logic.			 				
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IV.	The	End	of	History	and	the	End	of	the	World			 	
1.	An	Unanswered	Challenge			In	1992,	Francis	Fukuyama	issued	a	kind	of	challenge:	to	imagine	a	better	political	and	economic	system	than	the	one	inhering	in	modern	liberalism.	As	he	put	it			 In	our	grandparents’	time,	many	reasonable	people	could	foresee	a	radiant	socialist	future	in	which	private	property	and	capitalism	had	been	abolished,	and	in	which	politics	itself	was	somehow	overcome.	Today,	by	contrast,	we	have	trouble	imagining	a	world	that	is	radically	better	than	our	own,	or	a	future	that	is	not	essentially	democratic	and	capitalist.	Within	that	framework,	of	course,	many	things	could	be	improved…But	we	cannot	picture	to	ourselves	a	world	that	is	essentially	different	from	the	present	one,	and	at	the	same	time	better.218			 Taking	a	dialectical	view	of	history,	Fukuyama	believed	that	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	terminated	once	and	for	all	the	pattern	of	successive	contradictions	and	resolutions	that	had	driven	the	progression	of	human	societies	towards	a	particular	end:	the	“end	of	history,”	in	his	famous	phrase.	That	phrase	became	something	of	an	easy	target,	a	broad	code	meant	to	evoke	the	narrow	minded	and	naïve	ideological	triumphalism	emerging	in	the	west	with	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall.	(I	cannot	recall	how	often	I	have	seen	authors	dismiss	it	with	the	flick	of	a	wrist.)	Even	recently,	sardonic	turns	of	Fukuyama’s	phrase	can	be	found	in	titles	of	books	like	Alan	Badiou’s	The	Rebirth	of	History	(2012)	and	Seamus	Milne’s	Revenge	
of	History:	The	Battle	for	the	21st	Century	(2013),	whose	focus	on	the	resurgence	of	radical	political	movements	is	meant	as	a	kind	of	jab	at	The	End	of	History’s	claims.		But	I	want	to	revisit	The	End	of	History	with	the	climate	crisis	in	mind,	because,	for	all	the	critiques	levelled	at	the	book	(and	despite	the	sense	that	the	world	has	moved	on	from	it),	its	challenge	ultimately	remains	unanswered—there	is	no	apparent	mass	shift	away	from	liberalism—and	until	it	is	answered,	climate																																									 																					
218	Francis	Fukuyama,	The	End	of	History	and	the	Last	Man	(New	York,	NY:	Avon	Books,	1992),	46.		
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responses	will	remain	tightly	constrained.	Whether	Fukuyama’s	dialectic	was	correct—whether	liberalism	was	indeed	some	inexorable	result,	whether	history	
had	to	end	up	this	way—I	am	not	in	a	position	to	evaluate	(and	strongly	doubt,	despite	recent	arguments	in	this	vein219).	What	matters	for	the	present	discussion	is	the	continuing	and	enduring	dominance	of	liberalism	today	and	what	at	least	appears	to	be	a	widespread	intuitive	sense	that	the	main	thrust	of	Fukuyama’s	argument	is	correct:	that	liberalism	has	brought	humanity	to	its	historical	apex	of	freedom	and	prosperity	and	that	it	would	be	hard	for	most	to	envision	or	point	with	confidence	to	a	viable	alternative	system	that	better	resolves	a	variety	of	human	needs,	interests	and	conflicts	originating	in	our	nature.220		For	better	or	worse,	we	are	stuck	for	the	moment	with	liberalism.	And	it	may	turn	out	to	be	for	worse.	By	an	accident	of	history,	right	around	the	time	of	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union	and	the	liberal	triumphalism	it	triggered	came	a	challenge	threatening	to	undermine	liberalism’s	claims	to	superiority	in	managing	human	affairs.	Around	those	same	years	that	Fukuyama	was	working	on	The	End	of	History,	the	seriousness	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	began	coming	to	light.	A	key	moment	was	American	climatologist	James	Hansen’s	landmark	testimonies	before	the	US	Senate	in	1988	(“Global	Warming	Has	Begun,	Expert	Tells	Senate,”	read	the	
New	York	Times	headline	of	the	time)	and	1989,	the	latter	at	the	behest	of	then-senator	Al	Gore.221	The	Intergovernmental	Panel	on	Climate	Change	(IPCC)	also	published	its	first	assessment	report	in	1990,	revealing	for	the	first	time	the	scientific	consensus	that	human	activity	was	playing	a	role	in	changing	earth’s	climate.																																											 																					
219	See,	e.g.,	Steven	Pinker,	The	Better	Angels	of	Our	Nature:	Why	Violence	has	Declined	(New	York,	NY:	Penguin	Books,	2011)	220	My	thanks	to	Dr.	Terry	Maley	for	raising	the	point	that	uses	of	the	term	“human	nature”	are	loaded	and	often	problematic.	I	should	clarify	here	that	any	use	of	the	term	(or	derivatives	like	“our	nature”)	in	this	chapter	does	not	come	from	any	attempt	on	my	part	to	make	claims	about	what	human	nature	is.	Rather	it	is	used	to	give	a	sense	of	the	reasoning	that	occurs	within	liberal	theory	that	sees	a	correlation	between	human	progress	and	liberal	institutional	design	due	to	the	latter	being	based	on	a	more	sound	understanding	of	human	nature	than	offered	by	other	political	theories.					221	Phillip	Shabecoff,	“Global	Warming	Has	Begun,	Expert	Tells	Senate,”	New	York	Times,	June	24,	1988,	http://www.nytimes.com/1988/06/24/us/global-warming-has-begun-expert-tells-	
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And	so,	just	as	we	reached	the	End	of	History,	we	also	began	to	see	signs	of	the	End	of	the	World,	and	the	coming	of	another	world	eerily	and	dangerously	different.	It	is	a	world	we	might	call	“Eaarth”	(a	new	name	for	our	planet	coined	by	Bill	McKibben	to	suggest	the	Earth	humanity	once	knew	is	now	gone)	or	an	era	we	might	soon	call	the	Anthropocene.222	To	be	sure,	our	planet	is	not	going	anywhere,	but	the	world—the	longstanding	human	understanding	and	experience	of	that	planet	and	its	climate—is	vanishing.		A	dilemma	thus	presents	itself:	Unless	Fukuyama’s	challenge	can	be	
answered—unless	we	realize	something	other	than	liberalism—then	two	possibilities	
remain:	the	policies	responding	to	climate	change	will	have	to	emerge	from	within	the	
liberal	tradition—something	they	have	so	far	failed	to	do—or	the	world	that	human	
civilization	has	known	will	end.	And	the	liberal	tradition	desperately	needs	some	new	ideas.	A	very	troubling	aspect	of	the	response	to	climate	change	so	far	engendered	by	liberal	systems	is	the	limited	suite	of	climate	policy	responses	themselves,	which	follow	from	a	wide	and	longstanding	recognition	under	this	framework	that	the	climate	crisis	cannot	begin	to	be	resolved	until	there	is	a	correction	to	what	Stern	famously	described	as	“the	greatest	market	failure	the	world	has	ever	seen”:	the	systemic	underpricing	of	greenhouse	gases.223	Climate	change	is	here	understood	to	be	the	result	of	a	negative	externality—the	economic	term	describing	market	transactions	that	do	not	include	costs	to	those	outside	the	transaction—and	the	solution	begins	with	internalizing	it.	There	are	several	key	measures	proposed	to	internalize	the	cost	of	carbon:	carbon	taxes,	emission	caps	with	tradable	permits	(or	“cap-and-trade”),	and	regulations	like	emissions,																																									 																					
222	Bill	McKibben,	Eaarth:	Making	a	Life	on	a	Tough	New	Planet	(Toronto:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2010).	In	summer	of	2016	earth	scientists	made	a	recommendation	to	the	International	Geological	Congress	that	the	Holocene	be	officially	declared	over	and	replaced	by	the	Anthropocene,	human-driven	climate	change	being	among	the	reasons	(Damian	Carrington,	"The	Anthropocene	epoch:	scientists	declare	dawn	of	human-influenced	age,"	Guardian,	August	29,	2016,	https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/	aug/29/declare-anthropocene-epoch-experts-urge-geological-congress-human-impact-earth).		223	Nicholas	Stern,	The	Economics	of	Climate	Change:	The	Stern	Review	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007),	xviii,	25-34.			
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efficiency,	or	building	standards.224	Each	of	these	measures	presents	a	means	of	using	the	market,	either	directly	or	indirectly,	to	raise	the	price	of	using	fossil	fuels	and,	thereby,	of	steering	society	towards	clean	and	renewable	alternatives.225	Once	there	is	a	clear	price	for	carbon	and	clear	regulations,	the	power	of	the	market	can	be	wielded	to	decrease	demand	for	fossil	fuel	energy	while	increasing	demand	for	and	innovation	in	low-	or	no-carbon	energy	technologies	and	infrastructure,	incentivizing	private	actors	to	supply	the	appropriate	goods.	Pricing	carbon	offers	the	liberal	framework	what	we	might	think	of	as	a	kind	of	“mechanical	advantage,”	a	means	of	steering	with	relatively	little	political	work	a	very	broad	and	diverse	range	of	(often	powerful,	often	recalcitrant)	actors	towards	a	post-carbon	economy.	Moreover,	because	governments	can	select	the	policies	as	well	as	their	timing,	coverage,	and	intensity,	it	can	control	their	impact	on	the	economy,	ensuring	that	they	do	not	interfere	with	aggregate	growth	or	overburden	favoured	domestic	industries.		While	it	is	the	main	thrust	of	climate	policy,	carbon	pricing	alone	does	not	guarantee	the	necessarily	massive	scale-up	of	renewable	technologies.	Government	technology	policies	that	support	the	development	and	adoption	of	renewable	technology	will	also	be	needed	(e.g.,	subsidies	for	research	and	development	or	infrastructure;	or	feed-in	tariffs	that	guarantee	early	adopters	a	high	price	for	the	energy	they	produce).		As	there	is	a	scientific	consensus	on	climate	change,	what	I	have	just	described	is	a	kind	of	“liberal	consensus”	on	climate	change,	and	there	is	an	implied																																									 																					
224	Thomas	L.	Friedman,	Hot,	Flat,	and	Crowded:	Why	We	Need	a	Green	Revolution	and	How	It	
Can	Renew	America	(Release	2.0:	Updated	and	Expanded)	(Toronto:	Douglas	&	McIntyre,	2009);	Joseph	E.	Aldy,	J.E.	&	Robert	N.	Stavins,	“Using	the	Market	to	Address	Climate	Change:	Insights	from	Theory	&	Experience,”	Daedalus,	141	vol.	2	(2012).	225	The	policies	differ	in	their	perceived	acceptability	to	the	electorate,	likelihood	of	passing	through	political	bodies,	and	their	susceptibility	to	being	manipulated.	For	example,	to	make	them	more	politically	acceptable,	carbon	taxes	are	sometimes	proposed	as	revenue-neutral	to	avoid	raising	citizens’	tax	burdens	as	in	British	Columbia.	Emissions	trading,	meanwhile,	carries	accounting	risks,	particularly	around	the	practice	of	offsetting.	US	President	Barack	Obama	pursued	a	climate	strategy	through	Environmental	Protection	Agency	regulations	(largely	rescinded	under	President	Donald	Trump),	which	did	not	need	to	be	passed	through	a	Congress	dominated	by	the	climate	change	denying	Republican	Party.	
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sequence	or	causal	chain	to	it:	political	representatives	initiate	carbon	pricing	alongside	technology	policies	which	together	trigger	technological	innovation	in	the	renewable	energy	sector,	whose	products	can	in	turn	outcompete	carbon-intense	sectors	(their	products	now	subject	to	carbon	pricing),	leading	to	a	rapid	switch	to	a	carbon-free,	capitalist	economy.	And	not	only	is	there	a	long	list	of	thinkers	identifying	market	mechanisms	as	the	preeminent	policy	instrument	to	address	climate	change	and	preserve	a	prosperous	society	of	liberal	democracy	and	capitalism	into	the	far	future,226	but	carbon	pricing	has	now	become	the	preeminent	climate	policy	in	the	world.	In	2015,	the	World	Bank	reported	that	39	national	jurisdictions	and	23	subnational	jurisdictions	have	implemented	or	are	scheduled	to	soon	implement	carbon-pricing	policies.	Between	2012	and	June	2015,	the	number	of	carbon	pricing	instruments	jumped	by	90%.227	In	Canada,	in	fall	2016,	the	Trudeau	Liberal	government	had	recently	announced	Canada’s	climate	policy—the	first	significant	climate	legislation	since	before	the	successive	Conservative	Harper	governments	of	2006-2015.	Its	major	thrust	is	instituting	a	countrywide	carbon-pricing	framework.228		Unfortunately,	the	policies	of	this	liberal	consensus	are	not	only	limited,	but	also	unambitious,	maybe	disastrously	so.	Under	UNFCCC	climate	negotiations,	the	international	community	has	what	has	been	called	a	“two-headed”	target	for	
																																								 																					
226	In	addition	to	the	aforementioned	works	cited	(i.e.,	by	Nicholas	Stern	(in	particular	chapter	22	his	The	Stern	Review),	Thomas	L.	Friedman,	and	Joseph	E.	Aldy	and	Robert	N.	Stavins),	one	finds	it	in	Jeffrey	D.	Sachs,	The	Age	of	Sustainable	Development	(New	York,	NY:	Columbia	University	Press,	2015),	435-436;	Lester	R.	Brown,	Plan	B	4.0:	Mobilizing	to	Save	Civilization	(New	York:	W.W.	Norton	&	Company,	2009),	243-249;	Paul	Hawken,	Amory	Lovins	&	L.	Hunter	Lovins,	Natural	Capital:	
Creating	the	Next	Industrial	Revolution	(New	York:	Back	Bay,	1999),	241-259;	Gernot	Wagner	and	Martin	L.	Weitzman,	Climate	Shock:	The	Economic	Consequences	of	a	Hotter	Planet	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2014);	again	in	Nicholas	Stern,	Why	Are	We	Waiting?	The	Logic,	Urgency,	
and	Promise	of	Tacking	Climate	Change	(Cambridge,	MA:	The	MIT	Press,	2015),	chapter	3;	and	more.		227	World	Bank,	State	and	Trends	of	Carbon	Pricing	2015,	(Washington,	2015),	20,	http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/09	/21/090224b0830f0f31/2_0/Rendered/PDF/State0and0trends0of0carbon0pricing02015.pdf	228	Provinces	may	choose	the	form	of	carbon	pricing	or	deepen	and	expand	it	where	it	is	already	in	place.	Carbon	pricing	must	be	in	place	by	2018	and	of	at	least	$10	per	tonne.	Kathleen	Harris,	“Justin	Trudeau	gives	provinces	until	2018	to	adopt	carbon	price	plan,”	CBC	News,	October	3,	2016,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-trudeau-climate-change-1.3788825		
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limiting	global	average	temperature	increase	compared	to	pre-industrial	levels.229	Keeping	temperatures	below	1.5˚C	is	sometimes	referred	to	as	its	“aspirational”	goal	while	2°C	is	a	kind	of	“guardrail,”	the	upper	limit	before	which	warming	might	be	considered	safe.	But	the	adequacy	of	that	guardrail	target	has	long	been	questioned,230	and	for	good	reason:	the	difference	between	the	two	goals	“marks	the	difference	between	events	at	the	upper	limit	of	present-day	natural	variability	and	a	new	climate	regime,”	according	to	a	recent	climatological	review.231	Hopes	for	the	1.5˚C	goal	now	appear	to	be	gone.232	And	as	discussed	in	chapter	2,	the	emissions	reductions	pledges	that	states	have	been	willing	to	put	forth,	to	be	realized	by	those	market-based	policies,	blow	well	past	the	2˚C	goal,	reaching	as	high	as	3.5˚C	by	the	end	of	the	century.		It	very	much	appears	then	that	climate	change	arrived	on	the	scene	during	the	ascendancy	of	a	system	that	is	unable	to	respond	to	it.	What	accounts	for	the	character	of	its	too-weak	solutions?	These	are,	after	all,	not	the	only	conceivable	ways	out	of	the	crisis.	Indeed,	they	have	yet	to	prove	equal	to	the	challenge	presented	by	the	climate	crisis,	committing	us	to	at	least	some	degree	of	dangerous	climate	change,	if	not	worse.	They	are	an	attempt	to	undertake	a	response	to	the	climate	crisis	requiring	as	little	change	to	modern	lifestyles	as	possible	(save	for	those	earning	their	livelihoods	in	the	fossil	fuel	industries).	If	successful,	no	
																																								 																					
229	Carl-Friedrich	Schleussner	et	al.,	“Differential	climate	impacts	for	policy-relevant	limits	to	global	warming:	the	case	of	1.5 °C	and	2 °C,”	Earth	System	Dynamics	7	(2016):	327.	230	Even	before	the	Copenhagen	Summit	back	in	2009,	where	the	2°C	target	was	for	the	first	time	affirmed	at	the	international	level	in	the	Copenhagen	Accord,	that	guardrail	had	been	shown	to	be	inadequate	to	avoid	significant	risk	of	deleterious	climate	change.	See,	K.	Richardson	et	al.,	“Climate	Change:	Global	Risks,	Challenges	&	Decisions.	Synthesis	Report	of	the	Copenhagen	Climate	Congress,”	(University	of	Copenhagen,	2009),	12-16.	A	UNFCCC	panel	of	experts	wrote	in	2015	that	the	concept	of	2˚C	as	a	guardrail	was	inadequate	and	urged	a	reconceptualization	of	it	as	“a	defence	line	that	needs	to	be	stringently	defended,	while	less	warming	would	be	preferable.”	UNFCCC,	Report	
on	the	structured	expert	dialogue	on	the	2013–2015	review	(2015),	18.	231	Schleussner	et	al.,	“Differential	climate	impacts	for	policy-relevant	limits	to	global	warming”:	327.		232	A	2016	paper	in	Nature	concluded	that	“The	window	for	limiting	warming	to	below	1.5C	with	high	probability	and	without	temporarily	exceeding	that	level	already	seems	to	have	closed.”	Rogelj	et	al.,	“Paris	Agreement	climate	proposals	need	a	boost	to	keep	warming	well	below	2°C,”	
Nature	534	(2016):	631.		
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replacement	of	capitalism	with	some	more	ecologically	friendly	alternative—and	no	replacement	of	liberal	democracy	for	something	either	more	or	less	democratic,	or	less	anthropocentric—should	be	necessary.	The	liberal	climate	change	response	is	therefore	not	only	about	responding	to	climate	change,	but	doing	so	in	such	a	way	as	to	admit	no	necessary	change	in	the	economic	or	political	system,	to	preserve	modern	liberalism	into	perpetuity.	In	a	way,	it	turns	out	Fukuyama	was	right:	policymakers	(and,	as	I’ve	seen	personally,	even	parts	of	the	climate	movement)	are	having	trouble	imagining	a	world	that	is	particularly	different.			 In	part	1	of	this	chapter,	I	take	a	closer	look	at	the	liberal	system,	identifying	the	core	features	that	any	liberal	order	seeks	to	establish	and	protect.	Liberalism	has	accepted	two	major	institutional	systems—capitalism	and	liberal	democracy—in	order	to	realize	its	core	ideals	in	the	real	world.	In	doing	so,	it	had	to	take	on	some	of	their	key	elements,	logics,	and	imperatives.	In	part	2	of	this	chapter,	I	then	consider	how	these	core	features	of	liberalism	establish	a	system	of	“filters”	that	allow	only	a	narrow	range	of	climate	solutions	through—which	explains	the	character	of	climate	solutions	described	above.		Looking	at	liberalism	in	this	way	is	intended	to	allow	a	number	of	insights.	First,	we	appreciate	just	how	incredibly	formidable	of	a	system	it	is—how	difficult	it	is	to	break	out	of—even	in	the	face	of	an	existential	threat	like	climate	change.	Responding	to	the	crisis	will	need	to	involve	some	kind	of	engagement	with	it.	Second,	looking	at	how	liberalism	constrains	climate	responses	sets	up	the	challenge	of	climate	change	and	climate	justice	in	terms	of	political	philosophy	and	its	search	for	a	good	society.	It	thereby	opens	the	search	for	climate	justice	beyond	one	that	accepts	or	takes	for	granted	the	current	institutional	arrangements	and	how	they	determine	the	conditions	of	people’s	pursuit	of	their	good	life.	If	the	dominant	concept	of	the	good	life	and	the	institutional	arrangement	to	create	opportunities	for	it	is	blocking	efforts	to	take	on	climate	change,	then	it	follows	that	there	is	a	need	for	some	alternative.		
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Third,	we	can	begin	to	project	a	vision	of	what	the	world	will	look	like	if	we	respond	to	climate	change	through	the	suite	of	liberal	policies	that	can	fit	through	these	filters.	Is	the	world	after	the	liberal	climate	response	a	just	one?	If	not,	should	we	not	resist	it	or	steer	the	response	in	different	directions	(chapter	5)?	If	the	liberal	order	really	is	too	formidable	to	challenge	then	we	cannot	answer	climate	change	without	working	within	liberalism’s	constraints,	and	that	might	mean	that	a	far-reaching	version	of	climate	justice	is	simply	impossible.	If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	liberal	complex	possesses	structural	weaknesses	then	perhaps	there	is	a	chance	that	it	can	be	broken	apart	and	that	we	may	begin	to	visualize	a	plan	through	which	a	far-reaching	climate	justice	can	be	realized	(chapter	5).	These	are	important	matters,	complicating	the	possibilities	for	climate	justice,	and	so	I	dedicate	the	rest	of	my	dissertation	to	exploring	them.			 	*	 *	 *	 *		But	before	getting	started,	it	is	worth	pausing	to	address	two	additional	matters.	First,	we	should	address	other	explanations	for	the	current	state	of	solutions	and	action	on	climate	change.	Second,	we	might	ask	why	we	should	focus	on	liberalism	rather	than	neoliberalism,	which	is	such	a	dominant	focus	in	contemporary	critical	scholarship.		Let	us	begin	with	alternative	explanations	for	why	climate	policy	is	so	far	behind	where	it	needs	to	be.	A	first	suggests	that	fossil	fuel	interests	have	corrupted	the	political	system	in	a	number	of	ways.	Propagated	through	right-wing	think	tanks	funded	by	fossil	fuel	companies,	the	misinformation	on	climate	science	circulating	in	the	media	and	through	the	Internet	has	caused	confusion	and	skepticism	about	climate	change	among	the	public,	thereby	reducing	popular	support	for	action	on	the	issue.233	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	campaigns	orchestrated	to	spread																																									 																					
233	See,	e.g.,	James	Hoggan	and	Richard	Littlemore,	Climate	Cover-Up:	The	Crusade	to	Deny	
Global	Warming	(Toronto:	Greystone	Books,	2009);	Naomi	Oreskes	&	Erik	M.	Conway.	Merchants	of	
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disinformation	about	the	scientific	consensus	around	anthropogenic	climate	change	and	to	downplay	the	seriousness	of	global	warming	has	had	an	effect.234	But	even	as	the	political	currency	of	denialism	fades	in	the	mainstream	(with	the	US	Republican	Party	under	the	Trump	administration	forming	a	major	exception),	climate	policy	must	still	be	enacted	in	an	unwelcoming	system.	Simply	eliminating	misinformation	will	not	provide	the	channels	for	democratic	input	or	support	for	ambitious	climate	action.	The	same	limited	suite	of	solutions	remains.	Indeed,	in	the	wake	of	COP21,	several	authors	have	independently	referred	to	a	new	kind	of	climate	denialism	(a	“Denial-Lite”235	or	“denial	minor”236).	It	is	not	that	policymakers	reject	climate	science,	but	that	the	climate	policies	they	are	willing	to	deploy	(alongside	their	continued	commitment	to	fossil	fuel	expansion)	are	so	weak	they	are	tantamount	to	denying	the	crisis.		A	second	explanation	concerns	unreconciled	interests	of	developed	and	developing	countries	at	climate	negotiations	stemming	from	the	vast	inequalities	between	them	in	the	global	system.	Developing	countries	have	historically	resisted	making	deep	emissions	reductions	while	they	pursue	economic	development.	Developed	countries,	for	their	part,	have	resisted	making	emissions	reductions	for	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					
Doubt:	How	a	Handful	of	Scientists	Obscured	the	Truth	on	Issues	from	Tobacco	Smoke	to	Global	
Warming	(New	York:	Bloomsbury	Press,	2010);	or	the	excellent	website	Skeptical	Science	(www.skepticalscience.com).		234	A	severe	example	was	the	so-called	“Climategate”	(non-)scandal	that	occurred	in	2009	just	before	the	Copenhagen	climate	summit.	Climate	scientists	at	the	University	of	East	Anglia	saw	their	emails	hacked	and	dumped	on	the	web.	Right-wing	news	outlets	and	blogs	cherrypicked	and	spun	the	material	to	suggest	scientists	were	colluding	to	fabricate	or	exaggerate	the	reality	and	threat	of	global	warming.	Concern	about	global	warming	fell	in	the	US	following	these	events.	Morgan	Goodwin,	“Climategate:	An	Autopsy,”	Desmog,	March	30,	2010,	http://www.desmogblog.com/climatgate-autopsy;	Kate	Sheppard,	"Climategate:	What	Really	Happened?"	Mother	Jones,	April	21,	2011,	http://www.motherjones.com/environment/	2011/04/history-of-climategate;	Kevin	Grandia,"Debunked	Conspiracy	Climategate	Five	Years	Later,"	Desmog,	Novemeber	19,	2014,	http://www.desmogblog.com/	2014/11/19/climategate-five-years-later	235	Cameron	Fenton,	“Trudeau’s	approval	of	Kinder	Morgan	would	be	an	act	of	climate	denial,”	Ricochet,	November	18,	2016,	https://ricochet.media/en/1540/trudeaus-approval-of-kinder-morgan-would-be-an-act-of-climate-denial	236	Martin	Wolf,	“Climate	change	and	the	risks	of	denying	inconvenient	truths,”	Financial	
Times,	November	1,	2016,	https://www.ft.com/content/3f707b3e-9f91-11e6-891e-abe238dee8e2	
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fear	of	losing	competitive	advantage.	But	this	does	not	satisfactorily	explain	the	specific	character	of	the	solutions	being	discussed	either.237				 A	final	explanation	suggests	that	people	are	psychologically	or	cognitively	ill-suited	or	poorly	evolved	to	responding	in	an	anticipatory	fashion	to	the	climate	crisis,	particularly	as	it	remained	an	abstract,	somewhat	distant	threat.238	However,	that	would	unfairly	dismiss	the	enormous	efforts	of	activists	worldwide	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	who	have	been	prepared	to	fight	for	action	on	climate	change	without	needing	to	experience	immediate	and	severe	climate	disruption.	It	also	fails	to	account	for	what	would	happen	in	this	system	even	if	new	climate	communication	strategies	overcome	our	cognitive	shortcomings	and	people	begin	to	demand	climate	action	from	their	governments.	Would	this	system	actually	make	good	on	those	demands?		The	second	matter	we	should	attend	to	is	the	focus	on	liberalism	rather	than	neoliberalism,	which	has	rightly	attracted	much	criticism	for	the	past	few	decades.	Neoliberalism	is	a	particularly	virulent	form	of	the	complex	of	ideas	about	the	makeup	of	a	good	society	corresponding	to	liberalism,	one	that	dispenses	with	those	parts	of	liberalism	that	ease	inequality’s	burdens	and	that	actively	concentrates	economic	wealth	and	power	among	elites.239	But	it	is	the	larger	complex	of	which																																									 																					
237	For	a	look	at	the	opposing	positions	of	the	global	north	and	south	on	solutions	to	climate	change,	see	J.	Timmons	Roberts	and	Bradley	C.	Parks,	A	Climate	of	Injustice:	Global	Inequality,	North-
South	Politics,	and	Climate	Policy	(Cambridge:	The	MIT	Press,	2007).		238	See,	e.g.,	George	Marshall,	Don’t	Even	Think	About	It:	Why	Our	Brains	Are	Wired	to	Ignore	
Climate	Change,	(New	York,	NY:	Bloomsbury,	2015);	and	Robert	Jay	Lifton,	“The	Climate	Swerve,”	
New	York	Times,	August	23,	2014,	http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/opinion/sunday/the-climate-swerve.html.		239	David	Harvey	defines	neoliberalism	in	the	following	way.	“Neoliberalism	is	in	the	first	instance	a	theory	of	political	economic	practices	that	proposes	that	human	well-being	can	best	be	advanced	by	liberating	individual	entrepreneurial	freedoms	and	skills	within	an	institutional	framework	characterized	by	strong	private	property	rights,	free	markets,	and	free	trade.	The	role	of	the	state	is	to	create	and	preserve	an	institutional	framework	appropriate	to	such	practices.	The	state	has	to	guarantee,	for	example,	the	quality	and	integrity	of	money.	It	must	also	set	up	those	military,	defence,	police,	and	legal	structures	and	functions	required	to	secure	private	property	rights	and	to	guarantee,	by	force	if	need	be,	the	proper	functioning	of	markets.	Furthermore,	if	markets	do	not	exist	(in	areas	such	as	land,	water,	education,	health	care,	social	security,	or	environmental	pollution)	then	they	must	be	created,	by	state	action	if	necessary.	But	beyond	these	tasks	the	state	should	not	venture.	State	interventions	in	markets	(once	created)	must	be	kept	to	a	bare	minimum	because,	
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neoliberalism	is	itself	a	variant	that	we	should	turn	our	attention	towards,	because	if	our	analytical	lens	is	restrained	to	the	effects	of	neoliberalism	on	the	climate	response,	other	dimensions	of	the	liberal	system	and	their	impacts	are	obscured—perpetual	growth,	perpetual	extractivism,	technological	progress	as	human	purpose,	etc.	To	be	sure,	neoliberalism	makes	a	just	climate	response	even	more	difficult	than	under,	say,	social	democracy.	But	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	far-reaching	climate	justice,	I	believe	that	even	a	kinder	form	of	liberalism	retains	many	of	the	problems	driving	the	crisis.		What	I	hope	to	show	in	what	follows,	then,	is	that	the	climate	crisis	is	a	deep	problem	of	liberalism,	one	that	includes	but	also	goes	beyond	climate	change	denialism,	fossil	fuel	industry	corruption	of	democracy,	the	inability	to	reconcile	Global	North-South	divisions,	or	free-market	ideology—each	already	serious	enough	on	its	own.	It	is	a	problem	rooted	in	liberalism’s	“deep	tissue,”	in	the	way	liberalism’s	core	ideal	has	been	realized	through	its	dominant	institutional	arrangements,	and	so	I	turn	now	to	a	critique	of	liberalism.			
	
2.	The	Liberal	Order		Like	any	complex	political	philosophy	with	a	long	history,	liberalism	is	difficult	to	fully	capture	through	definitions,	and	so	before	continuing	I	should	be	clear	and	transparent	on	my	meaning	of	the	term	“liberalism”	and	its	derivatives	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					according	to	the	theory,	the	state	cannot	possibly	possess	enough	information	to	second-guess	market	signals	(prices)	and	because	powerful	interest	groups	will	inevitably	distort	and	bias	state	interventions	(particularly	in	democracies)	for	their	own	benefit	[…]	In	so	far	as	neoliberalism	values	market	exchange	as	‘an	ethic	in	itself,	capable	of	acting	as	a	guide	to	all	human	action,	and	substituting	for	all	previously	held	ethical	beliefs’,	it	emphasizes	the	significance	of	contractual	relations	in	the	marketplace.	It	holds	that	the	social	good	will	be	maximized	by	maximizing	the	reach	and	frequency	of	market	transactions,	and	it	seeks	to	bring	all	human	action	into	the	domain	of	the	market.”	David	Harvey,	A	Brief	History	of	Neoliberalism	(New	York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2005),	2,3.	
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(“liberal,”	“liberal	order”)	in	what	follows.240	I	begin	by	holding	that	the	main	current	running	through	philosophical	liberalism	is	the	inviolability	of	each																																									 																					
240	A	complete	statement-by-statement	system	of	citation	for	the	description	of	liberalism	below	would	be	impossible	here.	The	understanding	of	it	that	I	present	has	been	built	up	over	years	of	readings,	reflections,	and	realizations.	Nevertheless,	several	key	texts—some	of	them	from	within	the	liberal	tradition,	others	deep	critiques	of	liberalism—were	important	in	developing	the	sense	of	liberalism	that	follows	and	selecting	the	features	of	it	that	I	highlight.	I	identify	them	here,	starting	with	works	internal	to	liberalism.	My	main	source	(and	interlocutor	for	this	chapter)	from	within	the	liberal	tradition	is	Fukuyama’s	End	of	History,	which	lays	bare	many	of	liberalism’s	key	assumptions	going	into	the	present	globalization	era.	Fukuyama	is	an	exception	to	an	interesting	tendency	I	observed:	major	(or	“classic”)	works	by	authors	feeling	the	need	to	expound	on	or	defend	liberalism’s	ideals	and	their	reliance	on	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	to	achieve	it	seem	to	become	rare	in	the	late	20th	century	and	beyond,	particularly	with	the	fall	of	Communism	and	full	ascent	of	neoliberalism,	at	which	point	the	concern	seems	to	be	not	with	defending	liberal	ideas	in	and	of	themselves,	but	with	justifying	their	spread	throughout	the	world	through	(neoliberal)	globalization	(see,	e.g.,	Martin	Wolf,	Why	Globalization	Works	(London:	Yale	University	Press,	2004)	and	Thomas	L.	Friedman,	The	World	Is	Flat	3.0:	A	Brief	History	of	the	Twenty-first	Century	(New	York,	NY:	Picador,	2007)).	I	therefore	turned	to	earlier	works	to	see	liberalism’s	assumptions	stated	explicitly.	On	liberalism’s	right	wing	were	F.A.	Hayek	(The	Constitution	of	Liberty,	ed.	Ronald	Hamowy	(Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	[1960],	2011),	chapters	1-3)	and	Milton	Friedman	(Capitalism	and	
Freedom,	Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	1982,	particularly	chapters	1	and	10;	and	Free	to	
Choose:	A	Personal	Statement,	New	York,	NY:	Harcourt,	1980,	particularly	chapter	1).	John	Rawls’	A	
Theory	of	Justice	(Revised	Edition)	(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap,	1999),	with	its	strong	redistributive	principles,	gave	a	sense	of	liberalism’s	left	wing	(though	from	a	political	philosophical	perspective).	Finally,	Marcel	Wissenburg’s	Green	Liberalism:	The	Free	and	the	Green	Society	provided	a	deep	inquiry	into	whether	and	how	ecological	imperatives	could	be	reconciled	with	liberalism’s	core	belief	in	the	inviolability	of	people’s	plans	of	life.		As	will	become	apparent,	my	position	on	liberalism	is	a	very	critical	one	and	so	works	critical	of	liberalism	were	the	main	influence	here.	Noam	Chomsky’s	Government	in	the	Future	(AK	Press,	1970)	was	particularly	formative.	In	it,	Chomsky	describes	the	ideal	of	classical	liberalism	and	its	concerns	with	expanding	the	realm	of	human	freedom,	creative	endeavour,	and	inquiry	by	sharply	delimiting	the	powers	of	the	state,	and	how	that	ideal	became	warped	under	state	capitalism	whose	advocates	came	to	see	themselves	(incorrectly,	for	Chomsky)	as	the	inheritors	of	classical	liberalism’s	ideal.	Also	formative	were	the	works	of	C.B.	Macpherson	(The	Political	Theory	of	Possessive	
Individualism:	Hobbes	to	Locke,	Don	Mills,	Canada:	Oxford	University	Press,	[1962]	2011;	Democratic	
Theory:	Essays	in	Retrieval,	Don	Mills,	Canada:	Oxford	University	Press,	[1973]	2012;	and	The	Life	and	
Times	of	Liberal	Democracy,	Oxford	University	Press,	[1977]	2012;).	No	quick	summary	would	do	them	justice,	but	each	was	concerned	with	exposing	how	foundational	theories	of	liberalism	relied	on	a	concept	of	humans	as	being	truly	free	only	in	market	societies,	promoting	a	society	of	individualists	and	consumers,	and	placing	constraints	on	the	kind	of	democratic	models	that	were	possible.	(These	ideas	are	explored	further	in	his	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Economic	Justice	and	Other	Essays,	Reissue	(Don	Mills,	Canada:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	David	Held’s	Models	of	Democracy	(Stanford,	CA:	Stanford	University	Press,	2006)	and	John	S.	Dryzek	and	Patrick	Dunleavy’s	Theories	of	the	
Democratic	State	(Palgrave	Macmillan,	2009)	featured	important	chapters	on	the	“nuts	and	bolts”	of	liberalism	and	liberal	democracy,	but	their	works	also	show	liberal	democracy’s	limitations	by	considering	alternative	models	that	could	hold	potential	for	greater	citizen	representation	or	participation.	Robyn	Eckersley’s	The	Green	State:	Rethinking	Democracy	and	Sovereignty	(Cambridge,	MA:	MIT	Press,	2004)	is	another	rich	work	difficult	to	adequately	summarize,	but	a	main	influence	on	my	thought	was	in	its	attempt	to	show	how	the	logics	of	capitalism	and	the	liberal	democratic	state	
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individual’s	plan	of	life	or	good	life.241	Let	us	call	that	liberalism’s	core	ethic,	the	ethic	around	which	liberal	systems	must	arrange	institutions.	No	one	may	decide	for	any	other	what	their	plan	of	life	should	be	or	block	them	from	pursuing	the	plan	of	life	that	they	choose	so	long	as	it	does	not	interfere	with	others’	pursuit	of	their	own.	The	liberal	individual	is	therefore	considered	to	be	autonomous	and	free.	No	one’s	plan	of	life	can	be	said	to	be	more	important	than	anyone	else’s	because	no	objective	means	exist	to	determine	so,	and	all	have	the	same	freedom	to	pursue	their	plans.	The	liberal	individual	is	also	therefore	equal	to	all	others.	Liberalism’s	promise	is	to	offer	the	social	conditions	that	will	allow	free	and	equal	individuals	the	opportunities	to	create	and	pursue	their	unique	plans	of	life,	their	own	good,	to	self-
actualize.	Important	currents	within	liberalism	that	are	sometimes	(incorrectly,	I	believe)	assumed	to	form	its	core	ethic—for	example	concerns	with	religious	tolerance,	with	social	stability,	or	with	limitations	of	the	power	of	the	state—are	better	understood	as	corollaries	of	these	concerns	about	each	individual’s	free	and	equal	pursuit	of	the	good	life.		I	find	the	rightness	of	that	core	liberal	ethic	hard	to	object	to.	As	a	purpose	around	which	to	design	a	good	society	it	has	none	of	the	problems	of	autocratic	or	authoritarian	regimes,	where	it	is	necessary	to	find	a	justification	for	why	people’s	lives	are	to	be	controlled	by	some	unaccountable	authority.	Similarly,	it	is	free	from	the	troubles	of	communitarian/republican	arrangements	where	individuals’	good	life	is	determined	for	them	and	steered	by	state	policy	or	community	pressure.	Liberalism	furthermore	shares	its	core	ethic	with	other	political	philosophies,	for	example	the	libertarian	variants	of	socialism.																																										 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					place	sharp	limits	to	how	strenuously	environmental	concerns	may	be	addressed.	Clive	Hamilton’s	
Growth	Fetish	(London:	Pluto	Press,	2004)	and	Requiem	for	a	Species:	Why	we	Resist	the	Truth	about	
Climate	Change	(Washington,	DC:	Earthscan,	2010)	critically	informed	my	views	on	climate	change,	liberalism,	and	economic	growth.	If	there	is	a	common	thread	through	these	disparate	works,	it	is	in	their	critique	which	follows	from	a	deep	engagement	with	the	tension	between	the	highest	goals	and	ideals	liberalism	seeks	to	or	claims	to	be	able	to	achieve	on	the	one	hand	and	the	fate	of	these	ideals	under	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	on	the	other.		241	I	am	drawing	here	especially	on	chapter	1	of	Marcel	Wissenburg,	Green	Liberalism:	The	
Free	and	the	Green	Society	(UCL	Press,	1998).			
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In	short,	that	core	ethic	is	not	in	itself	a	good	basis	for	a	critique,	and	certainly	not	one	that	allows	us	to	see	how	liberalism	constrains	the	response	to	climate	change;	it	is	not	at	all	clear	from	the	outset	why	a	political	philosophy	like	liberalism	should	block	action	on	climate	change.		Where	much	stronger	critiques	of	liberalism	begin	is	with	its	more	distinguishing	and	defining	features:	(a)	the	economic	and	political	institutions	strongly	assumed	to	be	required	to	realize	the	liberal	ethic	in	the	real	world—namely	capitalism	and	liberal	representative	democracy;	(b)	the	requirement	of	economic	growth	that	follows	from	the	adoption	of	capitalism;	and	(c)	the	way	liberalism’s	wide	array	of	(often	antithetical)	elements	are	selected,	emphasized,	and	combined	in	order	to	provide	people	with	the	opportunity	to	seek	their	good	life.	The	problem	is	that	in	critiquing	or	seeking	to	change	features	assumed	to	be	essential	parts	of	liberalism,	we	risk	tampering	with	the	realization	of	its	important	core	ethic:	freedom	and	equality	for	individuals.		As	we	will	see	in	Part	2	below,	it	is	these	features	of	liberalism	that	combine	in	such	a	way	as	to	filter	out	all	but	the	select	few	responses	to	climate	change	described	above.	But	before	we	get	there	we	should	look	at	these	features	more	closely.	If	at	any	point	in	what	follows	it	appears	that	I	am	uncritically	accepting	liberalism,	know	that	is	not	my	intent.	In	focusing	presently	on	liberalism’s	characteristic	features,	I	withhold	a	more	sustained	critique	(which	begins	with	Part	2	of	this	chapter	and	continues	into	the	next),	and	instead	attempt	to	present	a	broad	description	that	a	committed	liberal	might	agree	with.	The	point,	again,	is	to	appreciate	just	how	formidable	that	liberal	complex	is,	how	difficult	its	stronghold	is	to	depart	from—to	show	the	nature	of	the	beast	that	those	of	us	seeking	really	ambitious	action	on	climate	change	are	up	against.		
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2.1	The	Economic	and	Political	Institutions	of	Liberalism		 Liberalism	traditionally	stands	on	two	institutional	pillars,	capitalism	and	liberal	representative	democracy.	Some	caution	is	required	here,	however.	Political	philosophers	have	insisted	that	liberalism	may	be	understood	separately	from	its	institutions.242	Yet	because	these	institutions	are	widely	seen	to	promote	that	core	liberal	ethic,	liberalism	is	marked	by	a	strong	institutional	inertia,	a	longstanding	distrust	of	other	institutional	arrangements.	It	is	therefore	more	useful	to	understand	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	as	being	the	strongly	preferred	institutions	of	liberalism;	they	define	a	historical	and	contemporary	really	existing	liberalism,	but	perhaps	not	liberalism	for	all	time.	In	what	follows,	I	seek	to	explain	liberalism’s	preference	for	these	institutions	by	describing	briefly	what	it	is	that	liberal	democracy	and	capitalism	do	for	liberalism,	the	“assurances”	that	they	offer,	which	in	some	cases	have	required	certain	innovations	in	how	those	institutions	operate.	For	its	part,	liberal	democracy	relies	on	the	deployment	of	a	strong	state	to	protect	a	series	of	rights	deemed	vital	to	the	liberal	core	ethic:	the	right	to	some	means	of	formal	political	participation,	freedom	of	expression	and	opinion,	freedom	of	religion	and	association,	freedom	of	access	to	education	and	information,	economic	freedoms	(both	consumer	freedoms	and	freedoms	of	trade	and	enterprise),	and,	of	course,	the	freedom	to	create,	pursue,	and	live	out	plans	of	life.	That	strong	state	is	however	one	with	limits.	For	one,	it	is	governed	through	and	accountable	to	the	will	and	consent	of	the	demos	through	regular	elections.																																									 																					
242	Marcel	Wissenburg	reminds	us	that	“we	should	not	make	the	mistake	of	equating	liberalism	with	liberal	democracy	or	the	free	market”	(Green	Liberalism,	219);	Alan	Ryan’s	definition	of	liberalism	is	agnostic	about	its	institutions:	“liberalism	is	best	understood	as	a	theory	of	the	good	life	for	individuals	that	is	linked	to	a	theory	of	the	social,	economic,	and	political	arrangements	within	which	they	may	lead	that	life”	(The	Making	of	Modern	Liberalism	(Princeton	University	Press,	2012),	35).	C.B.	Macpherson	suggests	“that	a	liberal	position	need	not	be	taken	to	depend	forever	on	an	acceptance	of	capitalist	assumptions,	although	historically	it	has	been	so	taken”	(The	Life	and	Times	
of	Liberal	Democracy,	2).	J.S.	Mill	believed	capitalist	growth	had	only	a	temporary	usefulness	to	liberalism	(see	my	discussion	in	chapter	5).		
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Constitutions,	meanwhile,	shield	civil	rights	and	liberties	understood	to	be	fundamental	to	the	liberal	ethic	from	what	even	a	majority	may	decide	upon.	Through	this	latter	innovation,	democracy	could	assure	liberalism	that	majorities	were	no	threat	to	its	core	ethic;	it	put	the	“liberal”	in	“liberal	democracy.”		Capitalism,	meanwhile,	assured	liberalism	a	way	of	allocating	to	individuals	the	means,	goods,	or	services	necessary	to	freely	pursue	their	good	life.	Under	capitalism,	individuals	can	enter	the	market	as	they	require	to	sell	and	purchase	property,	including	property	over	their	mental,	affective,	and	physical	labour.	Producers	produce,	sellers	sell,	and	buyers	buy,	all	following	only	their	own	interest,	all	free	of	overbearing	interference	or	coerced	decree	from	centralized	authority.	In	addition	to	market	benefits,	capitalism	offers	liberalism	even	more	assurances	through	one	of	its	central	features:	economic	growth.	Growth’s	assurances	to	liberalism	are	sufficiently	complex—from	preventing	revolution	to	fostering	plurality	to	expanding	the	horizon	of	individuals’	life	choices—that	they	are	better	dealt	with	in	a	separate	section,	found	below.		However,	pure	capitalism	is	not	a	perfect	fit	for	liberalism.	What	has	been	deemed	legitimate	property	to	exchange	in	the	market	has	been	contentious	within	liberal	orders	and	in	cases,	most	notoriously	racial	slavery,	in	complete	violation	of	liberal	principles.	So	capitalism	could	not	make	assurances	to	liberalism	if	it	could	only	exist	through	absolute	market	freedoms.	But,	because	it	could	allow	states	to	regulate	trade	in	particular	goods—whether	that	meant	criminalization	or	partial	or	full	legalization—and	to	establish	standards,	it	could	offer	a	space	that	is	“free	enough”	to	assure	both	capitalism	and	liberalism	that	their	union	works.		These	institutions	are	not	just	good	for	individuals,	but	liberals	are	also	highly	optimistic	about	how	collective	human	nature	expresses	itself	socially	inside	these	institutions.	Capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	are	seen	to	create	stable,	efficient,	and	prosperous	social	formations	in	which	free	individuals	may	thrive.	And	they	not	only	temper	the	worst	tendencies	of	our	nature	but	also	realize	its	greatest	
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potential.	A	key	feature	of	both	is	the	aggregation	of	mostly	private,	self-interested	decisions.		Capitalism,	liberals	argue,	drives	humanity	to	reach	its	innovative	and	productive	peak,	and	is	more	efficient	than	preceding	or	competing	economic	systems.	Atomized	individuals	making	autonomous	self-interested	utility-maximizing	decisions	in	an	impersonal	market	yield	correct	prices,	which	allows	individuals	to	make	informed	choices,	which	yields	efficient	social	distribution	of	scarce	resources.	People	express	personal	choice	by	“voting	with	their	wallets,”	collectively	determining	the	most	desirable	products	and	guiding	the	actions	of	producers.	Over	time,	these	market	forces	have	allowed	individuals	to	access	a	bewildering	array	of	options,	all	without	the	need	for	the	economy	to	be	subsumed	under	the	arbitrary	control	of	a	central	state	authority.243	Liberal	democracy,																																									 																					
243	The	productive	capabilities	of	capitalism	and	the	market,	the	freedom	they	offer,	and	the	innovative	spirit	they	unleash	are	long-running	themes	through	liberalism.	Seeking	to	explain	the	economic	growth	occurring	in	countries	adopting	incipient	capitalism,	Adam	Smith	observed	in	The	
Wealth	of	Nations	(Toronto:	Modern	Library,	2000)	that	it	was	those	societies	with	the	most	complex	divisions	of	labour	(coordinated	by	self-interested	market	actors)	that	saw	the	greatest	levels	of	productivity.	Thanks	to	“the	great	multiplication	of	the	productions	of	all	the	different	arts,	in	consequence	of	the	division	of	labour”	societies	experience	“that	universal	opulence	which	extends	itself	to	the	lower	ranks	of	the	people”	so	that	“the	accommodation	of	an	European	prince	does	not	always	much	exceed	that	of	an	industrious	and	frugal	peasant,	as	the	accommodation	of	the	latter	exceeds	that	of	many	an	African	king,	the	absolute	master	of	the	lives	and	liberties	of	ten	thousand	naked	savages”	(pp.	12-13)	But	the	division	of	labour	was	limited	by	the	size	of	the	market,	and	it	was	here	that	the	accumulation	of	capital	stock	comes	to	play	its	key	role	by	expanding	that	market.		A	little	over	two	generations	after	Smith	was	writing,	J.S.	Mill	would	open	Book	IV	of	his	
Principles	of	Political	Economy	by	remarking	on	a	“progressive	movement	which	continues	with	little	interruption	from	year	to	year	and	from	generation	to	generation;	a	progress	in	wealth;	and	advancement	of	what	is	called	material	prosperity.”	This	“progressive	economical	movement	of	society”	was	accompanied	by	progress	in	science	(“physical	knowledge”),	freedom	from	arbitrary	state	power,	and	productive	and	free	cooperation	in	the	market.	See	John	Stuart	Mill,	Principles	of	
Political	Economy,	Books	IV	and	V	(Penguin,	[1848]	1988),	55-60.		In	the	20th	century,	Joseph	Schumpeter	(Capitalism,	Socialism	and	Democracy	(Third	Edition)	(New	York:	Harper	Perennial,	2008))	extolled	“the	essential	fact	about	capitalism”	(p.	83):	Creative	Destruction,	which	“incessantly	revolutionizes	the	economic	structure	from	within,	incessantly	destroying	the	old	one,	incessantly	creating	the	new	one.”	Capitalism,	for	him,	had	positive	effects	not	just	for	the	economy	but	for	all	of	civilization:	“Not	only	the	modern	mechanized	planet	and	the	volume	of	the	output	that	pours	forth	from	it,	not	only	modern	technology	and	economic	organization,	but	all	the	features	and	achievements	of	modern	civilization	are,	directly	or	indirectly,	the	products	of	the	capitalist	process.	They	must	be	included	in	any	balance	sheet	of	it	and	in	any	verdict	about	its	deeds	or	misdeeds”	(p.	125).	Later	in	the	20th	century,	Milton	Friedman	(with	Rose	Friedman)	evocatively	took	the	example	of	a	simple	pencil	to	show	how	free-market	capitalism	is	
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meanwhile,	aggregates	the	preferences	of	individual	voters	to	compose	a	body	of	representatives	said	to	reflect	the	general	will	and	consent	of	the	voting	population	who	would	otherwise	remove	representatives	that	failed	to	preserve	or	enhance	individuals’	freedom	and	wellbeing.	It	thus	keeps	corruption	and	authoritarianism	at	bay	while	also	resolving	another	problem:	that	of	scale	in	governance.	At	the	same	time,	liberalism	is	pessimistic	about	how	human	nature	will	express	itself	in	societies	where	these	institutions	are	absent	or	badly	constituted.	Societies	with	weak	or	dysfunctional	states	experience	high	levels	of	internal	violence	as	individuals	compete	with	one	another.244	Under-	or	undemocratic	states	are	subject	to	tyranny	and	corruption.	But	overly	democratic	states	are	unwieldy	because	contemporary	societies	are	too	large	to	suit	direct	models	of	decision-making	and	such	models	expect	too	much	time	and	effort	dedicated	to	political	participation	to	be	realistic	in	any	case.	Non-capitalist	societies,	for	their	part,	will	be	wracked	economically	by	backwardness,	inefficiency,	and	stagnating	technological	development.	For	Fukuyama,	the	20th	century	was	a	kind	of	crucible,	a	testing	ground	for	vastly	different	alternative	political	institutional	formations	and	their	compatibility	with	human	nature.	In	the	end,	liberalism	alone	stood	triumphant.245			
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					able	to	produce	an	array	of	novel	goods	and	coordinate	their	production	on	a	global	scale	(see	chapter	1	of	their	Free	to	Choose).		244	The	thesis	of	Steven	Pinker’s	The	Better	Angels	of	our	Nature	is	that	there	has	been	a	remarkable	and	undeniable	fall	in	levels	of	violence	throughout	human	history.	He	views	human	nature	in	Hobbesian	terms	where	people	are	self-interested	beings	prone	to	violence	in	the	absence	of	a	powerful	state	to	“overawe”	them	and	argues	that	with	the	historical	extension	of	the	state,	violence	diminished.	International	conflicts	similarly	diminished	with	the	expansion	of	capitalism	with	its	“gentle	commerce.”	245	As	he	put	it,	“the	liberal	idea”	was	emerging	as	the	political	victor.	“That	is	to	say,	for	a	very	large	part	of	the	world,	there	is	now	no	ideology	with	pretensions	to	universality	that	is	in	a	position	to	challenge	liberal	democracy…Monarchism	in	its	various	forms	had	been	largely	defeated	by	the	beginning	of	this	century.	Fascism	and	communism,	liberal	democracy’s	main	competitors	up	till	now,	have	both	discredited	themselves…Even	non-democrats	will	have	to	speak	the	language	of	democracy	in	order	to	justify	their	deviation	from	the	single	universal	standard.”	Fukuyama,	The	End	
of	History,	45.		
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So	liberal	democracy	and	capitalism	offer	assurances	that	they	can	realize	the	liberal	core	ethic	in	the	real	world.	To	a	convinced	liberal,	departing	from	them—even	in	the	face	of	a	threat	like	climate	change—would	mean	endangering	that	ethic	either	by	playing	with	the	kinds	of	forces	that	ushered	in	the	tyrannical	social	formations	of	the	20th	century	or	by	experimenting	with	untested	institutions	whose	assurances	are	unknown	and	possibly	unrealistic.	But	if	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	had	to	offer	assurances	to	liberalism,	so	did	liberalism	have	to	accommodate	its	chosen	institutions.	And	that	comes	at	a	heavy	cost.	In	taking	on	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy,	liberalism	has	accepted	or	left	unchanged	many	of	the	logics,	imperatives,	and	limitations	they	possessed,	and	it	is	in	this	way	that	the	liberal	complex	comes	to	constrain	the	climate	response.			 Liberalism	never	as	a	matter	of	principle	required	its	democracy	to	take	on	any	stronger	forms	of	formal	political	participation	than	elections	in	multiparty	systems	once	the	franchise	was	extended	to	all	adult	citizens,	and	is	quite	compatible	with	a	depoliticized	citizenry.246	It	protects	the	strong	private	property																																									 																					
246	Pessimism	about	more	participatory	forms	of	democracy	is	associated	with	an	influential	model	of	liberal	democracy	described	sometimes	as	the	pluralist	élite	model	or	competitive	elitism,	associated	most	prominently	with	Joseph	Schumpeter.	C.B.	Macpherson,	a	critic	of	that	model,	described	it	as	follows:	“The	main	stipulations	of	this	model	are,	first,	that	democracy	is	simply	a	mechanism	for	choosing	and	authorizing	governments,	not	a	kind	of	society	nor	a	set	of	moral	ends;	and,	second,	that	the	mechanism	consists	of	a	competition	between	two	or	more	self-chosen	sets	of	politicians	(élites),	arrayed	in	political	parties…The	voters’	roles	is	not	to	decide	political	issues	and	then	choose	representatives	who	will	carry	out	those	decisions:	it	is	rather	to	choose	the	men	who	will	do	the	deciding…There	is	no	nonsense	about	democracy	as	a	vehicle	for	the	improvement	of	mankind.	Participation	is	not	a	value	in	itself.	The	purpose	of	democracy	is	to	register	the	desires	of	people	as	they	are,	not	to	contribute	to	what	they	might	be	or	might	wish	to	be.	Democracy	is	simply	a	market	mechanism:	the	voters	are	the	consumers;	the	politicians	are	the	entrepreneurs.”	See	C.B.	Macpherson,	The	Life	and	Times	of	Liberal	Democracy,	(Oxford	University	Press,	2012	[1977]),	78.		A	notorious	example	of	apprehensions	among	some	liberals	about	more	participatory	forms	of	democracy	came	in	the	wake	of	the	popular	democratic	movements	of	the	1960s.	Political	scientist	Samuel	Huntington—uneasy	with,	among	other	things,	American	youths’	refusal	to	automatically	obey	a	variety	of	forms	of	established	authority	(the	police,	government,	work	bosses)—wrote,	“some	of	the	problems	of	governance	in	the	United	States	today	stem	from	an	excess	of	democracy…Needed,	instead,	is	a	greater	degree	of	moderation	in	democracy.”	Michael	J.	Crozier,	Samuel	P.	Huntington,	and	Joji	Watanuki,	The	Crisis	of	Democracy:	Report	on	the	Governability	of	
Democracies	to	the	Trilateral	Commission	(New	York	University	Press:	1975):	113.	Wolin	describes	contemporary	electoral	politics	in	21st-century	liberal	democracies	as	having	taken	on	the	form	of	an	“inverted	totalitarianism”:	“The	crucial	element	that	sets	inverted	totalitarianism	apart	from	Nazism	is	that	while	the	latter	imposed	a	regime	of	mobilization	upon	its	
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rights	capitalism	requires;	a	key	part	of	that	has	meant	carefully	protecting	a	historically	unique	delineation	between	the	political	and	economic	spheres,	ensuring	that	the	decisions	about	production,	distribution,	pricing,	etc.	remain	the	purview	of	private	market	actors	and	is	thus	not	subject	to	democratic	rule.	All	of	that	has	meant	a	sharp	limitation	on	democracy	both	in	scope	and	degree	of	participation.	Liberalism	has	accepted	the	economic	inequalities	inherent	in	capitalism,	part	of	which	has	entailed	massive	wealth	concentration	among	the	upper	classes	(particularly	in	neoliberal	times).	Concern	for	human	wellbeing	has	been	operationalized	in	terms	influenced	by	capitalist	market	valuation:	growth	in	gross	domestic	product.	(Moving	away	somewhat	from	political	philosophy	and	into	the	realm	of	political	economy	we	can	further	observe	that,	given	these	arrangements,	liberal	states	are	vulnerable	to	influence	and	capture	by	powerful	corporations,	industries,	or	economic	interests	(e.g.,	lobby	groups),	and	are	not	above	using	compulsion	or	force	to	open	markets.)	And	there	is	one	imperative	of	capitalism	that	we	need	to	pay	special	attention	to:	economic	growth.		
2.2	Growth:	Keeping	Liberalism’s	Promise	In	allying	with	capitalism,	liberalism	also	takes	on	one	of	capitalism’s	important	characteristics:	growth.	Fortunately	for	that	alliance,	growth	also	works	to	advance	liberalism	in	several	main	ways.		1)	Pushing	back	scarcity,	calming	revolution.	Sheldon	Wolin	once	observed	that	liberalism	is	wracked	by	a	kind	of	anxiety.	Over	the	course	of	its	history,	liberal	philosophy	had	to	abandon	an	early	conception	of	capaciousness—of	“sufficient	social	space	to	accommodate	the	driving	energies	unleashed	by	[…]	capitalism”247—and	was	forced	to	recognize	the	reality	and	stubbornness	of	scarcity.	The	fixed																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					citizenry,	inverted	totalitarianism	works	to	depoliticize	its	citizenry…Where	the	Nazis	wanted	a	continuously	mobilized	society	that	would	support	its	masters…the	elite	of	inverted	totalitarianism	wants	a	politically	demobilized	society	that	hardly	votes	at	all.”	See	Sheldon	Wolin,	Politics	and	Vision:	
Continuity	and	Innovation	in	Western	Political	Thought	(Expanded	Edition)	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2004),	592.		247	Wolin,	Politics	and	Vision,	288.		
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amount	of	capital	at	a	given	time	meant	that	there	were	limits	to	the	investments	that	could	be	made	and	these	investments	determined	what	and	how	much	could	be	produced;	in	other	words,	the	fixed	amount	of	capital	fixed	the	amount	of	production,	fixing	in	turn	available	goods.	As	the	new	science	of	economics	revealed	the	law	of	diminishing	returns—where	increasing	amounts	of	investment	in	one	factor	of	production	yields	increasingly	smaller	returns	on	that	investment—the	concerns	about	scarcity	grew.	It	required	little	additional	reflection	to	realize	that	in	the	unequal	societies	developing	under	incipient	capitalism,	the	masses	composing	lower	classes	would	blame	persistent	experience	of	poverty	and	deprivation	on	property-holding	classes	accumulating	the	majority	of	fixed	production.		Wolin	argues	that	liberalism	solved	the	threat	of	the	masses	by	assigning	a	strong	state	role	in	protecting	private	productive	property.248	(In	this	way,	liberalism	was	forced	to	not	only	accept	inequality,	but	also	devised	an	instrument	to	secure	it.)	But	we	can	add	to	Wolin’s	argument.	Though	it	might	never	fully	eliminate	liberal	anxiety,	growth	can	assuage	the	worst	of	it.	Growth	can	mollify	the	populace	and	quell	revolutionary	fervour	so	long	as	marginalized	groups	can	appropriate	some	of	that	growth	for	themselves	and	experience	an	improvement	in	their	living	standards.	Increased	growth	ensures	increased	production	and	thus	availability	of	goods.	So,	while	production	is	fixed	by	the	amount	of	capital	at	a	given	time,	capital	that	grows	over	time	leads	to	growth	in	production.	The	standard	metaphor	is	of	the	“economic	pie.”	Even	where	workers	only	obtain	a	fixed	proportion	of	the	total	economic	pie,	as	long	as	that	pie	grows	so	does	the	absolute	amount	workers	take.		Growth	can	also	maintain	the	status	quo	by	creating	new	jobs	to	replace	those	destroyed	in	the	process	of	technological	change	and	capitalist	competition.	In	this	case,	material	conditions	may	not	be	improved,	but	growth	prevents	them	from	worsening.	It	is	important	for	liberalism	because	where	material	deprivation	threatens	wellbeing	—whether	in	terms	of	physical	survival,	social	status,	or	sense																																									 																					
248	Wolin,	Politics	and	Vision,	290.		
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of	dignity—it	becomes	the	motivator	of	revolution.	Growth,	then,	inoculates	liberalism	from	a	kind	of	opportunistic	internal	infection:	class	inequality.		2)	Promoting	Human	Development	and	Welfare.	Not	only	can	growth	prevent	the	overturning	of	the	liberal	order	by	angry	social	movements,	but	growth	also	creates	an	ever-larger	social	surplus,	which	can	be	invested	in	human	development.	For	example,	education	paid	partially	or	in	full	through	a	social	surplus	allows	people	to	develop	skills	and	acquire	knowledge	to	pursue	their	good	life.	Where	growth	increases	that	surplus,	the	opportunities	for	education	increase.	Opposing	currents	of	liberalism	differ	in	how	(and	how	much	of)	that	growing	surplus	ought	to	reach	the	masses.	Left-liberals	would	give	a	large	role	to	a	generous	welfare	state.	Right-liberals	would	insist	that	it	“trickle	down”	from	owners	of	the	property	who	accumulate	gains	from	growth.	However,	both	would	agree	on	the	necessity	of	growth.		3)	Putting	the	“I’s”	in	Liberalism.	Growth	may	also	be	a	key	source	of	individual	thinking,	of	the	ability	to	ask,	“Who	am	I?”	As	growth	at	the	same	time	depends	on	and	creates	social	complexity	and	divisions	of	labour,	and	as	individuals	begin	to	specialize	in	a	variety	of	functions,	the	“I”	takes	precedence	over	the	“We,”	and	the	individual	ceases	to	be	subsumed	by	the	collective.249		4)	Expanding	the	circle	of	liberal	inclusion.	Growth,	the	argument	goes,	also	carries	important	and	beneficial	moral	consequences	for	liberalism,	as	it	“fosters	greater	opportunity,	tolerance	of	diversity,	social	mobility,	commitment	to	fairness,	and	dedication	to	democracy.”250	As	the	economy	grows,	so	do	opportunities	available	to	a	population.	Conflicts	over	scarce	resources	or	jobs	diminish	precisely	because	they	have	become	less	scarce.	There	is	less	fear	about	expanding	rights	to	members	of	competing	groups	(who,	through	these	rights,	are	better	able	to	secure	a	larger	portion	of	the	total	economic	output)	and	therefore	more	tolerance	of																																									 																					
249	Stephen	Quilley,	“De-Growth	Is	Not	a	Liberal	Agenda:	Relocalisation	and	the	Limits	to	Low	Energy	Cosmopolitanism,”	Environmental	Values	22	(2013).	250	Benjamin	M.	Friedman,	The	Moral	Consequences	of	Economic	Growth	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	2005),	4.		
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difference.	As	intolerance	retreats	and	arbitrary	barriers	to	achieving	one’s	good	life	diminish,	more	people	receive	the	experience	of	liberalism.		Growth	achieves,	then,	the	conditions	necessary	for	liberal	pluralism.	Pluralism	follows	from	liberalism,	after	all.	As	Rawls	put	it,	pluralism	is	“the	natural	outcome	of	the	activities	of	human	reason	under	enduring	free	institutions.”251	If	all	are	free	to	pursue	their	own	good,	and	if	people	are	by	nature	diverse,	then	it	follows	that	a	society	must	make	possible	a	broad	array	of	versions	of	the	good	life.	The	reappearance	of	fascist	parties	in	Greece	and	the	growth	of	nativist	groups	like	the	Tea	Party	in	the	US	following	the	2008	global	economic	recession,	and	the	resurgence	of	a	xenophobic	right	in	the	UK	Independence	Party	and	in	the	rise	of	President	Donald	Trump	provide	a	stark	warning	about	what	can	happen	to	tolerance	in	the	midst	of	economic	recession	and	slow,	uneven	recovery.		Growth	also	promotes	liberal	cosmopolitanism.	Where	growth	has	been	powered	by	increased	trade	and	mobility,	the	resulting	intensification	of	contact	between	groups	leads	them	to	integrate	economically,	promoting	a	kind	of	stable	peace	between	them.	The	spirit	of	this	idea	was	summed	up	famously	by	neoliberal	writer	Thomas	Friedman:	“No	two	countries	that	both	had	McDonald's	had	fought	a	war	against	each	other	since	each	got	its	McDonald's.”		5)	Expanding	the	life	choices	of	liberalism.	But	growth	does	not	just	secure	liberalism	for	more	people	within	and	between	societies.	It	also	expands	the	horizon	of	life	choices	available	to	those	people.	For	those	living	in	the	21st	century	(assuming	they	are	in	a	developed	country	and	of	a	social	class	that	wins	significant	benefits	from	it),	growth	has	provided	a	wealth	of	choices	not	available	to	any	of	those	living	a	century	earlier.	If	the	inviolability	of	individuals’	plans	of	life	is	the	bedrock	of	liberalism,	then	an	expansion	of	possible	plans	of	life	to	choose	from	must	be	a	good	thing,	greatly	enlarging	the	ways	to	live	and	enrich	one’s	life.		
																																								 																					
251	John	Rawls,	Political	Liberalism,	(Expanded	edition)	(New	York:	Columbia	University	Press,	2005),	xxiv.	
 150 
Growth	promotes	the	availability	of	goods	and	services	to	ever	more	people.	As	economist	Robert	Reich	puts	it:	“economic	growth	isn’t	just	about	more	stuff.	Growth	is	different	from	consumerism.	Growth	is	really	about	the	capacity	of	a	nation	to	produce	everything	that’s	wanted	and	needed	by	its	inhabitants.”252	So	growth	provides	more	means	for	people	to	use	in	securing	and	living	their	good	life.	But	growth	introduces	a	self-amplifying	dynamic,	because	what	is	“wanted	and	needed”	grows	in	step	with	what	it	is	possible	to	have.	Individuals’	plans	of	life	change	in	accordance	with	what	is	available.	Growth-liberalism	gives	us	even	those	things	we	never	knew	we	wanted	and	needed	and,	once	given,	suddenly	could	not	be	happy	without.		6)	Progress.	Growth	is	also	intertwined	intimately	with	progress,	the	perceived	or	actual	improvement	over	time	of	the	quality	of	human	life,	the	depth	and	breadth	of	knowledge,	and	the	capacity	of	technology.	Advancements	in	quality	and	length	of	life,	scientific	knowledge,	and	technological	complexity	have	reached	their	apex	under	liberal	orders.	Continued	progress	in	these	areas	suggests	that	liberalism	must	be	doing	something	right.	And	people	ought	not	question	it	because,	as	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	chapter,	there	is	still	so	much	more	progress	can	accomplish.		The	projects	of	liberalism,	capitalist	growth,	and	progress	come	to	be	natural	allies,	forming	a	dense	and	complex	nexus,	one	whose	dynamics	climate	change	responses	ought	not	disrupt.	We	can	start	at	any	one	of	these	projects	and	see	how	they	are	together	enmeshed.	Let	us	start,	for	instance,	with	growth:	growth	generates	an	expanding	economic	surplus,	part	of	which	can	be	reinvested	into	research	and	development,	leading	to	technological	innovations,	to	which	capital	can	acquire	property	rights	and	use	to	enhance	growth	while	expanding	the	horizon	of	what	people	can	acquire	and	experience	(through	the	capitalist	market).	Or	to	start	at	another	point,	liberalism	ensures	progress	by	freeing	people	to	pursue	a																																									 																					
252	Robert	Reich,	“Why	growth	is	good,”	Christian	Science	Monitor,	August	20,	2010,	http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/Robert-Reich/2010/0820/Why-growth-is-good	
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plan	of	life	matching	their	unique	talents	and	interests	among	which	may	be	scientific	inquiry	and	experimentation,	which	has	the	potential	to	lead	to	greater	efficiencies	and	new	products	or	even	industries,	thereby	promoting	growth.	Technological	progress	is	required	due	to	capitalism’s	tendency	for	creative	destruction	in	pursuit	of	growth,	which	would	steadily	erode	the	employment	through	which	people	earn	the	means	to	their	good	life.253	Progress	is	therefore	needed	to	constantly	provide	new	capitalist	products,	services,	and	industries—all	good	for	sustaining	growth.			 In	sum,	as	long	as	capitalism	can	provide	growth,	it	can	make	some	assurance	to	liberalism	that	their	union	is	justified.	But	if	growth	serves	to	enhance	liberalism	in	the	above	ways,	any	move	away	from	growth—even	in	the	name	of	fighting	climate	change—has	a	difficult	task	ahead	of	it:	critiques	of	growth	risk	triggering	fears	of	losing	important	parts	of	liberalism.	Green	political	philosopher	Andrew	Dobson	asks,			[W]hat	happens	if	and	when	the	conditions	that	made	liberal	thinking	possible	no	longer	obtain?	Are	democracy,	freedom,	individualism,	the	liberal	rule	of	law	and	so	on,	in	some	sense	dependent	on	conditions	of	abundance?	If	these	conditions	disappear,	can	these	liberal	aspirations/achievements	survive?254	
	
																																								 																					
253	Fukuyama	understands	progress	in	science	to	necessarily	lead	to	capitalism	and	to	do	so	globally:	“modern	natural	science	establishes	a	uniform	horizon	of	economic	production	possibilities.	Technology	makes	possible	the	limitless	accumulation	of	wealth,	and	thus	the	satisfaction	of	an	ever-expanding	set	of	human	desires.	This	process	guarantees	an	increasing	homogenization	of	all	human	societies,	regardless	of	their	historical	origins	or	cultural	inheritances.	All	countries	undergoing	economic	modernization	must	increasingly	resemble	one	another…Moreover,	the	logic	of	natural	science	would	seem	to	dictate	a	universal	evolution	in	the	direction	of	capitalism”	(The	End	of	
History,	xiv-xv).		254	Andrew	Dobson,	“Political	Theory	in	a	Closed	World:	Reflections	on	William	Ophuls,	Liberalism	and	Abundance,”	Environmental	Values	22	(2013)	241–259:	246.		
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2.3	The	“Fine	Tuning”	of	Liberalism’s	Elements:	Different	Liberal	Guises		Liberalism’s	institutions	are	complex	and	must	deal	with	an	array	of	often	contradictory	elements—private	property,	class	inequality,	sharp	separation	between	economic	and	political	spheres—that	can	be	“fine-tuned”	or	“customized”	with	regards	to	how	strong	and	far-reaching	they	are,	the	priority	they	take	relative	to	other	elements,	and	so	forth.	There	are	some	familiar	examples:		
• Strong	rights	to	productive	property	(and	the	income	generated	through	it)	that	yield	enormous	economic	class	disparities	sit	in	tension	with	the	equality	liberalism	purports	to	advance.	Right-wing	liberals	like	neoliberals	and	libertarians	resolve	this	tension	by	justifying	the	inequalities,	seeing	them	as	inevitable	and	necessary	for	individual	liberty	in	a	survival-of-the-fittest	market	society	with	little	government	interference;	liberals	further	to	the	left	tend	to	favour	redistributive	welfare	state	provisions	to	secure	against	the	worst	effects	of	the	inequalities	or	even	state	investments	in	the	economy	to	promote	job	growth.		
• Negative	economic	freedom,	measured	by	the	reduction	or	even	absence	of	state-imposed	taxes	and	regulation,	rests	uneasily	alongside	positive	economic	freedom,	aided	by	redistributive	state	policies.		
• By	using	property	rights	to	remove	important	decisions	on	production,	investment,	distribution	etc.	from	popular	democratic	control,	capitalism	delimits	the	scope	for	the	democracy	that	is	supposed	to	enhance	human	freedom.		
• By	allowing	elected	governments	to	set	policies	on	taxation,	subsidies,	and	regulations,	democracy	interferes	with	capitalist	freedoms.			One	could	add	to	these	examples,	but	the	point	is	hopefully	clear	enough	to	continue.	Over	the	course	of	its	history,	liberalism	drops,	weakens,	or	circumscribes	
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some	elements	in	favour	of	others,	yielding	quite	different	assemblages	of	itself	over	time.	They	serve	different	functions	and	political	constituencies	and	so	a	given	assemblage	requires	political	work	by	a	variety	of	political	actors	to	either	achieve	or	prevent.	Assemblages	also	each	must	serve—or	at	self-justify	its	arrangements	as	serving—to	realize	the	same	core	liberal	ethic:	the	promise	of	the	freedom	for	each	individual	to	pursue	a	good	life.255				 Liberalism’s	assemblage	for	the	early	21st-century	is	still	coalescing,	but	we	can	be	sure	that	its	ability	to	take	on	many	guises	will	make	attempts	to	depart	from	it	difficult.	Part	of	the	endurance	of	liberalism	is	no	doubt	its	ability	to	contain	and	selectively	deploy	so	many	of	its	antipathetic	elements	from	its	deep	roster,	enabling	it	to	last	through	time	by	delimiting	much	of	mainstream	political	contestation	over	a	good	society	in	the	space	between	poles	internal	to	itself.	The	arc	of	the	liberal	pendulum	is	a	wide	one,	including	quite	different	kinds	of	societies	in	its	swing.	Its	different	assemblages,	while	all	part	of	liberalism,	are	different	enough	from	one	another	that	they	can	even	form	the	basis	for	fiercely	competing	liberal	political	parties.	Rather	than	threatening	the	long-term	viability	of	liberalism,	these	internal	contradictions	and	rivalries	have	been	a	major	part	of	its	longevity.	Much	of	the	discontent	with	one	liberal	guise,	say	today’s	neoliberal	one,	can	be																																									 																					
255	Take,	for	example,	the	assemblage	occurring	in	the	wake	of	tremendous	labour	organization	and	that	gave	rise	to	social	democratic	forms	of	liberalism	in	the	post-war	period.	It	oversaw	the	“golden	age	of	capitalism”	where	state	investment	in	the	capitalist	economy	and	the	labour-capital	class	compromise	served	to	steer	the	first	world	out	of	depression	and	the	post-war	reconstruction,	promote	economic	growth	that	was	shared	between	workers	and	owners,	reduce	some	of	the	appeal	of	non-liberal	left	alternatives,	and	quell	radical	labour	activism.	This	arrangement	extended	opportunities	for	(primarily	white	male)	members	of	the	working	class	to	pursue	a	good	life	using	means	earned	through	steady,	unionized	employment	and	generous	welfare	state	provisions.	The	neoliberal	assemblage,	to	take	another	example,	served	several	functions	during	the	global	economic	crisis	of	the	1970s.	Economic	elites	and	sympathetic	political	elites	could	deploy	the	philosophical	justifications	of	right-wing	liberal	economists	and	philosophers	like	F.A.	Hayek,	Milton	Friedman,	Ayn	Rand,	or	Robert	Nozick	to	show	how	liberty	was	best	achieved	by	undoing	the	previous	assemblage.	The	new	assemblage	was	one	where	the	minimization	of	the	state	role	in	promoting	equality	and	the	privatization	of	social	programs	were	justified	as	sparing	taxpayers	from	forcibly	supporting	government	spending;	union-busting	legislation	banning	private	sector	employers	from	having	to	pay	union	dues	allegedly	liberated	workers	and	gave	them	“the	right	to	work”;	loose	employment	termination	laws	gave	workers	“flexibility”	to	choose	their	place	of	employment.	Improving	global	competitiveness,	on	which	the	health	of	the	economy	and	its	ability	to	provide	jobs	was	said	to	rely,	justified	similar	suites	of	reforms	across	the	world.	
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answered	by	switching	to	another,	say	social	democracy,	rather	than	having	to	jump	liberalism’s	ship	altogether.256	But	that	change	still	retains	liberalism’s	preferred	institutions	and	can	alter	their	logics	and	imperatives	to	only	a	limited	degree.	If	that	part	of	the	climate	movement	concerned	with	climate	change	only	attempts	to	engage	the	political	system	enough	to	break	away	from	the	neoliberal	assemblage,	it	may	find	itself	frustrated	by	the	persistence	of	liberalism’s	constraints	in	the	new	assemblage.		
	
2.4	Summary	of	Part	1		In	order	to	carry	out	the	obligations	demanded	by	what	I	called	a	far-reaching	climate	justice,	we	must	make	systemic	change.	The	system	that	must	be	changed,	somehow,	is	liberalism,	a	formidable	edifice.	Its	core	ethic—the	promise	to	all	individuals	to	freely	and	equally	seek	their	respective	vision	of	the	good	life—is	difficult	to	object	to.	Any	stronger	critique	would	have	to	begin	with	the	defining	features	discussed	above.	But	for	all	the	attacks	one	might	direct	at	liberalism’s	institutional	arrangements,	one	then	faces	the	daunting	task	of	showing	what	they	can	be	replaced	with	and	whether	they	will	preserve	that	core	ethic	or	replace	it	with	a	better	one.	Any	alternative	we	might	propose	is	disadvantaged	in	that	it	whips	up	fears	of	the	failed	social	experiments	of	the	20th	century.	Or	it	may	be	disadvantaged	in	that	its	possibilities	are	hypothetical,	untested,	unknown,	and	maybe	unrealistic;	liberalism	is	complete	and	realized	in	a	way	that	competing,	but	not-yet-realized,	visions	are	not.	And	even	massive	political	work	might	merely	lead																																									 																					
256	Fukuyama’s	End	of	History	thesis	does	not	necessarily	assert	neoliberal	views.	Rejecting	the	notion	that	persisting	economic	inequality	under	liberal	orders	constituted	a	fatal	contradiction	of	liberalism	and	would	undermine	his	thesis	about	its	constituting	the	end	of	history,	Fukuyama	wrote,	“There	are	today	few	critics	of	liberal	societies	who	are	willing	to	advocate	the	wholesale	abandonment	of	liberal	principles,	either	in	the	political	or	economic	realm,	in	order	to	overcome	existing	inequality.	The	major	arguments	concern	not	the	principles	of	liberal	society,	but	the	precise	point	at	which	the	proper	trade-off	between	liberty	and	equality	should	come…the	specific	trade-offs	they	choose	can	all	be	made	under	the	broad	tent	of	liberal	democracy,	without	injury	to	underlying	principles.	The	desire	for	a	greater	degree	of	social	democracy	[…]	does	not	itself	refute	the	end	of	
history.”	Fukuyama,	The	End	of	History,	293-294	[emphasis	mine].		
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to	another	assemblage	of	liberalism,	given	the	system’s	ability	to	take	on	various	guises.			 Imagine	now	trying	to	push	ambitious	climate	action	through	this	very	unyielding	complex.	If	the	good	life	is	one	that	must	be	secured	by	the	institutions	of	the	liberal	order,	then	that	will	mean	a	just	response	will	need	to	preserve	them,	but	in	doing	so	it	will	accept	the	limitations	that	that	institutional	arrangement	places	on	climate	action.	In	the	next	section,	I	propose	a	means	of	conceptualizing	how	liberalism	comes	to	accept	only	a	very	constrained	range	of	climate	solutions	and	limits	opportunities	for	the	demos	to	support	them.			
3.	Liberal	Filters	to	Climate	Solutions		 On	the	matter	of	climate	change,	the	liberal	order	is	a	fatally	lumbering	thing.	The	purpose	of	the	following	section	is	to	propose	a	conceptual	model	that	provides	an	explanation	for	why	ambitious	climate	policy	has	been	so	slow	in	coming—why	even	in	the	face	of	a	vociferous	climate	movement	and	well-reasoned	burden-sharing	arrangements	rigorously	defended	by	climate	ethicists	not	only	is	the	range	of	solutions	governments	have	been	prepared	to	propose	very	narrow,	but	also	very	weak.	In	this	section,	I	argue	that	capitalism	and	liberal	representative	democracy	function	together	in	such	a	way	as	to	impose	a	series	of	“filters”	through	which	solutions	to	the	impending	global	climate	change	crisis	must	pass	in	order	to	be	considered	seriously	at	state	and	international	policy	levels.257	The	presence	of	these	filters	follows	logically	from	the	institutional	functioning	of	liberal	representative	democracy	and	capitalism	and	not	only	limits	the	range	of	possible	solutions,	but	also	dissipates	much	of	the	democratic	support	that	can	be	given	to	any	of	those	that	survive	the	elimination	process.																																										 																					
257	I	am	applying	to	climate	policy	a	model	similar	in	spirit	to	Noam	Chomsky	and	Edward	Herman’s	Propaganda	Model	from	Manufacturing	Consent:	The	Political	Economy	of	the	Mass	Media	(New	York,	NY:	Pantheon	Books,	2002),	which	identified	several	“filters”	through	which	news	must	pass	before	it	entered	mainstream	corporate	media	outlets	in	the	US.	That	model	accounted	for	the	narrow	ideological	views	that	could	enter	into	the	dominant	and	mainstream	private	news	media.	
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Liberal	Representative	Democracy		 The	first	system	of	filters	stem	from	the	ways	in	which	modern	liberal	democracy	prevents	popular	involvement	in	choosing,	voting	on,	or	otherwise	influencing	in	any	large	measure	the	long-term	policies	on	climate	change	adopted	by	government.			
3.1	Elections	and	Representation	
		Santos	and	Avritzer	describe	elections	as	“the	means	by	which	citizens	give	up	the	right	to	take	decisions	directly	by	delegating	it	to	their	representatives.”258	In	other	words,	the	role	of	the	electorate	during	an	election	is	to	authorize	its	own	marginalization	until	the	next	one,	at	which	point	it	hands	over	political	decision-making	once	again.	For	the	duration	of	their	time	in	public	office,	representatives	generally	operate	independently	of	popular	input.	It	is	a	system	Max	Weber	called	“free	representation”	(freie	Reprasentation),	where	free	referred	not	to	the	nature	of	the	process	of	choosing	representatives	through	elections,	but	to	the	independence	of	the	representative,	who	“is	obligated	only	to	express	his	own	genuine	conviction,	and	not	to	promote	the	interests	of	those	who	have	elected	him.”259			 What	this	means	for	the	range	of	possible	domestic	policies	for	climate	change	is	that	party	representatives	are	free	to	make	some	key	decisions	independently	of	the	populace:	(1)	whether	or	not	to	actually	include	policies	addressing	the	crisis	in	their	platforms;	(2)	which	policies	to	pursue;	(3)	whether	to	pursue	them	if	elected;	(4)	the	extent,	ambition,	and	timing	of	emissions	targets;	(5)	how	policies	will	be	implemented,	monitored,	and	evaluated,	and	by	whom;	and	(6)	
																																								 																					
258	Boaventura	de	Sousa	Santos	and	Leonardo	Avritzer,	“Introduction:	Opening	Up	the	Canon	of	Democracy”	in	Boaventuara	de	Sousa	Santos	(ed)	Democratizing	Democracy:	Beyond	the	Liberal	
Democratic	Canon	(New	York:	Verso,	2007),	lxvi.		259	Max	Weber,	The	Theory	of	Social	and	Economic	Organization	(New	York,	NY:	The	Free	Press,	1964),	417.	See	also	the	discussion	in	Michael	Hardt	&	Antonio	Negri,	Multitude:	War	and	
Democracy	in	the	Age	of	Empire	(Toronto:	Penguin,	2005),	246.		
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whether	to	continue	to	make	long-term	commitments	to	major	fossil	fuel	development	projects.260	Depending	on	how	many	candidates	include	solutions	to	climate	change	in	their	platforms,	an	electorate	can	be	presented	with	few	or	even	no	means	of	supporting	ambitious	solutions	to	climate	change.			 The	electorate	is	not	as	a	rule	formally	invited	to	submit	its	climate	solutions	or	directly	choose	from	those	offered,	but	only	to	be	willing	to	elect	representatives	who	will	then	craft	and	enact	the	policies	(with	input	from	policy	consultants	and	commissions261)	mostly	autonomously	of	democratic	input.	The	role	of	the	general																																									 																					
260	On	this	last	point,	consider	the	2015	Canadian	federal	election.	None	of	the	major	federal	parties	strongly	rejected	continued	tar	sands	development.	Transcanada’s	Keystone	XL	tar	sands	pipeline	was	supported	by	both	Liberals	and	Conservatives,	Enbridge’s	Northern	Gateway	tar	sands	pipeline	was	supported	by	the	Conservatives,	and	the	NDP	reserved	judgment	on	Kinder	Morgan’s	TransMountain	and	Enbridge’s	Line	9	tar	sands	pipelines	until	a	proper	environmental	assessment	could	be	conducted.	(To	many	of	us	in	the	climate	movement,	this	stance	was	indicative	of	the	weak	climate	commitments	the	NDP	under	Mulcair	was	willing	to	make	since,	if	climate	impacts	are	considered,	no	environmental	assessment	would	possibly	permit	continued	tar	sands	development	given	the	carbon	content	in	tar	sands	reserves.)	The	Greens,	while	not	a	major	federal	party,	had	the	strongest	position	on	the	tar	sands,	not	supporting	pipelines	but	supporting	oil	and	gas	refinement	in	Canada,	including	from	tar	sands.	See	Yadullah	Hussain,	"Pipelines	&	politics:	Where	the	parties	stand	on	oil	&	gas	issues,"	Financial	Post,	October	14,	2015,	http://business.financialpost.	com/news/energy/pipelines-politics-where-the-parties-stand-on-oil-gas-issues;	Josh	Wingrove,	"Mulcair	Pegs	NDP	Support	for	Canada	Pipelines	to	New	Assessments,"	Bloomberg,	August	7,	2015,	http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-07/mulcair-pegs-ndp-support-for-canada-pipelines-to-new-assessments;	David	Ljunggren,	"Canada's	buoyant	Greens	say	they	don't	favor	oil	sands	shutdown,"	Reuters,	August	7,	2015,	http://ca.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/	idCAKCN0QC28E20150807		This	is	also	a	good	place	to	mention	that	the	Trudeau	government	approved	in	late	2016	Kinder	Morgan’s	Transmountain	tar	sands	pipeline,	ignoring	protests	across	the	country	including	a	large	civil	disobedience	action	in	front	of	Canada’s	Parliament.		261	An	episode	during	the	2016	US	Presidential	election	gives	some	insight	into	how	policy	consultants	can	eliminate	ambitious	climate	options	from	representatives’	platforms.	Bill	McKibben	relates	his	experience	as	an	appointee	from	the	Bernie	Sanders	campaign	to	a	commission	responsible	for	drafting	the	Democratic	Party	platform	for	the	2016	US	presidential	election.	His	attempt	to	include	ambitious	climate	policies	was	met	with	dismissal	from	Hillary	Clinton’s	delegates:	“We	all	agreed	that	America	should	be	operating	on	100	percent	clean	energy	by	2050,	but	then	I	proposed,	in	one	amendment	after	another,	a	series	of	ways	we	might	actually	get	there.	A	carbon	tax?	Voted	down	7-6	(one	of	the	DNC	delegates	voted	with	each	side).	A	ban	on	fracking?	Voted	down	7-6.	An	effort	to	keep	fossils	in	the	ground,	at	least	on	federal	land?	Voted	down	7-6.	A	measure	to	mandate	that	federal	agencies	weigh	the	climate	impact	of	their	decisions?	Voted	down	7-6.	Even	a	plan	to	keep	fossil	fuel	companies	from	taking	private	land	by	eminent	domain,	voted	down	7-6.	(We	did,	however,	reach	unanimous	consent	on	more	bike	paths!).”	Later,	the	Clinton	campaign	took	on	some	of	the	suggestions—things	like	carbon	pricing	(but	not	a	carbon	tax),	and	a	program	to	install	half	a	billion	solar	panels	across	the	US	in	four	years.”	It	was	only	enough	to	at	most	create	some	mild	optimism:	“you	could,	if	you	squinted,	create	a	hopeful	scenario,”	McKibben	wrote.	Bill	
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population	is	to	form	a	sort	of	reserve	of	raw	volition	for	action	on	climate	change,	that	is,	to	give	a	mandate	for	climate	policy	decisions	made	by	governing	elites,	but	not	themselves	become	makers	of	policy.	Citizens’	climate	targets	and	proposals	for	solutions,	whatever	they	may	be,	tend	to	be	filtered	out	of	those	included	in	party	platforms.	This	process	of	filtering	occurs	even	on	those	rare	occasions	when	citizen	input	is	formally	invited.	In	the	summer	of	2016,	Members	of	Parliament	of	Canada’s	new	Liberal	government	held	several	town-hall	format	public	consultations	to	hear,	ostensibly,	what	Canadians	wanted	done	about	climate	change.	Activists	with	Toronto350.org	and	other	groups	went	to	several	(including	Environment	and	Climate	Change	Minister	Catherine	McKenna’s),	where	they	pressured	representatives	to	make	serious	commitments	to	climate	action	and	climate	justice.	By	September,	the	effect	of	the	public	consultation	on	climate	policy	became	clear:	the	Liberal	government	simply	reaffirmed	the	previous	Conservative	Harper	government	GHG	emissions	reductions	targets	(reductions	of	17%	relative	to	2005	levels	by	2020	and	30%	by	2030),	a	level	of	ambition	that	has	been	deemed	“inadequate”	by	the	Climate	Action	Tracker,	an	independent	scientific	analysis	tracking	global	emissions	reductions	pledges.	If	all	countries	adopted	levels	of	ambition	similar	to	Canada’s,	temperatures	would	likely	rise	3-4˚C	above	pre-industrial	levels.262	(In	November	2016,	a	“Youth	Climate	Town	Hall”	put	on	by	McKenna	appeared	to	screen	out	of	the	discussion	a	lot	of	youth	views	on	climate	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					McKibben,	“The	Clinton	Campaign	Is	Obstructing	Change	to	the	Democratic	Platform,”	Politico,	June	27,	2016,	http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2016/06/hillary-clinton-2016-democratic-platform-213993;	and	Bill	McKibben,	“A	World	at	War,”	New	Republic,	August	15,	2016,	https://newrepublic.com/article/135684/declare-war-climate-change-mobilize-wwii		262	Elizabeth	McSheffrey,	“Politicians	not	pleased	with	McKenna's	new	climate	commitments,”	National	Observer,	September	19,	2016,	http://www.nationalobserver.com/	2016/09/19/news/politicians-not-pleased-mckennas-new-climate-commitments;	“Canada,”	Climate	
Action	Tracker	(2016),	http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/canada.html;	“Comparability	of	effort,”	Climate	Action	Tracker,	http://climateactiontracker.org/methodology/85/Comparability-of-effort.html;	Carol	Linnitt,	"Canada’s	Climate	Action	Called	‘Inadequate’	at	UN	Climate	Talks	in	Marrakech,"	Desmog	Canada,	November	15,	2016,	http://www.desmog.ca/2016/11/15/canada-climate-action-inadequate-marrakesh-un-climate-talks	
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change	that	required	taking	on	the	fossil	fuel	industry	in	favour	of	less	controversial	matters	like	individual	lifestyle	changes.263)			 Elections	weaken	direct	support	for	climate	action	in	other	ways.	A	municipal,	state/provincial,	or	federal	election	is	a	“packaged	deal”;	that	is,	through	parties’	political	platforms	an	election	covers	a	broad	array	of	issues	instead	of	single	ones.	What	the	electorate	is	saying	can	be	unclear	and	interpretable.	Were	voters	voting	for	one	leg	of	a	party’s	platform,	for	another,	for	parts	of	it,	or	for	the	whole	thing?	Which	parts	do	they	prioritize?	Should	one	piece	(e.g.,	immediate	economic	stimulation	in	a	recession)	come	at	the	expense	of	another	(e.g.,	immediate	action	on	climate	change)	or	must	they	both	be	realized?	To	what	degree	were	electors	kept	distracted	or	made	unaware	of	political	platforms	or	even	manipulated	by	the	public	relations,	campaign	strategists,	and	corporate	news	media	constructions	of	politicians’	images?	The	latter	is	an	important	question	to	ask	when	the	topic	of	climate	change	was	barely	raised	by	either	the	moderators	or	presidential	candidates	during	televised	debates	preceding	the	2016	US	election,	the	most	prominent	public	expression	of	candidates’	positions.264	Because	a	general	election,	unlike	a	referendum	(insofar	as	it	is	a	binding	one),	provides	no	way	of	directly	voting	for	issues	on	a	given	policy,	there	are	few	ways	of	weighing	the	support	for	a	given	issue	versus	support	for	other	parts	of	the	platform.	To	fit	through	this	filter,	the	richness	and	detail	of	the	will	of	the	electorate	must	be	simplified.	Perhaps	a	useful	analogy	to	better	understand	this	process	is	digital	audio/video	compression,	which	is	used	to	reduce	the	amount	of	data	contained	in	an	electronic	media	file,	thus	reducing	the	file’s	size.	In	this	way,	media	can	be	made	to	fit	through	various	limited	bandwidths.	The	trade-off	is	a	loss	in	
																																								 																					
263	“Get	in	the	Game:	McKenna	gets	schooled	on	#YouthClimateAction,”	350Canada,	November	24,	2016,	https://storify.com/350Canada/get-in-the-game	264	Brian	Kahn	and	Andrea	Thompson,	“The	Climate	Questions	the	Next	President	Should	Answer,”	Climate	Central,	October	20,	2016,	http://www.climatecentral.org/news/the-climate-questions-the-next-president-should-answer-20804;	"In	Warmest	Year	Ever,	Climate	Change	Ignored	Again	at	Debate,"	Democracy	Now,	October	20,	2016,	http://www.democracynow.org/2016/	10/20/in_warmest_year_ever_climate_change	
 160 
sound	and	image	quality.	In	much	the	same	way	that	audiences	do	not	hear	the	whole	complexity	of	a	compressed	song	or	see	the	entire	richness	of	a	compressed	video,	elections	have	the	effect	of	filtering	out	much	of	the	character	of	an	electorate’s	will	so	that	its	full	quality	goes	unheard	and	unseen	and	only	a	general,	
compressed	approximation—a	lower-quality	duplication—passes	through.	Election	results	are	thus	open	to	the	interpretation	of	the	elected	representatives	instead	of	being	a	clear	representation	of	demands.			 While	single	issues	can	come	to	dominate	an	election,	these	issues	tend	to	be	of	the	more	pressing	kind	in	the	short-term	like	an	economic	recession	or	more	immediately	and	emotionally	visceral,	such	as	a	scandal.	A	longer-term	matter	like	climate	change	has	tended	to	be	deprioritized,	pushed	aside	until	it	becomes	a	short-term	issue—that	is,	once	it	is	starting	to	have	undeniable	and	serious	effects	on	the	population	voting—at	which	point	it	is	too	late.265			 Barred	from	more	direct	forms	of	involvement	in	climate	policy	formation,	participation	thus	becomes	“displaced”	to	the	kinds	of	actions	reviewed	in	the	previous	chapter—mass	marches	and	demonstrations,	blockades,	and	divestment.	But	this	entails	a	downgrading	of	the	democratic	role	the	demos	could	potentially	have	played	from	one	of	positive	policy	formation	(perhaps	on	the	model	of	citizens’	assemblies,	to	give	just	one	suggestion)	to	one	largely	characterized	by	negation,	that	is,	protest	or	resistance	against	decisions	that	have	already	been	made,	removal	of	social	license	rather	than	collective	creation	of	a	vision	of	a	society.			 One	potential	way	around	this	filter	was	mentioned	at	the	end	of	last	chapter.		In	fall	2016,	Washington	State	voted	on	a	grassroots-sponsored	ballot	initiative	regarding	the	adoption	of	a	revenue-neutral	carbon	tax	(ultimately	rejected).																																									 																					
265	This	raises	what	Giddens	calls	“Giddens’s	Paradox”:	“since	the	dangers	posed	by	global	warming	aren’t	tangible,	immediate	or	visible	in	the	course	of	day-to-day	life,	however	awesome	they	may	appear,	many	will	sit	on	their	hands	and	do	nothing	of	a	concrete	nature	about	them.	Yet	waiting	until	they	become	visible	and	acute	before	being	stirred	to	serious	action	will,	by	definition,	be	too	late.”	Anthony	Giddens,	The	Politics	of	Climate	Change	(Malden:	Polity,	2009),	2.	Of	course,	whether	the	many	would	still	“sit	on	their	hands	and	do	nothing	of	a	concrete	nature”	if	they	had	the	option	of	being	involved	in	a	more	serious	and	direct	way	in	the	creation	and	approval	of	long-term	policy	on	this	issue	does	not	appear	to	figure	into	Giddens’s	Paradox.		
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Initiatives	like	these	might	manage	to	put	some	climate	policy	on	the	political	agenda	at	least	at	the	subnational	level,	an	important	possibility	to	explore	with	the	recent	election	of	Donald	Trump.			
3.2	International	Representation		Because	it	permits	access	for	civil	society	actors	(as	well	as	developing	countries),	the	international-level	climate	regime	is	held	to	be	more	stakeholder-inclusive	than	other	international	regimes	(as	mentioned	in	chapter	3).266	However,	the	various	civil	society	organizations—the	bodies	through	which	citizens	can	most	directly	become	engaged	in	influencing	the	direction	of	the	international	climate	regime—appear	only	as	observers	who	may	on	occasion	share	views	with	delegates,	but	who	do	not	otherwise	engage	in	negotiations	and	who	certainly	have	no	role	in	approving	or	signing	agreements.	Furthermore,	their	participation	must	be	approved	by	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	secretariat,	they	are	barred	from	entering	meetings	designated	as	“closed,”	and	they	are	subject	to	a	number	of	restrictions	on	how	and	where	they	can	participate.267			 So	although	relatively	more	inclusive,	it	would	be	a	stretch	to	call	the	international	climate	regime	democratic	due	to	the	lack	of	citizen	participation	in	decision-making.268	Rather,	negotiations	are	conducted	by	appointed	state	delegates	and	diplomats,	not	elected	ones.	The	electorate	has	thus	been	filtered	out	twice	from	direct	decision-making	and	participation	at	this	level:	once	through	the	election	of	representatives	and	again	through	the	representatives’	appointment	of	delegates																																									 																					
266	Dana	R.	Fisher,	“COP-15	in	Copenhagen:	How	the	Merging	of	Movements	Left	Civil	Society	Out	in	the	Cold,”	Global	Environmental	Politics	10,	no.	2	(2010):	11.		267	For	the	rules	and	restrictions	non-governmental	organizations	must	abide	by,	see	UNFCCC,	“Guidelines	for	the	participation	of	representatives	of	non-governmental	organizations	at	meetings	of	the	bodies	of	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change”	(2003).		Available	at	http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/	application/pdf/coc_guide.pdf	268	The	supposed	inclusiveness	is	further	brought	into	question	when	one	considers	the	dilemma	of	poorer	nations	at	the	negotiations,	who	cannot	afford	to	send	the	same	number	of	delegates	and	have	difficulty	accessing	translated	documents	or	transcripts	of	proceedings.	See,	UNfairplay,	“Levelling	the	Playing	Field:	A	Report	to	the	UNFCCC	on	Negotiating	Capacity	&	Access	to	Information”	(2011),	https://unfccc.int/files/conference_programme/application/pdf/	unfairplayreportapril202011-1.pdf	
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who	are	much	less	accountable	to	an	electorate	than	to	the	state	that	appointed	them.	Accordingly,	over	the	course	of	the	negotiations,	the	diplomats	proceed	to	push	the	goals	of	their	states,	tied	as	they	are	to	securing	states’	power	and	position	in	the	competitive	international	capitalist	system,	and	so	solutions	to	climate	change	bear	this	imprint.		
3.3	Short-Term	Electoral	Cycles		Setting	elections	at	generally	short	intervals	ensures	that	the	electorate	is	given	fairly	regular	opportunities	to	change	its	government.	In	this	way,	political	short-termism	is	beneficial,	offering	a	means	for	reacting	to	and	replacing	a	government	that	is	ineffective,	corrupt,	or	otherwise	undesirable,	and	precluding	conditions	for	the	creation	of	a	long-term	autocracy.	In	terms	of	solutions	to	climate	change,	however,	it	creates	another	filter.			A	solution	to	climate	change	may	pay	off	only	in	the	long-term	while	potentially	having	directly	attributable	negative	and	immediate	consequences	on	an	economy.	Take	the	example	of	the	Alberta	oil	sands	projects	and	pipelines,	which	every	Canadian	political	party	supported	in	some	way	in	the	2015	federal	election.	Shutting	them	down	as	part	of	a	global	effort	to	mitigate	greenhouse	gas	emissions	risks	severe	political	consequences	for	a	government	due	to	the	resulting	termination	of	a	major	industry	and	its	jobs,	particularly	at	a	moment	when	a	collapse	in	oil	prices	has	led	to	massive	unemployment	in	the	sector.269	Insofar	as	it	would	help	to	preserve	the	prevailing	climate,	however,	it	is	a	completely	justifiable	response.	According	to	a	2015	study	in	Nature,	if	the	world	seeks	just	a	better	than	even	chance	of	keeping	temperature	rise	below	2˚C,	a	staggering	85%	of	tar	sands	reserves	(i.e.,	recoverable	under	current	economic	conditions)	and	99%	of	tar	sands	resources	(i.e.,	recoverable	over	all	time	using	current	and	future	technologies																																									 																					
269	By	one	estimate,	as	many	as	43,000	workers	in	Alberta	lost	their	jobs	in	the	oilpatch.	Estimates	for	job	loss	in	industries	that	support	the	oil	and	gas	sector	are	more	difficult	to	calculate	with	confidence.	See,	Tracy	Johnson,	“Just	how	many	jobs	have	been	cut	in	the	oilpatch?”	CBC	News,	July	6,	2016,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/calgary/oil-patch-layoffs-how-many-1.3665250	
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regardless	of	economic	conditions)	are	unburnable.270	However,	it	is	only	in	the	longer	term	should	the	world	succeed	in	averting	climate	catastrophe	that	this	decision	would	be	vindicated,	and	the	enacting	party’s	political	wisdom	be	clear.	Similar	dynamics	apply	to	a	wide	array	of	other	potential	political	decisions	on	climate	change.		However,	any	solution	attributable	to	government	action	with	immediate	negative	consequences	for	an	industry	or	economy	and	its	workers,	but	longer-term	positives,	will	logically	be	filtered	out	by	parties	and	representatives	interested	in	remaining	in	power.	This	biases	representatives	towards	solutions	that	are	of	minimal	negative	consequence	in	the	short-term	(and	that	wind	up	being	of	minimal	benefit	to	the	climate	over	the	long-term).271	We	can	also	expect	this	filter	to	prevent	representatives	from	permitting	wide	citizen	participation	in	selecting	and	implementing	solutions	to	climate	change	wherever	these	solutions	may	have	consequences	that	would	endanger	parties’	or	representatives’	remaining	in	power.				
3.4	Eligibility			Another	important	filter	is	voter	eligibility.	Eligibility	means,	at	minimum,	that	a	voter	meets	certain	citizenship	and	age	criteria.	The	people	who	in	theory	get	to	be	represented	are	those	who	meet	these	criteria,	that	is,	citizens	of	the	country	undertaking	elections	who	have	reached	legal	voting	age.	These	and	only	these	people	are	represented,	albeit	in	limited	ways,	as	suggested	above.	This	creates	
																																								 																					
270	Christophe	McGlade	and	Paul	Ekins	(2015),	“The	Geographical	Distribution	of	Fossil	Fuels	Unused	when	Limiting	Global	Warming	to	2˚C,”	Nature	517	(2015):	190.	271	As	mentioned	above,	Canada’s	climate	targets	under	the	Liberal	government	are	to	reduce	GHG	emissions	by	17%	relative	to	2005	levels	by	2020	and	30%	by	2030,	which	is	inadequate.	The	government	saved	a	more	ambitious	target	of	80%	reductions	for	the	far-away	year	of	2050.	Bruce	Cheadle,	“Ottawa	releases	climate	strategy,	says	Canadians	may	not	realize	scope	of	problem,”	Globe	and	Mail,	November	18,	2016,	https://beta.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/ottawa-releases-climate-strategy-says-canadians-may-not-realize-scope-of-problem/article32925503/	?ref=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.theglobeandmail.com&service=mobile		
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another	important	filter	in	terms	of	whose	solutions	can	be	included	and	to	what	degree	they	can	be	supported.			 It	bears	repeating	that	climate	change	is	a	unique	problem	in	that	its	effects	are	not	localized—the	worst	polluters	are	not	also	the	most	heavily	affected—but	will	instead	have	global	impacts.	Responsible	for	a	mere	30%	of	cumulative	emissions	since	1750	are	China	(12%),	India	(3%),	the	Middle	East	(3%),	Asia	Pacific	(excluding	Japan	and	China)	(5%),	South	and	Central	America	(4%),	and	Africa	(3%),272	places	of	the	world	expected	to	experience	some	of	the	worst	effects	of	climate	change.		So,	because	the	consequences	of	climate	change	are	global,	because	countries	in	the	Global	South	are	projected	to	experience	its	worst	effects,	and	because	countries	in	the	Global	North	are	collectively	most	responsible	for	it	both	historically	and	currently,	citizens	of	the	Global	South	ought	to	hold	some	influence	over	the	climate	policies	adopted	by	industrial	nations	(both	advanced	and	emerging).	The	eligibility	criteria,	however,	filters	out	their	ability	to	influence	which	“solutions"	will	be	adopted	by	rich	nations	as	well	as	support	those	solutions	that	are	available	to	choose	from	to	ensure	they	are	enacted.	Developing	countries’	influence	on	the	climate	policies	of	heavy	polluters	is	instead	relegated	to	international	climate	negotiations,	where	their	lack	of	military,	economic,	or	political	power	diminishes	these	representatives’	ability	to	set	agendas.			 But	the	effects	of	climate	change	not	only	cross	geographic	boundaries;	they	also	extend	temporally,	beyond	the	period	in	which	they	were	initiated.	The	potential	for	enormous	intergenerational	injustice	presents	a	moral	imperative	to	account	for	the	needs	and	views	of	future	generations.	Though	they	have	no	literal	voice,	it	is	reasonable	to	presume	that	future	generations	would	want	current	ones	to	preserve	a	climate	similar	to	the	one	to	which	life	and	civilization	are	currently	adapted.	We	can	expand	this	principle	to	include	the	interests	of	non-human	lives																																									 																					
272	James	Hansen	and	Makiko	Sato,	“Fossil	Fuel	CO2	Emissions,”	http://www.columbia.edu/~mhs119/	CO2Emissions/Emis_moreFigs/		
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and	their	ecosystems	as	well	in	order	to	encompass	as	much	as	possible	the	totality	of	those	affected,	what	Eckersley	refers	to	a	“community-of-fate,”	which	is	“tied	together	not	by	common	passports,	nationality,	blood	line,	ethnicity,	or	religion	but	rather	simply	by	the	potential	to	be	harmed	by	[a]	particular	proposal”273—or	in	this	case,	the	lack	of	proposals	and	democratic	ability	to	realize	the	few	that	exist.			 The	eligibility	criteria	for	those	whose	views	are	represented	(in	however	limited	a	way)	therefore	filters	out	entirely	the	solutions	of	populations	situated	geographically	and	temporally	outside	the	election,	as	well	as	their	ability	to	place	their	support	(or	have	their	reasonably	assumed	support,	in	the	case	of	future	generations)	behind	any	of	them,	despite	being	seriously	affected.	Once	we	consider	the	community-of-fate,	it	becomes	clear	that,	whatever	is	the	state	of	public	support	represented	in	opinion	polls	for	solutions	to	climate	change,	it	is	in	fact	a	vast	underestimate.			 	
	
Capitalism	Solutions	to	climate	change	tend	to	be	considered	in	light	of	the	economy.	How	might	reducing	greenhouse	gases	hurt	the	economy?	How	might	it	create	opportunities	for	the	economy?	Of	course,	the	economy	in	question	is	a	specific	one,	capitalism,	with	a	unique	logic	and	set	of	imperatives	that	stem	from	the	need	for	short-term	profit	in	values	visible	to	the	market	and	as	generated	by	private	enterprises.	Capitalism	presents	a	second	important	series	of	filters,	but	before	looking	at	these,	it	should	be	remembered	that	the	capitalist	model	is	only	one	possible	form	of	economy,	and	its	current	form—based	on	growth	and	profit	maximization	in	a	global,	neoliberal	system—is	only	one	of	several	possible	models	of	capitalism	itself.	Steady-state	or	zero-growth	economic	models;	lower-carbon	local	economies;	non-hierarchical	economies	based	on	participatory	decision-																																								 																					
273	Robyn	Eckersley,	“Deliberative	democracy,	ecological	representation	and	risk:	Towards	a	democracy	of	the	affected,”	in	Michael	Saward	(ed)	Democratic	Innovation:	Deliberation,	
Representation	and	Association	(New	York,	NY:	Routledge,	2000),	119.		
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making	all	present	alternatives	that	could	continue	to	satisfy	economic	needs	while	addressing	the	urgent	need	to	decrease	GHG	emissions,	and	they	deserve	serious	attention	and	consideration.	The	filters	described	below	ensure	that	they	are	eliminated	and	solutions	consistent	with	the	goals	of	capital	remain.	In	a	neoliberal	era,	where	so	much	economic	decision-making	is	given	to	private	corporations,	these	filters	become	even	stronger.			
3.5	Private	Property	In	the	same	way	that	citizens	under	liberal	democracy	are	not	policymakers	but	just	voters	for	pre-selected	platforms,	citizens	under	capitalism	are	not	economic	planners	but	potential	consumers.	Private	productive	property	keeps	the	world’s	immense	industrial	productive	and	financial	resources	beyond	democratic	planning	(particularly	in	neoliberal	times	when	so	much	of	the	economy	has	been	privatized).	Under	capitalism,	private	property	regimes	over	society’s	means	of	production	shields	firms	from	citizens	collectively	determining	that	production	is	to	provide,	for	instance,	non-profit,	community	run	renewable	energy	infrastructure	or	affordable	and	efficient	public	transit,	nor	may	they	determine	that	the	economy’s	massive	economic	surplus	is	to	be	reinvested	in	a	massive	scale-up	of	renewable	energy	infrastructure.		In	a	2016	piece,	Bill	McKibben	argued	that	it	is	just	this	kind	of	response	governments	will	need	to	take	on	the	climate	crisis,	one	modelled	on	the	massive	state	planning	and	investment	that	characterized	wartime	production	during	World	War	II	under	President	Roosevelt.274	As	he	notes,	industry	initially	resisted	involvement,	and	it	took	orders	from	the	US	executive	branch	and	a	then-closely	allied	Congress	to	pressure	private	firms	to	deploy	their	productive	powers	in	the	war	effort.	That	suggests	one	possible	way	through	this	filter,	and	McKibben	wondered	if	a	Bernie	Sanders	presidency	could	have	created	conditions	for	that	wartime-like	mobilization	to	happen.	However,	in	the	absence	of	something	like	that																																									 																					
274	Bill	McKibben,	“A	World	at	War.”	
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occurring,	much	of	the	response	to	climate	change	will	remain	in	the	private	capitalist	sphere,	which	subjects	it	to	logics	that	create	the	still	another	filter,	to	which	we	now	turn.			
3.6	Constant	Growth	and	Profit	Maximization		Capitalism’s	need	for	perpetual	profit	and	growth	imposes	one	of	the	strongest	filters	to	solutions	to	climate	change.	While	this	filter	is	a	property	of	capitalism	itself,	its	power	and	extent	is	due	to	the	dominance	of	corporations	in	the	world	economy	(particularly	exacerbated	in	a	time	of	neoliberalism),	given	their	overwhelming	influence	over	major	investment,	production,	and	distribution	decisions.	For	a	solution	to	pass	through	this	filter,	it	must	satisfy	these	entities’	profit	requirement.	It	cannot,	in	other	words,	demand	a	fundamental	reorienting	or	reordering	of	the	economy	that	could	save	the	climate	but	at	the	expense	of	the	profit	system;	such	a	demand	would	be	rejected	outright	by	the	world’s	dominant	economic	institutions.				 Applied	to	the	complexities	of	capitalism,	this	filter	yields	complex	results.	Capital	is	not	a	homogeneous	block,	and	there	is	resistance	even	to	growth-	and	profit-friendly	solutions	to	climate	change	from	some	centres	of	capitalist	power,	most	notably	the	fossil	fuel	industry.275	But	regardless	of	the	splits	within	capital,	at																																									 																					
275	Oil	and	gas	majors	were	long	at	the	forefront	of	rejecting	market-based	emissions	trading	proposals,	the	ultimate	aim	of	which	is	to	move	consumers	away	from	their	carbon-emitting	products	to	low-	or	zero-carbon	ones.	Only	in	recent	years	have	they	shown	middling	support	for	mild	carbon	pricing,	contradicted	by	support	for	trade	associations	attempting	to	hamper	climate	action.	(See	InfluenceMap,	Big	Oil	and	the	Obstruction	of	Climate	Regulations,	2015.)	Capital’s	diverse	constitution	has	become	apparent	in	light	of	the	climate	challenge.	In	2009	the	U.S.	Chamber	of	Commerce	saw	an	internal	split	over	climate	change,	with	its	leadership	opposed	to	action	on	the	issue;	major	members	like	Apple	resigning	from	the	group	citing	the	Chamber’s	position	on	climate	change;	and	a	breakaway	group,	the	Chambers	for	Innovation	and	Clean	Energy	(CICE),	demanding	stronger	action	on	climate	change	from	within	the	Chamber’s	ranks	(see,	John	M.	Broder,	“Storm	Over	the	Chamber,”	New	York	Times,	November	18,	2009,	http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/	business/energy-environment/19CHAMBER.html?_r=1;	and	Josh	Harkinson,	“Breakaway	clean	energy	coalition	splits	US	Chamber	of	Commerce,”	Guardian,	August	4,	2010,	http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/	2010/aug/04/clean-energy-coalition-chamber-commerce).	Recently,	hundreds	of	US	firms	including	major	ones	like	Nike	and	Starbucks	have	urged	
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the	core	of	this	filter	lies	the	need	to	preserve	capitalist	modes	of	production,	designed	as	they	are	for	profit	and	growth,	and	all	solutions	to	climate	change	that	have	been	seriously	considered	at	state	and	international	levels	conform	to	this.	Carbon	taxes	and	emissions	trading	projects	would	work	to	give	price	signals	to	firms	and	consumers	to	switch	to	clean(er)	energy	sources,	but	otherwise	preserve	the	current	economic	system.	If	these	mechanisms	can	be	introduced	so	as	to	cause	minimal	perturbations	to	profit	and	growth,	they	will	receive	greater	support	from	capital,	but	at	the	cost	of	setting	weak	GHG	reduction	targets.	If	we	want	to	keep	growing,	we	cannot	put	too	high	a	price	on	carbon,	but	if	we	do	not	put	a	high	price	on	carbon,	we	reduce	the	incentives	to	move	away	from	fossil	fuels—hardly	a	harmless	paradox.	The	much-sought	after	but	not-yet-proven	industrial-scale	carbon	capture	and	storage	technologies	are	even	more	attractive	and	tantalizing	than	market-based	solutions,	allowing	capitalist	production	and	trade	to	continue	without	needing	to	change	energy	sources.	This	filter	also	explains	the	fascination	with	the	fantastical	and	risky	ideas	of	geo-engineering.	Meanwhile,	proposals	for	transitioning	to	a	variety	of	alternative	economic	systems	that	could	very	well	solve	the	problem—like	zero-growth	economies,	local	small-scale	systems,	or	models	that	use	non-market	valuation	systems—fail	to	enter	into	serious	policy	discussions.			 What	makes	all	of	this	particularly	problematic	is	that	perpetual	growth	requires	so	much	energy.	Abundant,	cheap,	and	energy-dense,	fossil	fuels	are	deeply	implicated	in	the	functioning	of	the	capitalist	system	as	illustrated	strikingly	in	the	wake	of	the	economic	crisis	when	GHG	emissions	decreased	1.3%	in	2009—the	first	decrease	in	a	decade.276	(It	was	only	over	the	last	three	years,	i.e.,	2014-2016,	that	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					President-elect	Donald	Trump	not	to	abandon	the	Paris	climate	agreement.	Hiroko	Tabuchi,	"U.S.	Companies	to	Trump:	Don’t	Abandon	Global	Climate	Deal,"	New	York	Times,	November	16,	2016,	http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/17/business/energy-environment/us-companies-to-trump-dont-abandon-global-climate-deal.html	276	Friedlingstein	et	al.,	“Update	on	CO2	emissions,”	Nature	Geoscience	3	(2010):	811.	doi:10.1038/ngeo1022.	The	decrease	in	emissions	was	actually	lower	than	expected	because	growth	
in	emerging	economies,	powered	by	significant	use	of	dirty	fossil	fuels,	added	GHGs	that	made	up	for	part	of	the	decrease	in	developed-country	emissions.		
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emissions	levels	flattened	without	a	decrease	in	global	economic	growth,277	though	a	considerable	part	of	this	is	due	to	a	switch	from	coal	to	natural	gas	powered	plants.)	Bear	in	mind	the	complexity	and	scale	of	the	tasks	this	new	energy	infrastructure	must	deal	with.	It	must	power	the	worldwide	extraction,	processing,	and	movement	of	natural	resources	in	their	manifold	forms;	commodity	manufacture,	assemblage,	and	transportation	through	production	chains	and	on	to	warehousing,	and	final	points	of	sale	across	the	globe	once	complete;	the	transportation	of	personnel	by	road,	rail,	or	air;	the	innumerable	servers	and	computers	coordinating	marketing	and	production,	processing	orders	and	shipments;	and	so	much	more.278		Attempting	to	reconcile	the	need	for	perpetual	economic	growth	with	the	need	for	very	cheap	and	very	abundant	energy	has	created	a	kind	of	trap,	one	that	works	like	this.	Under	this	system,	we	cannot	abandon	growth,	and	we	cannot	immediately	abandon	old	fossil	fuel	energy	technologies	without	abandoning	growth,	and	so	we	have	had	to	await	new	energy	infrastructure	and	technologies	that	cannot	just	replace	fossil	fuels,	but	provide	the	basis	for	increasing	available	energy	indefinitely.	Under	these	conditions,	it	is	perfectly	reasonable	to	ask	whether	this	high-energy	global	production	system,	much	of	it	dedicated	to	creating	wasteful																																									 																					
277	Natasha	Geiling,	“Declining	coal	means	flat	emissions	for	a	third	year	running,”	Think	
Progress,	November	14,	2016,	https://thinkprogress.org/global-carbon-emissions-flat-three-years-34b4f6b159bd#.uxh5m4d91	278	It	is	difficult	to	truly	conceive	of	the	massive	amount	of	energy	required	to	power	global	capitalist	production	in	all	its	complexity.	In	2013,	world	total	primary	energy	supply	was	13,555	million	tonnes	of	oil	equivalent	(with	13.5%	of	that	coming	from	renewables),	but	I	have	to	admit	that	is	a	figure	so	large	as	to	be	too	abstract	to	grasp.	(IEA,	Key	Renewables	Trends:	Excerpt	from	
‘Renewables	Information’	(IEA	2015),	3,	https://www.iea.org/	publications/freepublications/	publication/	RENTEXT2015_PARTIIExcerpt.pdf).	There	are	some	visualizations	that	perhaps	make	things	more	intelligible.	Ecofys	has	put	together	a	flowchart	(inspired	by	an	older	one	from	The	World	Resources	Institute)	visualizing	the	sources	of	greenhouse	gas	(coal,	oil,	gas,	and	direct	emissions	from	livestock,	land	use	change,	and	waste),	how	much	of	them	each	sector	of	the	economy	uses,	and	how	much	of	each	greenhouse	gas	(CO2,	methane,	etc.)	results.	(See	“World	Greenhouse	Gas	Emissions:	2000”	(World	Resources	Institute,	2000);	and	“World	GHG	Emissions	Flow	Chart	2010”	(Ecofys,	2013)	http://www.ecofys.com/en/news/updated-information-on-the-worlds-greenhouse-gas-emissions.		See	also	Andreas	Malm,	Fossil	Capital:	The	Rise	of	Steam	Power	and	the	Roots	of	Global	
Warming	(Brookly,	NY:	Verso,	2016)	279-292.	
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luxury	goods	(and	creating	want	for	them),	is	actually	required	for	people’s	wellbeing—but	that	is	not	a	question	that	is	compatible	with	capitalism.	Where	the	world	may	now	need	to	choose	between	capitalist	growth	and	a	safe	climate,	this	filter	ensures	that	the	only	solutions	being	considered	are	the	ones	insisting	that	these	are	not	mutually	exclusive	goals.	One	of	the	most	chilling	passages	I	came	across	was	written,	in	the	understated	style	characteristic	of	climate	science,	by	climate	modellers	Anderson	and	Bows:		There	is	now	little	to	no	chance	of	maintaining	the	rise	in	global	mean	surface	temperature	at	below	2°C,	despite	repeated	high-level	statements	to	the	contrary.	Moreover,	the	impacts	associated	with	2°C	have	been	revised	upwards	sufficiently	so	that	2°C	now	more	appropriately	represents	the	threshold	between	dangerous	and	extremely	dangerous	climate	change.279		They	were	forced	to	reach	this	conclusion	after	being	unable	to	find	greenhouse	gas	emission	reduction	scenarios	where	(1)	global	average	temperatures	did	not	rise	past	2°C,	(2)	where	advanced	industrial	countries’	emissions	peaked	first	to	give	developing	countries	additional	time	to	develop	with	cheap	fossil	fuels,	and	(3)	where	the	emissions	reduction	necessary	did	not	reduce	
economic	growth	below	acceptable	levels.	No	scenario	met	all	three	criteria.	(Worse,	the	2°C	limit	“there	is	now	little	to	no	chance”	of	meeting	is	probably	insufficient	to	prevent	dangerous	climate	change.)	What	is	more,	capitalist	solutions	to	climate	change	must	not	just	yield	profits,	but	must	also	do	so	in	the	short-term,	further	constraining	the	ultimate	range	of	solutions	considered	at	state	and	international	levels.	SunEdison	Inc.,	which	quickly	grew	to	become	the	world’s	largest	renewable	energy	developer	and	first	great	renewable	energy	success	story,	is	now	the	world’s	first	great	renewable	energy	bust,	filing	for	bankruptcy	in	early	2016.	Green-industry	press	was	careful	to	note	SunEdison’s	failure	was	due	to	poor	management	decisions,	not	to	an	inherent																																									 																					
279	Kevin	Anderson	and	Alice	Bows,	“Beyond	'dangerous'	climate	change:	emission	scenarios	for	a	new	world,”	Philosophical	Transactions	of	the	Royal	Society	(2011):	41.			
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failure	in	the	solar	industry.	But	this	misses	the	larger	point.	Switching	to	a	different	energy	system	has	species-survival	implications,	and	it	is	a	strange	thing	to	turn	so	much	of	that	task	over	to	entities	that	must	operate	on	a	model	yielding	high	short-term	shareholder	returns.	It	is	logically	similar	to	delaying	full	mobilization	against	an	invading	army	until	conditions	allow	capital	to	profit	in	the	process.			
3.7	Market	Valuation			What	is	the	value	of	a	safe	climate?	Of	the	continued	health	of	an	ecosystem	adapted	to	the	prevailing	climate?	Of	the	human	lives	and	livelihoods	that	will	be	disrupted,	even	destroyed,	by	the	effects	of	climate	change?	Capitalism	is	capable	of	determining	a	value	only	for	goods	and	services	that	are	exchanged	within	the	market,	and	so	answers	to	these	questions—which	are	now	hardly	trivial	or	merely	philosophical—are	largely	filtered	out	of	policy	discussions	about	solutions	to	climate	change;	by	virtue	of	not	passing	through	the	market,	these	values	are	rendered	invisible.			 This	has	important	effects.	The	2°C	target	actually	entails	damage	to	ecosystems,	serious	risks	of	extreme	weather	events,	and	even	the	onset	of	a	new	climate	regime—and	therefore	risks	for	vulnerable	human	and	non-human	communities.	The	choice	of	this	target	was	not	one	made,	then,	with	the	goal	of	avoiding	all	deleterious	effects	of	climate	change;	some	degree	of	climate	change	is	evidently	acceptable.	Implicit	in	this	choice	is	a	calculation	weighing	the	cost	to	the	global	(capitalist)	economy	of	curbing	GHG	emissions	against	the	cost	of	damages	from	not	curbing	them.	Cost-benefit	analyses	can,	alternatively,	attempt	to	determine	the	value	of	damage	avoided	by	action	on	climate	change.	But	whichever	of	these	alternatives	is	used,	any	such	analysis	under	a	market	framework	will	fail	to	capture	the	value	of	that	which	does	not	enter	into	the	market,	like	the	items	raised	in	the	questions	above.		
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	 	In	this	sense,	the	apparent	high	costs	to	the	economy	of	transitioning	very	
rapidly	to	clean	energy	technologies	or	drastically	reducing	growth	and	production	were	always	false—but,	unfortunately,	only	in	this	sense.	While	they	would	help	preserve	a	safe	climate,	and	the	ecosystems	and	communities	dependent	on	its	preservation—which	are	not	valueless,	but	quite	literally	invaluable,	beyond	our	capacity	to	value—solutions	like	these	do	in	fact,	under	the	current	market	valuation	
system,	have	a	higher	cost	relative	to	benefits	than	they	would	in	an	alternative	system	capable	of	recognizing	their	value,	and	are	thus	filtered	out.			
4.	Conclusion		In	the	introduction	of	this	dissertation	I	highlighted	what	I	called	a	“proviso	of	far-reaching	climate	justice.”	I	noted	that	the	climate	crisis	makes	the	continued	commitment	to	our	dominant	political	and	economic	institutions	open	to	challenge	and	transcendence	if	(1)	they	can	make	only	weak	claims	to	having	created	a	just	society	and	(2)	if	they	constrain	just	responses	to	the	climate	crisis.	I	believe	the	conceptual	model	I	presented	in	this	chapter	gives	good	cause	to	believe	condition	(2)	to	hold.		I	have	argued	that	the	narrow	range	and,	in	light	of	the	severity	of	the	crisis,	peculiar	character	of	solutions	to	the	climate	change	crisis	being	seriously	considered	at	state	and	international	levels—carbon	taxes,	emissions	trading,	and	regulations,	all	supported	by	technology	promotion	policies	meant	to	meet	too-weak	emissions	reductions	targets—are	a	result	of	the	normal	functioning	of	representative	democracy	and	capitalism,	liberalism’s	preferred	institutions	for	realizing	its	core	ethic,	which	impose	a	system	of	filters	through	which	any	solution	must	successfully	pass.	The	filters	created	by	representative	democracy	and	capitalism	do	not	have	as	their	singular	goal	the	ultimate	selection	of	the	best,	most	certain,	most	just	solutions	to	preserve	a	safe	climate.	Rather,	they	are	solutions	that	preserve	the	climate	largely	as	a	condition	of	preserving	the	capitalist	system	and	
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the	political	fortunes	of	those	governing	elites	tasked	with	enacting	those	policies.	These	policies	have	not	been	democratically	selected	in	any	participatory	sense,	entail	little	risk	to	the	fortunes	of	political	representatives,	and	are	consistent	with	capitalism’s	need	for	short-term	profits	for	private	owners	in	values	visible	in	the	market.	This	system	of	filters	also	serves	to	diminish	the	degree	of	direct	support	a	population	can	give	to	any	of	the	solutions.	Because	of	them,	the	kind	of	binding	and	just	climate	deal	demanded	under	climate-justice-as-climate-ethics	does	not	materialize	and	neither	do	the	more	ambitious	and	complex	demands	for	accountability	made	by	the	climate	movement.		In	the	next	chapter,	I	show	that	condition	(1)	of	the	proviso,	that	liberalism	can	make	only	weak	claims	to	having	established	a	just	society,	holds	as	well.	Even	if	it	could	somehow	succeed	in	preventing	dangerous	climate	change,	the	society	that	a	climate	response	along	liberal	lines	would	usher	in	carries	forward	several	significant	problems	into	a	post-carbon	world	and	responses	from	alternative	frameworks	can	make	stronger	claims	to	building	a	more	just	society	while	also	working	around	some	of	the	liberalism’s	filters.					
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V.	Climate	Justice	as	Just	Society		
1.	Three	Climate	Kōans	We	saw	in	the	previous	chapter	that,	through	the	assurances	offered	by	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy,	liberal	theory	makes	claims	to	having	resolved	the	biggest	problems	in	realizing	a	just	society	and	offering	the	best	humankind	can	achieve.	At	the	outset	of	this	chapter,	let	us	(briefly)	try	to	imagine	the	outlines	of	that	liberal	order	projected	forward	in	time,	the	future	of	the	end	of	history.		For	the	sake	of	argument,	let	us	be	charitable	and	assume	a	scenario	in	which	liberal	solutions	actually	stave	off	the	truly	catastrophic.	What	would	the	world	on	the	other	side	of	the	climate	crisis	look	like	if	we	solve	it	using	the	full	complement	of	liberal	solutions,	but	also	accept	the	logic	it	preserves?	What	is	a	post-carbon	world	raised	in	the	cradle	of	a	liberal	order?	And,	if	the	solutions	permissible	under	the	liberal	framework	save	the	planet	but	lock	in	an	unjust	society,	why	should	we	pursue	the	response	under	that	framework?	Let	us	approach	these	questions	by	briefly	identifying	three	evocative	problems	to	use	to	contemplate	dimensions	of	the	liberal	response	to	be	wary	about.	They	are	a	bit	like	kōans,	puzzles	meant	to	break	the	spell	of	accepted	wisdom,	in	this	case	the	wisdom	suggesting	that	a	sufficient	response	to	climate	change	needs	only	swap	fossil	fuel	energy	for	renewable	energy.	If	resolving	climate	change	is	understood	as	an	effort	to	do	only	that	instead	of	an	effort	to	redefine	how	we	live—if	we	fail	to	see	the	injustices	climate	change	reveals—there	is	a	risk	of	carrying	over	some	serious	problems	into	the	world	on	the	other	side	of	the	climate	crisis.	All	told,	the	kōans	warn	of	a	future	of	continued	alienation,	empty	commodity	consumption,	continued	non-democratic	control	over	the	economy,	and	diminishment	of	non-human	nature	that	is	not	subject	to	the	logic	of	the	liberal	order.		These	problems	arise	from	the	fact	that,	far	from	being	transformative,	the	solutions	that	the	liberal	system	seems	ready	to	accept	commit	us	uncritically	to	a	
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near-status	quo.	Together,	the	kōans	sound	a	warning	about	the	intersection	of	liberal	democracy,	capitalism,	and	the	logic	to	which	they	will	subject	advances	in	clean	technology.	Nothing	about	the	most	dominant	solutions	shows	any	break	from	economic	patterns	that	were	already	driving	the	ecological	crisis	before	climate	change	came	on	the	scene.	Nothing	about	them	shows	any	inherent	system-	transformative	or	emancipatory	quality.		What	this	suggests	is	that	when	movements	push	for	clean	energy	technologies,	they	need	to	be	cautious	how	they	do	so.	Renewable	energy	acts	as	a	kind	of	common	denominator	unintentionally	linking	opposed	political	projects.	Demands	for	renewable	energy	with	the	intention	that	it	will	be	system	transforming	merge	easily	with	demands	for	renewable	energy	that	are	system	preserving	because	the	technologies	are	the	same	in	either	case.	The	key	difference	is	who	controls	decisions	over	the	production	of	those	technologies	and	the	logic	those	decisions	are	embedded	within,	which	will	determine	what	the	energy	they	provide	will	be	used	for.	As	they	are	processed	by	the	liberal	complex’s	machinery,	existing	power	relations	channel	the	call	for	renewable	energy	towards	system-preserving	ends.			
Kōan	1:	Fossil-Free	Alienation	Under	the	liberal	order,	renewable	energy	must	preserve	the	project	of	perpetual	economic	growth.	But	just	what	does	that	economic	project	do	for	workers,	many	of	whom	lead	work	lives	characterized	by	dissatisfaction,	precarity,	and	a	sense	of	purposelessness?280	A	fossil-free	transition	can	still	lead	to	a	world	of	fossil-free																																									 																					
280	The	2013	Gallup	global	report	on	job	satisfaction	gives	a	window	into	that	system.	The	report	places	workers	into	3	categories	depending	on	level	of	satisfaction	at	work:	1)	the	engaged,	who	are	passionate	and	connected	to	their	company;	2)	the	not	engaged,	who	are	unhappy	or	“checked	out”	and	“sleepwalk”	through	the	workday,	dedicating	neither	energy	nor	passion,	just	time;	and	3)	the	actively	disengaged,	who	seek	to	undermine	or	damage	their	companies	through	theft,	sabotage,	or	absence.	Globally	just	13%	of	workers	were	actively	engaged	in	their	jobs.	The	closest	the	world	came	to	a	workers’	paradise	was	in	Canada	and	the	US	where	fewer	than	one	in	three	people	(30%)	were	among	the	engaged—that	is,	those	actually	enjoying	the	activity	that	occupies	most	of	their	time	and	the	most	productive	years	of	their	lives,	and	that	they	spent	their	formative	years	preparing	for.	Bleak,	certainly,	but	that	was	nothing	compared	to	East	Asia	where	the	
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alienation	and	a	fossil-free	dystopia.	This	dystopia	is	a	place	where	the	response	to	climate	change	fails	to	include	within	it	any	measures	to	address	quality	of	work	life	under	capitalism.	Here,	the	energy	transition	opens	up	employment	in	the	green	jobs	sector,	which	absorbs	workers	facing	diminishing	job	prospects	in	the	fossil	fuel	sector.	But	workers	here	and	in	other	sectors	do	not,	as	a	rule,	gain	greater	control	over	their	conditions	of	work;	nothing	like	widespread	economic	democracy	in	the	workplace	comes	about,	and	people	remain	actively	disengaged,	unchallenged	and	unappreciated	in	their	work,	or	perhaps	they	are	overstressed,	dealing	with	bosses	from	hell	serving	at	all	costs	the	profit	imperative.	Pollution-free	electric	cars	drive	workers	on	long	commutes	to	hated	jobs.	In	constant	precarity,281	workers	search	desperately	for	the	next	temporary	contract	job	on	employment	websites	hosted	on	servers	powered	by	renewables,	just	like	the	computers	that	carry	out	job-destroying	automation.	The	global	division	of	labour	in	commodity	production	retains	its	current	structure.	Sunlight	powers	the	panels	on	the	roofs	of	the	sweatshops	northern	corporations	outsource	their	operations	to.	Renewable	energy	saves	human	civilization,	but	is	it	the	version	of	civilization	we	wanted	saved?		 	
	
	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					system	of	growth	has	provided	a	whopping	6%	of	workers	with	jobs	they	enjoy	but	26%	with	jobs	they	actively	disengaged	from.	Gallup,	State	of	the	Global	Workplace:	Employee	Engagement	Insights	
for	Business	Leaders	Worldwide	(2013);	Steve	Crabtree,	“Worldwide,	13%	of	Employees	Are	Engaged	at	Work,”	Gallup,	October	8,	2013,	http://www.gallup.com/poll/165269/worldwide-employees-engaged-work.aspx	281	Guy	Standing	has	probably	done	the	most	to	draw	attention	to	the	class-in	the-making	he	calls	the	precariat.	The	precariat	has	several	defining	characteristics:	insecure	jobs	interspersed	with	periods	of	unemployment;	diminishing	access	to	non-wage	income	and	benefits	and	to	state-guaranteed	rights;	a	lack	of	occupational	identity	and	control	over	time;	detachment	from	labour;	low	social	mobility;	over	qualification;	and	high	levels	of	uncertainty	(Guy	Standing,	A	Precariat	Charter:	
From	Denizens	to	Citizens	(New	York,	NY:	Bloomsbury,	2014),	16-28).	To	be	part	of	the	precariat	is	to	experience	the	“four	A’s”:	anger	(at	how	the	ways	for	improving	chances	at	a	meaningful	life	are	blocked),	anxiety	(due	to	high	employment	and	income	insecurity),	anomie	(a	listlessness	due	to	a	sense	of	constant	defeat),	and	alienation	(due	to	leading	an	existence	for	someone	else).	Hardly	some	insubstantial	proto-class,	Standing	estimates	the	precariat	occupies	about	a	quarter	of	the	adult	population	in	many	countries.	Standing,	The	Precariat,	33-41.		
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Kōan	2:	The	Problem	of	the	Solar-Powered	Invisible	Hand	Renewable	energy	is	making	impressive	market	gains,	and	those	successes	are	bringing	to	prominence	a	particular	discourse	to	be	wary	of.	282	A	2015	CBC	news	item,	“How	market	forces	are	winning	the	climate	change	battle,”	is	a	telling	example.283	Its	writer’s	starting	point	is	that	2014	was	the	first	time	ever	that	the	global	economy	grew	without	a	corresponding	growth	in	GHG/CO2	emissions,	a	triumph	of	the	entrance	of	renewables	into	the	market	and	(thanks	to	the	their	fall																																									 																					
282	See,	e.g.,	Joe	Romm,	“You’ll	Never	Believe	How	Cheap	New	Solar	Power	Is,”	Think	
Progress,	July	18,	2016,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2016/07/18/3797907/solar-energy-miracle-charts/;	Ed	King,	“Solar	is	now	cheaper	than	coal,	says	India	energy	minister,“	Climate	
Change	News,	April	18,	2016,	http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/04/18/solar-is-now-cheaper-than-coal-says-india-energy-minister/?utm_source=Daily+Carbon+Briefing&utm_campaign	=81551b9fc5-cb_daily&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_876aab4fd7-81551b9fc5-303423917;	Fiona	Harvey,	“Global	coal	and	gas	investment	falls	to	less	than	half	that	in	clean	energy,”	Guardian,	March	24,	2016,	http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/mar/24/global-coal-and-gas-investment-falls-to-less-than-half-that-in-clean-energy	283	Don	Pittis,	“How	market	forces	are	winning	the	climate	change	battle,”	CBC	News,	March	17,	2015,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/how-market-forces-are-winning-the-climate-change-battle-1.2996818.		And	there	are	further	examples.	“Far	from	posing	a	fundamental	problem	to	capitalism,”	climate	economists	Gernot	Wagner	and	Martin	L.	Weitzman	write,	“it’s	capitalism	with	all	its	innovative	and	entrepreneurial	powers	that	is	our	only	hope	of	steering	clear	of	the	looming	climate	shock.”	Climate	Shock:	The	Economic	Consequences	of	a	Hotter	Planet	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2014),	151.	The	Director-General	of	the	International	Renewable	Energy	Agency	penned	a	piece	in	The	
Guardian	promising	continued	GDP	growth	on	into	the	future.	As	he	put	it,	“For	many	years,	climate	action	was	synonymous	with	sacrifice.	It	was	a	matter	of	what	countries	and	individuals	would	have	to	“give	up”	to	reduce	emissions	and	save	the	planet.	Now,	thanks	in	part	to	the	growing	business	case	for	renewable	energy,	climate	action	is	increasingly	being	seen	as	a	means	to	create	jobs,	boost	GDP	growth,	and	improve	livelihoods,	even	in	oil	rich	countries.	In	this	context,	there	really	is	no	choice	to	make.”	Adnan	Z.	Amin,	“Renewables	are	changing	the	climate	narrative	from	sacrifice	to	opportunity,”	Guardian,	November	19,	2015,	https://www.theguardian.com/environment/	2015/nov/19/renewables-are-changing-the-climate-narrative-from-sacrifice-to-opportunity.		The	Senior	Advisor	for	Climate	Change,	Energy	and	Environment	to	former	Australian	Prime	Minister	Julia	Gillard	wrote	a	similarly	sanguine	piece	about	capitalist	forces	and	climate	change	in	
The	Guardian.	As	she	puts	it,	“It	might	seem	deflating	or	unethical,	but	someone	has	to	get	rich	reducing	carbon	pollution.	Just	as	new	business	models	developed	with	the	end	of	the	African	slave	trade	or	the	introduction	of	water	restrictions,	threats	to	vested	interests	are	opportunities	for	others.	The	particularly	good	news	in	the	case	of	climate	change	is	that	a	lot	of	that	money	is	going	to	be	made	bringing	clean	energy	to	people	who	don’t	have	it	today	or	reducing	the	amount	of	energy	the	rest	of	us	use.	That	means	solar	powered	lights	in	Africa,	electric	buses	in	Brazil,	cleaner	cookstoves	in	Cambodia,	and	yes,	some	fat	banker	bonuses	in	London,	Songdo	and	Beijing.”	Gabrielle	Kuiper,	"It	might	seem	unethical	but	someone	has	to	get	rich	fighting	climate	change,”	Guardian,	February	5,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/feb/05/it-might-seem-unethical-but-someone-has-to-get-rich-fighting-climate-change.	
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in	price)	their	growing	role	in	providing	energy.	He	tells	us,	“The	great	thing	is	that	the	capitalists	aren't	just	doing	it	for	the	sake	of	the	planet,	though	that	may	be	part	of	the	personal	motivation	for	those	who	work	at	these	companies.	They	are	in	it	for	the	profit.”	Notice	the	logic:	there	is	no	need	to	trust	people’s	moral	motivations,	always	fallible;	the	invisible	hand	is	what	is	truly	reliable	and	will	come	through,	as	ever.	One	hears	echoes	of	Adam	Smith:	It	is	not	by	the	benevolence	of	the	solar-panel	
entrepreneur,	the	wind-turbine	maker,	or	the	battery	manufacturers	that	we	expect	
our	daily	clean	energy…	Let	us	call	this,	then,	the	problem	of	the	solar-powered	invisible	hand.	Its	point	is	to	draw	attention	to	how,	as	they	take	on	an	increasingly	large	and	legitimized	role	in	the	climate	response,	capitalist	market	forces	sideline	alternative	responses.	Those	alternatives	often	hold	an	emancipatory	potential,	but	require	democratic	participation	in	determining	the	nature	of	a	more	sustainable	and	just	economy	and	society,	a	matter	I	turn	to	in	the	later	part	of	this	chapter.		The	possibilities	created	by	carbon-free	capitalism	detract	from	that	possibility	and	recast	the	moral	narrative	about	climate	change	in	a	way	that	complements	the	liberal	consensus	about	minimizing	systemic	changes	to	take	on	climate	change.	Industrial	leaders	with	a	bold	enough	vision	to	do	what	is	right	can	tap	into	humanity’s	infinitely	plastic	genius	to	bring	to	the	market	the	futuristic	technologies	that	will	save	us—and	they	can	do	so	competitively.	They	offer	people	hope,	not	through	the	ability	to	collectively	make	decisions	about	economies,	but	through	more	depoliticized	avenues	like	engineering	and	entrepreneurship.284	And																																									 																					
284	Consider	the	remarks	of	Shawn	Otto,	science	author	and	public	advocate	for	science	in	politics	who	organized	the	first	scientific	debate	between	American	Presidential	candidates	in	2008	(emphases	mine).	“Honestly,	I	think	we’re	past	the	point	where	the	climate	is	going	to	be	like	it	is	now.	Even	if	we	stopped	emitting	right	now,	we’ve	got	a	hundred	years	of	climate	change	already	built	in.	The	Earth’s	climate	system	has	so	much	inertia	that	it’s	like	the	Titanic	and	we’re	paddling	with	canoe	paddles	to	try	and	avoid	that	iceberg	[…]	But	what	makes	me	hopeful	is	things	like	Tesla,	engineering.	[…]	I	bought	a	Tesla	even	though	I	can’t	really	afford	it,	but	I	can’t	really	afford	not	to.	Because	I	think	that	science	and	technology	broke	that	zero-sum	game	from	Thomas	Hobbes’	time	when	he	wrote	essentially	that	without	a	common	authority	men	fell	into	war	and	that	for	me	to	get	
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maybe	side-by-side	with	a	government	willing	to	apply	a	carbon	tax	(and	even	some																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					ahead	in	economics	I’d	have	to	take	from	you	somehow.	Science	changed	that	and	we	are	still	thinking	in	terms	of	what	we	will	lose	in	order	to	solve	the	climate	change	problem.	And	I	think	that	we—and	by	“we”	I	mean	scientists,	I	mean	environmental	groups,	and	I	think	society	at	large—have	to	really	start	communicating	in	terms	of	what	we	gain.	And	what	we	gain	for	instance	with	Tesla	is	a	faster,	higher	performing	car	that	has	no	carbon	pollution,	and	that’s	worth	a	whole	lot	as	far	as	an	investment	goes.	And	those	kinds	of	things,	that	capacity	of	the	human	imagination	to	solve	problems,	to	invent	our	way	out	of	this,	is	where	I	think	our	future	will	be	saved.”	Shawn	Otto.	“Science	Under	Siege.	Part	3.”	CBC	Ideas	(Audio).	Otto	made	these	remarks	in	a	CBC	Ideas	podcast	on	the	deepening	of	scientific	illiteracy	and	the	underfunding	and	muzzling	of	scientists,	where	he	is	positioned	as	the	measured	voice	of	reason.			Note	how	for	Otto	the	climate	crisis,	far	from	requiring	us	to	think	about	whether	a	good	life	can	be	achieved	with	less,	is	best	tackled	by	emphasizing	how	much	more	we	get	out	of	the	response—new,	futuristic	commodities	that	we	“can’t	really	afford	not	to”	buy—thanks	to	science	and	technology.	Tesla	is	a	symbol	of	hope.	It	gives	people	an	example	to	fixate	on,	to	show	that	maybe	we	really	can	“invent	our	way	out	of	this.”		It	is	perhaps	too	much	of	a	digression	to	pursue	in	full,	but	it	is	worth	mentioning	that,	in	the	response	to	climate	change,	Tesla	is	perhaps	the	preeminent	example	of	where	capitalism	intersects	with	that	current	of	liberalism	concerned	with	scientific	and	technical	advancement.	For	the	futurologist	and	the	technophile,	it	offers	much	to	get	excited	about,	standing	as	the	model	of	all	the	right	kinds	of	progress.	MIT	even	declared	it	2015’s	smartest	corporation	in	the	world	(“50	Smartest	Companies	2015,”	MIT	Technology	Review,	http://www.technologyreview.	com/lists/companies/2015/).	Tesla	product	showcases—like	the	one	for	its	PowerWall	home	energy	storage	system	in	spring	of	2015—are	greeted	with	media	coverage	and	fanfare	similar	to	the	ones	Apple	receives.	Its	Model	S	luxury	sedan	receives	universal	praise	from	car	reviewers	and	aficionados.	It	comes	with	proto	self-driving	capabilities	and	its	performance	can	be	upgraded	through	over-the-air	software	updates.	There	are	scores	of	YouTube	videos	of	the	Model	S	P85D	beating	upscale	fossil	fuel	sports	cars	in	drag	races.		Tesla’s	popularity	is	not	only	due	to	clever	marketing	or	high-quality	products,	but	also	its	humble	and	charismatic	young	visionary	CEO,	multi-billionaire	entrepreneur	Elon	Musk	who	has	a	devoted	following	and	fanship.	(For	a	good	example	of	the	kind	of	praise	Musk	generates,	see	the	multi-part	series	on	Musk	(which	Musk	commissioned)	by	Tim	Urban	on	the	blog	Wait	But	Why.	For	part	1,	see	Tim	Urban,	“Elon	Musk:	The	World’s	Raddest	Man,”	Wait	But	Why,	May	7,	2015,	http://waitbutwhy.com/2015/05/elon-musk-the-worlds-raddest-man.html).	He	has	expressed	worries	about	the	fate	of	the	planet,	noting	that	humanity	is	conducting	“the	dumbest	experiment	in	history,	by	far”	by	continuing	to	use	fossil	fuels,	and	sees	Tesla	(which	in	summer	2016	announced	plans	to	acquire	Musk’s	other	company	SolarCity,	the	largest	installer	of	residential	rooftop	solar	panels	in	the	US)	as	his	contribution	to	ending	that	experiment.	Musk	has	also	been	calling	for	a	carbon	tax	alongside	a	“popular	uprising”	against	the	fossil	fuel	industry.	See	Stephen	Lacey,	“The	Benefits	and	Drawbacks	of	Tesla’s	Plan	to	Acquire	SolarCity,”	Greentech	Media,	June	21,	2016,	https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/The-Benefits-and-Drawbacks-of-Teslas-Proposed-Acquisition-of-SolarCity;	Jason	Koebler,	“Elon	Musk:	Burning	Fossil	Fuels	Is	the	'Dumbest	Experiment	in	History,	By	Far',”	Motherboard,	March	26,	2015,	http://motherboard.vice.com/read/elon-musk-burning-fossil-fuels-is-the-dumbest-experiment-in-history-by-far;	Lenore	Taylor,	“Elon	Musk	says	robust	carbon	tax	would	speed	global	clean	energy	transition,”	Guardian,	December	3,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/	environment/2015/	dec/03/elon-musk-says-robust-carbon-tax-would-speed-global-clean-energy-transition;	and	Rafi	Letzter,	"Elon	Musk	thinks	we	need	a	'popular	uprising'	against	the	fossil	fuel	industry,"	Business	Insider,	November	3,	2016,	http://www.businessinsider.com/elon-musk-popular-uprising-climate-change-fossil-fuels-2016-11.			
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corporate	subsidies),	they	will	defeat,	in	the	market	arena,	the	sectors	of	capitalism	that	are	attempting	to	keep	us	addicted	to	fossil	fuels	and	the	destructive	technologies	of	the	past.	What	climate	change	revealed	about	capitalism	and	the	need	for	those	projects	that	are	emancipatory	and	simultaneously	respect	ecological	limits	(see	Kōan	3	below)	gets	obscured.	Instead,	it	is	as	though	all	along	the	problem	was	that	not	enough	billionaire	entrepreneurs	were	given	the	right	incentives	to	invent	and	sell	us	citizens-cum-consumers	the	right	commodities.	To	be	sure,	the	issue	is	not	that	clean-tech	entrepreneurs	should	not	play	a	role	in	the	climate	response.	Rather	it’s	that	in	legitimizing	a	large	and	prominent	role	to	corporate	actors,	the	problem	of	climate	change	is	reduced,	simplified,	evacuated,	to	one	in	which	it	is	difficult	to	find	any	other	real	role	left	for	democracy	or	politics—or	justice—in	envisioning	and	creating	a	new	and	more	sustainable	economy	and	society.			
Kōan	3:	The	Global	Manhattan		In	his	book	investigating	whether	and	under	what	conditions	political	liberalism	can	be	made	environmentally	sustainable,	Marcel	Wissenburg	evokes	a	striking	image:	the	“Global	Manhattan”	(without	the	Central	Park).	A	Global	Manhattan	would	be	the	result	of	people	preferring,	as	part	of	their	freely	chosen	plans	of	life,	built	human	systems	over	natural	ones—a	full	or	extreme	substitution	of	nature—so	long	as	those	artificial	systems	sustainably	meet	human	needs.	And,	theoretically,	it	is	perfectly	compatible	with	liberal-democratic	principles,	Wissenburg	tells	us,	as	long	as	that	world	is	selected	by	people’s	non-coerced	preferences.285		We	can	anticipate	two	logics	under	the	liberal	order	that	could	open	the	path	to	the	Global	Manhattan,	a	world	depleted	of	non-human	nature.	First,	fossil	fuels	allowed	for	a	historically	unprecedented	era	of	economic	growth	predicated	on																																									 																					
285	Marcel	Wissenburg,	Green	Liberalism:	The	Free	and	the	Green	Society	(UCL	Press,	1998),	chapter	9.		
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wasteful	and	environmentally	unsustainable	commodity	production	and	consumption,	now	on	a	global	scale.	But,	rather	than	eliminate	this	logic,	the	liberal	transition	to	a	post-carbon	era	seeks	ways	to	renewably	power	it.	If	successful,	it	will	carry	over	into	a	post-carbon	era	as	much	of	the	current	society	as	possible—even	that	which	was	part	of	the	high-consumption,	high-energy	economic	patterns	of	excess	and	waste	already	driving	the	ecological	crisis	before	climate	change.286		Second,	we	should	anticipate	that	the	liberal	order	might	seek	to	address	climate	change	through	capital-intensive	technologies	that	replace	ecological	services.	In	the	realm	of	adaptation,	we	see	it	in	projects	like	a	California	desalination	plant	designed	to	increase	water	supply	as	its	glaciers	dry	and	it	experiences	more	frequent	and	severe	droughts.287	In	the	realm	of	mitigation,	we																																									 																					
286	An	earlier	draft	referred	to	this	as	the	problem	of	the	electric	race	car.	There	are	few	better	examples	of	carbon-fuelled	waste	and	excess	than	automotive	racing	and	the	larger	car	culture	it	belongs	to,	and	yet	there	are	signs	that	both	are	in	the	process	of	being	rescued	from	the	chopping	block.	The	point	of	this	koan	was	not	to	single	out	racers	or	car	aficionados	but	rather	to	draw	attention	to	a	powerful	symbol	allowing	one	to	reflect	upon	a	broad,	ongoing	approach	to	the	climate	crisis.	Because	the	race	car	is	a	kind	of	“apex	luxury”	of	the	fossil	fuel	era,	the	problem	it	generates	is	inclusive	of	other,	less	extreme	luxuries.	If	something	as	eminently	expendable	as	a	race	car	is	to	be	part	of	the	post-carbon	society,	then	there	is	no	reason	that	even	more	mundane	commodities	shouldn’t	be	(discount-priced	airfare	for	long-distance	vacations	to	all-inclusive	resorts	quarantined	from	the	local	population,	for	instance.)	The	electric	race	car	is	thus	a	powerful	emblem	of	a	desire	to	sacrifice	nothing.	Instead	of	seeing	in	the	climate	crisis	a	need	to	rapidly	expand	affordable	public	transit,	the	electric	race	car	gives	us	the	reassurance	that	if	its	kind	of	excess	is	still	possible	and	permissible	even	more	minor	excesses	are	too.	With	it	comes	the	rest	of	cult	of	the	personal	automobile.	BMW,	automaker	to	the	elite,	is	reportedly	planning	on	making	an	all-electric	version	of	its	luxury	i8	(currently	only	a	hybrid).	Porsche—automaker	to	the	super-elite—expects	to	have	a	high-performance	electric	car	in	production	by	2019.	Audi	plans	to	release	a	luxury	electric	model	every	year	starting	in	2018.	Tesla,	the	future-bringer	corporation,	has	adopted	a	different	profit-making	strategy,	seeking	to	roll	out	electric	cars	for	the	middle	class	in	a	few	years	following	sales	to	an	upper	stratum	of	consumers.	It	expects	to	produce	half	a	million	cars	by	2018,	a	million	by	2020.	Alice	Truong,	“Porsche	is	showing	off	an	electric	sports	car	that	could	take	on	Tesla,”	Quartz,	September	14,	2015,	http://qz.com/501986/porsche-is-showing-off-an-electric-sports-car-that-could-take-on-tesla/;	Kirsten	Korosec,	"Audi	Plans	to	Launch	a	New	Electric	Vehicle	Model	Every	Year,"	Fortune,	May	12,	2016,	http://fortune.com/2016/05/12/audi-plans-to-launch-a-new-electric-vehicle-model-every-year/;	Kshitiz	Goliya	and	Alexandria	Sage,	"Tesla	puts	pedal	to	the	metal,	500,000	cars	planned	in	2018,"	Reuters,	http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tesla-results-idUSKCN0XV2JL		287	HyrdroRevolution,	a	subsidiary	project	of	private	water	producing	firm	WaterFX,	is	a	commercial	desalination	plant	that	earned	some	media	buzz	in	the	midst	of	California’s	recent	years-long	drought.	Unlike	other	desalination	projects,	HyrdroRevolution	is	entirely	solar	powered,	meaning	we	can	adapt	to	climate	change	without	adding	to	the	crisis.	Projected	to	generate	1.6	billion	gallons	of	fresh	water	per	year	from	salinated	irrigation	drainage—enough	for	10,000	homes	or	
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will	see	more	“negative	emissions”	technologies,	industrial-scale	technologies	that	strip	the	atmosphere	of	excess	carbon,	which	have	increased	in	prominence	as	it	has	become	clear	the	world	is	going	to	blow	past	the	carbon	budget.288	By	legitimizing	the	application	of	private	technologies	to	control	climate,	they	open	possibilities	for	technologies	that	operate	on	a	larger,	planetary-scale:	geoengineering.	For	now,	there	is	much	trepidation	about	it,	even	among	liberal	voices,289	but	geoengineering	technologies	are	merely	a	change	of	scale,	not	kind,	and	their	application	is	consistent	with	this	logic.		The	spectre	of	the	Global	Manhattan	urges	a	reconsideration	of	the	consequences	of	responding	to	climate	change	primarily	through	technology	in	a	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					2,000	acres	of	cropland—HydroRevolution	is	a	sterling	example	of	a	kind	of	approach	to	the	climate	crisis	that	we	should	pay	attention	to.	It	is	an	approach	that	makes	a	badly	desired	promise	while	suppressing	the	larger	warning	climate	change	sounds	about	the	system	at	the	root	of	the	crisis:	technology	can	substitute	for	important	ecosystem	services	whose	capacity	has	been	overshot,	in	this	case,	by	an	irrational,	wasteful	commercial	agriculture	system	already	stressed	even	before	the	loss	of	California’s	glaciers.	Ari	Phillips,	“Have	You	Heard	Of	Solar	Desalination?	If	Not,	You	Will	Soon,”	
Think	Progress,	July	23,	2015,	http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2015/07/23/3682598/first-commercial-solar-desalination-plant-in-california;	In	September,	2015,	it	began	offering	shares.	See	Derek	Markham,	“California’s	First	Commercial	Solar	Desalination	Plant	Offering	Shares	Through	DPO,”	Clean	Technica,	September	10,	2015,	http://cleantechnica.com/2015/09/10/californias-first-commercial-solar-desalination-plant-offering-shares-through-dpo/	288	For	some	discussion	on	negative	emissions,	see	Kevin	Anderson,	“Duality	in	Climate	Science,”	Nature	Geoscience	8	(2015):	898-900;	Andy	Skuse,	“The	Road	to	Two	Degrees,	Part	One:	Feasible	Emissions	Pathways,	Burying	our	Carbon,	and	Bioenergy,”	Skeptical	Science,	November	16,	2015,	http://www.skepticalscience.com/TRTTDRCP26.html;	"Explainer:	10	ways	‘negative	emissions’	could	slow	climate	change,"	Carbon	Brief,	April	11,	2016,	https://www.carbonbrief.org/	explainer-10-ways-negative-emissions-could-slow-climate-change;	James	Hansen	et	al.,	“Young	People’s	Burden:	Requirement	of	Negative	CO2	Emissions,”	Earth	System	Dynamics	(Discussion	Paper)	(2016);	Simon	Evans,	“UK	launches	‘world	first’	research	programme	into	negative	emissions,”	Carbon	Brief,	April	21,	2017,	https://www.carbonbrief.org/uk-launches-world-first-research-programme-into-negative-emissions?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+carbonbrief+%28The+Carbon+Brief%29	For	Tim	Flannery,	author	of	The	Weathermakers,	one	of	the	all-time	most	popular	mass-market	books	written	on	climate	change,	it	is	these	industrial	carbon	removal	technologies	that	gave	him	hope	after	a	long	period	of	despairing	that	the	world	could	not	resolve	the	climate	crisis.	Tyler	Hamilton,	“Finding	hope	within	the	doom	and	gloom	of	climate	change,”	Toronto	Star,	October	28,	2015,	https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2015/10/28/finding-hope-within-the-doom-and-gloom-of-climate-change.html	289	Joe	Romm,	“Anti-‘Geoengineering’	National	Academy	Report	Opposes	‘Climate-Altering	Deployment’,”	Think	Progress,	February	10,	2015,	https://thinkprogress.org/anti-geoengineering-national-academy-report-opposes-climate-altering-deployment-bc1cf14fbd2d#.df7qa1d0g	
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liberal	order,	which	has	very	few	limits	on	how	much	of	the	natural	world	can	fall	under	its	logic.	It	presents	a	warning	of	what	might	occur	if	the	belief	persists	that	the	good	life	is	achieved	through	consuming	the	excesses	of	production	under	liberal	capitalist	modernity	and	if	those	excesses	can	only	be	sustained	at	the	cost	of	natural	systems	and	their	substitution	with	built	systems.	In	other	words,	it	gives	a	sense	of	what	world	might	exist	if	dominant	political	and	economic	institutions	cannot	recognize	a	non-instrumental	value	to	non-human	nature—the	world	to	be	expected	under	the	reigning	liberal	order.		 *	 *	 *			 Together,	the	three	kōans	raise	questions	about	what	kind	of	future	will	be	realized	under	the	liberal	order	even	if	the	climate	crisis	is	resolved.	They	suggest	that	the	world	would	carry	over	onto	the	other	side	of	the	climate	crisis	a	search	for	the	good	life	through	commodity	consumption	requiring	rapacious	resource	development;	the	legitimacy	of	corporate	control	over	production	and	distribution	of	goods;	work	lives	without	meaning;	continued	encroachment	on	natural	limits;	and	the	notion	that	technology	development	and	application	outside	of	democratic	control	can	save	us	from	it	all.	It	is	a	dynamic	predicated	on	a	vision	that	has	no	concept	of	sufficiency,	no	final	vision	of	where	progress	and	development	are	supposed	to	take	us,	no	end.	Rather,	there	is	a	state	of	perpetual	anticipation	of	breaking	through	new	technological	frontiers,	which	is	another	way	of	saying	there	is	constant	dissatisfaction	with	what	we	are,	what	we	know,	what	we	have,	what	our	bodies	can	do,	where	we	can	go	when	we	want.	But	climate	change,	properly	responded	to,	could	be	an	opportunity	to	put	this	dissatisfaction	to	an	end.	The	rest	of	this	chapter	takes	on	how	this	could	happen.			
 184 
	
2.	A	Restatement	of	the	Argument	Thus	Far		 This	dissertation	opened	by	looking	at	two	fronts	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice.	The	first,	climate-justice-as-climate-ethics,	understood	the	issue	in	terms	of	equity—burden	sharing	among	nations	in	taking	action	on	mitigation,	adaptation,	and	(possibly)	compensation—and	directed	its	focus	towards	the	design	of	an	ideal	global	climate	treaty	emerging	from	the	United	Nations	Framework	Convention	on	Climate	Change	(UNFCCC)	process.	The	hope	was	that	a	post-Kyoto	agreement	would	take	on	the	shape	of	a	legally	binding	treaty	where	countries	of	the	global	north	would	adopt	the	major	duties	in	addressing	climate	change.	As	it	became	apparent	in	the	wake	of	the	15th	Conference	of	the	Parties	(COP15)	in	Copenhagen	that	no	such	agreement	was	imminent,	this	kind	of	ethical	philosophical	approach	to	climate	justice	hit	a	major	barrier.	It	required	states	that	(1)	actually	prioritize	addressing	climate	change	and	(2)	are	concerned	with	accepting	and	honouring	duties	based	in	principles	of	justice.	The	agreement	signed	in	Paris	in	2015	does	not	really	have	the	shape	described	by	climate	ethicists.	Crucially	missing	is	any	mechanism	that	makes	taking	on	duties	legally	binding.	But	justice	is	not	an	optional	or	voluntary	act.		On	the	second	front	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice	stands	the	highly	complex	climate	movement,	which	directs	its	efforts	at	making	democratic	governments	accountable	to	moral	demands	for	action—climate	justice	as	political	
accountability.	A	large	part	of	the	movement	has	come	to	see	the	UNFCCC	process	as	largely	moribund,	and	has	therefore	been	pushing	for	more	prominent	and	direct	actions	to	press	its	demands	on	national	and	subnational	governments—marches,	blockades,	divestment,	and	other	tactics.	But	this	movement,	too,	is	constrained.	To	gain	“friction”	with	policymakers,	these	demands	cannot	run	counter	to	the	prevailing	institutional	logic	of	the	liberal	order.		
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In	sum,	efforts	to	achieve	progress	in	climate	justice	on	these	two	fronts	have	crashed	ruinously	against	the	liberal	order,	described	in	chapter	4,	that	is	currently	characterized	by	powerful	institutional	logics	that	militate	against	the	possibility	of	policies	corresponding	to	what	climate	ethicists	and	movement	activists	believe	justice	demands.	Under	this	order,	even	if	the	climate	crisis	were	to	be	addressed	(I	believe	it	is	prudent	to	at	least	allow	for	the	possibility	given	the	stunning	fall	in	renewable	energy	costs),	we	risk	taking	on	the	problems	I	described	at	the	outset	of	this	chapter—fossil	free	alienation,	the	solar-powered	invisible	hand,	and	the	global	Manhattan.	This	leaves	an	unsettling	dilemma.	If	the	climate	crisis	cannot	be	addressed	through	the	logic	of	the	existing	liberal	order—that	is,	in	ways	that	preserve	capitalist	economic	growth	and	curtail	participatory	political	and	economic	decision	making—then	the	liberal	order	is	unlikely	to	resolve	it.	Even	if	it	
is	addressed	through	the	existing	institutional	order,	the	world	on	the	other	side	of	the	crisis	will	have	carried	over	severe	problems	concerning	liberalism’s	ability	to	provide	the	conditions	for	a	just	society.	We	would	have	failed	to	satisfy	a	condition	of	far-reaching	climate	justice,	which	is	to	understand	the	climate	crisis	as	a	warning	that	our	current	economic	and	political	institutions	require	change	and	as	an	opportunity	to	push	for	something	more	just.		In	this	closing	chapter	I	will	argue	that	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice,	a	third	front	of	action	needs	much	more	attention.	Its	site	of	contestation	is	more	abstract	than	those	selected	by	climate	ethicists	(the	just	design	of	the	UNFCCC)	and	by	the	climate	movement	(the	accountability	of	political	and	economic	elites).	It	is	the	realm	of	the	very	political	philosophy	that	has	come	to	justify	the	prevailing	institutional	logic	that	I	argued	is	standing	in	the	way	of	responding	to	climate	change	and	whose	solution	to	climate	change	commits	us	to	an	undesirable	society.	If	attempting	to	address	climate	change	through	the	liberal	order	is	so	fraught	with	problems,	it	follows	that	some	other	framework	might	provide	better	solutions.	What	this	means	is	that	the	fight	for	climate	justice	has	to	include	but	extend	beyond	questions	of	alternative	energy	sources,	international	agreements,	and	pressuring	
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governments	to	take	on	climate	policy.	Let	us	call	this	third	front	seeking	to	identify	and	realize	that	framework	climate	justice	as	just	society,	and	let	us	understand	it,	in	taking	on	the	nature	of	the	political	and	economic	system,	as	the	first	front	to	step	
fully	into	the	realm	of	far-reaching	climate	justice.		One	of	the	immediately	obvious	challenges	in	engaging	in	this	site	of	contestation	is	that	liberalism	is	currently	ideologically	hegemonic.	Its	promise	of	providing	individuals	the	conditions	to	pursue	their	unique	conceptions	of	the	good	life	within	a	realm	of	possibility	realized	by	a	liberal	democratic	state	and	capitalist	markets	holds	widespread	acceptance.	Whatever	we	wish	to	call	this—“false	consciousness”	(after	Marx)	or	the	“one-dimensional	society”	(after	Marcuse)	or	some	equivalent	term—it	remains	an	obstacle.	Some	way	is	therefore	needed	to	disrupt	the	liberal	order’s	legitimacy,	its	hold	over	the	political	imagination,	and	the	idea	that	the	order	now	in	place	is	required	for	a	good	society—all	as	part	of	responding	to	climate	change.	That	brings	this	dissertation	into	the	realm	of	political	philosophy	and	theory,	the	task	for	which	is	to	inquire	into	the	nature	of	that	disruption,	to	base	it	in	an	approach	making	stronger	claims	to	forming	a	more	just	society,	and	propose	viable	stops	forward.		I	aim	to	do	that	in	this	chapter.	If	the	third	front	of	climate	justice	involves	a	struggle	to	challenge	liberalism,	its	claims	to	having	secured	the	conditions	for	a	good	or	just	society,	and	its	dominant	framework	for	understanding	and	responding	to	climate	change,	then	some	alternative	must	come	to	replace	it.	I	begin	by	quickly	positing	two	such	alternative	political	theoretical	frameworks	that	can	challenge	liberalism	on	this	third	front	of	climate	justice:	(a)	degrowth	and	what	I	will	call	(b)	the	eco-left.	Alternative	frameworks	like	these	disrupt	the	hegemony	of	the	liberal	framework’s	response	to	climate	change	by	showing	other	possibilities	unconstrained	by	the	need	to	preserve	capitalist	growth	and	low-intensity	democracies	that	promote	a	version	of	the	good	life	maintained	through	commodity	consumption.	The	challenge	that	follows	is	to	make	real	the	kind	of	society	conceptualized	under	those	frameworks.		
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Given	the	hegemonic	status	of	liberalism	and	the	system	of	filters	it	creates	(chapter	4),	it	would	be	difficult	to	achieve	a	wholesale	realization	of	these	frameworks	through	the	“front	door”	of	lobbying,	normal	electoral	politics,	or	even	pressure	tactics	like	the	marches,	divestment	campaigns,	and	blockades	discussed	in	chapter	3;	demands	made	through	these	channels	must	tightly	align	with	liberalism’s	logic	(achieve	“friction”)	or	else	end	up	being	filtered	out.	One	solution	considered	below	is	to	organize	a	mass	democratic	movement	around	a	set	of	transformative	policy	demands	and	find	strategic	political	openings	when	the	filters	weaken.	I	use	the	Leap	Manifesto	which	appeared	in	Canada	in	2015	as	a	real-world	example	of	how	this	can	occur.	Another	solution	is	to	soften	up	the	liberal	order	and	its	ideological	claims	to	having	realized	a	just	society	by	introducing	elements	into	it	that	rewrite	its	logic.	I	pursue	this	idea	through	a	heuristic	device	adapted	from	Saskia	Sassen	on	how	the	organizing	logic	of	societies	can	be	rewritten	from	within	to	lead	to	epochal	changes.		A	couple	words	of	caution	before	moving	forward:	first,	what	I	am	describing	should	be	understood	as	projects	intended	for	the	advanced	industrial	countries,	and	ones	that	can	be	embraced	by	progressive	forces	within	them.	It	is	these	countries	that,	in	their	pursuit	of	constant	growth,	have	done	so	much	to	bring	the	climate	crisis	to	where	it	now	stands,	but	at	the	same	time	have	arguably	reached	conditions	where	that	growth	(and	the	institutional	apparatus	to	achieve	it)	can	probably	be	abandoned	without	sacrificing	wellbeing.	Secondly,	I	have	held	to	describing	this	project	in	political	philosophical	terms.	There	is	still	much	work	to	be	done	at	a	more	empirical	level	to	determine	how	(and	whether)	all	of	these	ideas	can	work	together	in	a	feasible	and	effective	way.	At	this	point,	I	am	more	concerned	with	the	nature	of	these	ideas	and	how	they	relate	to	the	question	of	a	just	society	capable	of	taking	on	the	climate	crisis.			
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3.	Two	Alternative	Frameworks	for	Responding	to	Climate	Change		 The	third	front	of	climate	justice	involves	a	struggle	for	an	alternative	vision	of	society	that	can	challenge	or	transcend	the	liberal	order	and	its	hegemonic	framework	for	responding	to	climate	change.	There	are	two	frameworks	in	particular	that	offer	a	plausible	challenge:	degrowth	and	the	eco-left.	For	reasons	of	space,	I	will	sketch	them	only	in	outline	here	as	ideal	types	(in	the	real	world,	there	is	some	overlap	between	them)	before	proposing	how	their	visions	might	be	realized.		
Degrowth.290	Let	us	understand	degrowth	as	describing	a	series	of	critiques	arising	from	several	sources—ecological	economics,	European	anthropological	studies,	and	environmental	movements291—united	in	their	condemnation	of	the	pursuit	of	perpetual	economic	growth	as	a	means	of	improving	and	sustaining	wellbeing	in	the	developed	economies.	These	critiques	are	thus	diverse,	and	before	describing	them,	it	is	important	to	note	that	a	particular	degrowth	group	or	thinker	may	not	embrace	all	of	the	elements	in	the	description	presented	in	what	follows	to	the	same	degree.292	
																																								 																					
290	I	am	in	this	section	synthesizing	work	from	the	following	to	outline	the	contours	of	the	degrowth	framework:	Herman	E.	Daly,	Beyond	Growth:	The	Economics	of	Sustainable	Development	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	1996);	Peter	A.	Victor,	Managing	Without	Growth:	Slower	by	Design,	Not	
Disaster	(Northampton,	MA:	Edward	Elgar,	2008);	Tim	Jackson,	Prosperity	Without	Growth:	
Economics	for	a	finite	planet	(London:	Earthscan,	2009);	Serge	Latouche,	Farewell	to	Growth	(Malden,	MA:	Polity,	2009);	Bill	McKibben,	Eaarth:	Making	a	Life	on	a	Tough	New	Planet	(Toronto:	Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2010);	Konrad	Ott,	“Variants	of	de-growth	and	deliberative	democracy:	A	Habermasian	proposal,”	Futures	42	(2012);	Robert	Skidelsky	and	Edward	Skidelsky,	How	Much	is	Enough?	Money	
and	the	Good	Life	(New	York,	NY:	Penguin	Books,	2013);	Herman	E.	Daly,	“Economics	for	a	Full	World”	(Great	Transition	Initiative,	June	2015),	http://www.greattransition.org/publication/economics-for-a-full-world	291	Joan	Martínez-Alier	et	al.,	“Sustainable	de-growth:	Mapping	the	context,	criticisms	and	future	prospects	of	an	emergent	paradigm,”	Ecological	Economics	69	(2010):	1741-1747;	Federico	Demaria	et	al.,	“What	is	Degrowth?	From	an	Activist	Slogan	to	a	Social	Movement,”	Environmental	
Values	22	(2013):	191-215.	292	For	a	review	of	the	different	types	of	degrowth	and	how	their	contents	differ,	see	Ott,	“Variants	of	de-growth	and	deliberative	democracy.”	
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Degrowth	draws	from	a	social	critique	showing	that	economic	growth	is	no	longer	required	to	promote	wellbeing	in	the	advanced	industrial	economies.	First,	there	is	a	diminishing	effect	of	income	growth	on	individuals’	sense	of	wellbeing	past	a	level	of	“sufficiency,”	one	developed	countries	long	ago	moved	beyond.293	Fervent	pursuit	of	economic	growth	past	a	certain	point	not	only	has	little	positive	effect	on	wellbeing,	but	can	actually	decrease	it	by	imposing	a	lifestyle	dominated	by	careerism,	competition,	and	addictive	hyper-consumption.	Side	effects	of	this	lifestyle,	like	congestion,	loss	of	leisure,	pollution,	stress	from	competition,	and	work	precarity	actually	strip	away	at	people’s	sense	of	wellbeing,	effects	of	what	Daly	calls	“uneconomic	growth.”294		Second,	degrowth	also	tends	to	include	a	strong	environmental	critique.	It	draws	on	ecological	economists’	rejection	of	the	conventional	macroeconomic	understanding	of	the	economy	as	a	closed	loop	of	abstract	exchange	values	(firms	provide	households	with	goods	and	services;	households	provide	firms	with	factors	of	production)	with	little	relation	to	or	impact	on	the	environment—regardless	of	how	large	that	loop	grows.	The	economy	ought	to	be	seen,	more	accurately,	as	an	
open	sub-system	ultimately	‘nested’	within	a	natural	ecosystem.	The	perpetual	pursuit	of	growth	has	increased	the	size	of	that	economic	subsystem	as	well	as	the	degree	of	its	impact	by	drawing	down	services	and	overwhelming	waste	sinks.295		The	environmental	critique	of	growth,	which	requires	reductions	in	the	scale	and	intensity	of	human	use	of	the	earth’s	systems,	merges	well	with	social	critiques	about	the	competitive,	careerist,	hyper-consumptive	lifestyles	growth	demands	of																																									 																					
293	Beyond	that,	two	effects	occur:	in	the	first,	hedonic	adaptation,	rising	income	leads	to	rising	aspirations	as	people	become	accustomed	to	and	then	dissatisfied	with	their	new	standard	of	material	wealth.	In	the	second,	happiness	comes	from	increasing	status	relative	to	others	through	consumption	of	luxury	goods,	which	is	necessarily	zero-sum.	For	a	good	summary,	see	Peter	A.	Victor,	Managing	Without	Growth:	Slower	by	Design,	Not	Disaster	(Northampton,	MA:	Edward	Elgar,	2008),	124-128.		294	Herman	E.	Daly,	“Economics	in	a	Full	World,”	Scientific	American	(September	2005):	100-107;	and	Daly,	“Economics	for	a	Full	World.”	To	his	examples	we	can	also	add	financial	crises	sparked	in	the	wake	of	reckless	strategies	to	increase	profit	and	austerity	meant	to	restore	growth’s	benefits	to	elites.	295	See,	e.g.,	Daly,	Beyond	Growth	and	Victor,	Managing	Without	Growth,	34-36.		
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us.	Both	critiques	lead	to	an	inquiry	into	alternative	ideals	that	can	form	a	basis	for	how	the	human	good	can	be	achieved	without	the	intensive	material	and	energy	use	characterizing	hegemonic	liberal	visions	of	the	good	life	based	on	endless	development,	consumption,	and	wealth	accumulation.296	Ecological	economist	Tim	Jackson	rooted	a	vision	of	a	just	society	that	no	longer	required	economic	growth	in	the	capabilities	approach	to	justice	(discussed	further	below),	which	he	described	as	“flourishing	within	limits.”297	Again,	speaking	in	terms	of	ideal	types,	if	questioning	growth	makes	this	framework	distinct	from	the	liberal	one,	fixing	the	focus	on	growth	is	what	distinguishes	it	from	the	eco-left,	discussed	below.	The	latter	directs	its	critique,	more	fully,	at	capitalism	and	its	various	pathologies—corporate	power	and	capture	of	democratic	states,	the	violence	of	(neo)colonialism,	worker	exploitation,	etc.—in	the	context	of	the	climate	crisis.	Its	implications	are	necessarily	radical.	Degrowth	
can	hold	left-wing/radical	anti-capitalist	implications298—just	not	necessarily,	as	some	visions	of	it	are	achieved	within	existing	institutional	structures	through	reforms.299	Jackson,	for	example,	says	the	following	on	the	matter	of	the	nature	of	a	society	no	longer	pursuing	economic	growth:	‘Is	it	still	capitalism?	Does	it	really	matter?	For	those	for	whom	it	does	matter,	perhaps	we	could	just	paraphrase	Star	Trek’s	Spock	and	agree	that	it’s	“capitalism,	Jim.	But	not	as	we	know	it”.’300		
																																								 																					
296	To	briefly	give	examples	of	alternative	ideals,	Serge	Latouche	(Farewell	to	Growth	(Malden,	MA:	Polity,	2009))	considers	rooting	degrowth	in	autonomy	and	conviviality.	Robert	and	Edward	Skidelsky	(How	Much	is	Enough?	Money	and	the	Good	Life	(Penguin	Books,	2013))	argue	that	a	good	life	without	economic	growth	is	found	in	guarantees	of	the	basic	goods	of	health,	security,	respect,	personality	(i.e.,	ability	to	pursue	one’s	life	plans),	harmony	with	nature,	friendship,	and	leisure.		297	See	chapter	9	of	Jackson,	Prosperity	Without	Growth.		298	See	Serge	Latouche,	“Can	the	Left	Escape	Economism?”	Capital	Nature	Socialism,	23	(2012):	74-78;	Barbara	Muraca,	“Décroissance:	A	Project	for	a	Radical	Transformation	of	Society,”	
Environmental	Values	22	(2013):	147-169.	299	See,	e.g.,	Konrad	Ott,	“Variants	of	de-growth	and	deliberative	democracy.”		300	Jackson,	Prosperity	Without	Growth,	202.		
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Climate	policy	under	the	liberal	framework	is	universally	evaluated	against	its	impacts	on	GDP	growth.301	But	if	the	degrowth	critique	is	correct,	any	negative	impact	of	climate	policy	on	economic	growth	overestimates	its	impact	on	wellbeing.302	With	the	growth	imperative	abandoned,	it	is	be	possible	to	make	much	sharper	demands	under	this	framework	in	the	face	of	climate	change,303	to	call	for	a	sharp	decrease	in	working	hours,	an	end	to	the	hyper-consumption	and	hyper-production	patterns	requiring	enormous	and	cheap	energy,	and	more	localized	economies.304			
Eco-Left.305	This	second	alternative	framework	encompasses	several	radical	critiques	of	capitalism—from	Marxism	and	anarchism	on	the	far-left	to	democratic	socialism	just	left-of-centre.	Agreeing	with	the	previous	framework,	the	eco-left	sees																																									 																					
301	As	Herman	E.	Daly	has	asked,	“What	is	it	that	is	causing	us	to	systematically	emit	ever	more	CO2	into	the	atmosphere?	It	is	[…]	our	irrational	commitment	to	exponential	growth	forever	on	a	finite	planet	subject	to	the	laws	of	thermodynamics.	If	we	overcome	the	growth	idolatry	we	could	then	go	on	to	ask	an	intelligent	question	like,	‘How	can	we	design	and	manage	a	steady-state	economy,	one	that	respects	the	limits	of	the	biosphere?’	Instead	we	ask	a	wrong-headed,	growth-bound	question,	specifically;	‘By	how	much	will	we	have	to	increase	energy	efficiency,	or	carbon	efficiency,	in	order	to	maintain	customary	growth	rates	in	GDP?’	”	(Herman	E.	Daly,	“Climate	Policy:	from	‘know	how’	to	‘do	now’,”	keynote	address	to	American	Meteorological	Society,	Washington,	D.C.	(November	13,	2007),	http://www.climatepolicy.org/?p=65.	302	Jeroen	C.J.M.	van	den	Bergh,	“Relax	about	GDP	growth:	implications	for	climate	and	crisis	policies,”	Journal	of	Cleaner	Production	18	(2010):	540-543.	303	Clive	Hamilton,	Requiem	for	a	Species:	Why	we	Resist	the	Truth	about	Climate	Change	(Washington,	DC:	Earthscan,	2010);	Peter	Victor,	“Growth,	degrowth	and	climate	change:	A	scenario	analysis,”	Ecological	Economics	84	(2012).		304	See,	e.g.,	Bill	McKibben,	Eaarth.	305	I	am	here	synthesizing	work	from	several	sources.	Vandana	Shiva,	Soil	Not	Oil:	
Environmental	Justice	in	an	Age	of	Climate	Crisis	(Brooklyn,	NY:	South	End	Press,	2008);	Ian	Angus	(ed.),	The	Global	Fight	for	Climate	Justice:	Anticapitalist	Responses	to	Global	Warming	and	
Environmental	Destruction.	Nova	Scotia:	Fernwood,	2010);	John	Bellamy	Foster,	B	Clark,	and	R.	York,	
The	Ecological	Rift:	Capitalism’s	War	on	the	Earth.	New	York:	Monthly	Review	Press,	2010);	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything	(Toronto:	Alfred	A	Knopf	Canada,	2014);	Joel	Kovel,	The	Enemy	of	
Nature:	The	End	of	Capitalism	or	the	End	of	the	World?	(Zed	Books,	2002);	Fred	Magdoff	and	John	Bellamy	Foster,	What	Every	Environmentalist	Needs	to	Know	about	Capitalism:	A	Citizen’s	Guide	to	
Capitalism	and	the	Environment	(New	York,	NY:	Monthly	Review	Press,	2011);	Patrick	Bond,	Politics	
of	Climate	Justice:	Paralysis	Above,	Movement	Below	(Scottsville,	South	Africa:	University	of	KwaZulu-Natal	Press,	2012);	Paul	Chatterton,	David	Featherstone,	and	Paul	Routledge,	“Articulating	Climate	Justice	in	Copenhagen:	Antagonism,	the	Commons,	and	Solidarity,”	Antipode	45	no	3	(2013);	and	Brian	Tokar,	“Democracy,	Localism,	and	the	Future	of	the	Climate	Movement,”	World	Futures	71	(2015).	
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consumption-fuelled	economic	growth	as	a	powerful	driver	of	environmental	destruction,	but	extends	its	lens	beyond	growth	to	look	at	the	system	more	holistically,	identifying	other	destructive	dimensions	of	capitalism.	For	one,	it	tends	to	hold	a	deeper	and	different	analysis	of	the	power	inhering	in	the	state-capital	nexus,	understanding	the	state	as	having	been	captured	to	a	very	large	degree	by	the	capital	class,	and	having	taken	on	the	primary	function	of	actively	driving	capital	accumulation	(exacerbated	with	the	ascendance	of	free-market	neoliberal	ideology).	The	influence	of	the	fossil	fuel	industry	on	politics;	the	corporate	rights	locked	in	by	pro-corporate	multilateral	trade	agreements	preventing	strong	climate	action;306	and	the	“false	solutions”	to	climate	change	like	emissions	trading307	and	REDD+308	therefore	fall	under	particular	scrutiny.	The	eco-left	also	includes	stronger	concerns	with	labour,	anti-colonialism,	and	environmental	justice	than	in	other	frameworks	and	will	often	highlight	the	importance	of	allying	with	these	movements	in	the	pursuit	of	climate	responses.		An	eco-left	vision	of	a	just	society	that	could	respond	to	climate	change	would	require	some	level	of	confrontation	with	capitalism	through	a	deepening	and	extension	of	democracy	beyond	the	one	inhering	under	the	liberal	order	(particularly	in	a	time	of	neoliberalism).	In	questions	of	climate	policy,	this	would	mean	substantive	participation	from	the	demos	in	the	setting	of	climate	targets	and	the	complex	economic	planning	required	to	meet	them.	Again,	there	are	different	prospective	shapes	an	eco-left	project	could	take.	But	in	its	democratic	socialist	form,	it	would	entail	(at	least	in	its	initial	stages)	a	return	to	strong	economic	planning,	involving	centrally,	(1)	radically	progressive	taxation	regimes	on																																									 																					
306	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything,	chapter	2.			307	See,	e.g.,	Annie	Leonard,	“The	Story	of	Cap	&	Trade,”	Free	Range	Studios	(2009),	http://storyofstuff.org/movies/story-of-cap-and-trade/;	Tamra	Gilbertson	and	Oscar	Reyes,	Carbon	
Trading:	How	it	Works	and	Why	it	Fails	(Uppsala:	Dag	Hammarskjöld	Foundation,	2009);	and	Durban	Group	for	Climate	Justice,	“The	Durban	Declaration	on	Carbon	Trading,”	in	The	Global	Fight	for	
Climate	Justice:	Anticapitalist	Responses	to	Global	Warming	and	Environmental	Destruction,	ed.	Ian	Angus	(Nova	Scotia:	Fernwood	Publishing,	2011),	124-126.	308	See,	e.g.,	Tom	B.K.	Goldtooth,	“Why	REDD/REDD+	is	NOT	a	Solution,”	in	No	REDD:	A	
Reader,	eds.	Joanna	Cabello	and	Tamra	Gilbertson	(Indigenous	Environmental	Network	and	Carbon	Trade	Watch,	2010),	http://noredd.makenoise.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/REDDreaderEN.pdf		
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corporations	and	highest	income	earners	to	fund	massive	state	reinvestment	in	the	public	sphere	to	make	an	extremely	rapid	switch	to	a	post-carbon	society	and	(2)	strong	state	regulation	on	the	fossil	fuel	sector.	For	measures	like	these	to	take	hold,	a	battle	of	ideas	must	be	won	that	delegitimizes	the	ideological	basis	of	free-market	capitalism	and	replaces	it	with	one	that	rebuilds,	in	Klein’s	words,	“the	very	idea	of	the	collective,	the	communal,	the	commons,	the	civil,	and	the	civic”	and	restores	“the	right	of	citizens	to	democratically	determine	what	kind	of	economy	they	need.”309		While	alternative	frameworks	can	help	free	the	political	imagination,	their	visions	must	be	realized	in	the	real	world.	The	reigning	system	is	unlikely	to	take	them	on	wholesale;	there	is	currently	not	enough	institutional	pliability	to	let	them	in	through	the	“front	door”	of	elections	(to	my	knowledge,	no	viable	mainstream	western	political	party	yet	embraces	either	of	those	frameworks),	mass	marches,	and	so	on.	What	the	frameworks	offer,	however,	are	visions	of	what	another	society	could	look	like,	landmarks	on	the	horizon	to	reorient	towards,	both	requiring	a	substantive	ideological	shift	away	from	our	current	path.	How	might	that	ideological	shift	begin	to	happen?		
	
4.	The	Leap	Manifesto:	A	Model	for	Loosening	Liberalism’s	
Constraints?		The	Leap	Manifesto310	is	one	possible	program	of	struggle	against	the	reigning	ideology	that	could	pull	us	out	from	the	logic	of	neoliberalism,	and	from	there	possibly	onto	a	pathway	to	an	even	more	progressive	society.	Initiated	in	spring	2015	by	Naomi	Klein	and	Avi	Lewis	(and	others	belonging	to	the	team	organizing	politically	around	the	This	Changes	Everything	book,	film,	and	website),	the	Manifesto’s	contents	emerged	over	a	two-day	meeting	“attended	by	60																																									 																					
309	Naomi	Klein,	This	Changes	Everything	(Alfred	A.	Knopf,	2014),	125,	460.		310	“The	Leap	Manifesto:	A	Call	for	a	Canada	Based	on	Caring	for	the	Earth	and	One	Another,”	2015,	https://leapmanifesto.org/en/the-leap-manifesto/	
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representatives	from	Canada’s	Indigenous	rights,	social	and	food	justice,	environmental,	faith-based	and	labour	movements.”311	Leap	is	a	“justice-based”	energy	transition,	as	Lewis	put	it	in	a	town	hall	meeting	in	Toronto	in	spring	2016.		The	Manifesto	itself,	launched	in	September	2015,	tells	Canadians	they	are	in	a	deep	crisis	and	thus	puts	forward	an	urgent	(hence,	“leap”)	political	project	for	a	more	progressive	country—for	“a	Canada	based	on	caring	for	the	earth	and	one	another.”	Its	opening	demand	is	for	Canada	to	observe	the	inherent	rights	and	land	titles	of	Indigenous	Peoples,	and	to	fully	implement	the	United	Nations	Declaration	on	the	Rights	of	Indigenous	Peoples.	It	rejects	all	new	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	and	instead	calls	for	a	rapid	shift	to	100%	clean	power	within	the	span	of	a	generation.	The	transition	itself	would	involve	an	expansion	of	renewable	energy	(to	be	controlled	collectively	by	communities),	energy	efficient	homes,	new	high-speed	rail,	affordable	public	transit,	and	reinvestment	in	public	infrastructure	to	adapt	for	climate	change.	This	shift	would	create	employment	opportunities	that	could	also	address	systemic	inequalities	by	prioritizing	training	for	low-income	communities	and	workers	in	carbon-intensive	industries.	A	transition	like	this	requires	a	rejection	both	of	trade	deals	that	limit	policies	governments	can	use	to	rebuild	local	economies	or	stop	extractive	projects	and	of	austerity	politics	that	insist	Canada	cannot	afford	this	program.	It	demands	polluter-pays	policies:	progressive	taxes	on	carbon,	wealth,	and	financial	transactions,	higher	royalty	rates,	and	an	end	to	fossil	fuel	subsidies.	But	the	Manifesto	goes	beyond	renewable	energy,	calling	for	reinvestment	in	social	sectors	of	the	economy	(much	of	it	low-carbon	and	dominated	by	women)	like	education,	healthcare,	social	work,	arts	and	community-interest	media;	a	debate	on	a	universal	basic	income;	localized	and	more	ecological	food	systems;	more	welcoming	immigration	and	refugee	policies	in	recognition	of	Canada’s	contributions	to	drivers	of	migration	like	conflict	and	climate	change;	and	a	more	proportional	electoral	system.																																										 																					
311	“Frequently	Asked	Questions	about	The	Leap	Manifesto,”	Leap	Manifesto,	https://leapmanifesto.org/en/faq/		
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Leap,	then,	is	impressively	broad,	managing	to	unite	struggles	around	Indigenous	rights,	unemployment,	systemic	racial	discrimination,	public	sector	underinvestment,	migrant	rights,	and	more,	all	undergirded	by	policies	that	also	respond	to	climate	change.	But	just	how	is	the	Leap	meant	to	be	realized?	The	Manifesto	launched	in	advance	of	the	2015	Canadian	federal	election	where	it	had	little	appreciable	effect.	But	as	Naomi	Klein	put	it	in	a	post-election	defense,			the	Leap	is	not	about	electoral	cycles.	It’s	a	statement	of	principles	that	was	always	designed	to	push	the	debate,	to	create	political	space	by	articulating	policies	that	correspond	to	the	urgency	of	the	moment.	This	is	a	traditional	role	for	social	movements	in	the	political	dynamic,	influencing	whoever	is	in	power,	moving	the	goalposts.312			Progress	on	“influencing	whoever	is	in	power”	will	likely	be	constrained	by	the	problems	of	the	friction	with	the	liberal	order	I	discussed	in	chapters	3	and	4.	But	Leap	becomes	much	more	promising	in	its	intention	of	creating	“political	space,”	and	it	was	in	the	aftermath	of	2015	the	election,	at	the	spring	2016	national	convention	of	Canada’s	New	Democratic	Party	(NDP)	in	Edmonton,	Alberta,	where	the	Leap	Manifesto	potentially	found	a	way	of	doing	this.	The	NDP	was	seeking	new	leadership	and	perhaps	a	new	strategy	following	a	disappointing	3rd	place	finish	in	the	election	following	its	move	towards	Canada’s	political	centre.313	Though	a	non-partisan	document,	the	Leap	Manifesto	finds	a	natural	home	in	a	humbled	and	diminished	NDP	seeking	to	restore	progressive	credentials.	NDP	riding	associations	recognized	this	opportunity	to	move	past	party-establishment	politics	and	began	to	agitate	for	Leap	after	seeing	a	mass	progressive	movement	organize	around	Bernie	
																																								 																					
312	Naomi	Klein,	“The	Leap:	Time	For	A	Reality	Check,”	This	Changes	Everything,	April	14,	2016,	http://theleap.thischangeseverything.org/the-leap-time-for-a-reality-check/	313	After	its	attempts	to	“modernize”	by	removing	references	to	socialism	in	its	policy	documents	and	platforms,	the	NDP	largely	relinquished	its	position	as	Canada’s	progressive	party	and	entered	into	direct	competition	with	the	centrist	(at	least	on	Canada’s	truncated	and	right-shifted	political	party	spectrum)	Liberal	Party,	which	succeeded	in	mobilizing	a	now-unmoored	left-progressive	vote.		
 196 
Sanders	campaign	for	Democratic	presidential	nomination	in	the	US.314	They	succeeded	in	getting	Leap	onto	the	agenda,	but	the	party	quickly	found	itself	split	by	its	content,	in	particular	its	call	for	a	freeze	on	all	new	fossil	fuel	infrastructure	and	rapid	shift	towards	a	renewable	energy	future.	Alberta’s	provincial	NDP	Party,	which	had	a	few	months	earlier	unseated	the	generation-long	reign	of	the	Progressive	Conservatives,	rejected	it,	as	did	Albertan	federal	NDP	members.315	At	the	end	of	the	convention,	the	federal	NDP	resolved	to	discuss	and	debate	the	Manifesto	in	its	riding	associations	in	the	lead-up	to	its	policy	convention	in	2018.316		In	the	push	from	the	party	base	to	bring	the	Manifesto	onto	the	agenda,	there	is	a	glimpse	of	how	its	content	can	create	space	in	the	political	system.	Because	the	NDP	is	seeking	to	rebuild,	the	filters	that	reduce	the	possibilities	for	democratic	participation	in	the	development	of	parties’	political	platforms	may	have	weakened	just	enough	in	this	case	to	admit	policy	suggestions	from	an	energetic	base.	By	making	its	demands	a	core	around	which	to	rally	and	build,	a	democratic	movement	might	be	able	to	usher	into	power	political	representatives	beholden	to	that	content.	This	strategy	differs	from	that	of	seeking	to	achieve	“friction”	for	their	demands	with	those	already	in	power,	and	presents	an	avenue	for	the	radical	current	of	the	climate	movement	to	see	its	complex	demands	for	justice	met.	For	a	representative	or	a	party	to	succeed	in	winning	popular	support,	they	would	have	to	convincingly	embrace	the	Manifesto	and	its	ideals.	And	that	is	key.	It	possesses	the	important	quality	of	falling	within	the	order’s	logic	(a	party	is	elected	to	form	a	liberal	democratic	government),	but	the	policies	forming	its	core,	if	adopted,	could	begin	to																																									 																					
314	Naomi	Klein,	“Time	for	a	Reality	Check,”	The	Leap	Blog,	April	14,	2016,	http://theleap.thischangeseverything.org/the-leap-time-for-a-reality-check/	315	Rachel	Notley	said	"The	Government	of	Alberta	repudiates	the	sections	of	that	document	that	address	energy	infrastructure.	These	ideas	will	never	form	any	part	of	our	policy.	They	are	naive,	they	are	ill-informed,	and	they	are	tone-deaf."	(Michelle	Bellefontaine,	“Rachel	Notley	calls	Leap	Manifesto	'naive'	and	'ill-informed',”	CBC	News,	April	11,	2016,	http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/	edmonton/rachel-notley-calls-leap-manifesto-naive-and-ill-informed-1.3530309?cmp=rss)	316	Jason	Markusoff,	“The	Leap	Manifesto,	and	where	the	NDP	will	land,”	Maclean's,	April	10,	2016,	http://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/the-leap-manifesto-and-where-the-ndp-will-land/;	and	Murray	Cooke,	“The	NDP	Convention:	A	Leap	to	the	Left?”	New	Socialist,	April	18,	2016,	http://www.newsocialist.org/815-the-ndp-convention-a-leap-to-the-left	
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shift	the	ideological	context	in	which	policy	decisions	about	climate	change	are	made.	Representatives	may	of	course	end	up	not	following	through,	but	they	would	do	so	at	the	risk	of	alienating	the	base	that	lifted	them	into	power.		Predictably,	Leap	was	poorly	received	in	Canada’s	right-leaning	mainstream	press	like	The	National	Post,	Maclean’s,	and	The	Globe	and	Mail.317	But	it	has	also	attracted	more	considered	critiques	from	Canadian	public	intellectual	Thomas	Homer-Dixon.318	Homer-Dixon	believes	most	Canadians	would	be	“bewildered”	by	the	Manifesto’s	content,	wondering	what	common	thread	ties	it	all	together.	The	solution	to	that	puzzle	lies	in	understanding	what	he	believes	are	its	two	deep	assumptions.	The	first	is	a	“communitarian”	assumption	that	others’	wellbeing	ought	to	be	prioritized	above	our	own,	which,	Homer-Dixon	notes,	“sidelines	the	individualist,	the	entrepreneur,	or	anyone	who	thinks	that	society’s	health	depends	on	ensuring	lots	of	space	for	people	to	exercise	their	agency	and	creative	possibility.”	The	second	assumption	is	that	capitalism	is	necessarily	pernicious,	undermining	the	health	of	society	and	driving	the	climate	crisis,	an	assumption	he	believes	is	debatable,	as	capitalism	might	be	“an	essential	source	of	the	wealth	and	innovation	needed	to	save	humanity.”	As	he	concludes,			It’s	worth	asking,	though,	if	it’s	smart	to	make	this	debate	central	to	action	on	climate	change.	The	Leap	Manifesto	entangles	efforts	to	move	forward	on	climate	policy	with	a	host	of	other	matters	that	are	part	of	a	larger	ideological	agenda.	So	it’s	a	profoundly	divisive	document	at	the	very	moment	when	we	need	to	find	common	ground	on	climate	change.319		The	implications	for	society	that	Homer-Dixon	sees	in	Leap	and	that	lead	him	to	reject	it	are	striking	because	he	is	reading	them	into	the	manifesto—they	are	not																																									 																					
317	Following	the	release	of	the	Manifesto,	The	National	Post	wrote	24	articles	attacking	it.	Maude	Barlow,	Mark	Hancock,	Joanna	Kerr,	and	Katie	McKenna,	“Happy	Leap	Year	To	The	National	Post!,”	The	Leap	Blog,	February	25,	2016,	https://theleapblog.org/happy-leap-year-to-the-national-post/	 318	Thomas	Homer-Dixon,	“Start	the	Leap	revolution	without	me,”	Globe	and	Mail,	April	22,	2016,	http://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/start-the-leap-revolution-without-me/article29711945/	319	Ibid.	
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really	present	in	it—and	exposing	some	of	his	own	assumptions.	First,	does	Leap	really	subsume	the	individual	to	the	community?	Does	care	and	concern	for	community	necessarily	lead	to	a	situation	where	the	individual	is	superseded,	where,	as	he	puts	it,	‘	“we”	subordinates	“I”?’	It	would,	but	only	under	assumptions	that	individuals	are	not	free	if	they	are	restricted	in	their	accumulation	and	profit,	that	only	by	ensuring	“lots	of	space”	for	the	self-interested	creative	entrepreneur	can	we	ensure	that	individuals	are	not	subsumed.	Homer-Dixon’s	concept	of	the	individual	appears	therefore	to	be	a	particular	one,	one	aligning	very	closely	with	that	of	the	capitalist	individualist	in	which	the	measure	of	freedom	is	the	degree	to	which	one	may	venture	and	profit	in	the	market.	Under	a	conception	of	the	individual	like	this	one,	Leap	would	then	appear	to	be	a	communitarian	document,	as	Homer-Dixon	says.	But	before	drawing	that	conclusion,	there	is	an	important	question	to	ask.	Should	we	not	expect	Leap’s	policies	of	universal	guaranteed	incomes,	reinvestment	in	social	sectors	of	the	economy,	and	employment	opportunities	aimed	to	address	systemic	inequalities	to	actually	improve	individuals’	ability	to	pursue	their	good	life—to	ensure	“lots	of	space	for	people	to	exercise	their	agency	and	creative	possibility”?	Because	here,	too,	is	an	understanding	of	the	meaning	of	individual	freedom,	and	it	is	one	requiring	a	fairer	society,	one	where	more	individuals	are	free	to	do	the	things	that	are	meaningful	to	them,	a	society	that	does	not	leave	some	(actually	many)	individuals	behind	simply	to	preserve	the	full	freedom	of	the	entrepreneur.	Second,	does	the	Leap	really	characterize	capitalism	as	pernicious?	The	document	never	actually	mentions	capitalism,	and	its	condemnation	of	corporate	trade	deals	and	austerity	politics	really	suggest	its	target	is	neoliberalism	(a	focus	that	would	be	consistent	with	what	Naomi	Klein	has	said	elsewhere	about	the	kind	of	project	needed	to	deal	with	climate	change320).	Nevertheless,	the	anti-capitalism																																									 																					
320	Naomi	Klein,	“No,	We	Don’t	Need	to	Ditch/Slay/Kill	Capitalism	Before	We	Can	Fight	Climate	Change.	But	We	Sure	As	Hell	Need	To	Challenge	It,”	The	Leap	Blog,	September	27,	2014,	http://theleapblog.org/no-we-dont-need-to-ditchslaykill-capitalism-before-we-can-fight-climate-change-but-we-sure-as-hell-need-to-challenge-it/	
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Homer-Dixon	reads	into	the	Manifesto	rallies	him	to	capitalism’s	defense,	insisting	it	should	not	be	up	for	debate	in	the	context	of	climate	change.	But	why	must	(neoliberal?)	capitalism	be	part	of,	as	he	puts	it,	the	“common	ground”	held	on	climate	change?	Shouldn’t	we	be	debating	the	economic	system	that	has	so	far	been	incapable	of	taking	ambitious	and	just	action	on	climate	change?		Perhaps	not	if	our	worldview	is	shaped	by	the	assumptions	of	the	liberal	order.	As	policy	content	like	that	in	the	Manifesto	finds	ways	of	entering	into	mainstream	politics	it	will	trigger	a	reflexive	rejection—liberal	“antibodies”	in	the	body	politic—by	those	adhering	to	a	vision	of	the	just	society	requiring	liberalism’s	preferred	institutions.	And	this	brings	us	to	why	I	am	focusing	on	Homer-Dixon.	His	critique	is	a	well-considered	example	of	the	resistance	to	be	anticipated	in	the	ideological	clash	that	follows	from	attempts	to	break	with	the	hegemony	of	the	liberal	order	as	part	of	the	climate	response.		In	spring	2016,	I	attended	a	town	hall	meeting	in	Toronto	(facilitated	by	Avi	Lewis,	who	played	a	major	role	in	the	drafting	of	the	Leap	Manifesto)	intended	to	discuss	the	Leap	Manifesto.	Some	of	the	loudest	applause	of	the	night	was	reserved	for	when	the	matter	of	proportional	representation	was	raised,	which	I	have	to	confess	I	found	odd.	Proportional	representation	is	hardly	the	strongest	challenge	to	the	current	system	included	in	the	Manifesto,	and	it	is	not	at	all	clear	why	we	should	expect	it	to	offer	a	decisive	way	out	of	the	political	morass	producing	only	halting	action	on	climate	change.	For	instance,	none	of	the	major	Canadian	political	parties	strongly	rejected	tar	sands	development	in	the	2015	federal	election,	so…what	exactly	would	proportional	representation	have	changed?	While	Homer-Dixon	reads	elements	into	the	Manifesto	that	were	not	really	present,	the	crowd	that	night	might	have	been	reading	too	much	into	one	of	the	elements	that	was.		The	Leap	Manifesto	offers	a	lot	of	promise	for	escaping	from	the	constraints	of	the	neoliberal	order—and	beyond	that,	perhaps	more—though	how	it	plays	out	(at	least	in	Canada)	will	likely	have	much	to	do	with	a	number	of	factors,	most	immediately	the	results	of	the	NDP	riding	association	meetings	leading	up	to	the	
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party’s	2018	policy	convention.	But	it	will	also	be	interesting	to	see	whether	that	tendency	to	read	various	meanings	into	Leap	will	continue	as	the	manifesto	enters	further	into	the	mainstream,	and	to	see	how	that	affects	its	fortunes.	This	interpretability	could	be	due	to	the	manifesto	being	perhaps	too	light	on	political	philosophy	and	on	the	core	ethic	of	the	vision	of	the	world	it	advocates.	There	is	one	strand	in	the	manifesto’s	preamble,	however,	that	gives	an	important	glimpse	as	to	what	that	core	could	be:		We	could	live	in	a	country	powered	entirely	by	renewable	energy,	woven	together	by	accessible	public	transit,	in	which	the	jobs	and	opportunities	of	this	transition	are	designed	to	systematically	eliminate	racial	and	gender	inequality.	Caring	for	one	another	and	caring	for	the	planet	could	be	the	economy’s	fastest	growing	sectors.	Many	more	people	could	have	higher	wage	jobs	with	fewer	work	hours,	leaving	us	ample	time	to	enjoy	our	loved	ones	and	flourish	in	our	communities.321		 In	the	next	section,	I	want	to	take	that	last	part	of	Leap’s	preamble,	the	concern	with	human	flourishing,	and	tie	it	in	with	some	of	my	own	thinking	on	how	to	respond	to	the	climate	crisis.			
	
5.	“Jumping	Tracks”:	A	Post-Growth	Post-Liberalism?		 Customarily,	“What	is	to	be	done?”	sections	or	chapters	enumerate	a	long	series	of	policy	suggestions.	This	will	not	occur	in	the	pages	that	remain.	The	main	reason	is	that	a	lot	of	those	policy	suggestions	would	simply	overlap	with	what	is	in	the	Leap	Manifesto.	As	noted,	Leap	already	outlines	an	impressively	comprehensive	program,	providing	linkages	for	an	intersectional	movement	uniting	struggles	for	racial	equality,	recognition	of	Indigenous	rights,	economic	justice,	migrant	justice,	climate	change,	and	more.	In	this	way,	Leap	presents	a	highly	promising	and	desperately	needed	project,	one	to	be	monitored	closely	as	it	unfolds.		Before	concluding,	instead	of	retracing	what	Leap	already	covers,	this	dissertation	will	present	a	proposal	for	challenging	one	major	part	of	that	liberal																																									 																					
321	“The	Leap	Manifesto.”	
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order:	its	need	for	perpetual	growth.	The	proposal	that	follows	is	that	there	might	be	a	way	of	challenging	liberalism’s	growth	imperative	and	thus	opening	space	for	more	ambitious	climate	policies	by	identifying	ideas	or	policies	that	enter	into	or	“infiltrate”	the	liberal	order	and	rewrite	its	logic	from	within.	Perhaps	it	would	clarify	matters	to	turn	to	a	term	used	in	the	work	of	green	political	philosopher	Robyn	Eckersley:	“postliberalism.”322	While	the	post-	prefix	can	lack	specificity	(it	tends	to	define	against	the	essence	of	one	thing—i.e.,	negatively—rather	than	from	the	thing	challenging	or	replacing	it),	such	a	term	perhaps	evokes	the	kind	of	project	described	in	the	following	pages.	It	is	one	that	would	seek	to	retain	the	central	ethic	of	liberalism—the	free	pursuit	of	people’s	good	life—but	rupture	its	reliance	on	liberalism’s	preferred	institutions	of	liberal	democracy	and	capitalism,	in	particular	perpetual	growth.	In	so	doing,	it	would	reorient	the	pursuits	people	choose	away	from	those	characterized	by	hyper-consumption,	wealth	accumulation,	and	careerism.	But	what	is	the	path	there?		The	term	“non-reformist	reforms”	is	sometimes	used	to	describe	a	strategy	of	political	engagement	that,	instead	of	pushing	directly	for	revolution,	identifies	particular	policy	struggles	that	are	not	in	themselves	revolutionary,	but	contain	emancipatory	potential	(as	opposed	to	being	just	about	amelioration	of	conditions	within	a	deeply	problematic	system)	in	concert	with	one	another.323	What	follows	
																																								 																					
322	Robyn	Eckersley,	The	Green	State:	Rethinking	Democracy	and	Sovereignty	(Cambridge,	MA:	The	MIT	Press,	2004),	107.		323	I	have	heard	or	seen	the	term	used	numerous	times.	My	use	of	it	here	resonates	with	that	of	Nick	Srnicek	and	Alex	Williams	(Inventing	the	Future:	Postcapitalism	and	a	World	Without	Work	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Verso,	2015),	108),	who	mean	“three	things”	by	“non-reformist	reforms”:	“First	they	have	a	utopian	edge	that	strains	at	the	limits	of	what	capitalism	concedes	[…]	Second,	these	non-reformist	proposals	are	grounded	in	the	real	tendencies	of	the	world	today,	giving	them	a	viability	that	revolutionary	dreams	lack.	Third,	and	most	importantly,	such	demands	shift	the	current	political	equilibrium	and	construct	a	platform	for	further	development.	They	project	an	open-ended	escape	from	the	present,	rather	than	a	mechanical	transition	to	the	next,	predetermined	stage	of	history.	The	proposals	[…]	will	not	break	us	out	of	capitalism,	but	they	do	promise	to	break	us	out	of	neoliberalism,	and	to	establish	a	new	political	equilibrium	of	political,	economic	and	social	forces.”	Meanwhile,	Boaventura	De	Sousa	Santos	and	A.	Rodríguez-Garavito	(“Introduction:	Expanding	the	Economic	Canon	and	Searching	for	Alternatives	to	Neoliberal	Globalization,”	in	Another	Production	is	
Possible:	Beyond	the	Capitalist	Canon,	Boaventura	De	Sousa	Santos	(ed.)	(New	York,	NY:	Verso),	xxi)	
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would	fit	with	that	description,	however	“non-reformist	reforms”	is	a	bit	sparse	theoretically	for	the	argument	I	wish	to	present	here.	To	flesh	matters	out	a	bit,	I	turn	to	a	heuristic	device	(but	abstract	away	from	its	content324)	used	by	Saskia	Sassen	in	her	attempt	to	explain	historical	shifts	from	one	complex	social	order	to	the	next.		Simplifying	somewhat,	for	Sassen,	complex	systems	are	assemblages	of	different	constitutive	elements,	which	operate	in	such	a	way	as	to	serve	a	certain	organizing	logic.	But	the	elements	that	make	up	an	assemblage	are	“multivalent”:	though	they	have	the	ability	to	serve	one	organizing	logic	(and	are	often	introduced	for	the	purpose	of	doing	so),	a	small	change	in	how	they	function	would	allow	them	to	serve	a	very	different	one.	Those	elements	that	were	developed	to	serve	the	logic	of	one	complex	system	can	jump	track	and	serve	a	new	purpose.	(To	illustrate,	Sassen	gives	the	example	of	how	the	“rule	of	law”	was	an	essential	element	to	enforce	national	economic	protectionism	under	one	organizing	logic,	but	could	eventually	come	to	enforce	the	rules	of	a	different	logic,	neoliberalism.	Here,	the	rule	of	law	has	jumped	track.)	If	some	process	can	switch	enough	elements	onto	new	tracks,	they	together	bring	the	old	system’s	logic	past	a	tipping	point	and	into	a	new	logic.325		This	heuristic	device	offers	a	means	of	looking	to	see	whether	there	are	elements	within	liberalism,	or	that	can	be	introduced	into	it,	that	can	“jump	track”	and,	together	on	their	new	tracks,	create	a	new	political	assemblage	which	is	not	committed	to	perpetual	growth	and	the	attendant	cheap	and	enormous	energy	sources	required	to	power	it,	and	thus	is	better	suited	to	responding	to	the	climate																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					trace	the	origin	of	the	term	to	André	Gorz’s	Strategy	for	Labour:	A	Radical	Proposal	(Boston,	MA:	Beacon	Press,	1964).		324	Sassen	was	interested	in	how	the	European	medieval	system	gave	way	to	the	nation-state	system,	which	eventually	gave	way	to	the	present	globalized	order.	I	will	be	interested	in	showing	how	a	version	of	liberalism	requiring	perpetual	compound	economic	growth	and	commodity	consumption	due	to	its	reliance	on	capitalism	might	give	way	to	a	“post-liberalism”	that	transcends	that	economic	institution.		325	Saskia	Sassen,	Territory	Authority	Rights:	From	Medieval	to	Global	Assemblages	Updated	Edition	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	2008).		
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crisis.	Using	this	device	has	another	purpose:	to	identify	those	elements	that	popular	democratic	forces	can	help	“switch”	onto	another	track—or	at	least	put	in	a	new	light.	Sassen’s	device	makes	identifiable	in	a	new	way	a	variety	of	struggles	that	at	first	glance	are	not	necessarily	allied	or	together	coherent	as	a	pathway	to	ideological	change.	Where	concerned	with	different	elements	that	can	jump	track,	struggles	that	may	originally	be	intended	for	unrelated	ends	may	converge	in	such	a	way	as	to	alter	the	ideological	system—the	modern	liberal	system	may	reach	a	tipping	point.	That	new	assemblage	may	retain	liberalism’s	core	ethic	recognizing	the	inviolability	of	people’s	pursuit	of	the	good	life	but	rewrite	its	organizing	logic	so	that	the	good	life	is	not	pursued	through	a	system	willing	to	permit	such	pursuits	so	long	as	they	do	not	disrupt	perpetual	profit	and	economic	growth.	Can	that	liberal	
order	be	“infiltrated,”	“tricked”	into	taking	aboard	new	policies	or	reshaping	old	ones	
that	have	the	appearance	of	serving	its	logic	but	have	the	effect	of	disassembling	it?	Let	us	now	consider	some	examples	of	elements	that	could	jump	track.	Rather	than	a	kind	of	pyramidal	relation	where	it	is	essential	to	establish	some	foundation	before	progressing,	I	see	the	relation	between	them	as	a	kind	of	latticework,	intertwining	without	an	obvious	order	or	starting	point	and	with	multiple	points	of	interrelation.	They	also	act	as	an	appendage	to	projects	with	content	like	the	Leap	Manifesto’s.	While	the	latter	comes	from	what	I	have	called	an	eco-left	framework,	the	ideas	explored	below	came	from	reading	and	thinking	about	how	degrowth	might	be	achieved	starting	from	current	political	and	economic	conditions.	Though	the	“destinations”	those	two	frameworks	lead	to	are	different,	they	both	require	an	exit	from	the	liberal	order	and	so	at	an	early	stage	of	departure	they	are	not	opposed	to	but	can	complement	one	another.			
The	Capabilities	Approach.	One	alternative	to	self-actualization	through	consumption	in	the	market	that	thinkers	keep	returning	to	can	be	captured	by	the	term	capabilities.	The	achievement	of	multiple	capabilities	replaces	endless	material	accumulation	as	a	path	to	the	good	life.		
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Amartya	Sen	draws	an	important	distinction	between	well-having	and	well-
being.	Well-having	would	describe	how	rich	a	person	is	or	even	how	much	control	that	person	holds	over	offices	of	power.	It	refers	to	command	over	things	that	are	outside	of	a	person,	a	measure	of	opulence.	Well-being,	meanwhile,	would	describe	the	kind	of	life	a	person	leads.	Its	primary	feature	is	what	a	person	actually	succeeds	in	being	and	doing,	a	person’s	“functionings.”	But	functionings	cannot	on	their	own	give	a	full	sense	of	a	person’s	well-being.	Sen	frequently	distinguishes	between	a	destitute	person	who	starves	and	an	affluent	person	who	fasts.	Both	have	the	same	functioning	achievement	in	terms	of	nutrition,	but	the	key	difference	is	in	their	freedom	to	choose	to	experience	a	state	of	nutritional	deficiency.326	Because	identical	functionings	can	occur	for	wholly	different	reasons,	Sen	believes	that	freedom	has	to	be	part	of	any	concept	of	well-being:	it	is	necessary	to	look	at	what	different	combinations	of	functionings,	or	“capabilities,”	a	person	is	free	to	pursue.		 	Notably,	Sen	has	been	hesitant	to	specify	just	which	capabilities	to	achieve	functionings	ought	to	be	prioritized.	The	capabilities	approach	takes	on	its	most	articulated	form	in	the	work	of	Martha	Nussbaum	who	uses	it	quite	consciously	to	advance	a	project	of	social	justice.	Nussbaum	lists	10	Central	Capabilities	that	ought	to	form	the	basis	of	any	just	society.	They	are	the	capabilities	associated	with	the	following:	Life;	Bodily	Health;	Bodily	Integrity;	Senses,	Imagination,	and	Thought;	
Emotions;	Practical	Reason;	Affiliation	with	People;	Other	Species;	Play;	and	Control	
over	one's	Environment.327		Sen	and	Nussbaum,	at	least	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	do	not	devote	much	time	to	the	question	of	which	political	and	economic	system(s)	best	suit	a	capabilities	approach.	They	largely	take	the	existing	system	for	granted,	as	their	use	of	capabilities	is	
																																								 																					
326	Amartya	Sen,	“Well-Being,	Agency	and	Freedom:	The	Dewey	Lectures	1984,”	The	Journal	
of	Philosophy,	82,	No	4	(1985):	202;	Amartya	Sen,	Development	as	Freedom	(New	York,	NY:	Anchor	Books,	1999),	75.		327	Martha	C.	Nussbaum,	Creating	Capabilities:	The	Human	Development	Approach		(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap,	2013),	chapter	2.		
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concerned	with	other	matters.328	But	they	are	developing,	and	have	crystallized	a	name	for,	an	approach	to	justice	that	is	quite	ancient.	Sen	himself	roots	it	in	Aristotle’s	notion	of	human	flourishing.	It	is	also	recurring,	appearing,	as	we	will	see	shortly,	in	visions	of	a	good	or	just	society	proposed	by	authors	of	different	generations	and	political	stripes.	And	in	hands	other	than	those	of	Sen	and	Nussbaum,	it	offers	an	approach	to	justice	that	implies	the	need	for	an	alternative	to	the	liberal	order.		The	general	contours	of	that	vision	look	like	this	(references	follow	below).	Its	core	rests	on	an	idea	sometimes	expressed	by	positing	two	realms:	that	of	
freedom	and	that	of	necessity	(though	those	exact	terms	are	not	be	used	by	every	author	in	this	tradition).	True	freedom	can	only	be	said	to	begin	once	the	work	necessary	to	subsist	is	complete.	Throughout	history,	according	to	this	vision,	people	struggled	with	scarcity	and	therefore	needed	to	dedicate	large	amounts	of	their	time	and	labour	towards	meeting	their	societies’	basic	needs.	Possibilities	for	freedom	were	thus	closed	off.	But	progress	in	industrial	production,	organized	for	and	driven	by	capitalist	growth,	would	eventually	open	possibilities	for	a	major	rupture	with	that	past,	steadily	reducing	the	time	and	effort	required	to	eliminate	scarcity,	and	thereby	expanding	the	realm	of	freedom.	In	this	freedom,	people	would,	under	this	vision,	have	ample	time	and	opportunity	to	cultivate	their	capabilities	to	do	and	be	the	things	they	value.	
																																								 																					
328	Sen	distinguishes	between	transcendental	institutional	approaches	to	justice,	which	seek	perfect	justice	through	the	establishment	of	ideal	institutions,	and	realization-focused	comparison	approaches,	which	seek	means	of	evaluating	the	advancement	or	retreat	of	justice	in	the	actual	world	of	real	institutions	without	need	for	a	final	vision	of	the	good.	A	capabilities	approach	carries	out	this	latter	function.	See	Amartya	Sen,	The	Idea	of	Justice	(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press,	2009),	particularly	the	Introduction	and	chapters	11-13.	For	Nussbaum,	capabilities	are	explicitly	grounded	in	political	liberalism	and	could	help	to	address	a	problem	John	Rawls	dedicated	the	later	part	of	his	career	to	addressing:	that	of	achieving	a	stable	political	formation	that	could	embrace	a	pluralism	of	multiple	mutually	incompatible	belief	systems	(what	he	called	“comprehensive	doctrines”).	She	argues	that	her	set	of	10	Central	Capabilities	can	plausibly	form	the	basis	of	what	Rawls	referred	to	as	an	“overlapping	consensus,”	the	common	denominators	that	multiple	comprehensive	doctrines	can	all	agree	ought	to	be	achieved	in	any	society.	See	chapter	4	of	Martha	C.	Nussbaum,	Creating	
Capabilities.				
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While	some	level	of	material	abundance	is	necessary	for	realizing	a	society	in	which	people	can	develop	capabilities,	it	is	not	one	requiring	perpetual	compound	expansion	as	demanded	by	capitalism.	Under	the	latter,	the	current	liberal	order	directs	us	to	pursue	our	good	lives	through	careerism	and	commodity	consumption/accumulation.	Past	a	point	of	sufficiency,	continued	reliance	on	capitalism	and	economic	growth	for	wellbeing	is	unnecessary	and	actually	impedes	possibilities	for	a	truly	free	life.	This	is	because	the	time	colonized	and	administered	to	serve	the	logic	of	endless	profit	and	commodity	consumption	is	time	that	cannot	be	used	to	develop	the	capabilities	to	carry	out	the	activities	that	we	really	value	doing.		This	is	not	the	vision	or	project	of	some	voice	in	the	wilderness	or	fringe	political	belief	system.	In	fact,	it	is	crosscutting	among	political	ideologies.	Early	in	his	development	of	the	capabilities	approach,	Sen	himself	pointed	to	its	presence	in	Marx	and	Engels’	description	of	communism	in	The	German	Ideology.329	One	finds	glimpses	of	it	also	in	currents	of	anarchism	(e.g.,	Murray	Bookchin’s	Post-Scarcity	
Anarchism	and	Noam	Chomsky’s	Government	in	the	Future330)	and	post-Marxism																																									 																					
329	Amartya	Sen,	“Well-Being,	Agency	and	Freedom:	The	Dewey	Lectures	1984,”	The	Journal	
of	Philosophy,	82,	No	4	(1985):	202	(footnote	19).	In	a	famous	passage,	Marx	and	Engels	described	how	under	communism,	individuals’	existence	would	not	be	consigned	to	one	economic	role.	In	their	vision	of	what	a	communist	society	would	look	like	“society	regulates	the	general	production	and	thus	makes	it	possible	for	me	to	do	one	thing	today	and	another	tomorrow,	to	hunt	in	the	morning,	to	fish	in	the	afternoon,	rear	cattle	in	the	evening,	criticize	after	dinner	[…]	without	ever	becoming	hunter,	fisherman,	shepherd	or	critic.”	Karl	Marx	and	Frederick	Engels,	The	German	Ideology:	Part	
One	with	Selections	from	Parts	Two	and	Three	and	Supplementary	Texts,	ed.	C.J.	Arthur	(New	York,	NY:	International	Publishers,	1947),	53.	To	be	sure,	this	is	not	the	same	as	promoting	a	steady-state	economy,	but	it	asserts	a	vision	of	the	good	life	that	can	be	achieved	outside	of	an	economic	system	of	perpetual	growth,	unlike	the	current	version	of	liberalism	under	capitalism	driven	by	commodity	consumption.			330	In	Post-Scarcity	Anarchism	(Oakland,	CA:	AK	Press,	[1971]	2004),	Murray	Bookchin,	argued	that	a	revolution	in	productive	technologies	(particularly	automation)	had	brought	humanity	in	the	20th	century	to	a	unique	moment.	As	he	put	it,	“We	of	this	century	have	finally	opened	the	prospect	of	material	abundance	for	all	to	enjoy—a	sufficiency	in	the	means	of	life	without	the	need	for	grinding	day-to-day	toil	[…]	Supported	by	this	qualitatively	new	technology,	we	can	begin	to	provide	food,	shelter,	garments,	and	a	broad	spectrum	of	luxuries	without	devouring	the	precious	time	of	humanity	and	without	dissipating	its	invaluable	reservoir	of	creative	energy	in	mindless	labor.	In	short	for	the	first	time	in	history	we	stand	on	the	threshold	of	a	post-scarcity	society”	(p.iv).	He	notes	that,	if	bourgeois	state	capitalism’s	control	over	social	life	could	once	be	justified	as	necessary	to	organize	production	to	escape	scarcity,	it	had	reached	the	historical	limit	of	its	
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(e.g.,	the	work	of	André	Gorz,	discussed	below).	Frankfurt	School	scholar	Herbert	Marcuse’s	One	Dimensional	Man	provides	a	definitive	example	from	critical	theory.331	It	is	a	vision	that	merges	with	what	ecological	economists	and	degrowth																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					usefulness	once	it	had	ushered	in	this	technological	revolution.	State	capitalism	was	now	purely	an	obstacle	in	the	creation	of	a	free	society	characterized	by	sufficient	material	abundance	for	all,	and	offered	instead	only	continued	scarcity	to	the	poor,	toil	for	workers,	and	a	vacuous	consumer	society	for	the	upper	classes.	And	the	consequences	of	this	arrangement	were	not	merely	social.	State	capitalism’s	control	over	production	was	also	driving	degradation	of	the	environment	severe	enough	to	threaten	human	survival.	Bookchin	even	muses	about	the	effects	of	climate	change	(p.22),	a	still-distant	prospect	when	he	was	writing	in	the	1960s.	Bookchin’s	revolutionary	project	to	reconcile	these	problems	was	rooted	in	a	blend	of	anarchism	and	ecology.	In	Government	in	the	Future	(Oakland,	CA:	AK	Press	[1970]	2005)	Chomsky	inquires	into	the	proper	role	of	the	state	in	advanced	industrial	countries.	The	libertarian	socialist	views	he	espouses	in	that	lecture	are	to	him	the	natural	expansion	of	classical	liberal	views	like	those	held	by	Wilhelm	von	Humboldt,	whom	Chomsky	draws	on	to	note,	“since	humans	are	in	their	essence	free,	searching,	self-perfecting	beings,	it	follows	that	the	state	is	a	profoundly	anti-human	institution.	That	is,	its	actions,	its	existence	are	ultimately	incompatible	with	the	full	harmonious	development	of	human	potential	in	its	richest	diversity”	(p.10).		With	the	ascent	of	state	capitalism	and	state	socialism,	he	observes	that	the	possibilities	for	human	development	shrink	further:	“Under	conditions	of	authoritarian	domination,	the	classical	liberal	ideals	which	are	expressed…by	Marx	and	Bakunin	and	all	true	revolutionaries	cannot	be	realized.	Human	beings	will,	in	other	words,	not	be	free	to	inquire	and	create,	to	develop	their	own	potentialities	to	their	fullest.	The	worker	will	remain	a	fragment	of	a	human	being,	degraded,	a	tool	in	the	productive	process	directed	from	above.	And	the	ideas	of	revolutionary	libertarian	socialism,	in	this	sense,	have	been	submerged	in	the	industrial	societies	of	the	past	half	century.	The	dominant	ideologies	have	been	those	of	state	socialism	and	state	capitalism”	(p.28).	Like	Bookchin,	he	alludes	to	the	possibilities	offered	by	productive	property	under	democratic	control:	“[S]ome	say	that	centralized	management	is	a	technological	imperative,	but	I	think	the	argument	is	exceedingly	weak	[…]	The	very	same	technology	that	brings	relevant	information	to	the	board	of	managers	can	bring	it	at	the	time	that	it	is	needed	to	everyone	in	the	work	force.	The	technology	that	is	now	capable	of	eliminating	the	stupefying	labor	that	turns	men	into	specialized	tools	of	production	permits	in	principle	the	leisure	and	the	educational	opportunities	that	make	them	able	to	use	this	information	in	a	rational	way”	(p.44).	He	concludes,	“[w]e	have	today	the	technical	and	material	resources	to	meet	man’s	animal	needs.	We	have	not	developed	the	cultural	and	moral	resources	or	the	democratic	forms	of	social	organization	that	make	possible	the	humane	and	rational	use	of	our	material	wealth	and	power.	Conceivably,	the	classical	liberal	ideals,	as	expressed	and	developed	in	their	libertarian	socialist	form,	are	achievable.	But	if	so,	only	by	a	popular	revolutionary	movement,	rooted	in	wide	strata	of	the	population,	and	committed	to	the	elimination	of	repressive	and	authoritarian	institutions,	state	and	private”	(p.67).	331	Writing	around	the	same	time	as	Bookchin	and	Chomsky	(and	coming	to	similar	conclusions),	Marcuse	looked	forward	to	possibilities	for	a	“pacified	society,”	that	is,	a	society	where	basic	material	necessities	could	be	guaranteed	to	workers	without	need	for	unnecessary	labour	or	struggle	against	others	made	possible	through	the	democratic	control	over	advanced	productive	technologies.	But	such	possibilities	remained	latent.	The	apparatus	of	production—tightly	administered	by	business	and	(during	the	pre-neoliberal	era	he	was	writing	in)	the	welfare	state—had	itself	become	a	kind	of	ideology,	one	wedding	the	interests	of	economic	elites	with	those	of	the	labouring	classes	who	found	a	comfortable	or	even	good	life	in	the	rising	material	standard	of	living	offered	by	increased	production.	The	same	economic	and	political	apparatus	that	had	made	this	
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thinkers	have	been	saying	for	some	time.	For	instance,	one	sees	it	in	the	work	of	Clive	Hamilton.332	Tim	Jackson	(in	whose	work	I	actually	first	came	across	this	vision)	argues	convincingly	that	a	capabilities	approach	can	take	us	off	a	path	of	material	and	energy	intensity	and	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	“flourishing	within	limits,”	the	pursuit	of	a	good	life	without	unsustainable	use	of	the	environment.333		But	what	is	most	important	for	the	present	discussion	is	how	the	project’s	presence	is	not	confined	to	anti-capitalist	or	degrowth	frameworks,	but	is	also	found	in	currents	of	liberalism.	The	young	John	Stuart	Mill,	impressed	with	the	economic	growth	and	progress	of	his	time,	mused	that	there	would	come	a	point	at	which	it	should	stop:	one	in	which	“no	one	is	poor,	no	one	desires	to	be	richer,	nor	has	any	reason	to	fear	being	thrust	back	by	the	efforts	of	others	to	push	themselves	forward.”	As	society	reaches	this	point,	toil	would	diminish	and	many	more	people	would	have	the	leisure	to	“cultivate	freely	the	graces	of	life.”	But	even	if	economic	growth	came	to	a	standstill,	“human	improvement”	would	not.	Rather,	“[t]here	would	be	as	much	scope	as	ever	for	all	kinds	of	mental	culture,	and	moral	and	social	progress;	as	much	room	for	improving	the	Art	of	Living,	and	much	more	likelihood																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					project	possible	was	actively	hostile	to	alternatives	that	would	promote	a	free	life:	ideas	or	projects	that	transcended	this	ideology	or	confronted	it	with	fuller	notions	of	freedom	were	either	outright	rejected	or	reduced	to	terms	intelligible	to	its	technocrat	administrators.	Marcuse	thus	described	advanced	industrial	society	as	“one-dimensional,”	tightly	constraining	the	modes	of	economic	life	it	would	permit.	Some	revolutionary	democratic	project	would	be	required	to	tap	into	those	latent	possibilities	to	escape	it.	See	especially	chapters	1,2,	9,	and	10	in	Herbert	Marcuse,	The	One-
Dimensional	Man:	Studies	in	the	Ideology	of	Advanced	Industrial	Society	(Boston,	MA:	Beacon	Press,	1964).		 332	Hamilton	(Growth	Fetish	(London:	Pluto	Press,	2004),	210)	writes	“For	the	great	majority	of	people	in	rich	countries	the	human	condition	is	no	longer	dominated	by	an	ever-present	need	to	provide	for	survival	and	to	accumulate	assets	to	guard	against	lean	times	[…]	Once	the	economic	problem	had	been	solved,	before	history	had	allowed	time	for	people	to	decide	what	to	do	next,	the	markets	filled	the	vacuum	of	consciousness	with	their	message	of	consumption.	Although	most	people	intuitively	understand	that	their	condition	is	determined	above	all	by	a	need	to	find	fulfillment	in	a	social	environment	that	puts	income	before	purpose,	they	act	as	if	there	is	nothing	wrong	because	they	know	not	what	else	to	do.	The	vision	of	a	post-growth	society	answers	the	question	of	what	to	do	next.”	As	Sen	did,	Hamilton	reaches	back	to	Aristotle’s	notion	of	human	flourishing,	and	calls	the	vision	he	is	advocating	eudemonism,	“which	concerns	not	just	a	system	of	ethics	but	also	a	political	ideology	that	argues	for	an	organisation	of	society	that	promotes	the	full	realisation	of	human	potential	through,	in	the	first	instance,	proper	appreciation	of	the	sources	of	wellbeing”	(p.	212).		333	Tim	Jackson,	Prosperity	Without	Growth.	
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of	its	being	improved,	when	minds	ceased	to	be	engrossed	in	the	art	of	getting	on.”334		In	his	1930	essay	“Economic	Possibilities	for	our	Grandchildren,”335	John	Maynard	Keynes	expected	that	within	a	hundred	years,	technological	advance	would	expand	the	average	standard	of	living	four	to	eightfold,	reducing	the	time	required	for	work	to	fifteen	hours	per	week.	Rather	than	being	absorbed	in	preoccupations	about	their	economic	wellbeing,	individuals	would	learn	to	“pluck	the	hour	and	the	day	virtuously	and	well,”	and	those	who	“cultivate…the	art	of	life”	are	those	who	will	most	enjoy	this	new	society.		Though	not	himself	part	of	the	tradition,	C.B.	Macpherson	undertook	an	immanent	critique	of	liberalism,	one	building	on	liberal	thinkers	like	T.H.	Green	and	J.S.	Mill.	He	argued	that	what	is	essential	to	any	democratic	theory	is	an	understanding	of	the	human	individual	as	“a	doer,	a	creator,	an	enjoyer	of	[their]	unique	human	attributes.”336	Concomitantly,	any	such	theory	should	seek	to	maximize	the	development	of	individuals’	human	capacities.	(Not	only	is	Macpherson’s	term	similar	to	capabilities,	but	his	list	of	essential	capacities	also	anticipates	Nussbaum’s.337)	But	this	view	of	democracy	had	been	subsumed	under	contemporary	liberal	democracy	and	capitalism,	which	rest	on	an	understanding	of	humans	as	infinite	accumulators	in	the	market.	What	was	needed,	Macpherson																																									 																					
334	Such	a	project	would	even	hold	some	environmental	implications.	As	Mill	put	it,	“If	the	earth	must	lose	that	great	portion	of	its	pleasantness	which	it	owes	to	things	that	the	unlimited	increase	of	wealth	and	population	would	extirpate	from	it,	for	the	mere	purpose	of	enabling	it	to	support	a	larger	but	not	a	better	or	happier	population,	I	sincerely	hope,	for	the	sake	of	posterity,	that	they	will	be	content	to	be	stationary,	long	before	necessity	compels	them	to	it.”	John	Stuart	Mill,	
Principles	of	Political	Economy,	Books	IV	and	V	(Penguin,	[1848]	1988),	116.		335	“Economic	Possibilities	for	our	Grandchildren”	can	be	found	in	John	Maynard	Keynes,	
Essays	in	Persuasion	(London:	Macmillan,	1931).	eBook	available	at	http://www.gutenberg.ca/ebooks/keynes-essaysinpersuasion/keynes-essaysinpersuasion-00-h.html	 336	C.B.	Macpherson,	Democratic	Theory:	Essays	in	Retrieval	(Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	4.	 337	The	capacities	Macpherson	identified	as	“essential”	to	any	democratic	theory	included	“the	capacity	for	rational	understanding,	for	moral	judgment	and	action,	for	aesthetic	creation	or	contemplation,	for	the	emotional	activities	of	friendship	and	love…for	wonder	or	curiosity…for	laughter…for	controlled	physical/mental/aesthetic	activity,	as	expressed	for	instance	in	making	music	and	in	playing	games	of	skill.”	Macpherson,	Democratic	Theory,	53-54.		
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argued,	was	a	retrieval	of	that	other	understanding,	that	is,	of	humans	as	maximizers	of	their	capacities.	He	believed	the	ongoing	technological	revolution	could	“by	releasing	more	and	more	time	and	energy	from	compulsive	labour,	allow	men	[sic]	to	think	and	act	as	enjoyers	and	developers	of	their	human	capacities	rather	than	devoting	themselves	to	labour	as	a	necessary	means	of	acquiring	commodities.”338	Macpherson	believed	increases	in	material	productivity	to	have	only	been	a	temporary	necessity,	one	that	could	be	abandoned	in	advanced	industrial	nations,	but	only	if	people	could	come	to	see	themselves	as	developers	of	capacities	instead	of	consumers.339				I	believe	all	of	this	very	strongly	suggests	that	there	is	a	current	within	liberalism	that	is	consistent	with	its	core	ethic	of	allowing	people	to	pursue	their	unique	versions	of	the	good	life,	but	inconsistent	with	the	continued	hegemony	of	its	preferred	institutions,	particularly	capitalism	and	its	infinite	growth	imperative.	Taking	a	cue	from	Tim	Jackson,	I	will	continue	to	refer	to	this	in	what	follows	as	the	capabilities	approach,	but	acknowledge	that	not	all	authors	above	would	use	this	term	(J.S.	Mill,	Keynes,	and	Marcuse	all	made	reference	to	the	“art	of	life”	or	“art	of	living”).	The	capabilities	approach	to	justice	can	enter	into	the	liberal	order.	Indeed,	its	use	and	development	by	Sen	and	Nussbaum	very	much	show	it	is	already	part	of	liberalism’s	modern	tradition.	But	it	can	also	jump	track.	Instead	of	being	merely	a																																									 																					
338	Macpherson,	Democratic	Theory,	37.	339	As	he	put	it,	“The	standard	of	wants	appropriate	to	a	democratic	theory,	then,	is	different	from	the	standard	generally	assumed	in	the	liberal	theory.	But	does	it	not	also,	like	the	liberal	standard,	tend	to	shift	upwards	without	limit?	It	is	true	that	the	full	development	of	human	capacities,	as	envisioned	in	the	liberal-democratic	concept	of	man—at	least	in	its	most	optimistic	version	is	infinitely	great.	No	inherent	limit	is	seen	to	the	extent	to	which	men’s	human	capacities	may	be	enlarged.	But	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that	such	indefinite	enlargement	requires	an	indefinite	increase	in	the	material	prerequisites.	On	the	contrary,	the	extent	to	which	an	advanced	society	makes	individually	owned	material	increases	the	main	criterion	of	social	good	militates	against	its	recognizing	the	importance	of	equal	development	of	the	essential	human	capacities	[…]	No	increase	in	productivity,	however	great,	will	end	scarcity	while	people	continue	to	see	themselves	as	infinite	consumers.	A	comparatively	modest	increase	in	productivity,	or	no	increase	at	all	in	the	present	productive	capacity	of	the	economically	most	advanced	nations,	would	end	scarcity	if	people	came	to	see	themselves	(as	the	justifying	theory	of	liberal	democracy	must	assume	them	to	be)	as	doers,	exerters,	enjoyers	of	essentially	human	capacities.”	Macpherson,	Democratic	Theory,	62.		
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means	of	understanding	how	to	improve	things	within	a	liberal	order	as	Sen	and	Nussbaum	use	it,	it	can	actually	serve	as	the	basis	for	re-evaluating	liberalism’s	political	philosophical	claims	to	continuing	to	realize	the	conditions	for	a	just	society,	and	in	the	end	undermine	them.	Even	restricting	ourselves	to	thinkers	arguing	on	liberal	terms—J.S.	Mill,	Keynes,	and	Macpherson—the	capabilities	approach	quickly	shows	that	there	is	something	wrong	with	strict	adherence	to	the	liberal	order’s	pursuit	of	perpetual	economic	growth,	which	has	become	a	kind	of	malevolent	entity	possessing	our	society.	For	those	of	us	in	the	(over)developed	countries,	this	growth	imperative	is	no	longer	necessary	for	the	purpose	of	eliminating	scarcity,	no	longer—as	degrowth	thinkers	tell	us—increases	wellbeing.	Prioritizing	growth	even	makes	some	things	worse,	most	centrally,	our	ability	to	respond	to	climate	change,	but	also	to	shift	away	from	the	massive	material	throughput	that	is	so	burdensome	on	ecosystems.		The	major	effect	that	the	capabilities	approach	has,	then,	is	to	provide	a	standard	that	allows	us	to	simultaneously	delegitimize	the	claims	of	the	current	liberal	order	and	the	necessity	of	growth,	while	also	conceiving	of	a	good	society	that	can	be	achieved	within	ecological	limits.	One	of	the	most	immediate	and	consistent	questions	my	students	have	asked	in	lecture	and	tutorial	whenever	we	discuss	the	problem	of	sustainability	and	liberalism’s	institutions,	particularly	capitalism,	is	just	what	is	supposed	to	be	a	measure	of	a	good	life	or	society	if	not	one	centered	on	jobs,	perpetual	growth	and	progress,	and	consumption.	Though	anecdotal,	it	is	a	strong	indication	to	me	that	the	question	of	a	good	life	in	terms	other	than	those	of	the	liberal	order	must	be	answered.	There	is	a	reluctance,	a	nagging	doubt	at	the	back	of	the	mind,	to	level	a	full	systemic	critique	until	this	question	is	answered.	The	task	then	is	to	bring	the	capabilities	idea	into	the	mainstream.	The	kinds	of	policies	discussed	below	will	help	answer	how	the	capabilities	approach	is	to	be	realized.			
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Universal	Guaranteed	Income.340	The	universal	guaranteed	income	(UGI)	provides	individuals	with	an	income	regardless	of	employment	status.	It	is	often	put	forward	as	an	anti-poverty	strategy,	but	it	could	be	a	lot	more	ambitious	than	that.	In	the	same	way	that	universal	healthcare	can	be	seen	as	a	human	right	to	be	free	from	treatable	illness,	a	UGI	could,	at	the	very	least,	guarantee	a	right	to	live	free	from	poverty—and	it	is	often	put	forward	as	an	anti-poverty	policy.341	But,	if	
instituted	in	the	right	way,	it	can	be	more	ambitious	than	that,	providing	not	just	the	means	to	pursue	a	life	free	from	poverty,	but	a	free	life.	Period.		This	caveat	is	important.	Like	renewable	energy,	a	guaranteed	income	is	not	the	seed	of	any	one	particular	political	project.	Multiple	lines	of	political	philosophical	reasoning	support	it	and	simultaneously	limit	its	application,	and	so	some	care	needs	to	be	taken	regarding	what	kind	of	political	project	it	is	shaped	to	promote.342	For	example,	on	the	libertarian	right,	a	basic	income	is	justified	because	it	can	simultaneously	address	poverty	created	by	capitalism	while	shrinking	a	welfare	state	perceived	to	be	bloated	and	inefficient.	In	Milton	Friedman’s	version,	it	is	not	really	universal	at	all,	but	a	“negative	income	tax”	or	subsidy	to	those	below	a	certain	income	level,	merely	establishing	an	income	floor,	and	a	low	one	at	that.343																																										 																					
340	The	next	two	items,	a	universal	guaranteed	income	and	shorter	working	hours,	also	appear	prominently	(alongside	open	borders)	in	Rutger	Bregman’s	Utopia	for	Realists:	The	Case	for	a	
Universal	Basic	Income,	Open	Borders,	and	a	15-hour	Workweek	(The	Correspondent,	2016),	a	book	now	generating	considerable	attention	that	I	learned	about	too	late	to	read	and	include	in	this	dissertation.	An	article	by	Bregman	in	The	Guardian	based	on	that	book	is,	however,	cited	below	in	the	section	on	reducing	work	hours.	See	also	Graeme	Maxton	and	Jorgen	Randers,	Reinventing	
Prosperity:	Managing	Economic	Growth	to	Reduce	Unemployment,	Inequality,	and	Climate	Change	(A	
Report	to	the	Club	of	Rome)	(Vancouver:	Greystone	Books,	2016),	chapter	9.		341	Bob	Hepburn,	“New	poll	shows	surprising	support	for	anti-poverty	plan:	Hepburn,”	
Toronto	Star,	December	11,	2013,	http://www.thestar.com/opinion/2013/12/11/new_poll_	shows_surprising_support_for_antipoverty_plan_hepburn.html	342	For	more	detailed	surveys	on	the	different	justifications	for	a	UGI	than	what	follows,	see	Daniel	Raventós,	Basic	Income:	The	Material	Conditions	of	Freedom	(London:	Pluto	Press,	2007),	in	particular	chapters	2	and	3;	and	Philippe	Van	Parijs,	“Competing	Justifications	of	Basic	Income,”	in	
Arguing	for	Basic	Income:	Ethical	Foundations	for	a	Radical	Reform,	Philippe	Van	Parijs	(ed.)	(New	York,	NY:	Verso,	1992).		343	Gorz	argues	that	the	legitimacy	of	a	guaranteed	income	on	these	grounds	would	always	be	contested.	It	would	be	built	on	an	understanding	that	those	who	work	must	transfer	some	part	of	their	wealth	to	those	for	whom	there	are	no	job	opportunities	or	who	are	deemed	unable	to	work,	a	situation	sure	to	foment	resentment.	It	would	also	risk	acting	as	a	kind	of	“top	up”	for	low-grade	and	
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Philippe	Van	Parijs	argues	for	a	UGI	as	an	essential	part	of	establishing	what	he	calls	“real	freedom	for	all”	to	distinguish	it	from	a	right-wing	libertarian	notion	of	freedom.	The	latter	assumes	too	simply	that	guarantees	of	(1)	security	through	well-enforced	rights	(principally	property	rights)	and	(2)	ownership	of	self	are	sufficient	to	provide	freedom	from	coercion.	But	those	two	elements	make	individuals	merely	
formally	free	from	coercion,	“free”	even	as	they	face	destitution	for	lack	of	means	to	acquire	basic	needs	or	as	they	take	degrading,	oppressive	jobs	to	subsist.	Real	freedom	requires	that	(3)	individuals	have	the	greatest	opportunity	to	carry	out	what	they	wish	to	do.344	The	UGI	does	exactly	this.		Parijs	argument	is	a	very	complex	one	to	distil,	but	it	will	suffice	to	say	for	now	simply	that,	on	the	question	of	whether	real	freedom	for	all	ought	to	be	realized	through	capitalism	or	socialism,	Parijs	holds	that	one	must	choose	capitalism	because	it	possesses	a	superior	productive	potential	and	will	thus	offer	the	highest	sustainable	basic	income.345	What	this	means,	then,	for	my	argument	is	that	Parijs’	version	of	a	UGI	is	not	conceived	as	a	way	of	exiting	the	existing	liberal	ideological	order;	it	still	requires	capitalist	growth.	But	what	is	important	is	that	it	can	enter	into	that	order,	and,	once	it	is	lodged	there,	has	the	ability	to	jump	track	in	a	way	that	a	libertarian	version	of	a	guaranteed	income	would	not.		The	greatest	effect	of	a	generous	UGI	once	introduced	would	be	ideological.	Once	inserted	into	the	liberal	order	it	could	signal	the	arrival	of	a	system	of	post-
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 																					low-paid	precarious	work.	See	André	Gorz,	Critique	of	Economic	Reason	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Verso,	1989),	210.	(But	for	a	response	see	Raventós,	Basic	Income,	184-185.)		Thanks	to	Dr.	Ellie	Perkins	for	also	pointing	out	that	the	resentment	Gorz	worries	about	could	be	reduced	in	a	society	that	comes	to	form	a	broad	social	understanding	of	the	importance	of	equality	in	society,	the	far-reaching	benefits	of	which	are	pointed	out	in	Richard	Wilkinson	and	Kate	Pickett,	The	Spirit	Level:	Why	Equality	is	Better	for	Everyone	(Toronto:	Penguin	Books,	2010).	344	Phillipe	Van	Parijs,	Real	Freedom	for	All:	What	(if	anything)	Can	Justify	Capitalism?	(Clarendon	Press,	1998.),	chapter	1.		345	Again,	this	is	a	very	involved	argument.	Parijs	actually	compares	capitalism	and	socialism	in	“optimal”	forms,	but	to	define	them	would	involve	a	lengthy	digression	that	I	do	not	believe	affects	my	argument	that	a	UGI	would	not	automatically	provide	a	mechanism	to	transcend	liberalism	and	its	growth	imperative.	It	has	the	ability	to	serve	a	capitalist	organizing	logic,	but	also	some	alternative	organizing	logic.	For	more	on	how	he	arrives	at	his	conclusions,	see	Van	Parijs,	Real	
Freedom	for	All,	especially	chapters	2	and	6.		
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scarcity,	of	the	achievement	of	productive	capacity	to	provide	for	the	material	needs	for	a	good	life.	And	as	people	come	to	understand	that	condition,	their	political	imaginary	might	grow.	They	may	come	to	question	the	need	to	take	on	alienating	work,	and	the	need	for	the	perpetual-growth	fetish.	It	will	help	that	a	UGI	will	also	have	entailed	a	major	extension	of	democracy	into	the	economy,	a	democratic	reclamation	of	society’s	vast	economic	surplus	previously	appropriated	as	private	hyper-wealth.	The	UGI	can	offer	reassurance	that	an	exit	from	careerism	will	not	leave	workers	in	precarity.	It	could	allow	people	more	freedom	to	participate	in	the	kind	of	economy	they	want	by	opening	possibilities	to	engage	in	economic	enterprises	that	are	not	about	profit,	maximizing	competitiveness,	or	growing	market	share.	And	that	democratic	economic	extension	can	be	built	upon	further.	If	part	of	society’s	economic	surplus	comes	back	to	us	as	individuals,	why	not	also	to	our	communities,	why	not	also	those	communities	in	other	parts	of	the	world	to	whom	we	have	duties	to	ensure	transition	into	a	post-carbon	world	adapted	for	climate	change?		One	area	where	a	UGI	coincides	directly	with	climate	concerns	is	in	easing	the	transition	towards	a	renewable	energy	system.	In	particular,	it	would	make	stronger	environmental	regulation	more	politically	acceptable	where	that	regulation	affects	jobs	in	heavily	environmentally	destructive	sectors,	like	the	fossil	fuel	industry.	It	might	even	eventually	play	a	role	in	allowing	countries	to	take	in	more	migrants	from	places	experiencing	climate	change.	And	a	UGI	can	also	work	in	conjunction	with	another	policy	change	to	which	we	now	turn.			
Shorter	working	hours.	A	confluence	of	recent	changes	could	set	the	stage	for	bringing	policies	around	reducing	work	hours	into	the	liberal	order.	First,	there	is	some	evidence	showing	that	shorter	working	days	can	improve	efficiency	and	reduce	employee	turnover	(in	addition	to	other	benefits),	which	is	good	for	
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capitalism.346	Second,	in	a	time	when	increased	automation	threatens	jobs,347	work-sharing	programs	may	offer	a	way	of	reducing	unemployment.	Third,	labour	campaigns	have	won	some	impressive	recent	victories	in	their	fight	for	a	liveable	($15)	hourly	wage.	As	a	result,	labour	may	find	itself	emboldened,	its	strength	renewed	by	these	victories,	and	find	ways	to	expand	the	fight	around	work	and	liveability;	shorter	working	hours	might	be	among	them.		Instead	of	merely	improving	worker	productivity	or	cushioning	the	blows	of	capitalist	automation,	reduction	of	work	hours	could	jump	track	to	serve	the	capabilities	approach.	Most	obviously,	it	would	ensure	more	people	more	free	time	to	pursue	their	good	life.	There	is	always	a	temporal	opportunity	cost	to	work:	hours	worked	are	hours	that	cannot	be	spent	in	developing	or	using	capabilities.	The	need	to	transfer	over	to	an	employer—and	thus	reduce—the	use	of	and	control	over	the	development	of	one’s	capacities	was	central	to	C.	B.	Macpherson’s	condemnation	of	capitalism	and	his	search	for	a	freer	society.348		Complemented	by	some	form	of	income	guarantee,	a	reduction	in	work	hours	opens	up	even	more	possibilities	for	deviating	from	liberalism’s	hegemony.	In	
Critique	of	Economic	Reason,	André	Gorz	argued	that	as	automation	reduced	the	need	for	workers	and	increased	precarious	work,	the	political	left	needed	a	new	project.	He	envisioned	one	centering	on	equitably	sharing	what	necessary	working	time	remained	as	a	condition	of	receiving	an	income.	Gorz’s	does	not,	therefore,	propose	an	unconditional	income	(he	argues	that	work	is	essential	for	equal	
																																								 																					
346	David	Crouch,	“Efficiency	up,	turnover	down:	Sweden	experiments	with	six-hour	working	day,”	Guardian,	September	17,	2015,	http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/17/efficiency-up-turnover-down-sweden-experiments-with-six-hour-working-day;	Rutger	Bregman,	“The	solution	to	(nearly)	everything:	working	less,”	Guardian,	April	18,	2016,	http://www.theguardian.com/	commentisfree/2016/apr/18/solution-everything-working-less-work-pressure.		347	For	example,	a	recent	study	out	of	the	Oxford	Martin	School	estimated	47%	of	US	jobs	may	be	at	risk	of	automation.	See,	Carl	Benedikt	Frey	and	Michael	A.	Osborne,	"The	Future	of	Employment:	How	Susceptible	are	Jobs	to	Computerisation?"	(Oxford	Martin	School,	2013)	http://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/publications/view/1314	348	Macpherson,	Democratic	Theory,	chapter	1.		
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citizenship349).	But	income	amount	would	not	be	tied	to	the	amount	of	hours	worked,	as	current	wage-labour	is—only	to	having	completed	one’s	fair	share	of	it.	Nor	would	employment	have	to	be	concurrent	with	income.	Workers	could	schedule	their	periods	of	required	employment	in	such	a	way	that	they	are	allowed	lengthy	stretches	of	time	off,	with	enormous	benefit:				 This	possibility	of	periodically	interrupting	your	working	life	for	six	months	or	two	years	at	any	age	will	enable	anyone	to	study	or	resume	their	studies,	to	learn	a	new	occupation,	to	set	up	a	band,	a	theatre	group,	a	neighbourhood	cooperative,	an	enterprise	or	a	work	of	art,	to	build	a	house,	to	make	inventions,	to	raise	your	children,	to	campaign	politically,	to	go	to	a	Third	World	country	as	a	voluntary	worker,	to	look	after	a	dying	relative	or	friend,	and	so	on.350		 Time	dominated	by	the	demands	of	work	(and	the	recovery	from	the	long	workday)	is	also	time	that	cannot	be	dedicated	to	developing	community.	Reducing	work	hours	holds	implications	for	the	political	system,	too.	With	control	over	time	increased,	people	will	have	more	hours	to	engage	in	democratic	endeavours.	The	justification	for	liberalism’s	shallow	democracy—the	time	burden	prohibiting	average	citizens	from	becoming	involved—will	begin	to	look	hollow,	and	more	participatory	or	deliberative	forms	of	democracy	can	begin	to	take	root	and	thrive.	Anyone	involved	in	climate	activism	can	attest	to	how	many	of	the	activists	are	young	undergrad	students,	employed	part-time,	or	retirees,	precisely	those	groups	with	more	time	than	the	demands	of	careerism	under	the	demands	of	capitalist	growth	allows.		The	energy	inputs	required	for	full-time	employment	of	40	hours	per	week	or	more	(for	almost	every	week	of	the	year)	of	the	majority	of	an	economy’s	adult	population	are	enormous.	They	would	include	not	only	the	powering	of	work	sites	themselves	but	the	entire	system	of	rhythmically	synchronized	daily	reproduction	of	the	workforce—from	the	energy	needed	to	heat	water	for	morning	coffees	and																																									 																					
349	See	André	Gorz,	“On	the	Difference	between	Society	and	Community,	and	Why	Basic	Income	Cannot	by	Itself	Confer	Full	Membership	of	Either,”	in	Arguing	for	Basic	Income:	Ethical	
Foundations	for	a	Radical	Reform,	Philippe	Van	Parijs,	(ed.)	(London:	Verso,	1992).		350	André	Gorz,	Critique	of	Economic	Reason	(Brooklyn,	NY:	Verso,	1989),	210.		
 217 
showers	across	households	simultaneously	to	the	energy	required	to	power	the	commute	and	so	on.	Reducing	work	hours	could	therefore	have	important	implications	for	climate	as	well,	though	this	will	depend	on	finding	ways	of	ensuring	freed	up	time	is	not	reinvested	in	carbon-intensive	activities.351		
Public	goods.	Though	undermined	in	the	neoliberal	period,	investments	in	public	facilities	and	events	have	traditionally	been	part	of	liberal	societies,	and	there	are	already	a	wide	variety	of	fights	for	renewed	public	investment	at	multiple	levels	of	governance.	These	investments	have	the	possibility	to	switch	track.		Tim	Jackson	notes	that	a	capabilities	approach	as	Sen	describes	it	could	still	preserve	and	even	justify	an	economic	system	based	on	material	consumption.	The	problem	lies	in	how	Sen	acknowledges	that	avoidance	of	shame	is	an	important	social	capability,	but,	if	one	takes	a	capitalist	system	for	granted	as	Sen	appears	to,	avoidance	of	shame	requires	a	constant	process	of	“keeping	up	with	the	Joneses.”																																									 																					
351	There	have	been	arguments	(and	some	evidence	for	them)	that	reducing	work	hours	can	be	a	pathway	to	reducing	emissions.	See,	e.g.,	David	Rosnick	and	Mark	Weisbrot,	Are	Shorter	Work	
Hours	Good	for	the	Environment?	A	Comparison	of	U.S.	&	European	Energy	Consumption	(Center	for	Economic	and	Policy	Research,	2006)	available	at	http://cepr.net/publications/reports/are-shorter-work-hours-good-for-the-environment-a-comparison-of-us-a-european-energy-consumption;	Juliet	Schor,	“Reducing	working	hours	can	benefit	the	economy	and	the	environment,”	Guardian,	June	2011,	https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/reducing-working-hours-economy-environment;	David	Rosnick,	“Reduced	work	hours	as	a	means	of	slowing	climate	change,"	Real-
World	Economics	Review	63	(2013).	See	also	the	brief	literature	review	in	Qing-long	Shao	and	Beatriz	Rodríguez-Labajos,	“Does	decreasing	working	time	reduce	environmental	pressures?	New	evidence	based	on	dynamic	panel	approach,”	Journal	of	Cleaner	Production	125	(2016).	However,	Shao	and	Rodríguez-Labajos	(op.	cit.)	found	some	evidence	for	a	“rebound	effect”	where	per	capita	carbon	emissions	do	not	decline	with	a	fall	in	working	hours.	The	authors	speculated	that	hours	not	occupied	by	work	might	be	occupied	by	carbon-intensive	activities	(such	as	travelling	by	car	and	vacationing	abroad).	Druckman	et	al.	had	earlier	warned	about	the	possibility	for	this	rebound	effect	and	stressed	the	importance	of	the	kinds	of	activities	non-work	hours	are	dedicated	towards.	Though	they	do	not	propose	a	program	to	do	so,	they	suggest	that	“supportive	structures”	will	need	to	be	in	place,	which	could	include	a	change	in	travel	infrastructure	so,	for	example,	“twenty	minute	neighbourhoods”	become	the	norm	“where	all	basic	needs,	such	as	shops,	workplaces,	health	facilities,	libraries	and	recreational	facilities	can	be	met	within	a	twenty	minute	walk	or	cycle	[…]	Natural	areas	such	as	parks	are	included	within	the	area	and,	because	people	are	no	longer	in	their	cars	and	live	more	locally	based	lives,	community	spirit	and	social	capital	are	increased,	resulting	in	improved	levels	of	well-being.”	Druckman	et	al.,	“Time,	gender	and	carbon:	A	study	of	the	carbon	implications	of	British	adults'	use	of	time,”	Ecological	Economics	84	(2012),	158-159.	The	possibility	of	a	rebound	effect	obviously	complicates	the	way	reduction	in	working	hours	might	affect	GHG	emissions,	but	this	is	precisely	where	a	carbon	tax	can	make	a	major	impact.		
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Jackson	sees	public	investment	as	a	means	to	develop	capabilities	that	rival	the	appeal	of	material	consumption	and	accumulation:				 The	task	is	to	create	real	capabilities	for	people	to	flourish	in	less	materialistic	ways.	At	a	societal	scale,	this	means	re-investing	in	those	capabilities:	physically,	financially	and	emotionally.	In	particular,	we	need	to	revitalize	the	notion	of	public	goods	[…]	Green	space	parks,	recreation	centres,	sports	facilities,	libraries,	museums,	public	transportation,	local	markets,	retreats	and	‘quiet	centres’,	festivals:	these	are	some	of	the	building	blocks	for	a	new	vision	of	social	participation.352		 The	way	Jackson	conceives	of	realizing	his	ideas	is	not	through	decreeing	accumulative	hyper-consumptive	lifestyles	illegal	through	government	fiat,	but	by	making	them	unappealing	in	contrast	to	richer	lifestyles	of	capabilities	development.				 What	I	have	described	is,	again,	a	kind	of	latticework,	an	intertwined	set	of	policy	changes.	The	changes	might	even	have	a	Mobius	strip-like	character	in	the	way	they	interact	with,	reinforce,	and	lead	into	one	another:	a	capabilities	approach	to	the	just	society	implies	a	need	for	some	base	level	of	material	opportunity	and	significant	control	over	one’s	time;	an	income	guarantee	and	a	reduction	in	working	hours	respectively	realize	the	material	and	temporal	conditions	for	developing	one’s	capabilities;	a	UGI	can	break	the	relationship	between	hours	worked	and	income	received;	with	extra	time	and	a	new	understanding	of	the	importance	of	developing	one’s	capabilities	will	come	demands	for	more	public	investment;	the	intuitive	appeal	these	ideas	already	hold	in	the	mainstream	for	their	own	sake	(e.g.,	shorter	work	hours	relieve	us	from	long	stretches	at	alienating	jobs)	can	be	anchored	or	grounded	philosophically	in	a	capabilities	approach,	giving	them	more	weight.	But	each	can	be	justified	under	reasons	consistent	with	the	liberal	order	and	so,	I	believe,	has	the	possibility	of	entering	into	it	and,	once	lodged	there,	rewriting	its	logic.																																										 																					
352	Tim	Jackson,	Prosperity	without	Growth,	193.		
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6.	Conclusion:	Towards	a	More	Just	Society		If	what	I	have	described	can	take	hold	and	begin	to	recast	the	way	a	good	society	is	conceived,	possibilities	might	open	up	for	other,	more	ambitious	changes	that	further	break	apart	liberalism’s	hold.	As	defining	a	good	life	through	a	capabilities	approach	(rather	than	through	ability	to	thrive	in	the	market)	strengthens	the	moral	case	against	vast	wealth	accumulation,	income	ceilings	could	complement	basic	incomes.353	And	they	might	be	conceived	in	liberal-consistent	terms.	Hoarding	obscene	personal	riches	interferes	with	and	diminishes	the	freedom	of	others	by	depriving	society	of	means	that	can	be	redistributed	to	individuals	or	communities	that	would	otherwise	enhance	their	capabilities;	hyper-accumulation	might,	in	other	words,	be	conceived	of	as	an	illegitimate	freedom.	Advertising	could	be	conceived	as	an	illiberal	tool	of	manipulation,	one	that	interferes	with	our	autonomy	by	allowing	massively	powerful	corporations	to	push	lifestyles	and	life	choices	onto	us.	In	its	branding	form	in	particular,	advertising	carries	little	product	information	necessary	for	individuals	to	make	market	decisions.	It	could	thus	be	taxed	or	regulated.354	New	policy-evaluation	instruments	could	chip	away	at	the	prioritization	of	gross	domestic	product	growth.	Generous	guaranteed	incomes	could	undercut	part	of	the	rationale	behind	wealth	inheritance—the	desire	to	ensure	economic	security	for	one’s	children.		As	mentioned,	I	have	held	to	describing	this	project	in	political	philosophical	terms.355	There	would	still	be	much	work	to	be	done	at	the	empirical	level.	At	what																																									 																					
353	Herman	Daly	speculated	that	maximum	inequality	in	income	between	the	richest	and	poorest	should	be	around	10:1	(or	at	most	20:1	to	be	conservative	about	where	best	to	set	maximal	difference).	Herman	E.	Daly,	Beyond	Growth:	The	Economics	of	Sustainable	Development	(Boston,	MA:	Beacon	Press,	1996),	202-203.		354	Erik	Assadourian,	“The	Path	to	Degrowth	in	Overdeveloped	Countries,”	in	State	of	the	
World	2012:	Moving	Toward	Sustainable	Prosperity,	eds.,	Erik	Assadourian	and	Michael	Renner,	(Washington,	DC:	Worldwatch	Institute,	2012),	30.		355	Sadly,	I	do	not	have	the	advantage	that	the	Leap	Manifesto’s	authors	did	in	being	able	to	turn	to	a	progressive	think	tank	to	write	a	report	demonstrating	the	feasibility	of	my	project.	See,	Bruce	Campbell,	Seth	Klein,	and	Marc	Lee,	We	Can	Afford	The	Leap	(Canadian	Centre	for	Policy	Alternatives,	2015).		
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level	should	we	set	a	UGI?	Which	parts	of	the	economy	can	we	hand	over	to	automation	and	work-sharing	to	reduce	working	time?	How	best	can	the	UGI	be	paid	for?	How	much	might	we	minimize	work	hours	and	still	have	an	economy	permitting	this	capabilities-based	society?	How	and	to	what	degree	might	the	conditions	created	by	a	capabilities	turn	affect	generation	of	economic	surplus?	I	leave	questions	like	these	to	others.	My	concern	here	is	to	propose	and	justify	a	political	project	for	a	more	just	society	that	would	lead	to	a	search	for	answers	to	questions	like	those	instead	of	questions	like,	“how	much	will	economic	growth	suffer	if	we	take	the	drastic	climate	action	needed”?			Like	much	of	the	content	of	the	Leap	Manifesto,	the	political	struggles	of	the	project	I	have	described	are	not	ones	that,	at	first	blush,	relate	obviously	to	the	fight	for	climate	justice.	But	what	they	can	do	is	rewrite	the	organizing	logic	of	the	current	liberal	political	and	economic	system	from	within	so	that	the	kinds	of	struggles	that	are	obvious	in	that	fight	are	not	filtered	out	by	the	need	to	preserve	capitalist	growth	and	wealth	accumulation	and	to	obstruct	democratic	participation	in	the	economy.	Under	a	new	logic,	there	is	a	great	deal	more	political	space	for	more	ambitious	action.	And,	just	as	the	Leap	Manifesto	does,	the	project	I	describe	also	satisfies	the	condition	demanded	by	far-reaching	justice,	which	is	to	seek	viable	progressive	systemic	change	at	a	moment	when	the	climate	crisis	raises	serious	questions	about	the	validity	of	claims	to	justice	our	current	society	makes.	It	diverges	somewhat	from	the	Leap	Manifesto	in	clearly	grounding	itself	in	a	better-defined	political	philosophical	tradition	of	justice,	but	also	picks	up	a	thread	mentioned	therein	and	develops	it	to	show	how	it	offers	the	key	to	exiting	the	liberal	order.		The	project	also	addresses	the	three	problems	described	at	the	beginning	of	this	chapter	that	the	liberal	framework	for	addressing	climate	change	creates.	Fossil	
free	alienation	fades	as	a	UGI	and	reduced	work	hours	permit	workers	to	bargain	for	better	work	conditions	and	participate	in	economic	activity	they	find	valuable.	The	
global	Manhattan	(continued	commodity	hyper-consumption	in	the	post-carbon	era	
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which	leads	to	the	loss	of	nonhuman	natural	space	and	the	substitution	of	natural	processes)	is	blunted	by	a	turn	away	from	the	need	for	commodity	consumption	and	its	attendant	pressure	on	ecosystems.	The	solar-powered	invisible	hand	(i.e.,	the	relegation	of	so	large	a	part	of	the	climate	response	to	capitalist	market	forces)	loses	its	grip	to	the	degree	alternative	economic	priorities	can	reduce	the	legitimacy	of	capitalism.			Paradoxically,	even	though	this	third	front	is	probably	the	one	with	the	least	hope	of	seeing	victories	for	its	struggles—of	seeing	liberalism’s	hegemony	replaced—it	is	also	the	one	where	I	turn	to	find	the	most	hope.	In	the	recognition	that	another	and	more	just	society	is	conceivable,	even	possible,	we	find	a	bottomless	well	of	inspiration	for	new	ideas	(and	for	critique	of	tired	ones),	for	making	demands	uncompromised	by	false	pragmatism,	for	courage	to	fight	for	it	all.	It	is	this	third	front	that	addresses	the	proviso	of	far-reaching	climate	justice	I	discussed	in	the	introduction:	that	if	climate	change	is	signalling	the	presence	of	major	injustices	in	the	current	system,	then	that	system	should	be	replaced	with	something	more	just.	A	search	for	a	fairer	world	with	better	work	and	the	opportunities	to	develop	ourselves	at	the	same	time	that	we	address	climate	change	does	just	that.				
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VI.	Conclusion:	Three	Fronts	in	the	Struggle	for	Climate	
Justice		In	this	dissertation,	I	have	sought	to	look	into	the	meaning	of	climate	justice.	I	opened	by	observing	that	climate	justice	is	best	understood	as	a	moral	framework	allowing	us	(1)	to	understand	the	various	injustices	causing	or	engendered	by	climate	change	and	(2)	to	organize	responses	to	climate	change	addressing	those	injustices.	Its	first	facet	identifies	and	draws	attention	to	the	various	injustices	associated	with	climate	change	that	must	somehow	be	attended.	I	enumerated	15	groups	of	potential	climate	wrongs,	which,	because	of	their	diversity,	defy	attempts	to	comprehensively	define	climate	justice	via	this	first	facet	alone.			The	second	facet	of	climate	justice	is	the	one	that	I	explored	at	length	in	this	dissertation.	This	facet	organizes	responses	to	climate	change	concerned	with	addressing	or	preventing	those	climate	injustices	described	in	the	first	facet.	I	described	three	“fronts”	in	the	fight	for	climate	justice,	each	with	a	different	“site	of	contestation”:	climate	justice	as	climate	ethics	concerned	with	the	creation	of	a	just	global	agreement	governing	the	distribution	of	burdens	and	benefits	among	nations;	
the	climate	justice	of	the	climate	movement,	which	seeks	to	make	governing	elites	democratically	accountable	for	its	moral	demands;	and	climate	justice	as	just	society,	focused	on	the	ideological	grounds	of	society’s	political	and	economic	institutions.	Each	of	these	fronts	is	concerned	with—or	“activates”—different	combinations	of	injustices	of	that	first	facet.	(Tentatively,	I	proposed	a	way	to	map	out	a	relationship	between	the	two	facets.	Taking	into	account	the	three	fronts,	the	multiple	struggles	of	the	climate	movement,	and	the	moderate	and	radical	currents	contained	within	it,	we	discover	a	very	complex	theatre	of	climate	justice.)	What	ties	each	of	the	three	fronts	together,	beyond	striving	for	moral	responses	to	climate	change,	is	that	each	in	some	way	has	to	engage,	knowingly	or	not,	with	the	realm	of	possibility	for	climate	action	delimited	by	capitalism	and	
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liberal	representative	democracy,	the	economic	and	political	institutions	that,	in	political	philosophical	terms,	claim	to	realize	liberalism’s	core	ethic	of	permitting	individuals	to	pursue	their	good	life.	The	question	of	liberalism	thus	runs	throughout	the	dissertation.	While	the	primary	question	of	this	dissertation	is	What	
does	climate	justice	mean?,	a	secondary	question	is	How	has	liberalism	constrained	
moral	possibilities	in	the	response	to	climate	change?	Chapter	4	described	how	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy	work	together	to	create	a	system	of	filters	that	favour	a	narrow	range	of	climate	policies.			In	identifying	the	three	fronts,	I	also	observed	that	important	tasks	remain	to	be	addressed	on	each.	On	the	first	front,	climate	ethicists	engaging	with	climate	change	must	now	adapt	to	what	I	called	a	“mutation”	in	global	climate	politics	that	led	to	negotiations	diverging	significantly	from	the	kind	of	legally	binding	agreement	grounded	in	duties	of	justice	many	were	anticipating.	The	mutation	eliminates	an	agreement	structure	designed	to	incorporate	matters	of	justice—but	it	does	not	do	away	with	the	need	to	address	those	matters.	I	noted	in	chapter	2	that	this	is	what	philosopher	Dale	Jamieson	called	“the	wreckage	of	the	old	story.”	In	it,	climate	ethicists	must	find	new	means	of	theorizing	justice	in	a	global	climate	negotiation	system	characterized	by	voluntary	pledges	and	ratchet	mechanisms	based	on	the	“global	standing	and	reputation”	US	climate	negotiator	Todd	Stern	believed	would	suffice	to	drive	climate	action.	They	must	figure	out	how	vital	matters	of	justice	that	remain	unresolved—north-south	mitigation	and	adaptation	funding,	rapid	emissions	reductions	coordinated	to	keep	global	temperature	rise	low	enough	to	preserve	a	safe	climate,	and	so	on	all	in	accordance	with	well-considered	principles—can	still	be	addressed	in	this	new	regime.			On	the	second	front,	the	climate	movement	stands	at	an	interesting	moment.	It	gathered	tremendous	strength	particularly	after	COP15	in	2009	as	activists	observed	how,	instead	of	adopting	ambitious	climate	policy,	governments	were	actively	promoting	some	of	the	most	destructive	fossil	fuel	projects	on	earth.	The	movement’s	moderate	and	radical	currents	became	united	in	some	initial	struggles	
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essential	for	any	climate	response:	mass	marches,	blockades,	and	divestment.	Stitched	together	in	this	way,	the	climate	movement	became	the	strongest	it	has	ever	been,	using	these	actions	to	press	its	complex	moral	demands	for	accountability—addressing	gender	and	racial	inequality,	recognizing	Indigenous	land	rights,	creating	good	jobs,	increasing	democratic	control	of	the	economy,	and	so	on.	But	the	movement	must	deal	with	a	problem	created	by	the	liberal	order—that	of	“friction,”	which	requires	that	demands	be	made	in	terms	that	register	within	and	can	be	resolved	through	the	logic	of	capitalism	and	liberal	democracy.	Friction	is	highest	for	demands	with	few	specifications,	captured	in	highly	interpretable	calls	for	“climate	action.”	The	need	for	friction	makes	the	movement’s	complex	and	differentiated	moral	demands	susceptible	to	being	translated	and	flattened	by	governments	to	a	choice	between	a	narrow	set	of	market	mechanisms,	chiefly	carbon	taxes	and	emissions	trading,	to	meet	an	unambitious	set	of	climate	policy	objectives.	Compared	to	that	2009	moment,	the	adoption	of	even	just	these	market	policies	might	satisfy	the	more	moderate	current	of	the	movement,	but	not	the	radical	stream,	and	that	could	risk	pulling	the	movement	apart	where	it	was	once	stitched	together	and	strengthened	by	the	need	to	act	in	a	time	of	widespread	government	inaction.	Movement	activists	will	need	to	find	ways	of	maintaining	a	strong	climate	movement	that	can	continue	the	fight	for	those	complex	moral	demands	even	as	that	narrow	array	of	climate	action	enters	more	and	more	into	the	policy	landscape	and	eases	concerns	about	climate	inaction	that	had	done	so	much	to	power	the	movement.		Even	if	successful,	flattened	to	narrow	market	mechanisms,	liberal	climate	policy	would	not	threaten	the	current	status	quo,	but,	would	carry	it	into	a	post-carbon	future.	I	suggested	reasons	to	be	wary	that	such	a	program	might	be	sufficient	to	avoid	catastrophic	warming	(as	mentioned	in	chapter	2,	government	pledges	under	the	Paris	climate	agreement	bring	global	warming	to	a	devastating	3.5˚C	by	2100	if	not	improved	upon,	and	some	countries,	like	Canada,	are	off	track	to	meet	even	these	pledges),	but	even	if	it	were,	it	risks	creating	a	world	characterized	
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by	three	potential	problems,	which	I	called	Fossil-Free	Alienation,	the	Solar-Powered	
Invisible	Hand,	and	the	Global	Manhattan.		We	thus	turn	to	our	third	and	final	front	in	the	struggle	for	climate	justice.	If	the	struggles	for	climate	justice	both	of	climate	ethicists	and	of	the	climate	movement	are	waged	in	a	realm	of	possibility	constrained	by	the	imperatives	of	liberalism,	then	justice	might	demand	a	change	in	the	very	ideological	foundation	of	our	society	and	the	function	of	our	political	and	economic	institutions.	This	is	perhaps	the	most	difficult	task	of	all,	and	so	I	explored	several	ways	of	going	about	it.	Two	alternative	frameworks	for	responding	to	climate	change,	degrowth	and	the	eco-left,	give	a	sense	of	how	we	might	depart	from	liberalism’s	logic;	they	are	thus	landmarks	on	the	horizon	to	reorient	towards.	A	project	like	the	Leap	Manifesto	gives	a	sense	of	how	we	might	move	towards	an	eco-left	destination.	Specifying	an	array	of	policy	demands	that	would	turn	away	from	liberalism’s	most	extreme	form,	neoliberalism,	and	finding	key	strategic	windows	to	bring	them	into	the	mainstream	(like	an	NDP	seeking	to	restore	progressive	credentials)	offers	an	avenue	for	popular	movements	that	avoids	some	of	the	problems	of	friction.	Leap	is,	however,	a	bit	light	on	exactly	what	the	political	philosophical	core	of	its	just	society	is,	a	matter	that	can	create	some	confusion	about	the	nature	and	extent	of	the	change	it	demands.	But	in	its	concern	for	control	over	time,	greater	income	through	better	work,	and	the	human	“flourishing”	it	refers	to,	it	possesses	an	important	thread	that	intersects	with	some	of	my	thinking	about	how	to	achieve	degrowth.	There	are	a	series	of	changes	that,	although	consistent	with	liberalism	or	serving	its	institutions’	logic,	could	“jump	track”	in	their	functions	and	work	together	to	rewire	the	liberal	order	from	within.	I	argued	that	recasting	the	search	for	a	good	society	from	the	point	of	view	of	capabilities	offers	a	way	to	disrupt	liberalism’s	claims	and	to	simultaneously	point	the	way	to	a	society	that	is	not	only	more	just	but	better	able	to	respond	to	the	climate	crisis	because	it	will	have	begun	to	be	relieved	of	capitalism’s	growth	imperative.	
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There	is	one	final	way	the	three	fronts	of	climate	justice	relate	to	one	another:	victories	won	in	one	front	increase	the	possibility	for	victories	in	another.	They	are	synergistic.	Changing	the	ideological	foundation	that	defines	the	society	our	institutions	are	meant	to	realize	broadens	the	political	space	the	climate	movement	can	make	its	demands	in.	If	the	climate	movement	can	win	its	struggles,	states	would	commit	to	more	ambitious	climate	duties	as	part	of	a	binding	agreement	under	the	UNFCCC	system	that	more	closely	resemble	the	models	for	a	just	global	arrangement	climate	ethicists	have	envisioned.	In	this	sense,	the	three	different	kinds	of	climate	justice	are	not	separate,	but	intertwined	in	addressing	the	most	important	crisis	of	our	time	because	how	we	respond	to	the	climate	crisis	will	determine	the	nature	of	the	world	we	and	future	generations	will	live	in.	If	we	are	concerned	that	that	world	is	the	most	just	one	possible,	it	is	the	struggle	for	climate	justice	that	we	must	seek	to	understand,	in	all	its	facets,	and	to	advance,	on	all	its	fronts.				 			
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